THE EVOLUTION OF INDO-MUSLIM THOUGHT AFTER 1857

DR. L. S. MAY

SH. MUHAMMAD ASHRAF
KASHMIRI BAZAR · LAHORE (PAKISTAN)

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TO
MY PARENTS

This commonplace world—you may call a fleeting picture ;
All that happens in the universe—you may deem an idle tale—
But :—when you set your purpose to any noble work,
Think every breath you draw the life eternal.

—Shiblī, Quatrain xxxii

PREFACE

This book which originally was my Dissertation for the Ph.D. in History of Religion (at Columbia University) is a study of the relationship between religion and politics in Islamic India (later, Pakistan). It attempts to tell how Indo-Muslim nationalism originated, its developmental course, and its ultimate ripening into Pakistan. Three major questions raised in it are: (1) Did the Mutiny of 1857 give birth to Indo-Muslim nationalism? (2) To what extent are the philosophico-legal foundations of the "Pakistan Movement" derived from Islamic and from foreign sources? (3) How was the nature of the State of Pakistan formulated? To answer these questions, an analysis of earlier political and other events, Islamic Modernism and educational principles is fundamental.

Some technical observations are: (1) many primary sources have been consulted; (2) the word "Community" refers to the Islamic world at large, the term "community" denotes particularly India's Muslims; (3) so usually does "Indian Islam" which, where specified, means the Sunnite branch; (4) the Appendices contain some speeches, political and other facts pertinent to this inquiry. The Chapter (IV) on the Aḥmadīyyah Movement had been presented earlier;[1] that (VI) on Muḥammad Iqbāl had been published previously and reappears in a slightly revised form.[2]

It is hoped that the analysis presented here may contribute to a greater historical perspective. I do not presume it to be either complete or definitive, but I assert that objectivity ruled in presenting "the truth of testimony". Any conclusion(s) to which the quoted records may point has (have) been corroborated by consulting as many different sources as possible and has (have) been reached after careful consideration of and reflection upon the circumstances giving rise to the events narrated.

This work could not have been written without the invalubale training given to me by my many teachers. I wish to mention especially Professor I. H. Qureshi, at present Vice-Chancellor of Karachi University, formerly Pakistan's Education Minister and, for some years, Visiting Professor at

1. It was submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Certificate granted by Columbia University's Near and Middle East Institute in May 1959. It is based on Mr H. A. Walter's *The Ahmadiya Movement*, Calcutta: Association Press, 1918; Aḥmadīyyah books and pamphlets; and a personal interview with one of its former representatives in New York City: Mr A. Q. Zaighun.

2. Chapter VI was published in the Journal *Iqbal*, Bazm-i-Iqbal, Vol. VI, No. 3 (January 1958), pp. 28-60.

Columbia University, and the late Professor A. Jeffery, Chairman of Columbia's Oriental Studies Department upon his death. Their respective lectures on the political and cultural history of the Islamic world and on Pakistan's origins and development have served as a necessary foundation for this inquiry. Their guidance and encouragement have been inestimable.

I also wish to thank particularly the publishing firm of Sh. Muhammad Ashraf in Lahore, Pakistan ; also E.J. Brill in Leyden, Holland ; Orient in Paris, France, as well as many private Pakistanis, including Messrs M. Hamid,[3] G.A. Parwez (of Lahore), and A.Q. Zaighun for supplying me with books and other materials. My gratitude is expressed equally to Mr F. Paar, librarian at the Oriental Division of the Public Library, New York City, for assisting me indefatigably in the search for necessary documents.

Last, but not least, I am deeply indebted to Mr Muhammad Ashraf Darr (until recently Secretary of the Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore) for his editorial assistance and for seeing the entire work through the press.

The international co-operation which I have received not only made the writing of this book possible, but is most heartening in a world rent asunder by disputes among men.

(Dr) L. S. May

New York City
June 1970

1. Formerly Cultural Attachs at the Pakistan Mission to the United Nations in New Yark City.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE PRINCIPAL CAUSES OF THE MUTINY

Few events in India's history jut out as prominently as the Sepoy[1] Uprising of 1857. Its origin, its causes, its nature have preoccupied many historians until the present day. Their conclusions do not always concur, due partly to the complexity and partly to the personal readings of this rebellion.

When did the Mutiny begin ? According to official consensus, it began on 10 May 1857,[2] when the first European[3] lost his life in it. However, on 29 March 1857, its opening shot was fired:

> The quarter-guard of the 34th Native Infantry . . . nearly all high-caste Brahmins—is drawn up in regular order. . . . Some thirty yards in front of the line of the 34th swaggers to and fro a Sepoy drunk with religious fanaticism. [Strutting back and forth, the] six-foot sepoy, [holding a loaded musket, shouts] in shrill and nasal monotone, "Come out, you blackguards ! Turn out, all of you ! The English are upon us. Through biting these cartridges we shall all be made infidels." [Other Sepoys gather in an ever-larger crowd around him as they come off duty. The excitement increases.] A human powder magazine . . . is about to explode.[4]

Can it be said, then, that this signalled the Mutiny's initial moment ? India's soldiery had, in fact, rebelled as early as 1806 :

> "On that occasion a new head dress had been introduced which offended the sepoys, partly by its resemblance to the European hat and partly from the belief that hog's skin was employed in the manufacture of the cockade. Political disaffection too had its share in the revolt."[5]

Was it the first rumbling of the Great Rebellion of 1857 ?

"That the movement of 1857 had been developing steadily for the past 50 years and could be traced back to the Battle of Plassey with a chain of outbreaks in 1806, 1824, 1844, 1849 and with concentrated effect from the beginning of 1857 is the opinion of Arthur Magnin."[6]

The thesis expressed is that the victory gained by East India Company[7] forces at Plassey (in 1757),[8] opening the road to British political supremacy, at first in Bengal, and subsequently throughout India, produced resentment which intensified in the course of a century and burst forth in the Mutiny. This thesis appears substantiated by the following statement :

> "The English obtained Bengal simply as the Chief Revenue Officer of the Dehli Emperor. Instead of buying the appointment by a fat bribe, we won it by the sword. But our legal title was simply that of the Emperor's

Dīwān or Chief Revenue Officer." [Subsequently] "we usurped the functions of those" formerly in charge of the administration.[9]

It could not have happened unless the British had been successful at Plassey. The build-up of tension which in the course of time might explode was foreseen decades before the Mutiny :

> . . . The native troops are the only body of natives who are always mixed with Europeans, and they will, therefore, be the first to learn the doctrines, circulated among them by the newspapers; for, as these doctrines will become the frequent subject of discussion among the European officers, it will not be long before they are known to the native officers and troops. . . . They will learn to compare their own low allowance and humble rank with those of their European officers, to examine the ground on which the wide difference rests . . . and to believe that it is their duty to shake off a foreign yoke and to secure for themselves the honours and emoluments which their country yields. . . .[10]

It, therefore, may be said that the seeds of the Great Rebellion were sown at Plassey.

When did this Rebellion end ? The last shots were exchanged on 19 September 1857.[11] With the hoisting of the British flag over the Delhi palace on 20 September next year, it drew formally to a close.

What were the chief causes of the Great Rebellion ? According to Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān,[12] the main cause was political ; namely, the "non-admission of natives into the Legislative Council of India. . . ."[13] He did not mention, probably because he was pro-British, that the Great Rebellion perhaps expressed a reaction against British expansionism. It occurred only forty years after the last Maratha attack[14] was repelled by the British and eight years since the Sikhs surrendered to them.[15] The memories of defeat suffered by the Muslim ruling classes as well as the Hindus, undoubtedly still vivid in 1857, were intensified by Lord Dalhousie's decision to annex the last, at least theoretically, sovereign kingdom of Oudh (Avadh).[16] Its Nawāb Wājid 'Alī Shāh, was deposed. The British appropriated about 3500 *jāgirs* belonging to Hindu *taluqdars* (holders of respective groups of villages who had the right to a cash balance after payment of revenue due to the Government) and *zemindars* (landowners). They relocated about 15,000 of the 60,000 soldiers, who had lost their income, in police or local regiments or the State's administration, giving the rest inadequate allowances.[17] Such policies created "a general feeling of discontent amongst a very numerous and powerful class of our subjects,"[18] comprising the ruling class, the land-holders and the soldiery, many of whom invested their wages, after completion of service, in a small parcel of land.

The King of Oudh, his prime minister, 'Alī Naqī Khān and some other advisers, having settled in Calcutta in April 1856, began to plot the overthrow of the British. His agents sowed seeds of distrust among the military

and the civilian population.

"An alliance was at the same time entered into with the King of Delhi" and they decided together to plan a general insurrection "throughout the Bengal Presidency, from Calcutta to Peshawur. . . ."[19] The substance of the royal message was that the natives were the original landowners, their rights had been taken away from them by the British who also would subvert their religion. This occurred under Lord Canning who succeeded Lord Dalhousie early in 1856. On his arrival, the members of the Government of India included a Colonel Birch, its Secretary, portrayed as an "ignoramus," General Low, "wanting in eloquence" and, hence, unable to support his views, and the Home Secretary, Mr Beadon, whose only motto was: "India for the Civil Service," and who is said to have hated all individual entrepreneurs and closed India to them. Lord Canning, himself, is described by one of his own countrymen as a "weak and vacillating" man of "mediocre" qualities.[20] The consequences of his and his group's insensibilities to the realities of Indian customs and thought were the bloodbath of 1857.

Mismanagement of the Army and its consequent disaffection fall under Sir Sayyid's military classification. But he did not specifically state the nature of this maladministration and thus did not relate it overtly to religion. Involved was the cartridge affair, regarded by many as the military and sole cause of the Mutiny. The underlying reason for this view is that the Uprising was sparked by the soldiery. Sir John Lawrence, the Punjab's Governor during the Mutiny, wrote: " 'It is . . . my belief that the cartridge question was the immediate cause of the Mutiny.' "[21] A later historian agreed with him: " '. . . recent researches have fully proved that the real as well as the ostensible cause of the Mutiny was the greased cartridges.' " This was a " 'shameful and terrible fact. . . . If mutiny was ever justifiable, no stronger justification could be given than that of the Sepoy troops.' "[22]

Why did this and other Englishmen so severely indict their countrymen by admitting that the sepoys had every right to feel suspicious and even to rebel? Certain Indian regiments, comprising a Hindu majority and some Muslims,[23] had become excited at the beginning of 1857[24] about rumours that they would have to handle cartridges greased with pig or cow fat.[25] In doing so, they would have transgressed the dictates of their respective faiths, as Hinduism, exalting the cow, forbids its slaughter, and Islam regards the pig as unclean. Were these rumours based on fact? They were, as is evident from an official document, issued after an inquiry into this matter had been made: " 'tallow, used, had been supplied by a contractor . . . ; it was ascertained that no sufficient precautions had been taken in the arsenal to ensure the absence from it of all matter which might be objectionable to the sepoys' " By ordering them, Colonel Birch violated, as stated, the dictates of Islam and Hinduism. While " 'ready-made ammunitions

ceased to be sent from England, loose balls and cartridge papers, however, continued to be furnished from that country.' "[26] Consequently, the sepoys refused to handle the cartridges.

When once, however, the suspicions of the Sepoys were, rightly or wrongly, aroused, it was impossible to smoothe them. The men were told that they might grease the cartridges themselves, but the paper in which the new cartridges were wrapped had now, to alarmed Sepoy eyes, a suspiciously greasy look, and the men refused to handle it.[27]

Malleson censured Colonel Birch :

For a man occupying the position of Military Secretary to the Government of India to make so great a blunder was unpardonable. Equally so that, when the mistake was discovered, no disavowal was made by the Government for four months, and then only in consequence of the outbreak at Meerut : well aware that the idea had taken possession of the Sepoys' minds, Colonel Birch made no attempt to counteract it, gave no intimation that the manufacture of greased cartridges had been stopped. He calmly surveyed the mischief his acts had caused, and—did nothing. Yet this man, whose blundering incapacity caused the revolt, is still Secretary to the Government of India in the military department ! [28]

The reason for the sepoys' opposition has been indicated : they did not wish to break the rules imposed by their religion. The delay in disavowing the "blunder," confirmed by other than contemporary sources,[29] resulted in the soldiery's obstinacy. Their fear of a Christian conspiracy against their faiths, played upon by the King of Oudh who sent out agents to the regiments, was strengthened by Colonel Birch.

"In the absence of tangible evidence on the subject, it had been difficult to convince the Hindoo sepoys that their religion was actually in danger, and without satisfactory proof on that point, they were unwilling to rise against the Government. In fact the plot was beginning to languish, when, at this juncture, the combined ignorance and folly of Colonel Birch gave the King of Oudh the very opportunity he had been seeking for in vain."[30]

Although the Enfield affair was strictly a military matter, its underlying motif was religious anxiety. The sepoys' irritation was stimulated further by missionary activities carried on by high Army officers as well as private British individuals While the zealous endeavours of the former group directly preceded the Mutiny, they grew out of the pertinent permissive attitude of earlier Government officials. "The right of unrestricted entry of Christian missionaries to India was conceded by the Charter of 1813." [31] On this issue, Sir Sayyid wrote :

In the year 1837, the year of great drought, the step which was taken of rearing orphans in the principles of the Christian faith was looked upon through the North-West Provinces as an example of the schemes of Government. It was supposed that when Government had similarly brought all

Hindustanees to a pitch of ignorance and poverty, it would convert them to its own creed.[32]

British inability to probe or insensitivity to the profound feelings of India's people on the subject of religion resulted in one irritation after another.

"By an Act passed in 1850 the principle already laid down in a Bengal Regulation of 1832 that change of religion should not involve loss of property or civil rights was extended to the whole of the territories subject to the British Government of India." The Act set aside "the religious and civil laws . . . and shielded the converts to Christianity, as far as law could shield them, against temporal ill-consequences from their change of faith." The Act was highly unpopular, as it was . . . an encouragement to proselytism".[33]

The missionary activities, carried on vigorously in most parts of India,[34] and extending into the domains of publication and education, did not allay the suspicion and fear among Indians that the British were engaged in a programme of Christianisation. The range of missionary work is clear also from the following statement :

According to the "Revised Statistics of Missions in India and Ceylon" . . . there were in India and Ceylon at the beginning of 1852, 22 missionary societies, 313 missionary stations, 443 missionaries (of whom 48 were ordained natives), 698 Native Catechists and 331 native churches accommodating 1,841 communicants. The native Christians numbered 112,191. The missionaries maintained 1347 Vernacular schools, 93 Boarding schools and 126 English schools for native boys. The numbers of boys reading in those schools were 47,504, 2,414 and 14,562 respectively in the pre-Mutiny days. For the spread of female education the missionaries established 347 Day schools, and 102 Boarding schools for the native girls. Girls taught in those schools in the pre-Mutiny days numbered 11,519 and 2,779 respectively. Both the boys and girls were encouraged to study English. . . . For the wide circulation of missionary teachings the missionaries maintained 25 printing establishments.[35]

The education of girls, too, was opposed by Indian conservatives. "The activities of the missionaries for the spread of education among native boys and girls and for preaching Christianity to the native population produced not a little discontent and disaffection in the country."[36]

Sir Sayyid's comment on this problem is illuminating. " 'When the village schools were established, the general belief was that they were instituted solely with the view of teaching the doctrine of Jesus. . . . Their sole idea was, that these were Christian schools, established with the view of converting them.' "[37] Indeed, " 'men said it was by the order of Government' " that such schools were founded.[38]

The discontent created by the missionaries among the civil population, which increasingly believed that the Government deliberately aimed at converting it entirely, was shared by the sepoys. Among them, too, high Army officers were preaching Christian doctrine. As an example, Colonel S.G.

Wheeler may be cited. Pressed by his superiors for an account, he confessed his guilt:

"As to the question whether I have endeavoured to convert sepoys and others to Christianity I would humbly reply that this has been my object, and I conceive, is the aim and end of every Christian who speaks the word of God to another. . . . Such, I feel confident, would be the feelings of every commanding officer, being an experienced Christian."[39]

The Colonel was not the only Army officer of rank to follow the promptings of his conscience; many must have done likewise. The censure he received came too late. His confession proves also that the sepoys were justified in fearing for their respective faiths.

In summary, the primary[40] causes of the Mutiny appear to have been political (expansionism with its attendant evils), military (the cartridge affair) and religious (fear of Christianisation, which, as noted, also caused sepoy opposition).

The question now arises as to whether the Mutiny, which burst into the Great Rebellion, was *essentially* military, political or religious in nature. It erupted soon after the two 1856 Acts[41]—and the cartridges containing objectionable grease elements[42]—all of which hurt Indian religious sentiments, were introduced. "But a fanatical belief on the part of the Sepoys that these particular cartridges concealed in their greasy folds a dark design against their religion was undoubtedly the immediate occasion of the Great Mutiny."[43] Three proclamations issued during the Mutiny: one by the sepoys in reply to East India Company promises to eradicate all causes of discontent, and two by Bahādur Shāh II, illuminate this problem.[44] They seem to indicate that the Mutiny was neither military nor even political in nature for the reason that the Mughal Emperor was concerned chiefly with Islam's defence, which is a Muslim leader's primary duty. The soldiery regarded him not only as the symbol of Indian freedom, but also as the protector of religious liberty, which explains why they rallied about the Mughal throne.

The authorities, themselves, acknowledged a deeper motive, viz. the sepoys' religious anxiety, behind the cartridge affair. This is clear from the following extract of a meeting held by the Committee of the Mahomedan Assoccation on 27 May 1857:

Resolved.—That this Committee learn from the proclamation promulgated by Government on the 16th May 1857, and published in the *Gazettes* and newspapers of the day, that the cause of the present mutiny may be traced to an unfounded report maliciously spread by ill-disposed men of a contemplated interference on the part of the Government with the religious rites, ceremonies, and persuasions of the natives of this country. . . . "[45]

Queen Victoria's promise, made in 1856, assuring the Indians of non-governmental interference with their faiths, is a royal testimony to the

failure of the authorities in convincing the soldiery to the contrary and, therefore, to prevent the outburst. The conclusion, presented here, is that religious anxiety was the major cause of the Mutiny. The contention that other causes contributed to it is not invalid ; however, the contemporary records seem to prove that the fear of interference with their faiths sparked the fire of the revolt. The disparity between this and Sir Sayyid's view is on the emphasis given religion, which he considered a secondary rather than a primary motif. He may not have wished to stress it, because of the then current dispute between the Muslims and the British authorities who insisted on the former's duty to wage a Holy War against their Christian overlords.[46]

The Mutiny affected a number of regiments as well as segments among India's population and, hence, is said to have set off the Great Rebellion. Was it national in scope ?

The outbreak of 1857 was purely a military movement, and there was in it no dynamic and no directing force of patriotism which alone could make it a national movement. The question of patriotism could not arise in the case of Indians who for the past 600 years have had no national fatherland of their own. They had had no ties of common interest since they had been divided and split up, each community being indifferent to the sufferings of the other.[47]

This thesis taking into account the many divisions among India's population repudiates the view that the Mutiny led to a national political outburst. It is not shared by Sir John Lawrence. "That which was in the first instance a mere desire to resist an infringement of their religion speedily extended into a great political movement."[48] Another witness tends to agree with him. This is what Malleson had to say on the subject :

They knew our skill ; they witnessed the constant scientific improvements evinced in railways, electric telegraphs, etc., and they dreaded lest some morning they should awake and find themselves, owing to some unaccountable ingenuity on our part, deprived of their religion and caste.[49]

A Bengali, named Kishori Chand Mitra, wrote to the contrary in 1858 : " 'The insurrection is essentially a military insurrection. . . . It has nothing of the popular element in it.' "[50] An Englishman agreed with him :

If John Lawrence had to disband or suppress 36,000 mutinous Sepoys in the Punjab, he was able to enlist from Goorkhas and Sikhs and the wild tribes on the Afghan borders more than another 36,000 to take their place. . . . At the time of the Mutiny there were 38,000 British soldiers in a population of 180,000,000. If the Mutiny had been indeed a "national" uprising, what chances of survival would the handful of British have had ?[51]

On the other hand, his countryman Malleson wrote again :

In the beginning of June, it had been brought to the notice of the Governor-General that the native newspapers were primed with incendiary articles, abetting and encouraging the insurrection. . . . The native news-

papers were the organs of the enemy; they disseminated treason throughout the country; they were read by all natives who could read; they advocated the cause of the King of Delhi. . . .[52]

It is true that the sepoys rallied around ths Mughal throne, considered the symbol of national resistance to foreign imposition, and that Bahādur Shāh II, himself, advocated their cause by virtue of his position as India's Emperor. The sources cited show, however, that even at that time Indians as well as Europeans were split on the question whether or not the 1857 Uprising could be seen as a national revolt. Who was right? To answer this question, it is necessary to examine its spread among India's military and civil population as well as the extent to which Hindus and Muslims participated in the Rebellion.

(1) *The Range of the Revolt among India's Military.* Prior to the Mutiny, India had three principal military groupings: the Bengal, Madras and Bombay Armies.

"The name, 'Bengal Army,' was somewhat of a misnomer, for Bengal had little or nothing to do with the personnel of the Army, and the sepoys of the Bengal Army were chiefly high-caste Hindus (mainly Brahmans and Rajputs), the Jats of Upper India, and sturdy Pathans, also of the same part of the country. The dominant elements, forming a majority, belonged to the State now known as Uttar Pradesh, specially Avadh, which, until 1856, was an independent kingdom, at least in name and form."[53]

That its recruits were mainly high-caste Hindus drawn from one region, is affirmed by Malleson, who wrote:

We will suppose that one company is composed of 20 Mahomedans, 40 Brahmins, and 40 Rajpoots and low-caste Hindoos. The influence of the Brahmins over the 80 Hindoos is paramount, and the Mahomedans being a small minority would not contest the palm with them. The whole company may, therefore, be said to be under Brahminical influence.

Consequently, the men of a Bengal regiment, though nominally subject to the British Crown, are really under the orders and control of a Brahminical clique, formed in each regiment. . . .[54]

Elsewhere, he stated that Oudh furnished the "men of whom the Cavalry regiments were chiefly composed, and who supplied at least two hundred bayonets to each regiment of Native Infantry." From the king of Oudh's "territorities, our army was almost entirely recruited". After completion of their military service, Hindu and Muslim sepoys alike would return to Oudh and invest small fortune in land.[55]

The proportion in the Bengal Army was that of twenty-four Indians to one European. It was this army that revolted. The Madras Army consisted of Telegus, Tamils, low castes and Muslims from the Madras Presidency, who came from India's "deep south"; the ratio between its Indian and European soldiery was 16 to 1; the Bombay Army was entirely heterogene-

ous as it was formed of Hindus and Muslims of Upper India and the Bombay Presidency's southern districts, of all castes and races as well as tribes from Central Asia, and its percentage of Indians to Europeans was 9 to 1.[56] These statistics show that the Europeans were far more numerous in the Bombay and Madras Armies than in the Bengal Army.

The Bombay and Madras Armies had been indiscriminately composed of Hindus, Muhammadans, Jews and of Christians too. Because of such discordant and heterogeneous materials entering into the composition of the two Armies chances of united action for Mutiny were invariably eliminated....

The loyalty of the two Southern Armies was due also to the presence of a certain percentage of Christians in the ranks. The presence of Christians in the regiments of the Bombay and Madras Armies proved a deterrent to the secret combination of the sepoys for maturing plans of conspiracy against Government. The loyalty of the southern Armies was no less due to the fact that these were not so much caste-conscious as the Bengal Army was....[57]

The presence in the Madras and Bombay Armies of larger numbers of British (loyal to the Government) and Central Asian Muslims (neutral to the authorities as they were probably freebooters) were significant reasons why those Armies did not participate in the Mutiny, although some of their regiments were infected and revolted.[58] The following summary account not only will serve to show the growth of the rebellious spirit, but to make some deductions derived from the nature of the situation.

At Barrackpore, sixteen miles distant from Calcutta, were stationed "the 2nd Grenadiers, the 34th Native Infantry, the 43rd Light Infantry, and the 70th Native Infantry. Between Calcutta and Dinapore, an extent of 400 miles in length and enormous breadth, there was but one European regiment, the 53rd Foot. Half of this garrisoned Fort William, the other half was stationed at Dumdum, about seven miles from Calcutta."[59] The excitement after the discovery of the nature of the grease began as early as 22 January 1857, a few weeks after the training programme in the new rifles had begun. The sepoys attached to the Dumdum depot openly manifested their discontent on 23 January; the next day, the Barrackpore telegraph station was set afire.

"But although the eyes of our Government were blinded, those of the King of Oudh and his agents were wide open to the importance of the occasion. The minds of the Sepoys at Barrackpore were hourly worked upon, and with such effect, that letters were despatched in shoals to every regiment in the service, giving full details, often amplified and exaggerated, of the cartridge business. Agents were also despatched, well supplied with money, to every station in India; these men were directed to prepare the native army for an immediate rise, and to adopt every possible means to

bring about the revolt without the cognizance of the authorities."[60]

By the end of February no official explanation having been given to allay the sepoy's fear, the Cawnpore Troops were in a state of ferment. The spark of ignition occurred at Berhampore, about 120 miles from Calcutta, where "a small guard of the 34th Regiment N.I." having arrived there on 24 February, told their hosts, members of the 19th Regiment N.I., about the cartridge affair.[61] The following night, the 19th mutinied; it was disbanded on the 26th. Calcutta received this news on 4 March. Only then did the British Government[62] begin to take measures. Dissatisfaction spread to the Ambala (Umbala) depot, then an important military station about 120 miles north of Delhi, on 26 March and thence to the 2nd and 34th Regiments N. I., stationed at Barrackpore. The defiant spirit grew in the 34th and one of its members fired the shot which signalled the beginning of the Great Mutiny. The date was 29 March 1857.[63]

The 34th was not disbanded until 6 May, when the hope that it would quiet down had vanished. By this date, only two mutineering regiments, the 19th and the 34th N.I., had been dissolved. The disaffection, however, had spread from Barrackpore to Oudh's main city, Lucknow (4 May) and, thence, to Meerut (10 May). General Hewitt, in charge at Meerut, was unable to prevent the outbreak among those troops under his command. The news now flashed across the land: " 'The Bengal Army has revolted!' "[64] The mutineers marched from Meerut to Delhi capturing India's capital (11 May), which they held until its reconquest by the British (19 September 1857). They stormed the palace and proclaimed the restoration of the Mughal dynasty. Delhi's fifty-member European Christian community was massacred. By 29 May large areas had become disaffected. However, let us first continue with the military narrative. "On the 3rd, 4th, and 5th" of June, the troops stationed "at Azimgurh, Benares, Allahabad, and Cawnpore rose in revolt."[65] In Benares, whose population was estimated by Malleson "at 300,000 of whom four-fifths are Hindoos," were stationed the 37th Regiment N.I., "the Sikh Regiment of Loodhiana, an irregular Cavalry regiment, and half a company of European artillery, or about thirty men."[66] "News of the rebellious 17th N.I. at sixty-mile distant Azimgurh had reached Benares' British officialdom on June 4th and they now feared for a mutiny among the 37th. That same evening, Lt. Col. Neill, commander of the Madras Fusilliers, had the 37th parade and encircled by the Fusilliers, then directed [the 37th] to place their muskets in the bells of arms appointed to receive them: some obeyed." Suddenly, a shot was fired at the brigade-major, Captain Dodgson.

"The sound of that pistol-shot had not yet been borne away on the winds, when the Sikhs, hitherto standing firm, brought up their muskets to the shoulders, and opened an indiscriminate fire on their own officers and the Europeans. Our guns, which, up to this time, had been blazing away at the

37th, then turned upon the Sikhs; these latter dashed forward to charge them, but were repulsed and broken. The Irregular Cavalry, most of whom had joined the mutineers, were also put to flight and dispersed, The 37th likewise fled in terror and confusion."[67]

By June, 600-700 members of the 13th Regiment N. I., who hitherto had remained loyal, mutinied. The 6th was stationed at Allahabad, which contained the British arsenal, together with "a battery of Native Infantry, and five companies of the regiment of Ferozpore (Sikhs)."[68] Impressed by news from Delhi and Meerut, which had reached them on 14 May, they rebelled on 6 June, but were disarmed with the aid of the Sikhs, whose commander held the latter in line. It took long and hard fighting to control and subdue the Great Mutiny. "Such was the battle at Cawnpore, in which 1000 British troops and 300 Sikh . . . without cavalry, and with one artillery of inferior weight, defected 5000 native troops, armed and trained by our own officers."[69]

What does this account indicate? *First*, the Brahmins, forming a determined opposition to British policies, were predominant in the Bengal Army. *Second*, the majority of its recruits being drawn from Oudh deeply resented its annexation by the British. *Third*, the attempts at inciting the troops by the King of Oudh and his Agents, in association apparently with India's ruler, may have helped to inflame hurt feelings. *Fourth*, not all of the Bengal Army's sepoys mutinied, but as time went by, the majority did and, furthermore, the rebellious spirit affected some regiments in the other two armies. *Fifth*, the scarcity of the Europeans in the Bengal Army, following the theory that their greater numbers in the other two acted as a deterrent. *Sixth*, the disaffection also spread to certain Sikh regiments; had it not been for their cool leaders, they, too, might have participated in the Great Mutiny. *Seventh*, the energetic attempt of some colonels and other high-placed Army officers to prevent the rebellion in the regiments under their immediate command, failed. *Eighth* and last, Government delayed action in dealing with the rebels.

Two major themes are interwoven in the many accounts; one pertaining to the central leadership, held by Bahādur Shāh and the stated effort by Oudh's deposed ruler to link regional to imperial opposition; the other, referring to the extent of the disaffection among the military, to show that the Mutiny, although it affected some other regiments, was limited to those constituting the Bengal Army. The first would point in the direction of a national enterprise in guiding the rebellious spirit; the second would contradict such a thesis. Is this the reason for the disagreement among the witnesses of the events? The subject is not exhausted, so that no conclusions can be presented, without looking at the civilian participation in the 1857 Uprising.

(2) *The Sepoys and India's Population*. The discussion under this heading will cover the relation between India's military and civilian population and the extent to which the latter sympathised and participated in the 1857 Uprising.

The sepoys, estimated at 131,374 by 1857, were recruited from the Indian population, totalling then about 180 million. Upon completion of their military service, they again became civilians. Between the 1750's and 1850's, five generations had served and returned to their homes. They and their families were affected by the many Acts and policies executed by the British. The Emperor had become an empty symbol of India's sovereignty, and was unable to prevent interference with age-old religio-social traditions. It must be remembered, therefore, that the sepoys, recruited from the civil ranks, bore within them smouldering embers of resentment. The cartridge affair may be likened to the coal feeding the fire. It is true that it flared up first among the military, but by 29 May 1857, it had spread to a large segment among the population of North-West and Central India.

In almost the whole of the then North-Western provinces,[70] in Bundelkhand,[71] Oudh,[72] the Saugor and the Narbada territories,[73] in West Bihar and Chotanagpur,[74] the Mutiny wore the appearance of a popular revolt. Those areas had been scenes of risings of the sepoys and people alike. . . . Various social reforms, introduced by Government, caused much agitation in the North-Western provinces, where the majority of the population was commanded by the Hindus. Again, the so-called Bengal Army, which was the soul of military opposition to Government during the Mutiny was composed of men, belonging largely to the agricultural class of the North-Western provinces. The agitation of the Bengal Army accordingly found its spontaneous and sympathetic echo among the civil population of that region.[75]

Most of the localities in these provinces and States were apparently affected. This was the case not solely in west Bihar. "In fact, almost the whole of Bihar then rose in arms against the British."[76] The reasons were that it bordered on the rebellious North-Western provinces and "was one of the centres of recruitment of the sepoys of the Bengal Army."[77] Patna, 380 miles northwest of Calcutta and then inhabited by about 300,000, "a large proportion of whom are Muhammadans," was under Commissioner William Tayler's command. Had it not been for his control of the affairs and the arrival of Sikh troops (on 4 July 1857), this city also would have joined the revolt. The residents apparently also were "disaffected".[78]

In Rajputana,[79] the soldiery in the Princes' employ, unlike the rulers and nobles, revolted.

The districts under their independent chiefs were, however, as recorded by Prichard, "very much tainted with the spirit of revolt and hostiled, against the British Government, and had the siege of Delhi been protractity

it was exceedingly doubtful, if this feeling would not have manifested itself in a general rising of the people against their own sovereigns on account of their alliance with the British Government."[80]

The revolt of the Rajput population in such areas as Sahabad (situated in Bihar) ; Ghazipur, Cawnpore, the whole of Bithur (all located in the North-Western provinces) ; the (Rajput) villages in the Patna division and in Oudh reflected a widespread anti-British stand in these regions of India."[81]

In Sind also, the mutineers received little response from the population.[82] "Occasionally some fanatical Muhammadans attempted to unfurl the green flag to instigate the Muslim community to fight for Islam. Yet, on the whole, the people of Sind remained attached to Government."[83] The explanation given (by the authorities) was that the Sindhis were happy to be relieved from the tyranny of their *Amirs* and prospered under British rule.[84]

Could not the presence of Bombay Army Regiments and the 2nd European Infantry[85] in Sind, the isolation of its population (resulting in their inadequate knowledge of the Mutiny's real cause) and their indolence (due perhaps partly to the hot climate) explain more satisfactorily why its Muslims generally did not join the rebels ?

What situation prevailed in the Punjab, Bengal and Orissa ?

In the Punjab, despite some military uprisings, the people remained quiet.[86]

Government also adopted certain effective measures to maintain peace in the Punjab. The whole province was disarmed after its annexation. The disarming of the entire province eliminated chances of rebellion . . . on the part of the civil population of the province. Sir John Lawrence also issued a vigorous proclamation in which he asked the people of the Punjab to remain quiet and faithful and threatened them with dire consequences, if they revolted. Lawrence's proclamation had its desired effect. Again, the maintenance of a large British force in the Punjab frightened the civil population. . . . Elsewhere in India, the glaring disproportion between the British and native soldiers and the ill-distribution of the former before 1857 went a long way in encouraging defection and rebellion among the latter.[87]

The disarming of the populace and the presence of a large British Army were powerful reasons why the Punjabis "kept aloof from the Mutiny and maintained a peaceful front."[88] Why did the British disarm, and maintain a large army in, the Punjab ? For fear of disaffection, because this province had been annexed only eight years earlier.[89] There would have been no reason for the British to deprive it of weapons unless they wished to prevent a conflagration.[90]

In Bengal, the "sepoys mutinied in certain districts," i.e. Berhampur, Chittagong, Dacca, but on the whole the civil population did not join them.[91]

"The zemindars (Hindu and Muslim), talukdars and men of common rank," inhabiting the Chittagong and Noakhali districts and the Rajshahi division were opposed to the mutineers, as is clear from the resolutions passed by some groups among them pledging their assistance to the British in case of any disorders.[92] "There was no rising of the civil population in the Presidency Division, though it was there that the first blood of the Sepoy Mutiny was shed."[93] Calcutta's European residents stood, of course, with the British. But so did generally its Indian groups. "The revolted sepoys got no support from any of the communities living in Calcutta, Hindu, Muslim and Christian."[94] Why didn't they ?

The reasons why the civil population of Bengal did not sympathise with the mutineers and join them in opposition to Government are not far to seek. The Mutiny of 1857 was in reality the Mutiny [of sepoys who did not hail from Bengal]. The rising of such non-Bengalese sepoys naturally failed to arouse any sympathy of the civil population of Bengal for them. . . . Secondly, under the patronage of the English East India Company a trading middle class came to rise in Bengal . . . bent on accumulating wealth for themselves through undisturbed trade and commerce. Naturally, therefore, they fervently longed for the preservation of peace in the country during the Mutiny. Lastly, under the impact of the British rule there was an intellectual and cultural awakening in Bengal in the early part of the 19th century. Wave after wave of social, religious and literary reforms inundated Bengal before 1857, with the result that a new Bengal was born, a Bengal that was saturated with the spirit of Renaissance to a considerable extent.[95]

And yet Calcutta's European residents charged that the Bengalis were not loyal to the British during the Mutiny as they did not volunteer their services.[96] It was denied in the following terms :

As regards the loyalty of the Bengalees, we have no hesitation in asserting that Mr. Norton is entirely wrong. They did come forward with their cattle and if they had not, we should not have been able to have procured one single hackery in spite of fifty Impressment Acts. . . . Government, knowing this, made no use of an Impressment Act ; they appealed to the zemindars, and the zemindars responded loyally, guaranteeing payment to the unwilling owners of hackeries and promising protection to their families, advancing them money to purchase bullocks and using all those inducements which zemindars alone can use. The result was that the Government had in a few days 7,000 carts collected at Raneeganj. . . .[97]

This defence indirectly appears to prove that those alleging Bengali sympathy with the mutineers were correct in so far as the villagers were concerned. The urban middle class and the zemindars were interested more in protecting their own interests than in allying themselves with those who threatened their security. But Bengal's peasantry, suffering more than perhaps any other Indian group from misconduct of Company officials, police and zemindars' oppression, murders and daily robberies, had nothing to lose

by withholding their carts and bullocks from the British. To some extent, they apparently feared sepoy reprisals, which would explain in part their unwilling attitude and the zemindars' promise of protection.

Jessore's peasantry "appeared not to take much interest in the Sepoy Mutiny with the particulars of which they were very imperfectly acquainted."[98] This reason may partly explain the peasantry's aloofness from the Mutiny in other districts of Bengal and some regions in India situated far from the centres of commotion.

In Assam and in Orissa, the civil population " 'view with horror and dread the proceedings of the sepoys and earnestly pray for the restoration of peace and order.' "[99] This statement is explicable by these provinces' relationship to the rest of India. Despite Assam's Bengali-speaking Hindu majority, it was not part of the Mughal Empire ; it was ceded by Burma to the British under the Treaty of Yandabo (in 1826). Orissa was but loosely integrated with the Mughal Empire. Its Oriya-speaking inhabitants (not to mention its Munda-speaking aborigines living in its interior), among India's most backward groups, felt little concern for and probably were poorly acquainted (like Jessore's peasantry) with the particulars of the Mutiny. The Brahmin (landlord) group, like the zemindars in other regions of India, probably preferred peace to chaos for fear that, if they aligned themselves with the sepoy cause, they might lose their control.

In contrast, the mood of excitement prevailing generally among the northerners was shared by the inhabitants of Central India: namely, of the Bombay Presidency, the Mahratta and other States.

A stir was caused in the Bombay Presidency by the revolt of some Bombay Army regiments (among them the 27th Regiment of the Bombay Native Infantry which mutinied on 1 August 1857).[100] In Bombay City, the Europeans, joined by Indo-Christians, Parsees,[101] Muslims and, in fact, by members of various creeds and castes, supported the British. The rebellious sepoys were joined, however, by Muslim and Hindu inhabitants of certain districts (such as Poona, Dharwar, and others). Nevertheless, the general population of the province did not, at least openly, take the side of the rebellious sepoys.[102]

The mutiny of the 27th Regiment, on the other hand, fermented "the whole of the South Maratha country."[103]

> In Nagpur, Satara and Hyderabad the people stood disaffected and were disposed towards joining the mutineers but their rulers remained faithful to Government in their own interest and prevented their subjects from breaking into revolt. Sindhia of Gwalior was friendly to Government, though his subjects were almost to a man against Government. . . . The same loyal feeling as among the princes and chiefs in Rajputana and Central India prevailed among the chiefs in Western India excepting the South

Maratha territory. . . . The Nizam of Hyderabad was faithful.[104]

How did South India's population react during the Mutiny? "The chiefs of Mysore, Travancore and Cochin in the South displayed similar feelings of loyalty towards Government during the Mutiny."[105]

The presence of British residents at the court of, as also the posting of British troops in, each of the States were powerful reasons why most of the "autonomous" princes did not join the Mutiny. Undoubtedly, they were also motivated by fear of slaughter and British retaliation if they were to take part in the militant opposition, because in that case, the conquerors would have replaced the ruling dynasties and annexed the States (as happended in Oudh). Another strong deterrent must have been the realisation—based on historical fact—that they could not win against a much stronger enemy. To say that their action reflects a loyal disposition toward the authorities seems to be a misinterpretation. Their stand was rather inspired by a realistic appraisal of the situation confronting them.

The civil population in areas lying outside of the Southern States also remained aloof from the Mutiny. Madras, the scene of the Vellore outbreak in 1806, remained quiet in 1857.

> Armed with past experience, the people of Madras had been convinced of the utter futility of resisting Government, and, therefore, chose to remain quiet during the Mutiny, though they had reason to complain against Government. . . . By the time the Mutiny broke out, Madras passed under the Rayatwari system, though . . . the "Zemindari" system lingered in a few [coastal districts. Lands in Madras under the Rayatwari system were over-assessed which led to grievances]. The rayats were to cultivate lands at the pleasure of the "tahsildar" (native deputy Collector) and "the acknowledged right of private property in no wise prevented the oppression on the owner or his gradual and sure pauperization. . . . Despite their grievances against Government the people of the province of Madras did not rise in revolt during the Mutiny. The composition of the Madras Army was such as eliminated chances of rebellion on the part of it."[106]

Two main reasons thus restrained the discontented predominantly Hindu inhabitants of Madras from rising against the British; first, the memory of their futile attempt five decades earlier; and second, the presence of a heterogeneous Army, "which even volunteered to help Government against the revolted sepoys in the North-Western provinces."[107] Madras's inhabitants had no choice but to keep aloof from active participation in the Mutiny. They cannot be said to have been favourably disposed towards the British, but rather towards the mutineers.

A somewhat detailed analysis has been given in order to present a clearer picture of the mood of India's people in 1857, They were on the whole dissatisfied and in many regions restrained from joining the mutineers either by their own heads of state or by the British.

From the data it appears also that turbulent elements were present among all sectors of India's population. This would contradict the thesis advanced (particularly by the British) that only one segment, its Muslim citizens, incited the country to rebellion. The communal issue, therefore, also enters into the discussion.

It cannot be denied that a national synthesis had been built up in medieval India that continued unshaken in spite of Aurangzeb down to 1857 and led to the great upsurge for Delhi and devotion to Bahadur Shah who was the *de jure* sovereign and the symbol of political unity. This was a reality which impressed Metcalfe who, rejecting the unilateral Muslim jihad, said, "The probability is that it was a joint proclamation, the work of Hindus as well as of Mahomedan conspirators." In fact this joint proclamation itself was the result of the great popularity that Bahadur Shah had been enjoying among the Hindus and Musalmans ; and Metcalfe looked upon this as a symbol of Indian nationalism.[108]

While this view was contradicted by the Calcutta Press, which "described the Mutiny as a Muhammadan revolt,"[109] others shared it, as the following excerpt makes clear :

In a large part of the North-Western provinces, in the districts where the Muhammadans are numerous and the influence of the Delhi Court was strongly felt, the revolt took a Muslim colour and assumed to some extent the character of a holy war against the infidel. Persons whose experiences were confined to that region often erroneously assumed that the rebellion was the result of a Muhammadan conspiracy. But elsewhere the revolt was more Hindu than Muhammadan.[110]

In effect, the above-mentioned Proclamations were addressed " 'to all the Hindoos and Mahomedans,' " while the sepoys were drawn from Hindu and Muslim ranks.

Now the predominating race in a Bengal regiment is the Hindoo ; the followers of that religion, as a general rule, being to the Mahomedans in the proportion of five to one. A regiment, a thousand strong, will therefore be found to contain about eight hundred Hindoos. Of these it often happens that more than four hundred are Brahmins or priests, about two hundred Rajpoots . . ., and the rest of a lower caste.[111]

This proportion prevailed throughout all Regiments of the Bengal Native Infantry, which "was an Army of aristocratic composition, its sepoys being recruited mainly from the upper-class Hindus."[112] The 19th Regiment B. N. I., which was the first to mutiny,[113] was altogether void of Muslims.

It was noted previously that large Hindu and Muslim groups among the civil population (e.g. in Calcutta and Madras) did not participate in the Mutiny, while others did. Various reasons account therefor ; to repeat : the presence of large numbers of Europeans in the southern Armies, the civil

population's disarmament, the desire on the part of scores of leaders—such as Hyderabad's Niẓām, Rajputana's princes—to keep the peace, knowing well they would lose out, lack of interest for the reasons cited and also (as in East Bengal), the absence of effective leadership. The major exception was the Nawāb of Oudh who joined his—mainly Brahmin and Rajput—subjects in the uprising.[114]

This synopsis reveals clearly that the Great Rebellion had Muslim-Hindu support in spite of the fact that some Muslim groups also officially disassociated themselves from it.[115] On the basis of the evidence, it is difficult to accept and maintain the thesis that the Great Rebellion was a communal plot devised by India's Muslims to overthrow the British.

Holloway who participated in the War of 1857 observed, "The British never conceived that the Hindus and Musalmans could unite over any question. . . . It was deemed quite as an impossible occurrence for the Hindus and Musalmans to agree upon a question of public interest as it was for fire and water to agree when brought into contact with each other. This assumption has proved a fallacy. For both these representatives of the religious bodies perfectly agreed whilst prosecuting the scheme for over-throwing our dominion in the East."[116]

Can it be said, therefore, that the Mutiny grew into a national revolt? Not all authorities deny that it did, as they acknowledge that it involved "the whole country".[117] Among those holding a contrary viewpoint, some support their decision by the military argument: [118] namely, if there had been concerted action, it would have been easy to overcome the much smaller British sector among the military. "It was repressed by a minute force. Its leaders . . . were a failure."[119] Furthrmore, few of the "better elements" in India took part in the Mutiny.[120] It is true that by no means *all* Hindus or *all* Muslims revolted and probably those who did constituted altogether not even half of India's total population at the time. But it is equally true that large segments of its people (in the Punjab, Bengal, Hyderabad, South India) would have joined the mutineers, if the circum-stances had permitted them to do so. Had the *Niẓām* of Hyderabad "turned against Government, southern India would have been in a blaze of insurrection."[121] In other words, had the leadership been present in certain areas (including Bengal and the Punjab) the greater part of India would have risen against the British.

What are some of the deductions that can be derived from the discus-sion? *First*, North and Central India took part in the Uprising; other areas would have become involved, had it not been either for reasons of geo-graphical distance or for opposition by the respective leaders, fearing un-doubtedly for a needless bloodbath. *Second*, the insurgents held Delhi and Lucknow for a few months, General Havelock relieving the last-mentioned

city for the first time on 25 September 1857 ; it was not until 16 November that Campbell's troops recaptured it. *Third,* British disarmament of the Punjab Army occurred, because they were afraid it might revolt and instigate the civilians in the areas of its contact. *Fourth,* the disaffection had begun to spread to Sikh regiments whose leaders, however, kept them under control (noted earlier). *Fifth,* a prolonged fighting was forced upon the British for the reconquest of India.

The view that the Rebellion was not national is based on its limitation to a specific sector, excluding not only Rajasthan, Assam and Orissa, but also "greater parts of the Punjab, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh, as well as the whole of India south of the Narmaba."[122] Such an interpretation stresses exclusively the issue of direct participation. History shows, nevertheless, that the land lay wrapped in the mood of great discontent. A total conflagration would have consumed it, if certain British and the Sikh army chiefs had not taken the necessary measures keeping the military and civil groups under their control. The final conclusion, submitted here, is that the Great Rebellion had a national dimension.

It may well be that the communalist reading of the Mutiny was due to British policy which elevated racial discrimination into "a form of loyalty."[123] This communalist approach was derived in part from political motivations : dislike of the conqueror for the erstwhile rulers, and *vice versa* ; in part from religious antagonism. The irony of history is that a Muslim ruler (the of Niẓām of Hyderabad). apparently had it in his power to incite South India to rebellion and did not do so, that the majority of India's Muslims remained aloof from the Mutiny, and yet that they alone stood as the accused and accursed party. Undoubtedly, the reasons must be sought in the central leadership which lay with the country's Muslim Court and in the firm conviction held by the English resident authorities that Islam called upon all Muslims to wage war against the "unbelievers" (*jihād*).

Would the Great Rebellion have been prevented by :

(1) Immediate retraction regarding the cartridges by the Government ?

(2) The presence of more European troops in the Bengal Army ?

(3) A larger number of better generals, who would have gained the sepoys' respect and been able to alleviate their suspicion ?

(4) A more equal system of advancement for the non-European soldiery, which might have resulted in greater confidence in the Indian military officers by their countrymen under arms and who might have checked the sepoys' outburst ?

(5) Quicker disbanding of the 34th Reg. B.N.I ?

(6) More effective leadership by imprisoning immediately the King of Oudh (arrested only on 15 June 1858) ?

(7) The opening of India to the smaller British entrepreneurs, who would have formed a European middle class and acted as a link between their Indian counterparts and the Government ?

(8) The suppression of freedom of the press (received by an 1823 Ordinance), thereby removing another conduit of anti-English sentiments?

It is impossible to say, of course, whether the Mutiny and the Great Rebellion could have been prevented by the execution of some or most of these measures. The resentment lay deep in the Indian soul, but all writers agree that the cartridge affair brought it to the surface and offset the explosion.

The Great Rebellion had many consequences ; political—for the East India Company days were over in 1858,[124] when India passed under the Crown of England,[125] i.e. the national revolt was unsuccessful as the British remained India's rulers ; military—an increase in European and a decrease in the Indian regiments resulting in a constant proportion of two Europeans to six Indians ;[126] communal—the Hindus, despite the fact that they could not be fully trusted, became the favourite group in the administration and the professions, whereas the Muslims, suspect and disliked, fell into the shadow of oblivion. Their tragic lot and the reasons for it are described in the subsequent section.

The Plight of the Indian Muslim in the Mid-Nineteenth Century

> Firmly relying Ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with gratitude the solace of Religion, we disclaim alike the Right and the Desire to impose our Convictions on any of Our Subjects. We declare it to be Our Royal Will and Pleasure that none be in any wise favoured, none molested or disquieted by reason of their Religious Faith or Observances ; but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the Law. . . .
>
> And it is Our Further Will that, so far as may be, Our Subjects, of whatever Race or Creed, be freely and impartially admitted to Offices in Our Service, the Duties of which they may be qualified by their education, ability, and integrity, duly to discharge.[127]

Was the promise kept ? Christian missionaries were not recalled from India. Public education—associated in the Indian mind with Christian impregnation—more than ever became the duty of the British Indian Government. And, above all, India's Muslims were not treated equally with the Hindus ; they reached their lowest depth between the 1860's and 1870's. They had lost favour with the British authorities in India who did not heed Her Majesty's lofty message.

Lord Ellenborough[128] had said in 1843 : " 'I cannot close my eyes to the belief that this race [Musalman] is fundamentally hostile to us and therefore our true policy is to conciliate the Hindus'."[129]

There were undoubtedly four main reasons which prompted Lord Ellenborough to make this statement: namely, (1) the opposition of the Muslims, formerly the ruling class in India,[130] to the new masters; (2) the Wahhābī-British clashes; (3) the British stress on the Islamic doctrine of the Holy War (*jihād*); (4) desire to exploit any dissatisfaction with erstwhile Muslim control, thereby ignoring Hindu participation in the Great Rebellion.

The national revolt lent substance to Lord Ellenborough's views, because the Mughal Emperor and Princes of the Court openly came out against the British; the latter interpreted this leadership as unifying the hostile *Muslim* elements and, hence, they saw the 1857 Uprising primarily, but erroneously (as noted) in terms of an Islamic conspiracy. Nothing further needs to be said about the leadership, for it was discussed previously.

The Wahhābīs, a puritanical Sunnite sect,[131] were suspect because of their militant attitude towards all other religious groups. Disciples of the Indian Wahhābī, Sayyid Aḥmad of Rai Bareli (1786-1831),[132] had settled at Sittana (on the Punjab frontier), whence they raided Indian territory. Firmly convinced that the Indian Wahhàbīs[133] incited the frontier tribes and formed a coalition with them[134] as well as with India's Muslims in order to expel the authorities from India, the British waged three wars[135] with them.

Was this contention supported by valid facts? Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān[136] repudiated it altogether; regarding its first part, he said, correctly, that the tribes had been turbulent since times immemorial and that their Ḥanifite creed, coupled with saint-worship, was entirely antagonistic to Wahhābism; in support, he quotes an Arabic verse upholding this legal school of thought: " 'May the curses of our God, innumerable as the sands of the sea, fall upon him who followeth not the doctrines of Abu-Hanifa.' "[137] Wahhabism, in turn, denounced the veneration of saints and their shrines. Sir Sayyid's confession to a coalition between the Wahhābīs and the hill tribes, enabling their conquest of the Sikh city, Peshawar, might be considered as a weakening of his religious argument. He notes, however, the subsequent waning of the Wahhābī cause.

They [meaning the Wahhābīs] saw that the Pathan tribes on the frontier hated them on account of their faith, that no help was therefore to be expected from them, and they saw that their own number was too small to cope successfully with the Sikhs. They therefore declared that they were no longer bound by their religion to continue the contest.[138]

Two decades later (in 1858), the Frontier tribes attacked "the Sittana host" and slew their leader.[139]

Regarding the second aspect of the British contention, viz. a Wahhābī coalition with India's Musalmans, the following data will prove it

incorrect. Sayyid Aḥmad of Rai Bareli was unable to obtain any support from the Muslim nobility and despite a certain popularity among the masses, he had to look for recruits in Afghanistan. His adherents first numbered about 500 to 600, but the total force he raised comprised not more than about 800.[140] Wrote Dr Hunter:

Their hand fell heaviest upon the Sikh villages, but they hailed with fierce delight any chance of inflicting a blow upon the English Infidel. . . .

On our annexation of the Punjab, the fanatic fury, which had formerly spent itself upon the Sakhs, was transferred to their successors. Hindus and English were alike Infidels in the eyes of the Sittana Host and, as such, were to be exterminated by the sword. The disorders which we had connived at, or at least viewed with indifference, upon the Sikh Frontier, now descended as a bitter inheritance to ourselves.[141]

If the British inherited the Wahhābī problem, then, historically, it was just a transfer of hatred to another non-Wahhābī group and, hence, in the beginning certainly not specifically anti-British. This is borne out further by Dr Hunter's own admission that no collision between the Sittana colony and the English troops occurred during 1852 and 1857. Had its fury vented itself on the British, such encounters should have been frequent prior to 1857. By that time, however, as has been stated, Wahhābism was in decline, due to internal dissension and break-up in 1849. When one of their leaders, Maḥbūb'Alī, was asked by "the rebel leader, Bukht Khan. . . to sign the proclamation for a religious war against the English, he refused" for reasons of its legal invalidity.[142]

After 1857, however, the collisions are frequent. What is the inference to be drawn from this? I think there can be but one, viz. that it was the Company's mutinous sepoys who were the instigators and actors in much that has occurred since that year. The "Wahabis—i.e. the remnants of Syed Ahmad's band—had no hand in the raids nor is there the slightest foundation for Dr. Hunter's sweeping assertion, that the flames then kindled were nursed by the Mahomedan community in India. The border tribes had also a great deal to do with the many raids and cases of kidnapping, burning, and plundering of British villages; but to lay all these atrocities at the door of Syed Ahmad's followers, and through them to implicate the whole of the Indian Musalmans, is monstrous in the extreme.[143]

Sir Sayyid's conclusion is confirmed by other authorities, who state that a number of Wahhābīs (if such they were) appear to have co-operated with the British in 1857. Among them were those settled in Bombay:

Bombay was not free from Wahabee-phobia; but I am glad to say that I experienced no lack of assistance from the Wahabees. The Kazee,—the high priest in Bombay of Mahomedans—was a rank Wahabee, but made his services available at any hour of the day or night; so was the soobedar, Mahomed Booden, of the Police, a Wahabee by whom I was greatly assisted in bringing to light the plot hatched by the sepoys at Sonapoor.[144]

The Wahhābī "party" was also exonerated in the Patna outbreak (19 July 1857); despite the use of the Wahhābī inscription on the flag, Commissioner Tayler wrote : " 'I do not . . . think the Wahabees as a sect or party had any connection with this outbreak and am confirmed in this belief by the fact of Ahmad Oollah's [a Wahhābī Maulvī] father, Ilahee Buksh, having sent intelligence of the affair the day before, a thing which I now feel sure he would not have done, had his party any active connection with it. . . .' "[145]

If the testimony of such Englishmen as Commissioner Tayler and Police Commissioner Forjett is valid, then in some cases, the non-Wahhābī Sunnīs, and not the Wahhābīs, were "guilty of conspiracy". It would disprove the British allegation that the Wahhābī sect stood united in their anti-Britishness; support Sir Aḥmad's statement that the Wahhābīs at Sittana were extremists with whom the majority of India's Muslims cannot be identified; and undermine the view prevailing among British circles in India at the time that an extensive Wahhābī-non-Wahhābī Muslim conspiracy existed in that country to evict the British. It is interesting to note that, on the one hand, Dr Hunter accepts such a wide conspiracy as a fact,[146] while, on the other hand, he indicates that Wahhābī preachers had little success in Bengal, an area where hatred ran deep, and where, in the 1830's, a Wahhābī boxer known as Tītū Miyān,[147] had made many converts among the villagers in the districts lying to the east and north of Calcutta.

India's Muslims belong to the Ḥanafī school, explaining the limited appeal of Wahhābism to them; they regarded the Sittana colony as extremist; and, lastly, they were too concerned with the complex problems besetting them and their country under English rule to join the Wahhābī cause. These three reasons show why Dr Hunter's accusation, representing the British viewpoint, must be rejected as invalid. Nevertheless, his countrymen insisted that India's Muslim community generally was conspiring with the Wahhābīs. Could it be due to the increase in Muslim converts in Bengal resulting from Wahhābī propagation during the stage of a more moderate leadership under Maulvī Karāmat 'Alī (d. 1873)? According to an 1891 census report of the time, Bengal's Muslim population had grown within two decades so as to surpass its Hindu residents by one and a half million.[148] The British contended that Islamic puritanism by its very nature must reject non-Muslim rule. Their allegation, again formulated by Dr Hunter, was as follows :

> It is one of the misfortunes attendant on the British Rule in India, that this Reformation should be inseparably linked with hatred against the Infidel Conquerors. But everywhere, any attempt by the Muhammadans to return to the first principles of their Faith involves a revolt against the ruling power; for even the most orthodox Musalman State has had to mould

these principles to the necessities of Civil Government.[149]

The British had two facets: one, political; the other, religious. It can be explained by the puritanical and aggressive nature of Wahābism, the Mughal Court's refusal to accept foreign, Christian, rule[150] and the Great Rebellion. The officials in charge of India's government, taking their cue from the daily political affairs,[151] were certain that the majority of India's Muslims (including the Wahhābīs), compelled by the dictates of their faith, were carrying on a *jihād* ("Holy War") against the Queen. Those Englishmen—among them Dr Hunter—who had familiarised themselves with its legal principles, were convinced that Islam regarded British India as *dār-ul-ḥarb* ("an Islamic abode ruled by non-Muslims") rather than *dār-ul-Islām* ("an abode of Islam") so that a Holy War seemed imperative and lawful.[152]

The thesis that India under the British, i.e. non-Muslims, was *dār-ul-ḥarb*, was expressed a century earlier by the Indian revivalist Shāh Wali Allāh[153] (1703-63), who had witnessed disintegration of Mughal power and India's defeat at Plassey (1757). Did he imply that, as a consequence, its Muslims were bound to deliver India from its foreign yoke? Or did he restate the legal Islamic position on this issue, which became crucial for the first time in India's Muslim period during Shāh Walī Allāh's life? The questions involved were whether Islam can survive in a Christian-dominated Muslim-inhabited land and whether it had not the right to strike back at an enemy which had been the first to attack. Concerning the second point, the Qur'ān states:

> And fight for the cause of God against those who fight against you: but commit not the injustice of attacking them first: God loveth not such injustice.[154]

The foreigners had been the attackers; hence, the Qur'ān gave the Muslims the right to defend themselves. There had been a deep seated anxiety, furthermore, that the Englishmen would not guarantee Islam's survival, based partly on their encouragement of the missionary movement,[155] and, partly, on the fear that Christian rulers would impose not only their laws, but also their faiths, on the conquered.[156] It stemmed, in turn, from the conception that religion and law form an integrated whole.

Reasoning along these lines, India's Wahhābīs, reasoning along these lines, exhorted their Muslim countrymen in many a pamphlet to take up arms against the authorities, such as in the following:

> In a country where the ruling religion is other than Muhammadanism, the religious precepts of Muhammad cannot be enforced. It is incumbent on Musalmans to join together, and wage war upon the Infidels. Those who are unable to take part in the fight should emigrate to a country of the True Faith. At the present time in India, Flight is a stern duty. He who denies this, let him declare himself a slave to sensuality. He who, having gone

away, returns again, let him know that all his past services are vain. Should he die in India, he will lose the way of salvation.

In short, Oh Brethren, we ought to weep over our state, for the Messenger of God is angered with us because of our living in the land of the Infidel. When the Prophet of God himself is displeased with us, to whom shall we look for shelter? Those whom God has supplied with the means should resolve upon fight, for a fire is raging here. If we speak the truth, we shall be hanged; and if we remain silent, injury is done to our faith.[157]

Amidst their call to the fight, the accusations and counter-accusations, another debate was carried on between the British and India's Muslims. It focussed on the legality of a holy war (*jihād*), as such the Rebellion was read by the former. Islamic legal theory, founded on Qur'ānic tenets, acknowledges the right of a *jihād* against the "peoples of the Book," viz. Christians and Jews, under certain circumstances. One, noted earlier, is that the Muslims must be attacked first; another, if their faith and, therefore, their existence as a religious community is endangered. Nevertheless, the holy war against the aforementioned two groups must not be as intense as one fought against infidels, because the former, unlike the latter, do believe in God.[158]

In this dispute, the indefatigable Dr Hunter again defended his countrymen's position, while the equally vigorous Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān once more took the Indian Muslim's side. A number of India's and Arabia's theologians were drawn into it as well. It related to a critical problems, because on its answer depended a final judgment; namely, were India's Muslims guilty or not of warring against the Queen? If British India were still *dār-ul-Islām*, then its Muslims were not ultimately responsible for the asserted crime.[159] If, on the contrary, it was regarded as *dār-ul-ḥārb*, then they were to be indicted.

Abū Ḥanīfah, one of the foremost Muslim jurists in medieval time,[160] declared that a country becomes *dār-ul-ḥarb* when *all* of the following three conditions exist: (1) it must be openly ruled by "infidels"; (2) it is not separated from another *dār-ul-ḥarb* by a *dār-ul-Islām* (whence aid could be given in times of need); and (3) when its Muslim inhabitants no longer enjoy religious autonomy which, in Islamic lands, flows from self-rule. According to Dr Hunter, all three of these conditions were fulfilled in India's case, for the sea—the main travel route between India and England—was considered *dār-ul-ḥarb*.[161]

On the other hand, an Indo-Muslim code, the *Fatāwā-i-'Ālamgīrī*, which was compiled toward the end of the seventeenth century,[162] gave these stipulations all of which must be fulfilled for a country to become *dār-ul-ḥarb*: (1) when an Islamic people has fallen under non-Muslim rule; (2) the precepts of Islam are no longer followed; (3) no Islamic city (rather than

country) lies between two non-Muslim lands; (4) the Muslims have lost religious liberty.[163]

Muslim jurists at Mecca, consulted at the time by India's theologians, declared that " 'as long as even some of the peculiar observances of Islam prevail in it, it is *Dār-ul-Islām*.' "[164] The theologians of North India, basing themselves in part on these decisions (*fatwās*) and in part on the *Fatāwā-i-'Ālamgīrī*, admitting that India, erstwhile under a Muslim and now under a Christian government, had lapsed into *dār-ul-ḥarb*, started that its Muslim inhabitants nevertheless continued to profess their faith, concluding therefrom that a Holy War is legally forbidden. Their decision is embodied in a *fatwā*, issued on 17 July 1870 (Rabī'-uth-thānī 1287), in reply to the question "whether a Jihād is lawful in India," posed by Sayyid Amīr Ḥusayn, then Personal Assistant to Bhagalpur's Commissioner.[165] This *fatwā* states:

The Musalmans here are protected by Christians, and there is no Jihād in a country where protection is afforded, as the absence of protection and liberty between Musalmans and Infidels is essential in a religious war, and that condition does not exist here. Besides, it is necessary that there should be a probability of victory to Musalmān and glory to the Indians. If there be no such probability, the Jihād is unlawful.[166]

Calcutta's theologians, on the contrary, held that India under the British continued to be *dār-ul-Islām*, and their conclusion, therefore, also was that a *Jihād* is illegal. Issued in pamphlet form in 1871, it said concerning the question of Holy War:

The second question is, "whether it is lawful in this Country to make *Jihād* or not". This has been solved together with the first. For *Jihād* can by no means be lawfully made in Dār-ul-Islām. This is so evident that it requires no argument or authority to support it. Now, if any misguided wretch, owing to preverse fortune, were to wage war against the Ruling Powers of this country, British India, such war would be rightly pronounced rebellion; and rebellion is strictly forbidden by the Muhammadan law. Therefore such war will likewise be unlawful; and in case any one would wage such war, the Muhammadan subjects would be bound to assist their Rulers, and in conjunction with their Rulers, to fight with such rebels. The above has been clearly laid down in the Fatāwā-i-'Alamgīrī.[167]

In other words, despite the opposite point of departure, North India's and Calcutta's theologians reached the same conclusion which agreed, furthermore, with those decisions laid down by the orthodox jurists at Mecca. Muslim opinion was not shared (as stated) by the British. Dr Hunter, writing before the issuance of the *fatwās* decreed by India's Muslim jurists,[168] criticised "the Mecca Doctors" and Maulvī 'Abdul Ḥaqq, because they

confine themselves to affirming that India is a Country of Islam, and *most carefully avoid drawing the inference that rebellion is therefore unlawful*. The truth is, that, according to strict Muhammadan Law, the opposite conclusion would be correct, and the Mecca Doctors well knew

this when they gave their decision. They affirm that India is a Country of Islam, and leave it to the Faithful to conclude that for this very reason they ought to strive, by war or otherwise, to drive out the infidels who have usurped the Government and who in a hundred ways have interfered with the practices and procedure both legal and religious, of the former Muhammadan rulers.[169]

He scored in particular Calcutta's theologians for stressing the need for "religious liberty" (*aman-i-awwal*), which he regarded as an incorrect interpretation, because it ignores the term's real meaning and full implication; viz. that India's Muslims have lost "the whole religious security and full status" they "*formerly* enjoyed under their own rule."[170] He felt that the religious status enjoyed by India's Muslims since the imposition of the British power "is entirely dependent on the will of their Christian rulers" so that it is quite different in degree to their former sovereign status.[171]

North India's theologians also came under Dr Hunter's attack. While claiming, in agreement with the Wahhābīs, that India under British rule has lapsed into *dār-ul-ḥarb* they did not draw the logical conclusion that its Muslims had to engage in a *jihād* against their Christian governors.

> This, I believe, is the true solution of the difficulty. Had India remained a Country of Islam, as the Mecca Law Doctors insidiously try to make out, a large portion of the orthodox sect would have deemed themselves bound to rebel. If India were still *de jure* a Country of Islam, this portion of our Musalman subjects would feel compelled to rise against us, and to make a Country of Islam *de facto*. . . . Indeed, if India were still a Country of the Faithful, every day some ground of rebellion would arise.[172]

He struck here at the root of the problem, as he asked himself whether an Islamic country can remain *dār-ul-Islām* when it succumbs to Christian rule, which means that its own institutions, based on the Islamic socio-legal Code (*Sharī'ah*), are replaced in many istances by those developed out of a different tradition. If Muslim jurists insist that, despite this replacement process, a country (India) still remains *dār-ul-Islām*, does their position not reveal their negation of its changed status? And does not this very negation carry with it the responsibility of Muslims to effect a restoration to its real nature, for which a *jihād* becomes necessary? Such reasoning prompted Dr Hunter to disagree thoroughly (perhaps rightly) with those maintaining that Mughal and British India had substantially the same religious status; in other words, they refused to acknowledge the transformation which—according to him—profoundly affected India's Islamic structure.[173] He was of like mind with those (i.e. North India's Muslim) theologians who asserted that British India was *dār-ul-ḥarb*, but he could not see how they concluded that the obligation to wage a *jihād* was still not incumbent upon Indian Islam.

Sir Sayyid Aḥmad's opinion on this issue is revealing. He agreed with Dr

Hunter that India under the British ceased to be an Islamic land, but added a condition, namely, if the term *dār-ul-Islām* is used in its "'primary significance' ".[174] However, should the Calcutta Muhammadan Society have used this word in its secondary sense, namely, that India's Muslims were not forced by the British to give up their faith, the conclusion that India is *dār-ul-ḥarb* must be rejected. To accept such a conclusion within the context of the term's secondary meaning would imply a conscious effort by the Christian authorities to eradicate Islam. This was not the case, as the mosques had not been or were not being closed and worship was not impeded. (Had this occurred, then such a measure would have constituted a legal right for India's Muslims to call a *jihād*.) Sir Sayyid had, of course, an ulterior motive for concluding that there was no legal reason for a *jihād*; he wished to show that Indian Islam was not guilty of sedition. He wrote : " 'A true *Dar-ul-Islam* is a country which under no circumstances can be termed a *Dar-ul-harb* and *vice versa*. There are, however, certain countries which, with reference to certain circumstances, can be termed *Dar-ul-Islam*, and with reference to others *Dar-ul-harb*. Such a country is India at the moment.' "[175]

Sir Sayyid agreed, therefore, with all Muslim (Indian and Arab) jurists, concerned with the case, that legal ground for a *jihād* by Indian Islam against the British was absent. The conclusion drawn was that this community was not guilty of sedition. It implied a general Muslim denial of the British charge which, itself, was regarded by inference as being illegal. It may be taken also as a condemnation of the British, held responsible for the decay of the Indian Musalman.

The plea sent by some members of the Indo-Islamic community to Her Majesty Queen Victoria is a sad testimony to the appalling conditions they suffered :

> As loyal subjects of Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen, we have, we believe, an equal claim to all appointments in the administration of the country. Truly speaking, the Orissa Muhammadans have been levelled down and down, with no hopes of rising again. Born of noble parentage, poor by profession, and destitute of patrons, we find ourselves in the position of a fish out of water. Such is the wretched state of the Muhammadans, which we bring unto your Honour's notice, believing your Honour to be the sole representative of Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen for the Orissa Division, and hoping that justice will be administered to all classes, without distinction of colour or creed. The penniless and parsimonious condition which we are reduced to, consequent on the failure of our former Government service, has thrown us into such an everlasting despondency, that we speak from the very core of our hearts, that we would travel into the remotest corners of the earth, ascend the snowy peaks of the Himalaya, wander the forlorn regions of Siberia, could we be convinced that by so

travelling we would be blessed with a Government appointment of ten shillings a week.[176]

Their pitiful decline was all the more astonishing, because they had been India's governing class during centuries. Moreover, for about fifty years after the British rise in Bengal, "the whole ministerial and subordinate offices of Government continued" in Muslim hands. [177] During

the first fifty years of the Company's rule the Musalmans had the lion's share of State patronage. During its second half century of power, the tide turned, at firsts lowly, but with a constantly accelerating pace, as the imperative duty of conducting public business in the vernacular of the people, and not in the foreign *patois* of its former Muhammadan conquerors, became recognised. Then the Hindus poured into, and have since completely filled, every grade of official life.[178]

This leads to the fourth principal reason why English officialdom insisted that the Muslims were hostile to them. Fourteen years before the Mutiny, Lord Ellenborough formulated what had been and would remain English policy : Hindu conciliation.[179] It could be possible only by exploiting Hindu-Muslim disunity, which had existed prior to, and did not disappear after, the 1857 Uprising. The unity that existed during that year was forged to withstand a common danger. During the Sultanate (1021-1526) and the Mughal Empire (1526-January 1858),[180] the Muslims were the ruling class and the Hindus had lost their political sovereignty. The Mughals tried to forge a State ; in it, they legally could and did succeed each other ; the Hindus formed a community within the Islamic body politic and thus could not aspire to succession, but only to its protection. The demand made by India's Muslim reformers of the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries that Islam purify itself of Hindu religious practices (idolatry, including the veneration of Hindu saints, participation in festivals) tended to separatism, based on existing traditions of a very different nature. Emperor Aurangzeb's (1619 ; ruled 1658-1707) decree, reinstating the poll-tax for non-Muslims (jizyah) in 1679 abolished by Akbar in 1564, was not received amicably by the Hindus. The latter, however, governed by caste traditions, which forbade not only interrelations between the castes but also social intercoure with Muslims, adhered to separatism. Neither did they speak a common language ;[181] during the Sultanate, Turkish was spoken mainly by the conquerors who came from areas where it was the daily tongue; it continued to be spoken by Turkish elements in the Mughal era, when Persian became the language of the Court and diplomacy. Meanwhile, Urdu, a language developed by Amir Khusro (1253-1325), had made headway among India's Muslims and became their language. The Hindus spoke any one of more than 300 tongues among which Hindi has been elevated as India's national language, although many do not speak it even today.[182] The British undoubtedly wished

to take advantage of the schismatic aspect present in Indian society. How?

Charles Cornwallis [183] abolished in the 1780' the double governmental system introduced by Baron Robert Clive of Plassey (1725-74). Under this double system, an Indian (Muslim usually, because he had administrative experience) and a Britisher (East India Company man) had served in every post. With Lord Cornwallis's re-organisation, all important jobs were taken over by East India Company officials. This policy resulted in the Muslims' losing their posts, their high remunerations and the social status which they had enjoyed. Dr Hunter himself admits that the Cornwallis Code, which formed the model for India's governmental sysem during the nineteenth century, broke the Muslim monopoly in the civil administration.[184] The initial moment of decline in Indian Islam, therefore, may be traced back to Cornwallis's policies in the late eighteenth century.

Changes in the revenue system, culminating in the Permanent Settlement of 1793, another reform introduced by Lord Cornwallis, also contributed to the impoverishment of Indian Islam. Under the new system, the Muslim "revenue-farmers"—who had previously acted as middlemen between the revenue officials (mostly Muslim) and the peasantry—were replaced by English district collectors.[185] As a result, many Muslims lost their jurisdiction over their subordinate farm-holders (often Hindus who had formerly acted as a subordinate revenue service, and now became acknowledged land-proprietors) and the income thus received.

Appropriation by the British of all rent-free lands, held by Muslim individuals or Foundations (*waqfs*),contributed also heavily to the impoverishment of the Indo-Islamic community.[186]

The panic and hatred which ensued have stamped themselves for ever on the rural records. Hundreds of ancient families were ruined, and the educational system of the Musalmans, which was almost entirely maintained by rent-free grants, received its deathblow. The scholastic classes of the Muhammadans emerged from the eighteen years of harrying, absolutely ruined. Any impartial student will arrive at the conviction, that while the Resumption Laws only enforced rights which we had . . . most emphatically reserved, . . . the Resumption Proceedings were harsh in the extreme, and opposed to the general sense of the Indian people,[187]

Before the British take-over, Muslim nobles had made the Army their career. Thereafter, no Indian (Muslim or Hindu) could hold high Army posts. "A very few Muhammadan gentlemen hold commissions from the Governor-General, but, so far as I can learn, not one from the Queen. A native of India can only enter the Army as a private soldier, and the rare individual instances of men promoted from the ranks by a merely local commission form no exception to the rule."[188]

Another source of income was lost thereby to the Indian Musalman.

The same situation prevailed with regard to the higher police posts. Whereas they were occupied formerly by Muslims, they were filled under British rule by Hindus : "even the higher offices in the Police are recruited from the pushing Hindu Youth of the Government School."[189]

Finally, they were excluded from the judiciary as well.

Now the Law is even more strictly closed to the Muhammadans than the official services. Among the Judges of Her Majesty's High Court of Judicature in Bengal are two Hindus but no Musalman. Indeed, the idea of a High Court Judge being taken from the race that once monopolized the whole administration of justice, is inconceivable alike to Anglo-Indians and to the Hindus at the present day. In 1869, when I last made up the statistics of the Indian Professions, they stood thus :—The Law Officers of the Crown were six in number—four Englishmen, two Hindus, and no Musalman. Among the Barristers-at-Law were three Hindus (now greatly increased, I believe), and not one Musalman.

But the list of Pleaders of the High Court, a sort of subordinate Barristers, tells the most cruel story of all. This was a branch of the Profession almost completely in the hands of the Musalmans within the memory of men still living. The present list dates from 1834, and the surviving pleaders of that year consisted in 1869 of one Englishman, one Hindu, and two Musalmans. Up to 1838 the Musalmans were almost as numerous as the Hindus and English put together, the proportion being six of the former to seven of both the latter. . . . Even as late as 1851 the Muhammadans . . . equal[led] the whole number of the English and Hindu pleaders put together. From 1851 the scene changes. A new order of men began to come to the front. Different tests of fitness were exacted, and the list shows that out of two hundred and forty natives admitted from 1852 to 1868, two hundred and thirty-nine were Hindus, and only one a Musalman. It matters not to what department of the Profession I turn, the result is the same. In the Office of the Registrar of the High Court there were in 1869 seventeen *employés* of sufficient standing to have their names published. Six of them were Englishmen or East Indians, eleven were Hindus, and not one was a Musalman. [The same held true of] the articled clerks [among whom, in 1869] were twenty-six Hindus, and again not one Musalman.[190]

A similar tragic fate befell those Muslims occupying the lower echelons in India's legal system, i.e. the *qādīs*, who combined the functions of an ecclesiastical, a civil and a criminal judge.

It was to him that we chiefly trusted to carry on the administration of justice when we first took charge of the country. Our earliest code recognised his importance and confirmed his office, and a long list of twenty-five Regulations touching his duties may still be found in our Indian Statute Books. Indeed, so indispensable is Kāzi to Muhammadan domestic and religious code, that the Law Doctors decided that India would continue a Country of Islam so long as the Kāzis were maintained, and become a country of the Enemy, the moment they were abolished.[191]

In 1864, appointments of these judges by the British India Government

cessed for the reason that their continuance would constitute its "recognition of their sacerdotal character".[192] The older *qāḍīs* retained their posts, but when one among them retired or died, his place remained vacant. The performance of marriage and other ceremonies prescribed by the Islamic Code (the *Sharī'ah*) became impeded. A serious consequence was the impossibility of proving the legality of a (Muslim) marriage and the rise in adultery cases "from 561 in 1862, two years before the discontinuance of the official appointment of Kāzīs, to 1984 in 1866, or two years after that discontinuance."[193] Government "recognition or appointment *is* necessary under a settled civil government like that of British India."[194] Dr. Hunter's view was not only prompted by the difficulties faced by India's Muslim community, but by a problem confronting as a result the British authorities in India : growth of discontentment among the orthodox Muslims who felt that they could not live properly under the British Government, because it obstructed the Islamic way of life by not appointing new *qāḍīs*.

Consequently, India's Muslims lost their monopoly in the five major branches of State employ : the civil administration, revenue, army, police and judiciary. Henceforth, they had to compete with their Hindu compatriots in filling all but the key spots (reserved to Englishmen).

The proportion of Muhammadans to Hindus . . . is now less than one-half ; the proportion of Musalmans to Europeans is less than one-fourteenth. The proportion of the race which a century ago had the monopoly of Government, has now fallen to less than one-twenty-third of the whole administrative body. This, too, in the gazetted appointments, where the distribution of patronage is closely watched. In the less conspicuous office establishments in the Presidency Town, the exclusion of Musalmans is even more complete. In one extensive Department the other day it was discovered that there was not a single *employè* who could read the Musalman dialect ; and, in fact, there is now scarcely a Government office in Calcutta in which a Muhammadan can hope for any post above the rank of porter, messenger, filler of ink-pots and menders of pens.[195]

The few Muslims (of Bengal) qualified to fill civil posts apparently were kept as will. "In short, the Muhammadans have now sunk so low, that even when qualified for Government employ, they are studiously kept out of it by Government notifications. Nobody takes any notice of their helpless condition, and the higher authorities do not deign even to acknowledge their existence."[196]

In the professions also, India's Muslims lagged behind. They no longer met the requirements of the changed (westernised) curriculum[197] and hence could not serve as instructors in the public schools. Formerly, they had been in charge of Medicine, but "the Muhammadan Physicians proper are now a small and decaying class". While they are still functioning in Upper India, "in the Bengal Districts they are never met with."[198] Rarely did a

Muslim gentleman's son receive medical training of a western type.

It has been my good fortune to be intimately acquainted with many Hindu doctors whose bearing and whose learning entitle them to the respect due to their noble calling. But I have never met a single Musalman doctor of this class. Such men may exist in Northern India, but in Bengal the Muhammadans do not seem to aspire to any of the recognised grades of the Medical Profession. In 1869 the statistics stood thus :—Among the Graduates of Medicine in the Calcutta University there were four doctors ; three Hindus, one Englishman, and no Muhammadan. Among eleven Bachelors of Medicine, ten were Hindus and one an Englishman. The hundred and four Licentiates of Medicine consisted of five Englishmen, ninety-eight Hindus, and one solitary Muhammadan. . . . The truth is, that Muhammadans do not consider Medicine as taught in our schools the profession of a gentleman. . . .[199]

The problem was complicated by the fact that Muslims despised the Hindu teachers who had become employed in the public school system.[200] Their own institutions, the *maktabs* ("village schools") and the *madrasahs* (advanced learning centres), were incapable of giving Muslim youth the curriculum responding to new needs. Three main reasons therefor were the lack of training in the western sciences had by the teachers, an old-fashioned curriculum and disinterest, if not open hostility, manifested by the Indo-Muslim intellectual elite at that time towards a curricular modernisation, which would have implied the addition of novel scientific subjects. The *Madrasah* at Calcutta, founded by Warren Hastings in 1781, floundered, partly because of poor Muslim management and partly because its curriculum no longer fitted the changed conditions of life in India :

Persian and Arabic remained the sole subjects of instruction, long after Persian and Arabic had ceased to be the bread-winners in official life. . . . In 1826 . . . an English class was formed, but unhappily soon afterwards broken up. Three years afterwards, another . . . effort was made, but with inadequate results. During the next quarter of a century, the Muhammadan College shared the fate of the Muhammadan community. It was allowed to drop out of sight ; and when the Local Government made any sign on the subject, it was some expression of impatience at its continuing to exist at all.

Furthermore, sums which formerly would have been used for building Muslim educational institutions, defrayed instead the expenses incurred in the erection of English schools.[201] Insufficiently trained in English, local languages, modern sciences and methods, India's Muslims were unable to compete with the better prepared Hindus for Government and professional posts. Consequently, that group which for centuries had been India's administrators, faded from civil and non-civil employ.

In searching for the source of the decay suffered by Indian Islam, Dr Hunter enunciated the question which has vaxed leaders of successive

Indo-Muslim generations :

How comes it that the Muhammadan population is thus shut out alike from official employ and from the recognised professions? . . . The Government has covered Bengal with schools, and many of its Districts are peopled with Muhammadans ; yet the Government schools fail to develop a class of Musalmans who can compete successfully at the University, or find an entrance into any of the professions. The same schools send forth every year a vast body of well-read, ambitious and intellectual Hindu youths, who distinguish themselves as young men at the University, and in after life monopolise every avenue to wealth or distinction.[202]

The reason, he thought, was that the Hindus learned English and India's Muslims did not. "Under Muhammadan Rule the Hindus accepted their fate exactly as they have done under our own. At present preferment depends upon a knowledge of English, and they learn English. Formerly, preferment depended upon a knowledge of Persian, and they learned Persian." Both are foreign languages to him, which explains his indifference. He learns them only "as a means of preferment".[203]

Unlike the Hindus, India's Muslims abstained from the British educational system, because they had their own, which inculcated, unlike the western curriculum, Islamic principles. They had an emotional attachment to Arabic, the language in which their Bible had been revealed, as well as to Persian, a semi-sacred tongue particularly for the Shīʿite segment among them. Prayers had to be said in Arabic, "and this our schools have never recognised."[204] In fact, "Persian is a language unknown even in our higher class District schools."[205]

Was it essentially the unsuitability of the British educational system which lay at the root of the decay of Indian Islam? "The truth is, that our system of public instruction, which has awakened the Hindus from the sleep of centuries, and quickened their inert masses with some of the noble impulses of a nation, is opposed to the traditions, unsuited to the requirements, and hateful to the religion, of the Musalmans."[206]

Secular education, introduced by the British into India, did not provide its Muslims with religious instruction, which they needed to perform the duties imposed by their faith.[207] Dr Hunter's admission that no provisions responding to Muslim needs had been made by the British in the educational system they set up, constitutes his agreement with the accusations made by Indian Islam that its degeneration was primarily the fault of the authorities.

For there is no use shutting our ears to the fact that the Indian Muhammadans arraign us on a list of charges as serious as has ever been brought against a Government. They accuse us of having closed every honourable walk of life to professors of their creed. They accuse us of having introduced a system of education which leaves their whole community

unprovided for, and which has landed it in contempt and beggary. They accuse us of having brought misery into thousands of families, by abolishing their Law Officers, who gave the sanction of religion to the marriage tie, and who from time immemorial have been the depositaries and administrators of the Domestic Law of Islam. They accuse us of imperilling their souls, by denying them the means of performing the duties of their faith. Above all, they charge us with deliberate malversation of their religious foundations, and with misappropriation on the largest scale of their educational funds. . . . In a word, the Indian Musalmans arraign the British Government for its want of sympathy, for its want of magnanimity, for its mean malversation of their funds, and for great public wrongs spread over a period of one hundred years.[208]

The thread of religion runs through these accusations. It was the cornerstone of Muslim education, which the British ignored. Secular instruction failed, essentially, because it was wholly disassociated from Islam.

At one point, Dr Hunter asserts that "for this decay, we are not entirely to blame."[209] Was Muslim stubbornness involved ? "Had the Musalmans been wise," he wrote, "they would have perceived the change, and accepted their fate. But," he added, "an ancient conquering race cannot easily divest itself of the traditions of its nobler days."[210] The authorities failed to understand the distress inflicted as a result of these two important factors : reduction of former rulers to a subordinate role and equalisation with their erstwhile subjects. Elsewhere, Dr Hunter states : "Any answer based on their own degeneracy is a *petitio principii*, for their degeneracy is but one of the results of our political ignorance and neglect."[211] This critique by an Englishman of his compatriots' policy toward Indian Islam is supplemented by another : "Hitherto the English in India have been but poor Iconoclasts after all.[212] No stronger admission of guilt can be made !

In expiation for past wrongs, Dr Hunter suggested the appointment of Muslim teachers (*maulawīs*) "to each of the District Government Schools," who "should instruct in the usual branches of education through the Urdu vernacular and give a thorough knowledge of that language, besides an acquaintance with Persian, and perhaps a little Arabic." He expressed the hope that "the prevailing tone of a District Government School might" induce the attending Muslim students to learn English as well.[213] He furthermore suggested the re-organisation of the Muslim College study course (at Hugli or at Calcutta) where "an unbroken curriculum" would lead from "the Lower or Anglo-Persian" to the "Upper or . . . Anglo-Arabic" branch so that what is learned in the first will not be forgotten in the second level. Muslim Law should also be taught, because its absence from the curriculum would antagonise Muslim students ; yet, to be kept separate, for inclusion in it would be unwise as "the Muhammadan Law means the Muhammadan religion," which should not be imparted to Hindu and Christian students.[214]

In concluding this discussion, it may be said that Dr Hunter acknowledged religion to be the primary cause of Indo-Muslim decline. The British did not follow up his suggestions for educational reform. The burden of arousing the Indian Musalman from his inertia and lifting him out of his morass fell upon the shoulders of his co-religionist countryman : Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān.

Chapter II

THE GROWTH OF MODERNISM IN INDO-ISLAMIC THOUGHT

SIR SAYYID AḤMAD KHĀN, FOUNDER OF THE ALIGARH MOVEMENT AND HIS ASSOCIATES

1. *Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān* (*1817-98*)

Years of Childhood and Youth (*1817-36*). Sayyid Aḥmad Khān was born into a noble Muslim family[1] at Delhi, the old Mughal capital,[2] on 17 October 1817. His father, Mīr Muttaqī, continued the family connections with the Mughal Court,[3] but his interest in the dervish orders overshadowed his concern with State affairs. He was a disciple of Shāh Ghulām 'Alī of Delhi, a famed Naqshbandī[4] saint and founder of the Bēnawā order.[5] Aḥmad's mother also came of a high-class Muslim family and was an educated and pious lady. Her relatives followed the teachings of Shāh 'Abd al-'Azīz, head of a school which taught "the reformist near-Wahhābī tradition of Shāh Walī Allāh."[6]

The boy was first taught (by a governess) the three R's as well as the Qur'ān. He then was sent to a Muslim primary school (*maktab*) where he learned some Persian, Arabic and mathematics.[7] In addition, he received religious instruction, attending first Shāh Ghulām 'Alī's "school" (*khānqāh*) and, later, the institution run by Shāh 'Abd al-'Azīz.[8] This was all the formal education had by Sayyid Aḥmad Khān. At home and in school he was exposed to two divergent and opposite religious currents : mysticism and Wahhābism. His insistence subsequently on reform may be derived from his Wahhābi heritage, while his views on devotional duties were shaped by his training in mysticism.

Early Adulthood (*1837-57*). Sayyid Aḥmad's[9] carefree youth ended with his father's death (in 1838). Aged twenty-one, he was forced to make a living, as the emoluments his mother received from the Mughal Court were minimal.[10] He entered into East India Company service as a record-writer (*sarishtadār*) in the Criminal Department of the Court of Justice at Delhi. He thereby severed the (thin) relations with the palace. The principal reasons for his reversing the family tradition probably were : his father's earlier lack of interest in politics (a gradual rejection of connections with the Mughal Court during Aḥmad's boyhood) ; his own realisation that the dynasty's days were numbered ; a young man's fascination with the

foreigner's novel ways ; the influence of an uncle (Khalīl Ullāh Khān), who was a subordinate judge (*ṣadr-amīn*) in East India Company service and introduced his young relative to the Delhi Court of Justice.[11]

Whatever prompted his decision, Aḥmad had the courage to break entirely the palace connections, facing his relatives' criticisms, for the British were suspect in Indo-Muslim eyes and the Mughal Court was still in evidence. A few years after he had joined the Company, he was appointed (in 1841) subordinate judge (*munṣif*) at Fatehpur Sikri (Agra District). By the time the Mutiny broke out, he had been promoted to *ṣadr-amīn*,[12] which post he held during that year at Bijnore. He was then forty years old and had been in Company service for nearly two decades.

While engaged in judicial activities, he began to write on miscellaneous subjects.[13] Among the best known of his early works is an archaeological book, entitled "Description of Old Monuments" (*Āthār al-Ṣanādīd*, 1847), immortalising Dehli's ancient buildings and its famous residents of yore. It expresses his yearning for the greatness of a vanished era in India's history, which echoes also in his "Institutes of Akbar" (*Ā'īn-i-Akbarī*), a recension (written in 1856) of this Emperor's administrative-statistical record.[14]

His biographer, Ḥālī,[15] has opinioned that the Mutiny awakened the romantically inclined Sayyid Aḥmad Khān to the realities of his own time.[16] He meant thereby that the Mutiny was a turning point in Aḥmad's career, because it shocked him into the awareness that the splendorous Mughal era had ended. It forced him to concentrate on the present. Sir Sayyid's despair[17] can be gauged from his admission (made in 1889) that he had planned to leave his homeland during the upheaval and emigrate to Egypt :

> At that time I considered it to be impossible that our people would prosper again, and would receive esteem any more ; and I could not bear to behold the condition of the people. For some days I remained in this state of confusion and affliction. You may feel certain that this affliction made me old and turned my hair grey.[18]

Sayyid Aḥmad decided, nevertheless, not to run away, but to face the unhappy situation. Henceforth, he devoted himself indefatigably to improving the lot of his coreligionists. Undoubtedly, his post-Mutiny efforts can be seen as an attempt to re-attain the greatness which the Indo-Muslim community utterly had lost.

He received a pension from the British for the courage and loyalty he had displayed during the Mutiny by sending European residents of Bijnore to Meerut, thus saving their lives. He was also granted the title of "Companion of the Star of India".

The Decade of Transition (*1858-69*). The Mutiny forced Sir Sayyid to appraise the needs particularly of India's Musalmans, who suffered more

than any group from decay. He pursued three modes of activity towards this end : theological study, educational endeavours, and political defence.

During the immediate post-Mutiny years, Sayyid Aḥmad made two new theological attempts. First, he re-read the Qur'ān so as to better apprehend its genuine teachings and meanings for the new age. Second, he began to study the Old and New Testaments. He engaged a person versed in English to translate the important portions of these Holy Books and a Jew to teach him Hebrew. The purpose was not solely to meet the missionaries on their own ground, or to give his coreligionists a better insight into Christian and Jewish doctrines, but also to investigate the principles giving elasticity and vitality to, and enabling the progress of, Western peoples. However, for the time being, he remained an orthodox Muslim with regard to his religious beliefs for even in such a work as his "Commentary on the Two Testaments" (*Tabyīn al-Kalām*, 1862),[19] he did not stress evolution. Nevertheless, new ideas were germinating, but they were not to ripen and find expression until in later years.

In the educational field, however, he did advocate a new trend, characterised by his insistence that India's Muslims learn English and the sciences. It signalled a deviation from the traditional Islamic curriculum. According to his own statement, it was only after 1857 that he became convinced that the Indo-Muslim community could not be reactivated until and unless its members learned western sciences and English.[20] He founded various schools as well as a Scientific Society for translation purposes.[21] Acknowledging his distinguished contributions to Indian enlightenment,[22] the British Crown bestowed a gold medal upon him (in November 1866).

He earned the authorities' recognition despite a series of writings combatting their conviction—expressed by Dr Hunter—that India's Muslims bore the main guilt for the Mutiny.[23]

Despite all these undertakings, Sayyid Aḥmad Khān had continued his official legal duties and been promoted to chief judge (*ṣadr-ul-ṣadūr*). He had been transferred several times, at first to Ghazipur (1863-4), then to Aligarh (1864-7) and subsequently to Benares (1867-9). Owing to his efforts, a Homoeopathic[24] Dispensary and Hospital was opened at the last-named city (on 26 September 1867).

It had been a decade of stirring activity, which ended with his European journey. He had decided to have his two sons educated at Cambridge.[25] Accordingly, the forty-two-year-old father boarded ship with them (in 1869) and was off on a trip that took him to London and Paris, at a time when the age of liberalism prevailed in Western Europe. Charles Robert Darwin (1809-82) had published his *Origin of Species* in 1859—only a decade prior to Sir Sayyid's visit—and it had created a furore in European

learned circles. Furthermore, such writers as the Frenchman Emile Zola (1840-1902) and the Englishman Charles Dickens (1812-70) were fierce critics of the social scene and their works engendered increasing public demands for reforms. He visited Cambridge, a great centre of liberal arts studies. He met with some of the foremost literati, and witnessed for himselt the influences of rationalist thinking that profoundly influenced the cultural climate of nineteenth-century Europe. The general education had by Westerners of both sexes astounded him. Maids and hackney drivers read the newspapers, females worked as saleswomen and secretaries. He grumbled that India, in comparison, was most backward. He admired the excellent workmanship, the thoroughness, with which a job was done, and declared that they "'are the results of education and civilization.'" He expressly wrote: "'This is entirely due to the education of men and women. . . . If Hindustanis can only attain to civilization, it will probably, owing to its many excellent natural powers, become, if not the superior, at least the equal of England.'"[26]

It attests to his faith in India's inherent and latent powers and his conviction that, when resuscitated, his native land[27] will be great again. The pride in his own heritage is displayed also in his *Essays on the Life of Mohammed*, which he wrote while in London.[28]

The European journey gave Sir Sayyid a deep respect for western civilisation, but it also intensified his urge to improve his country's (and particularly his coreligionists') condition. It broadened his vista and crystallised his views on the *via renovationis* to be trodden by his community. This, in itself, implied an optimistic assurance that it could be reborn and might attain its former excellence.

The Path of Renovation (1870-98). The impact made upon Sir Sayyid by European liberalism expressed itself in his attempts at religious and social reforms. Upon his return (to Benares) toward the end of 1870, he resumed his judgeship and, at the same time, launched an Urdu journal called the "Refinement of Morals" (*Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq*).[29] Devoted to social improvement, it contained nevertheless articles demanding a change in the religious attitude held by Indian Islam. Its purpose was announced by Sayyid Aḥmad Khān in its first number (dated 24 December 1870) as follows: "'The aim of publishing this periodical is to make the Muslims of India desirous of the best kind of civilization, so that it shall remove the contempt with which civilized peoples regard the Muslims, and the latter shall become reckoned among the respected and civilized people in the world'."[30]

The reason for this low esteem was due, he felt, to Islam's adoption of old Jewish stories, Roman Catholic doctrines, and Hindu rites, which debased the faith. The task was, therefore, to see "'in which way we should

abolish everything which harms and obstructs civilization.'" He demanded purification (revealing his Wahhābī training), hoping thus to rediscover Islam's genuine character.

According to Ḥālī :

bit by bit its effect was seen in a limited circle of Muslims. Illiterate people, who always outnumber educated people in a declining community, did not even know wherefrom the *Tahzīb al-Akhlāq* was derived. Over the Maulwīs and preachers also it could not breathe a spell, because they thought that it was not only injurious to religion, but perhaps also to their position. It was very difficult to bring it to the notice of the nobility, for it was as hard to show them that the Muslims were going backwards as it is to warn water-fowl of a tempest. So the influence of the *Tahzīb al-Akhlāq* was restricted to middle-class people who were neither ignorant, nor yet skilled in all sciences.[31]

This statement must not be underrated, because the middle class be-became the chief agent in the modification of the Indo-Muslim attitude. It also stimulated the development of Urdu prose.

Henceforth, Sir Sayyid was the foremost champion of reason (*'aql*) *versus* traditionalism (*taqlīd*) in Islamic India. He gave his views final theological formulation in his "Commentary on the Qur'ān" (*Tafsīr al-Qur'ān*) and his "Writing on the Principles of Exegesis" (*Taḥrīr fī 'uṣul al-tafsīr*), written towards the end of his life.[32]

His educational activities, also, were directed towards ensuring that western sciences and the English language were imparted to the Indo-Muslim student body. They were crowned with the erection of the Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh (in 1875),[33] to which city he again was transferred.

He had been forced meanwhile to resume his coreligionists' defence by writing a *Review* (1873) of Dr Hunter's *The Indian Musalmans*. They had no stauncher defender than Sir Sayyid.

In 1876, Sayyid Aḥmad Khān relinquished his judgeship, retiring after thirty-eight years of service at the age of fifty-nine. Two years later, however, he was appointed as a member of the Legislative Council, continuing in this post until 1883.

He was made Knight Commander of the Star of India (in 1888), the Crown's formal acknowledgment of his unflinching loyalty to it and of his energetic dedication to his coreligionist countrymen's welfare. This devotion not only was expressed by his attempts at their defence, at building up friendship between them and the British, but also at the protection of their political interests. After the Indian National Congress had been founded (in 1885), Sir Sayyid came to believe that it would not act as spokesman for Indian Islam. He therefore set up (in 1889) the

Upper India Muhammadan Defence Association to present Indo-Muslim wishes on their own and the country's behalf to the British.

During the decade left to him, he looked after Aligharh's interests and continued with his theological work. He died—an honoured man—in 1898. Apart from his official position as judge, he was primarily an educator; his theological efforts mainly were aimed at making the Indo-Muslim mind more receptive to the new spirit of the time

Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, the Theologian. Sir Sayyid's theological development permits a division into three periods, as follows: (1) Sir Sayyid, the orthodox Muslim (1837-57); (2) Sir Sayyid, the apologist (1858-69); (3) Sir Sayyid, the modernist (1870-98).

(1) *Sir Sayyid, the Orthodox Muslim (1837-57).* Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's earliest religious work[34] was a brief biography of the Prophet Muḥammad, entitled "Delight of the hearts in remembering the Beloved" (*Jilā al-qulūb bi dhikr al-maḥbūb*, 1842). Its purpose was to give a factual account of Muḥammad's life over against the many elegiac-like tracts written on him.[35] A similar stress on historical veracity is found in "A Treatise on Ḥasan" (*Tuḥfah Ḥasan*, 1844), a defence of Abū Bakr against Shī'ite libels. In two later tracts, entitled "Truthful Treaching" (*Kalimat al-Ḥaqq*, 1849) and "Explanation of the Shaikh's Mystical Practices" (*Namīqā dar bayān-i-mas'alah-i-taṣawwur i Shaikh*, 1852), he criticises respectively the excesses and magical practices found in Sufism.[36] In yet another, called the "Way of the Sunnah and the Rejection of Innovations" (*Rāh i Sunnat dar radd-i-bi'dat*, 1850), written against the (extremist) Wahhābīs, he advances the view that those practices which they regard as innovations go back in most cases to the *sunnah* ("custom") of the Prophet and his Companions. The series ended with an Urdu translation of portions from al-Ghazālī's "Chemistry of Happiness" (*Kīmiyā al-sa'ādah*, 1853).

These treatises show that Sir Sayyid dealt with traditional Islamic subjects, which he discussed in a manner acceptable to orthodoxy. Nevertheless, he was advocating already a more realistic approach to spiritual matters. It implied that he was unwilling even at this time to accept everything that went by the name of religion unless it had a quality of truthfulness about it. Can this inclination be regarded as the first glimmer of his later modernist views?—only perhaps in so far as his stress on truth is concerned. For he said later that if a pious man insists on something that science has shown to be false, science and not the religious person must be believed. But in no way did his approach at this early time exhibit the theological position which would eventually mark him as a modernist.

The emphasis on truth, which has a purificationist tendency, reflects the Wahhābī influences to which he was exposed as a child. It is true that 'Abd

al-Wahhāb had rejected mysticism altogether and that Sayyid Aḥmad Khān contented himself mainly with attempting to correct its extremes. He followed, therefore, rather the Indo-Muslim reformer, Shāh Walī Ullāh (in whose school of thought he had been trained), who had not gone as far as 'Abd al-Wahhāb.[37] Rather, he criticised the mystics for their exclusive reliance on intuitional knowledge. Shāh Walī Ullāh had taken the Indian Muslims to task, however, for their adoption of polytheism (a theme expressed by Sir Sayyid in the first issue of his *Tahdhīb*) and the 'ulamā' for their ultra-conservatism (an accusation subsequently levelled at them by Sir Sayyid). He had re-stated, furthermore, Islam's fundamental principles and advocated the opening of the "door of independent thinking" (*bāb-i-ijtihād*), whose "closing" centuries ago, he felt, contributed to the decay.

Sir Sayyid advanced these same views and while he did not give full theological expression to them at this early stage, nevertheless they must have been germinating in his mind. He confessed during his last years that he was a " 'Wahhābī multiplied'. "[38] In other words, the reformist conceptions, infused during his school years and found in his first writings, were preliminary to, and facilitated the formulation of, his subsequent modernist theology. Nevertheless, he did not deviate at first from accepted standards of belief, and for the time being, at least, remained an orthodox (and unknown) Muslim.

(2) *Sir Sayyid, the Apologist* (*1858-69*). During the years immediately following the Mutiny, Sir Sayyid's theological endeavours pertained not solely to Islamic, but also to other, subjects. While in Moradabad,[39] for instance, he had learned that certain of its districts poured out Muslim literature using the word *Naṣārā* in the meaning of "Nazarene" to express contempt for the Christian authorities whose rulership they resented.[40] He took up his pen and wrote that this term was translated erroneously and that its proper origin was *naṣr* ("help") rather than *Nāṣara* ("Nazareth").[41] He supported his thesis by the following quotation from the Qur'ān : "And when Jesus perceived unbelief on their part, he said : 'Who my helpers with God ?' The apostless said, 'We will be God's helpers ! . . . ' " (iii. 45).[42]

He tried to show that Christians had heeded God's call to aid others regardless of their faith. His exegesis served to point out that the Qur'ān accepted the Christians as believers and that the Muslims had no reason to apply this derogative word and feel superior to them. Perhaps, it was also a hint that this attitude reflected ingratitude towards those who came voluntarily as their "helpers".

Sir Sayyid thus expressed a tolerant view towards Christianity.[43] Undoubtedly, he regarded it (after the first shock since 1857 was over) as a saving power in the sense that it brought the new Western civilisation to

India, permitting its people to get acquainted with it. The political motif was not absent, as the chief aim of his philological exposition was reconciliation between his Muslim countrymen and the British. He formulated it, however, in religious terms.

His "Commentary on the Two Testaments"[44] was written to gain a firsthand understanding of Jewish and Christian Holy Writ. It was a novel idea as he was the first Muslim to engage in writing a Commentary on Scriptures other than the Qur'ān. Until its publication (in 1862), few Muslims, engaged in theological disputes with Christians, had had any *direct* knowledge of the Two Testaments, as the subject had been imparted by missionaries, that is, received secondhand. In this work, Sir Sayyid not only sets forth the Judaeo-Christian views, but presents an exegesis as close to Muslim theological conceptions as possible. "To this end he quotes in columns side by side with the Bible-text sayings derived from Koran and Ḥadīth which are of similar content."[45] It, also, reflects an intermediate approach as is seen, for instance, from his exposition of *taḥrīf*.[46] He refused to accept that the Jews and Christians had twisted Scripture and furthermore rejected the opinion of those Muslims holding that incorrect exegesis rather than the actual changing of the text was involved. He thereby followed neither the Qur'ān nor even the more liberal-minded Muslim scholars. Another instance of his intermediate position is his statement that the resting day, described in *Genesis*, 2 : 2, agrees with Sūrah x. 3 : "Verily your Lord is God Who hath made the Heavens and the Earth in six days—then mounted his throne to rule all things. . . ."

His stress, nevertheless, was not, as in Judaeo-Christian exegesis, on God's resting during the seventh day—which seems neither to be implied in the verse quoted—but on the completion of the world's creation by the end of the sixth day. In this respect, he follows general Muslim opinion.

In conformity with Qur'ānic teaching, Sir Sayyid rejected the Christian doctrine of sin (implied in the Fall), giving as reason that Adam was a prophet and, like all prophets, infallible. God's decree that he and Eve should not eat from the tree was issued solely for their welfare; that is, it must be regarded as an ethical, not a legal, injunction. Had they not eaten from its fruit, they would have remained unaware of good and evil and not have become responsible for their actions. By their contrary conduct, they inclined to sin with harmful consequences to themselves. Their sinful act did not devolve upon their descendants. Sir Sayyid thus followed Qur'ānic doctrine.[47]

The ethical precept that man must love his enemy (*St Matthew*, 5: 44) was rejected by some Muslims as unnatural. Sir Sayyid countered their criticism by pointing to the prime example given by Jesus as well as many

Muslims. If they adhered to this rule, how can it be said to be impracticable? It reflects his non-militant attitude, which he displayed also in his insistence that India's Muslims generally were not guilty of subversion.[48] He joined in the historical dispute, raging in his time, concerning the origin and authorship of the *Gospel of St Matthew*. He took the side of those Western scholars believing that it had a Hebrew origin,[49] but he disagreed with Bible critics who rejected the authorship traditionally ascribed to this Gospel and doubted the authenticity of certain Biblical passages.[50] His opposition stemmed partly from his traditionalist background and from his personal attitude. The Islamic world did not then (or now) accept Biblical criticism. Sir Sayyid, himself, feared that it might call into question equally certain passages found in the Qur'ān, weakening thereby its and Muḥammad's status. He firmly adhered to the Islamic doctrine that the Qur'ān is Allah's "word"[51] so that it is inviolable. He never changed his view on this issue for he repudiated equally the doctrine of abrogation formulated by the Muslim theologians.[52]

What conclusions can be drawn from his exposition in the *Tabyīn al-Kalām*? First, the theological views he presented therein are generally consonant with Muslim belief. He adhered to them throughout his life. Second, it enabled him to refute firmly Christian contentions about Islam, for the study which it had necessitated had given him direct knowledge of at least certain Scriptural portions. Also, other Muslims now gained more accurate information which strengthened at once their knowledge of the Old and New Testaments and their argumentation. Third, he tried to show that Christianity and Islam were not as far apart as thought, i.e. he advocated an amelioration between these two antagonistic groups. Despite his assumption of a more critical attitude towards Christianity in his (later) "Commentary on the Qur'ān," he pursued the policy of conciliation until his death. Fourth, the *Tabyīn al-Kalām* did not contain any terms (such as "natural religion," "the law of nature," *et al.*) found in the *Tafsīr*. It did not (unlike the *Tafsīr*) constitute a break with Islamic traditional theology. Lastly, it served an apologetic cause, because it tried to show that the Islamic faith was equal to Christianity and Judaism. Was it not, however, already an attempt to discover the inner springs of Western civilisation? It must be kept in mind that the "Commentary on the Two Testaments" was written at a time when new ideas began to germinate. It may be regarded, perhaps, as a soliloquy initiating the process of a radical turn of mind.

(3) *Sir Sayyid, the Modernist* (*1870-98*). It is after his European journey that Sir Sayyid began to present theological ideas which were at sharp variance with those to which the Indo-Muslim community adhered.

The trip had taught him that traditionalism—not Islam—kept his people back.

This opinion is implicitly present in his first (apologetic) work dating from this period : *"Essays on the Life of Mohammed"* (1870). It was written in reply to an Englishman's rejection of Islamic civilisation as inferior to that produced by Western Europe.[53] Sir Sayyid countered it by stating, for instance, that the greatest contribution made by Islam to (Protestant) Christianity was that religion's resistance to papal power.[54] His conviction that his faith was and is beneficial to mankind assured him that it was not responsible for the Indo-Muslim decay. Perhaps, the earliest theological formulation of the distinction he made between tradition and religion is found in a letter written on 21 January 1870 (that is, immediately upon his return to India) to Muḥsin al-Mulk, an Indo-Muslim advocate of traditionalism : " 'If people do not shun blind adherence, if they do not seek specially that light which can be found in the Qur'ān and the indisputable Ḥadīth, and do not adjust religion and the sciences of today, Islam will become extinct in India.' "[55]

Sir Sayyid had concluded that the Indian Musalman could not progress unless it was shown that either scientific principles are false or Islam does not oppose them. This is what he said in a speech given in 1884 :

Today we are, as before, in need of a modern ilm al-kalām, by which we should either refute doctrines of modern sciences or undermine their foundations, or show that they are in conformity to propagate those sciences amongst the Muslims, about which I have just stated how much they disagree with the present-day Islam, then it is my duty to defend as much as I can the religion of Islam, rightly or wrongly, and to reveal to the people the original bright face of Islam. My conscience tells me that if I should not do so, I would stand as a sinner before God.[56]

Meanwhile, he had completed the first two volumes of his *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān* and was busy writing the third.[57] It was meant to supplant the "existing commentaries with their pre-occupation on trivia"[58], and together with his *Taḥrīr fī uṣūl al-tafsīr*, to present to his coreligionists a new theology based on Qur'ānic principles.

It is founded on certain fundamental assumptions, namely, God's existence (*maujūd*) and self-existence (*wājib al-wujūd*), unity, eternity, primacy ; His creation (of the universe and all creatures) ; revelation (of the Qur'ān) ; Muḥammad's prophethood and its finality. In accepting these theological propositions as truths, Sir Sayyid conformed with Qur'ānic teachings.

His stress on (1) reason as the knower of God's existence ; (2) God as First Cause; (3) the identity between God's creation (nature and the natural

laws) and His word (the Qur'ān) is not essesentially contrary to accepted Islamic doctrine, because the primary nature of Divinity and His revelation, implied in the third point, constitutes the "first pillar" of the faith. Islamic rationalism (Mu'tazilism) developed during the Middle Ages through Greek influence, emphasised furthermore the first two points, although it lost out for being too radical an orientation.[59] It was Sir Sayyid's treatment and analysis of the three cited topics rather than the substance underlying them, which encountered such great opposition. The more datailed discussion, which now follows, will show the reasons for it.

(1) *Reason is the Knower of God's Existence*. God is known to exist, a presupposition affirmed by reason which declares, nevertheless that His nature remains unknowable.

The positive and negative attributes of God, the creating essence (*Dhāt Bārī*) which are stated in the Qur'ān are all true and right, but to know the exact state of these attributes is beyond human intellect. . . .[60]

Sir Sayyid transgressed orthodox boundaries by making reason affirm faith (rather than faith being reason's supporter) and by insisting that man cannot perceive the Divine nature. Inasmuch as he calls the Divine attributes "the creating essence," implying, as did the Mu'tazilites, that they are not distinct from God's nature, the conclusion is : "The attributes of the Creator are the essence itself. . . ."[61] This view has its roots in a philosophical problem, viz. the unity *versus* the duality of existence. He accepted the thesis of duality in the sense that the created are separate from the Creator, a view held by Shaikh Aḥmad Sirhindī (1564-1624)[62] in contradistinction to the monistic doctrine, called "unity of existence," expounded by the Muslim mystic, Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn 'Arabī (1165-1240).[63] Sir Sayyid clearly did not subscribe to the doctrine of Divine immanence, of a fusion between the world of man and God, which obliterates the distinction between them. He had three aims in presenting his theories : (*a*) to maintain that faith and reason lead to the same truths; (*b*) to preserve God's uniqueness; and (*c*) His unity.

(*a*) Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's insistence that reason affirmed God's existence was prompted by his desire to see the sciences accepted by his co-religionists, who repudiated them for being non-Islamic. He had to prove that they had a mistaken opinion and tried to show, by theological analysis, that subjects based on rational inquiry, did not teach anything that could be considered inimical to the Qur'ānic precepts. He thus hoped to attain their approval and uplift.

(*b*) He stated that man was not made in God's image, but in His shadow, *Genesis, 1 : 26* :

clearly shows that God is not to be regarded as a human body with

hands, feet, eyes, nose and ears, but that man, being created in the shadow of God (and consequently of very little worth when compared to Him) bears in a very slight proportion, certain resemblance to Him in attributes such as knowledge, mercy, sovereignty, intelligence, justice, power, etc.[64]

His negation of any physical resemblance between man and his Creator may reflect a profound sense of humility. The depersonalisation was primarily intended, however, against the anthropomorphic conception of the Deity. Sir Sayyid followed neither the Qur'ān nor traditional Muslim theology, but was influenced rather by Mu'tazilite doctrine.

(*c*) Involved is the preservation of God's unity. The Qur'ān decrees: "God is only one God!" (iv. 169).[65] However, it also states that Allah possesses knowledge, power, compassion (lix. 22, 23, 24), but does not clearly define the mode of relationship between the Deity and His attributes. Various speculative theories consequently were developed by the Muslim theologians to solve the problem. Sir Sayyid (following the Mu'tazilites) held that they form part of the Divine essence.[66] The *'ulamā'* (adhering to Ash'arite doctrine) accept all anthropomorphisms as literally true without inquiring (*bila kayf*) into how this can be so.[67] The latter approach was inconsistent with Sir Sayyid's rationalist inclination. He repudiated it, but nevertheless followed a current within Islam which, as stated, was rejected by Muslim orthodoxy centuries ago.

(2) *God, the First Cause.* " 'Amongst all the attributes which we ascribe to His nature, there are only two, from which the issues are so manifest that—although their real *modus* remains concealed for us—yet everyone observes them and nobody can deny them, viz. (1) the attribute of being the First Cause, (2) the attribute of being the Creator."[68]

This scholastic formulation was quite unlike the Qur'ān in its formal theological aspect, presenting God as the First Cause, with the implication that He is a remote Being (conforming with Sir Sayyid's view that God's nature is unknowable). It reflects the medieval Muslim rationalist arguments which, themselves, were influenced by the Aristotelian tradition. However, Mu'tazilism lost out in an environment influenced by Sufism with its anti-philosophical mood and its stress on God's immediacy. Standing in this "pietist" tradition, the Muslim theologians criticised Sir Sayyid chiefly because his is a distant, and hence inactive, Deity, and his doctrine of the First Cause is held by the "Materialists". He, himself, summed up their first argument as follows:

Very pious, but less thoughtful, divines have the idea that if the world were running according to laws of Nature and nothing could oppose them, then, creation having once been created, nothing would be left to God to do, even if He Himself had created those laws. So what does a god mean to us who has become dethroned and inactive ? . . . Those people always put

forward notions and analogies derived from daily life in connection with the nature of God. They see that a watchmaker, as soon as the watch is functioning, has nothing more to do with it. . . . On this analogy they declare that naturally if God Himself constructs laws of Nature according to which the world will run, then no work is left to Him and what does He mean to us ?[69]

Sir Sayyid countered it by saying that everything depends on the First Cause ; if it lost this connection, it could not exist, because the chain of cause and effect generated by the laws of nature would be ruptured. " 'So if God were inactive, the whole world would perish and it would not even one second longer exist'. "[70] His statement seemingly echoes the Ash'arite theory that all events are (immediately)[71] caused by Allah and (contrary to the *Mutakallimūn*, who stressed God's will), emphasised cause and effect as a necessity. Sir Sayyid could not emphasise God's immediacy, as it would have meant acceptance of anthropomorphism, which he rejected. Yet, he had to show that there was some relationship between God and the physical world ; not to do so ultimately would have indicated a denial of His existence. He was not prepared to go that far.

Another implication is the doctrine of continuous creation (held also by the *Mutakallimūn*). The Qur'ān asserts : "We created the heavens and the earth and all that is between them in six days, and no weariness touched us" (l. 37).

It postulates that creation (*ex nihilo*) occurred during a six-day period, negating the resting day.[72] On these three points Sir Sayyid is orthodox. But the Qur'ān does not say that God is creating continuously. Could Sir Sayyid have been influenced in his theory also by Reform Judaism,[73] which (unlike Jewish and Islamic orthodoxy) stresses continuous creation ?[74]

Sir Sayyid repudiated the second charge, namely, that he presented a materialist doctrine, by stating that science has proven matter to be in existence first. He apparently did not accept the then current scientific view that matter contains a high percentage of hydrogen and that its peculiar nature enables the formation of atoms.

But I and probably all the Muslims believe that matter also was created, and that God who is the First Cause, created it. . . . No explanation can be given for this : how those atoms which resemble each other, and belong to the same group, become more united to each other, and how it can happen that by a special combination they take here the shape of a mountain and there that of a river or an ocean. . . . This shows that there must exist a Great and Wise One who has the power to combine those atoms in such many ways.[75]

Does his emphasis on the mysterious reflect the Ash'arite precept that man must not ask himself how certain things can be possible ? As an advo-

cate of scientific enlightenment, it would appear to be a contradiction if he had admitted that reason must not probe the unknown, and must be content with acknowledging God's omnipotence. Sir Sayyid's statement may well represent the boundaries of his progressivism or, possibly, a subtle attempt to appease the *'ulamā'*. The former is more likely, as it explains the resulting contradiction, noticeable also in his description of the Deity in personal terms, despite his insistence that God is the First Cause. It is contrary to his attempt at depersonalisation.

Elements of Islamic and other sources were fused in this aspect of Sir Sayyid's theology. The Muslim reformer Shāh Walī Ullāh is quoted in the seventh principle to support the thesis of Divine unity—" 'will is identical with essence' "—against the "scholastic dogmatists" (i.e. the *Mutakallimūn*) who hold that the "attributes of the Creator are neither the essence itself nor other than the essence."[76] Despite this criticism, the retionalists influenced him particularly in his emphasis on reason as the determinant of religious truth, his rejection of anthropomorphism and his acceptance of the doctrine of continuous creation. Among the Westerners who had an impact on his thought must be cited Rene Descartes (1596-1650). This French philosopher held that man, not being self-existent (unlike the Creator), must have a cause : God, who, however, cannot be the *immediate* cause of the physical world, as He is incorporeal (Spirit or Mind). Sir Sayyid's symbolism of the watchmaker seems to have been borrowed from Descartes, who posited a mechanistic conception of the universe.

The theory that God's nature cannot be perceived was postulated by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), whose "thing-in-itself" is a transcendental and essentially unknowable entity. He also rejected the anthropomorphic conception, for he regarded Being as Pure Reason, a Final Cause, whose relation to the universe is not causal, because this would imply a notion of a quasi-human Governor.

Finally, the Deists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries held that nature's course sufficiently demonstrates God's existence. They rejected formal religion and supernaturalism. Some among them held that God is aloof from human affairs.

Sir Sayyid thus attempted—not wholly successfully—to assimilate various currents in postulating a mechanistic universe. The theologians, repudiating Islamic and Western rationalism, accused him of presenting a materialistic system in which God was so distant as to be well-nigh beyond human apprehension. They regarded it, rightfully, as utterly un-Qur'anic, for their Scripture does not refer to Allah as the First Cause, a fully transcendent, non-anthropomorphic Being, unconcerned with the terrestrial course of life. Neither does it (as stated) consider creation as His continuous

activity. It projects, furthermore, the possibility of direct communication between man and his God,[77] which cannot be had in a system such as that posited by Sir Sayyid. For all these reasons, the *'ulamā'* fully rejected it.

(3) *God's Creation and Revelation are Identical.* They looked askance also at his theory of the identity between Revelation and Natural Law. It is founded on four main assumptions :

(*a*) *God and His Word* (*the Qur'ān*) *are both true.*[78] If Allah were not "true," then His word becomes questionable. It has been affirmed that He is true. Therefore, the statement that the Qur'ān is untrue is a contradiction. If God is true, His word must be equally true. Were it asserted that God's word is true, then it must necessarily follow that He is also true. For how can an "untrue" God give a "true" revelation ? This would imply that revelation either comes from some other supernatural Being or from a non-Divine source. The first presupposition might lead to polytheism ; the second to a repudiation of God. Both are contrary to Islam, which maintains Allah's existence and revelation. Therefore, He is true and the Qur'ān, being His word, is also true.

(*b*) *God's Work and His Word are true and non-contradictory.* If Allah's word is true, so is His work (creation, the universe with its laws) : " 'The positive and negative attributes of God, the creating essence (*Dhat Bari*) which are stated in the Qur'ān are all true and right. . . .' "[79] He maintains here[80] the Mu'tazilite theory that God has attributes, but they are of His essence. Sir Sayyid did not concern himself with the problem of how God can create without attributes (*modus agentis*). His interest lay in proving that God's word being true, so must be His work. Islam acknowledges Allah to be the Creator of the universe. Inasmuch as it (and its laws) have a divine source, they must be as true as His revelation. ". . . It is not possible that what He declares be opposed to what He has created, or vice-versa. . . . Agreement between the word and work of God is essential. If the word is not according to the work, then such word cannot be the word of God."[81]

Sir Sayyid then interpreted Allah's word by His work. The problem was acute because if the Qur'ān is true, modern scientific discoveries not (explicitly) described by it can be regarded as untrue. Muslim orthodoxy took this standpoint. Sir Sayyid agreed with them that the Qur'ān—being God's word—cannot be false. He, therefore, had to find in it a level of meaning concordant with the (Western) rationalist mood of his day. His solution was to demythologise those passages describing supernatural events (including miracles), which he declared to be "as impossible as the infringement of the verbal promise of God."[82] They are in accordance with "natural law" and, therefore, are not supernatural in nature.[83] An example of his Qur'ānic exegesis is his denial that Moses struck the Red Sea with his staff. Rather

God told Moses : " 'Go through the sea, leaning on your staff ; the sea is split, i.e. there is a ford'."[84] In regarding this as a "natural" occurrence, Sir Sayyid approximated the (modern) Western view that, probably, Moses had reached the Red Sea during ebb tide. The same may be said of his assertion that the "universal extent and height" of the Flood is contrary to the actual event, which was limited in scope.[85] Another instance is his disagreement with traditional belief that the Ptolemaic theory (of the sun's revolution around the earth) is implied in this verse : "Abraham said, 'Since God bringeth the sun from the East, do thou, then, bring it from the West'" (ii. 260). Sir Sayyid's comment was :

"And he (that is Abraham) does not say how God brings the sun from the East, whether by its own turning or by the turning of the earth. So it is absolutely wrong to say that this verse is decisive proof of the revolution of the sun. . . . It was very sensible (for the Prophet) not to discuss questions of this sort, because if these questions were discussed, the people would be troubled with a new problem, and the original intention of the guidance would be lost.[86]

In other words, God's work was not contradicted by the Qur'ān which, in fact, "is far ahead of its time."[87] Sir Sayyid thus affirmed its scientific world-view, its greatness (based on guidance rather than—following traditional opinion—on its unimitable rhetoric and style)[88] and the concord between God's work and word. " 'In our opinion,' " he wrote, " 'the word of God and the creation of God are two synonyms. . . .' "[89] He tried to refute in this fashion theologians' rejection of science for the reason that it contradicts God's word, and the (Indo-Muslim) sceptics' aversion to the Qur'ān as antiquated and, hence, irrelevant to modern times.

(c) *God's "verbal promise" and "operational promise" do not contradict each other.* Allah's assurance of future blessing or punishment constitutes His "verbal promise" ; "the law of nature, upon which this universe is made... is procedural (operational) promise."[90]

The first observation is that Sir Sayyid posited the existence of the "law of nature"[91] He wrote : " 'Making these promises and setting up a universe under a law of nature cannot be contrary to the absoluteness and infinitude of His power.' " If Allah were unable to do either, it would detract from His sovereignty. It must be acknowledged, therefore, that both are within His power.

Secondly, His promise involves creation "after a fixed decree". The synonymity of God's word and His creation "mean that no change can occur in nature."[92] It is an affirmation that the law of nature (that is, the scientific mode of operation)—prearranged by Allah—falls within the Divine order of creation (as does also the "operational promise") While the believer does not reject Allah's "verbal promise," he audaciously repudiates His

"operational promise". This is a contradictory standpoint as both promises are God-given. Acceptance of Allah's "verbal promise" necessarily implies affirmation of His "operational promise" and *vice versa.*

If God broke His "operational promise," it would be "equal to the infringement of the verbal promise (which) cannot happen . . ."[93] It would mean discordance between these two types of promise, which Sir Sayyid considered "impossible," because it would imply that Allah lacked in rationality and perfection. His greatness would be impaired, an untenable viewpoint. Also, it would have upset Sir Sayyid's own theory of the harmony between reason and revelation or science and faith.

On the basis of these principles, Sir Sayyid constructed his ***Tafsīr al-Qur'ān***. His main reason for wishing to prove the identity between revelation and creation was to infuse India's Muslims with a progressive spirit. This, he hoped, would allow them to accept the sciences, a modern education and march forward.

The assumption that God and His revelation are true is based on piety (supported by reason in Sir Sayyid's system). If rejected, Muḥammad's faith and apostleship, honesty and supreme position among the prophets and mankind become dubitable. The Qur'ān itself, would be reduced to the legislation of an ordinary human, who falsely posed as Allah's messenger. Sir Sayyid (like all modernists) wished to preserve its and Muḥammad's pre-eminence and, as believers, could not accept such a radical (secularist) conclusion. Nevertheless, he (and they) contributed to it by the view that those Scriptural portions relating to social affairs are unrevealed. Logically, it leads to the conclusion that the Qur'ān then is not entirely Holy Writ. If this is so, ultimately, it may not be regarded as revelation. Consequently, any attempt to show the identity between God's work and word becomes meaningless. This is contrary to what Sir Sayyid set out to prove. Apart from his concern for improvement, he was forced to take this position by Western biblical research, which endangered the Qur'ān's veracity and Muḥammad's infallibility. He opposed it (as stated) in so far as it meant criticism of text and authorship, but apparently accepted it regarding interpretation. Another factor was the growing scepticism towards the Qur'ān (particularly its supernaturalism) among Aligarh's graduates. He, therefore, rallied to a reaffirmation of the Qur'ān's revelation through Allah's appointed prophet, Muḥammad.

Muslim orthodoxy did not dispute Sir Sayyid's view on this point, but refused to accept his statements concerning God's "operational" and "verbal promise," "work" and "word" and the identity between them. They agreed with him that God and the Qur'ān are both true, although to them it was a matter of faith and not of theoretical formulation Sir Sayyid wanted to show that piety is not always founded on "true" religion, and

a distinction must be made between that which teaches genuine truth and that which does not. His conclusion was that only that religion whose truth corresponds with scientific results is valid. This correspondent truth is found in the Qur'ān, not in traditionalist Islam, which has veered away from it. In other words, his is a call back to Scripture to determine its genuine teachings for the new age. It implied an independent effort (*ijtihād*)—by-passing *ijmā'*—and an appeal (similar to Luther's) to his people that they break away from traditionalism so that they may become revitalised. Sir Sayyid's insistence on a reinterpretation of the Islamic faith is not entirely new; the novelty lies rather in the mode and consequences that could be drawn from his analysis. The theologians, who once again were challenged, resented and rejected his thesis, mainly because they considered it to be un-Islamic, but probably also, because it represented a challenge to their centuries' long authority as Islam's trustees.

The other major religious problems with which he dealt were the doctrines of the Qur'ān, Revelation and man.

Doctrine of the Qur'ān. If the Qur'ān is "absolutely true,"[94] the question is, in which sense? Leaving apart the attempts to find in Scripture references to modern scientific discoveries, the linguistic issue remains. Do the words used have the same meaning today as in past times? Their form and significance change. Of course, from a fundamental viewpoint, the Biblical text embodying eternal truth apprehensible to mankind in all epochs remains unaltered by time's onslaught on language. Sir Sayyid agreed (partially) in so far as "spiritual teachings" were concerned, but was dissonant when the discussion related "to those things which have connection with sciences and physics."[95] Involved particularly were those passages alluding to anthropomorphic features of the Divine and to expressions[96] that are senseless if taken literally. In such cases where the "rational argument" is "opposed to" the word's "original meaning," another acceptable to reason may be used. However, another problem emerges, namely, whether a certain word did not have more than one meaning, and if it did, "in which particular sense it is used, and whether it is used metaphorically and so on."[97] Believing that a great deal of early Arab speech has been lost, he suggests that where lexicographies do not register the sense in which the Qur'ān employs a certain term, that found in Scripture—preserving the form which the Arabic language, and the meaning its words had in Muḥammad's time—must be accepted. The Qur'ān, therefore, becomes a linguistic authority. Involved is the question of *tā'wīl* or allegorical interpretation. Sir Sayyid rejected the traditional method whereby a certain term is given a meaning other than the explicit one if it does not fit. He accepted it only when the speaker's intended meaning is "unsound". If it is the same as determined

by *tā'wīl*, it reveals the speaker's *real* meaning and, therefore, interpretation is not used. For instance, the phrase, "Zaid is a lion," defines this person's brave character. (Obviously, Zaid is not an animal.) Therefore, interpretation is not involved. "Rather it is the exposition of the original meanings intended by the speaker. Similarly, when we accept a word of the Qur'ān not in its basic sense, but its metaphorical sense we do not call it *tā'wīl*, because, according to our capability, we understand that God has used this word in this very metaphorical sense."[98]

Accordingly, such words as "devil" (*Iblīs*) and "desert demons" (*jinn*)[99] are not actual beings believed in by Muslims. The Qur'ān's statement (ii-34) that Iblīs caused Adam's and Eve's disobedience and expulsion from Paradise is a metaphorical way of saying that their own evil inclinations led to their punishment. He agreed that a few Scriptural passages[100] attest to pre-Islamic Arabia's belief in the *jinn*, which do not denote, however, "desert demons," but "savages" in contrast to *ins* or "civilised people".[101] Everywhere else, *jinn* and *jann* denote respectively man's evil and good propensities. Both instances exemplify Sir Sayyid's theory according to which the metaphorical sense of the cited words is that "employed" by God and *tā'wil*, therefore, is not used. "We must keep ourselves governed by the words of the Qur'ān alone in our interpretations and not by the stories that are popular among Jews and Christians."[102] Beliefs by non-Muslim peoples must be rejected unless they are supported by a "decisively evident text in the Qur'ān or in the *ḥadiths*. In conformance with his rejection of the supernatural, Sir Sayyid had to claim that generally neither the Prophet's "Sayings" nor the Qur'ān attest thereto. The latter in particular having a "scientific" approach could not possibly accept such "stories". The passages covering them must be taken "metaphorically" in the sense that they have an original (non-mythological) meaning intended by God, but hitherto hidden to the Muslims, because they had not advanced sufficiently to discover it. To consider the respective portions as literally true instead of accepting their "basic sense" is erroneous.

Concerning Muḥammad's Traditions,[103] he felt that many originated or were elaborated after the Prophet's death, The compilers of the canonical Traditions (*Ṣaḥīḥ*) were unable to sift them all, because they included only those whose traditioner (*rāwī*) they considered reliable.

> But this should be taken into account that . . . there are three or four traditioners (for one *ḥadīth*). And Mālik and Bukhārī knew only the traditioner from whom he received the ḥadīth, and not the preceding. So it is very difficult to be certain whether all the traditioners were trustworthy, and also whether no mistake was made in handing down the text of a ḥadīth.[104]

Furthermore, it is quite possible that some found in these canonical

Traditions echo words of the collectors themselves.

All the Ulama and *Muḥaddithīn* (tradition-experts) admit that the contents of the traditions are not to the letter, but to the spirit, i.e. the words in the related traditions are not the very words spoken by the Prophet of God, because it is possible that after all they contain words of the traditioners, recorded by Bukhārī, Muslim or someone else; or is it not likely that here and there we will meet words of Bukhārī himself or another collector of traditions?[105]

Sir Sayyid did not reject all of the *ḥadīths* and suggested that the Muslims " 'be grateful for the exertions made by the *Muḥaddithīn* in collecting them.' " Nevertheless, he insisted at the same time that they be critically examined " ' to investigate whether they are really the words and acts of the Prophet, or not.' "[106]

His insistence, with regard to the Qur'ān and the *ḥadīths*, on internal evidence as proof of veracity reflects the influence of Western critical views about them. He stated, for instance, that " 'the subject related must have come under the actual ken of its first traditioner.' "[107] Again, he wrote: " '. . . we are not justified in saying such a *ḥadīth* is from the Prophet whose contents are inconsistent with reality.' "[108]

In other words, all those that do not thus conform, i.e. with the truths proven by science and, hence, with "God's work," are to be rejected as unauthentic. The approach is different from that taken towards the Qur'ān, because traditions are not derived from God and, therefore, may be discarded. Scripture being "God's word," no part of it can be claimed as untrue; it is perfect.

His aim was to show that the Qur'ān was entirely in accordance with the laws of nature and that all the "truths" proven by science are found in this Scripture. His Muslim critics feared that by establishing meanings in conformity with current scientific discoveries, others may have to be devised at a later age. The Qur'ān would thus become " ' a toy in the hands of people. ' "[109] Sir Sayyid's reply was that the Divine word is fully in agreement with His work.

But the great miracle in it is that at every level of knowledge of ours, it guides uniformly and effectively in matters for which it (the Qur'ān) is sent down. Its words have come down in a miraculous manner so that as the sciences continue to advance and as we ponder over it with regard to these advanced sciences, it will become known that its words are in agreement with reality in the light of these (newer sciences, too), and it will be proved to us that the meanings we determined earlier, and which were proved wrong now, were a fault of our knowledge, and not of the words of the Qur'ān. What we mean is that, due to the advancement of sciences, our turning away from the ideas which we had determined regarding the Qur'ān and finding the Qur'ān is in accordance with the ideas which we had recourse to after the advancement of sciences, establish the shortcoming of our pre-

vious knowledge. They are a proof of the perfection of the Qur'ān. Certainly it is no good reason for shooting any sarcasm at us.

It is at once a defence of the Qur'ān against European scholarly critique and a plea to Muslim orthodoxy to accept the scientific mode of thought. He wished to show that he was as pious a believer as they, because he also looked upon it as the most sacred (and, hence, untouchable) writ. Nevertheless, the quoted statement reflects their caustic attitude towards his theories, which they considered unholy.[110]

In accordance with his doctrine that the Qur'ān is "absolutely true" and perfect, he repugned the traditional theory of abrogation (*nāsikh*), founded on Sūrah ii. 100, : "Whatever verses We cancel, or cause thee to forget, We bring a better or its like. Knowest thou not that God hath power over all things?"

It is commonly held (by Muslim theologians) to imply abrogation of certain verses by other Qur'ānic verses. Sir Sayyid felt that Scripture would thus degenerate into " 'a note-book of a poet' "[111] ; it would lose its sacredness, because revelation itself is seen as inconsistent. If God is a perfect Being, and Muḥammad most trustworthy in transmitting His word,[112] then the doctrine of abrogation, pertaining to Qur'ānic verses, cannot be accepted. Rather, it applies to other Scriptures, a view supported by Sūrah x. 37 : "It conformeth what was revealed before it and is a clearing up of the Scriptures," i.e. of the Old and New Testaments.

A contradiction ensues in Sir Sayyid's theory, because if Allah is omnipotent, He has the power to abrogate certain passages in the Qur'ān. "What He pleaseth will God abrogate or confirm : for with Him is the source of revelation" (xiii. 39). This is the traditional Muslim view. Sir Sayyid considered it as an absurd proposition despite his concept of an *absolute* First Cause.[113] His opposition probably derived from his extreme concern, due to the secularist inclination bred by modernist thinking, for preserving the Qur'ān as *the* perfect Book.

Doctrine of Revelation

Revelation is that which has been given to the Prophet by God, but former interpreters did not explain this "has been given" in the right way ; they thought that God and the Prophet were like a king and a minister. These explanations of our Ulama in former days are an object of mockery for people of to-day, and on account of such explanations they consider the Qur'ān and Islam as nonsense. . . . One ought, however, to understand that prophethood is a natural phenomenon which is present in the prophets like other innate faculties. . . . Between God and a prophet there does not exist an ambassador who brings messages other than the prophetic talent, which is called *Akbar Nāmūs*, and in the language of the Sharī'a "Gabriel". The heart of the Prophet is the mirror in which the splendour of the divine glory is reflected, it is the instrument which echoes the words of God, it is the ear

which hears the letterless and soundless words of God.[114]

Sir Sayyid's statement implies that revelation is a process of infusion and that the name "Gabriel" symbolises "the prophetic talent". He stated that " 'the faithful spirit (*al-Rūḥ al-Amīn*) poured (or infused) it on the heart of the Prophet. This . . . is the belief I personally follow.' "

" 'But I do not accept the view that only the subject matter (*madmūn*) was poured on the heart and that the (actual) words of the Qur'ān are the Prophet's own, whereby he has expressed that subject matter in his tongue.' "[115]

He thus negated Shāh Walī Ullāh's theory that Muḥammad, himself, had dressed the ideas in words which then came to be called " 'the speech of God.' "[116] He agreed with this saint, however, on the mode (infusion or "flowing") of revelation and that the Qur'ān is an expression of God's nearness to man.[117] His theory of infusion opposes the general Muslim acceptance of a literal communication between God (*via* Gabriel) and Muḥammad. Having repudiated the existence of angels as ontological beings, he could not subscribe to the traditional belief that the Archangel was the intermediary between Allah and his Apostle. Sir Sayyid's view contrasts with the Qur'ānic statement: "That this is the word of an illustrious Messenger," i.e. of Gabriel (lxxxi. 19). His belief that the Spirit is the infuser of revelation is not entirely un-Qur'ānic,[118] but he did not accept (unlike Islam and Christianity) the Spirit as an intermediary. It is, in Sir Sayyid's doctrine, of the Divine essence (Christian and Mu'tazilite dogma) [119]; consequently, God and Spirit are one. This runs counter also to the Qur'ān, which seems to indicate rrather an identity between the Spirit and Gabriel.[120]

Sir Sayyid accepted the doctrine that the Qur'an "is in the plain Arabic" (xvi. 105).[121] Furthermore, he held (contrary to Shāh Walī Ullāh) that infusion took the form of the words found in this Scripture, "because no idea divested of words can come to mind, nor can its pouring (into the heart) take place."[122] In rejecting the saint's theory that the ideas were shaped by Muḥammad into words, which thus came to be called God's "speech," he agreed with orthodoxy. It countered any thought that the Prophet might have altered (unconsciously) the ideas received from Allah. He opposed traditional doctrine when stating that "prophethood is a natural phenomenon," a view in line with his repudiation of angelology and his affirmation that all occurrences conform with the law of nature. He repugned it also by saying that " 'it is not incompatible with human nature that to such a heart which has no connection with objects, perceptible to the senses and is turned to spiritual instruction, revelations descend'."[123]

These words were written in 1892, about twelve years after they were expressed.[124] They reflect not only Western philosophical influences,[125] but

also psychological theories then being formulated. The cited passage shows that he did not deny revelation thereby assuming an anti-sceptic stand. However, it implies that prophecy pertains to an extremely sensitive God-oriented psyche able to hear God's silent (small or still) "voice". He could not have accepted the theory that prophecy is the objectification of an inward spiritualism, for it is contrary to his belief in God (a wholly transcendent Being in his system) and in revelation (preserving the possibility of a relationship between the Creator and the created). He was apparently unaware of the consequences resulting from his doctrine of revelation with particular reference to the prophetic office.

Doctrine of Prophethood. Three aspects arise under this heading : (1) the general nature of the Prophet's functions ; (2) Muḥammad's role ; (3) the conception concerning Jesus.

(1) *The general nature of the Prophet's functions.* The modernist Sir Sayyid did not subscribe to the view that prophethood is a miracle ; yet, he did not deny that it was a wondrous thing that God has implanted an extra-sensory organ permitting man possessing "a prophetic talent" to receive and transmit His revelation. Elsewhere, he had said that no communication is possible.[126] How, then, can the prophetic office be validated ? He solved the problem precisely by stressing extra-sensory perception, spiritually disciplined, and the process of infusion, on which he and Islamic orthodoxy parted company. He viewed the prophets as preceptors charged with the duty of explaining to mankind " 'the true ethical virtues laid down in man's nature.' "[127] This accords with the role of the saint who guides his disciples on the path to moral elevation and spiritual illumination. Prophets, fulfilling the preceptor's rule, exhort mankind to follow Scripture. Among the saints, however, there are antinomistic groups who stress self-realisation independently of written law. One question is whether his stress on "spiritual instruction" does not contract the traditional thesis of the "call". The former is a subjective discipline aiming at the unfolding of man's essential being ; the latter is external and objective, as it depends on the action of a Heavenly being. A prophet's *own* conviction that he is called by God can be questioned on the ground that it is entirely subjective and not attested by spiritual progress under respected tutelage which is regarded essential by all standing within the mystic and intuitive schools of thought. Consequently, the validity of the call as a Divine appointment becomes doubtful. So does the unique status of the prophets as His *appointed* spokesmen to mankind as well as their supreme authority derived from their office. The possibility of a limitless succession of prophets or rather spiritualised but not called men also looms, which conforms again to the endless numbers of saints throughout history. The important distinction between prophet and saint also is eliminated. True, a prophet is a saintly man, but a saint is not

a prophet. Lastly, the prophet's impeccability vouchsafes his transmission of the Divine revelation without altering it. If the validity of office itself is questioned, the revelationary content, too, fails subject to scrutiny and, ultimately, can be repudiated. The result would be the despiritualisation of human and, in this specific case, the de-islamisation of Muslim society. Sir Sayyid was unaware of the contradictions in and the implications of his doctrine of prophethood. Yet there is another element in his thinking which might obliterate them. Its nature is clarified in the next section.

(2) *Muḥammad's role.* Some pertinent remarks were made about it in the discussions concerning revelation and prophethood. Therefore, a few observations will suffice here. The implication in Sir Sayyid's interpretation, viz. that prophethood might not result necessarily from the call is entirely contrary to Muḥammad's experience. Having brooded over the problem why the Arabs, unlike the Jews and Christians, had no prophet and no revelation, he heard the call while meditating in a cave near his birthplace, Mecca. Suddenly a voice commanded him: "Read!" It was Gabriel's. Muḥammad, astounded, replied : "I cannot read?" Then Gabriel dictated the opening chapter of the Qur'ān. Thus Muḥammad was designated by God to become the Prophet of Islam. He insisted later that he was the "seal" of the prophets (xxxiii. 40), meaning at once that his was the last dispensation and that it incorporated and, therefore, superseded those given in earlier times. Sir Sayyid was shown to have negated the traditional interpretation of Gabriel.[128] Apparently, he did not reject the Qur'ān's finality, although he opposed its doctrine of Jewish and Christian scriptural falsification,[129] which then could be regarded as a silent admission that the Old and the New Testaments have equal validity with the Muslim Bible. If this were correct, he again contradicts Qur'ānic teaching.

What about Sir Sayyid's conception of Muḥammad? Despite the latter's eminent position as prophet and leader of the growing Islamic community, Muḥammad asserted that he was a man, i.e. equal with all other humans.[130] Sir Sayyid, convinced that Allah's messenger is pure in faith and behaviour, defended him against allegations.[131] His concern to vouchsafe Muḥammad's impeccability (*ismā*) points to a sanctification of Islam's prophet[132] even though he, too, rejected human divinity. He probably was influenced by monism, which does not conceive of duality between matter and spirit and the infusion process then may be interpreted to the unfolding of consciousness culminating in enlightenment. In other words, the religious awakening does not depend on the call from above, but on an internal development. It is attainable only when maintaining that spirit is present in the body (matter) to such a degree that human spiritualisation is possible in life. Society's despiritualisation from such a viewpoint becomes an impossibility because man is regarded as a part of the eternal order. Sanctification is seen as the

result of his ability to transcend his and the world's material nature, the casting off of matter, so to speak, allowing him to assume eternal form. In such a system, there is no distinction between saint and prophet as the prophet is seen as saint. Those Muslim mystics standing in the monistic tradition apotheosed Muḥammad whom they called "the Light of the World".[133]

To return to the thesis that there may be contradictions in Sir Sayyid's doctrine of prophethood. His reference to infusion is one way to explain a man's spiritualisation. It seems to imply that he subscribed to the monistic doctrine of unity. This is not so strange if it is remembered that he attended schools taught by mystics and that his parents subscribed to their teachings. A mystical notion, injected during his childhood education, may have slumbered in his soul and crept unconsciously into his doctrine of Muḥammad. It explains the tendency in his system towards the sanctification of Islam's revealer. From orthodoxy's standpoint, it is full of contradictions and in opposition to Qur'ānic dogma. Approached from a mystical side, there seem to be none, but the disagreement with the Islamic tradition on the discussed subjects remains. On two points Sir Sayyid and orthodoxy converge: the rejection of Muḥammad's divinity and the assertion of his excellence.[134]

(3) *The teaching concerning Jesus.* To gain a clearer idea of Sir Sayyid's interpretation, the Qur'ānic doctrine is presented first. It is as follows. Jesus's birth is announced by Allah's messenger:

Remember when the angel said, "O Mary! Verily God announceth to thee the Word from Him: His name shall be Messiah Jesus the son of Mary, illustrious in this world, and in the next, and one of those who have near access to God" (iii. 40).

He was born by an immediate divine act (xix. 20-22, 35; cf. iii. 52), that is to say, virgin birth, stated in these terms:

She said, "How, O my Lord! shall I have a son, when man hath not touched me?" He said, "Thus: God will create what He will; when He decreeth a thing, He only saith, 'Be,' and it is'" (iii. 42; cf. lxvi. 12; iii. 51).

God sent him a mission, namely, "to attest the law which was before me . . ." (iii. 44; cf. v. 50). He is called, therefore, "illustrious in the world" (iii. 40) Having completed his mission, he died a natural death: "they crucified him not, but they had only his likeness" (iv. 156). His resurrection will follow.

And peace was on him on the day he was born, and the day of his death, and shall be on the day when he shall be raised to life (xix. 15, 34).

Although the Qur'ān does not negate Christian dogma entirely, it differs from it on some basic principles. For instance, it emphatically denies Jesus's divinity: "Far be it from His[135] glory that He should have a son!" (v. 169;

cf. xix. 36 ; ii. 110 ; ix. 30, 31 *et al.*).

It asserts that Jesus did not claim divinity for himself, as he stated that " 'God hath made me a prophet' " (xix. 31 ; cf. v. 79) ; he did not "say to his followers, 'Be ye worshippers of me, as well as of God' ; but rather, 'Be ye perfect in things pertaining to God, since ye know the Scriptures, and have studied deep' " (iii. 73). According to the Qur'ān, it was not Jesus, but the sects "fallen to variance among themselves about Jesus," which had declared his divinity (xix. 38). A prophet, sinless by virtue of his status, would not commit the greatest sin by claiming, as a mortal, to be God (*shirk*).

His *death on the Cross* is not affirmed by it either, disavowing thereby the doctrines of crucifixion, redemption and incarnation. One cited verse refers to his "likeness" (iv. 156) and may imply doceticism, an early Christian heretical movement, whose adherents held that Jesus apparently, but not really, lived and suffered, thus repudiating his humanity altogether and, by implication, his incarnation. This is the more popular belief among orthodox Muslims. However, with the rise of science, another interpretation has been gaining ground among them; namely, that Jesus was on the Cross, but taken off it alive and hidden by his disciples who nursed him back to health. He then left Jerusalem, as it was not safe for him to stay there. His whereabouts after his departure are shrouded in mystery. No evidence attesting to the validity of this thesis has come to light.

Reincarnation, too, is rejected. Muslims do not give to "the Word" announced by Gabriel to Mary (iii. 40) the same exegesis as do Christians. The former assign to it the sense of a tiding, which view is supported by xvii. 111 : "And say : Praise be to God Who hath not begotten a son, Who hath no partner in the Kingdom . . ." (cf. xix. 36). Jesus's holiness (xix. 19), then, derives not from his being God-man, but from his elevation by Divinity to prophethood. "Verily, I am the servant of God ; He hath given me the Book, and He hath made me a prophet" (xix. 31). This explains his special status in the Qur'ān while Muslim orthodoxy regards him as eminent, furthermore, for appearing as the very last prophet prior to Muḥammad.

The Qur'ān not only rejects Christology, but also *Trinitarianism* : "Believe . . . in God and His apostles, and say not, "Three ! . . . Forbear . . . God is only one God !" (iv. 169). What is its teaching concerning the Holy Ghost, the third person apart from God the Father and Jesus ? It states that the latter was strengthened by the Holy Spirit (ii. 81, 254 ; cf. xvi. 104), apparently anonymous in these verses with Gabriel.[136] The Islamic interpretation is that the divinity of the Archangel, not of the Holy Ghost, is rejected. Jesus is said " 'to announce an apostle that shall come after me whose name shall be Aḥmad !' " This apostle is regarded as the Paracletos.

Muḥammad, whose name means "praised" or "glorified" and is "from the same root and of the same meaning as Aḥmad," another name he bore,[137] applied the title to himself. Christianity does not accept this interpretation, but insists that the Holy Ghost is meant. Its long-raging controversy with Islam on this doctrinal point has continued until the present time.

Neither the *Virgin Birth* nor *Jesus's resurrection* is contested by the Qur'ān. The question, however, is to what extent it agrees with Christian teachings on these two principles. Its viewpoint on the *first one* is dissimilar if the correct interpretation is that Jesus was born of a chaste woman, as expressed in the Muslim Bible (iii. 42). Conception by the Holy Ghost is not meant. In his exegesis of this passage, Muḥammad 'Alī comments that any unmarried girl would have Mary's reaction upon receiving such a tiding and that this verse shows that the Virgin Birth did not take place.[138] The Muslims, giving as reason that God can perform miracles, generally embrace the older view. Its acceptance or rejection does not affect their faith vitally, because the doctrine itself is not cardinal to the Islamic creed.

If divinity, incarnation and crucifixion are rejected, *resurrection—as Christians interpret it*—becomes theologically untenable for Muslims. It has two aspects : one referring to Jesus ; the other, to humanity at large. Its pertinent verses on the first (xix. 15, 34) does not mention specifically that Jesus shall be resurrected on the third day and ascend to Heaven to take His place on God's right side. God's assurance : " O Jesus ! verily I will cause thee to die, and will take thee up to myself . . .' " (iii. 48) means no more than that he, as a sinless person, will be gathered to Him and be assured of paradise and eternity. Concerning mankind, the Qur'ān asserts : "He will certainly assemble you on the Day of Resurrection. There is no doubt of it . . ." (iv. 89). The reference here is to God. The conclusions from these two groups of verses are that Jesus must be linked with the rest of humanity, the Muslim Bible does not distinguish between him and its resurrection and, therefore, fundamentally disagrees on this article of faith with the Christian thesis.

Lastly, what are its views on Jesus's *intercession* and his role as *mahdī* ? It is not clear on the *former*. Some commentators [139] state that the verse : "Jesus, the son of Mary, illustrious in this world and in the next" (iii. 40) implies that he is *an* (not *the*) intercessor ; that is to say, he will intercede on behalf of the Jews and the Christians, but he will not, as the Christian believes, redeem mankind. Many traditions uphold intercession by Muḥammad.

According to the well-known tradition from Anas, the Prophet said that

Jesus will be unable to intercede on the day of resurrection, not (as in the case of other prophets) because he has sinned, but because his followers worshipped him as a God,[140]

The view that Muḥammad rather than Jesus shall intercede represents orthodox Islamic belief.

Certain Muslim quarters hold that Jesus is the *mahdī* (xliii. 61) and that he shall "return to earth at the end of the world . . . slay the Antichrist, die, and be raised again."[141] They accept Jesus as the second Adam, for he, like man's progenitor, was an immediate divine creation (iii. 52). It has no Qur'ānic basis, however, and is not universal Muslim belief.

In summary, the Qur'āu rejects the Christian doctrines of Jesus's divinity, crucifixion, resurrection, incarnation and redemption, and the Trinity. Its teaching of the Virgin Birth may or may not be regarded as consonant, while it apparently agrees on the divinity of the Holy Ghost. It does not clearly admit Jesus's intercession and is silent on his role as *mahdī*.

Reverting now to Sir Sayyid, the question is how far he conformed with Qur'ānic teachings on Christianity's founder. His repudiation of human divinity is clear from the *Tabyīn al-Kalām* in which he declares Jesus to have been born of human parents, a view which he repeats in his *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān* : " 'If Christ is regarded as a prophet of God—as we Muslims regard him—then the whole meaning of it becomes clear'."[142] This thesis is consonant with the Qur'ān. He felt that the concept of sonship was influenced by the father principle, the father being considered " 'the orignator of something. . . . The son is he whom God has formed with His hands. . . .' " Expressed in Arabic terminology, the "father" signifies God (*rabb*) and the "son" is "the chosen servant" (*al-'abd al-maqbūl*).[143] Sir Sayyid's interpretation is his own, but it agrees in substance with the Muslim Bible.

His thesis on the Virgin Birth is as follows. He acknowledged, as did the Qur'ān, Mary to be Jesus's mother, noting correctly that his father is not mentioned in this Scripture.[144] Rejecting the doctrine of miraculous conception, he stated the Virgin Birth in terms of Mary's monogamous relationship with her husband. If the Qur'ānic doctrine is regarded as similar in nature to that formulated by Christianity, he deviotes from it ; if, on the other hand, its correct interpretation is that Mary was chaste, he concurs.

Sir Sayyid repudiated Jesus's crucifixion and resurrection. He wrote :

> Crucifixion itself does not cause the death of a man, because only the palms of his hands . . . and feet are pierced. The real cause of death is this that when someone is hanged on the cross for four or five days, he does on account of the pains of the pierced hands and feet, combined with the

endured hunger, thirst and exertion. . . . When we bring the whole event into a historical connection, it is clear that Christ did not die on the cross. . . . After three or four hours Christ was taken down from the cross, and it is certain that at that moment he was still alive. Then the disciples concealed him in a very secret place, out of fear of the enmity of the Jews . . . and they spread the rumour that Christ ascended to heaven.[145]

This statement does not imply Sir Sayyid's specific acceptance of the docetic doctrine. Rather, he rationalised the event, insisting that Jesus was alive after having been taken down from the Cross and that he recuperated. This rather novel interpretation, as mentioned, has found acceptance among Muslims.

He may be said to be in accord with Qur'ānic teaching by denying the Christian resurrection thesis and subscribing to the idea that Jesus is similar to that awaiting mankind. It is important to note that disagreement concerning this doctrine and that of the Virgin Birth exists between Muslim orthodoxy and the modernists on the one, and among the latter on the other hand. [146] Sir Sayyid's rejection of the miraculous and, related thereto, his rationalisation of certain biblical events are further points on which he parts company with orthodox Islam.

To summarise, Sir Sayyid followed the Qur'ān in denying *Jesus's divinity*, for it is said : "God is only one God ! Far be it from His glory that He should have a son ! (iv. 169).[147] Elsewhere, God's messenger is made to announce to Mary the birth of "a holy son" (xix. 19), "illustrious in this world" (iii. 40).[148] Although the Qur'ān emphatically denies Jesus's divine sonship and stresses the fact that he is Allah's servant (iii. 31), it does seem to assign to him an exalted status. Rejection of the *Trinity* (cxii.) implies repudiation of incarnation, which results from insistence on Jesus's humanity, implying an absolute denial of Christology. If the Qur'ānic doctrine of the Virgin Birth (iii. 37, xix. 20) is regarded as similar. in nature to that formulated in Christianity, Sir Sayyid deviates from it ; if, on the other hand, its correct interpretation is given in terms of his being born from a chaste woman (iii. 20), he is in agreement with it.[149] His opposition to *Jesus's death at the Cross* finds its basis in the verse : "they crucified him not, but they had only his likeness" (iv. 156), subscribing to the implied doceticism, he gave his own interpretation. The resurrection doctrine has two sides. One pertains to humanity at large, of which it is asserted : "He will certainly assemble you on the day of resurrection. There is no doubt of it. . . " (iv. 89). The other relates to Jesus :

> And peace was on him on the day he was born, and the day of his death, and shall be on the day when he shall be raised to life ! (xix. 15 ; cf. xix. 34).

The Qur'ān does not contest Jesus's resurrection, but specific mention that

it shall occur on the third day is not given. The conclusion is that its relevant verses are to be interpreted in a more general sense by linking Jesus as a prophet with the rest of humanity. Sir Sayyid can be said to be in accord by denying the *Christian* doctrine of resurrection and subscribing to universal redemption. On most of these subjects, he and Islamic orthodoxy concurred ; the split between them concerned his emphatic insistence on Jesus's manhood (perhaps in the light of the mystics' conception of Muḥammad as the "Light of the world"), his rejection of the miraculous and, related thereto, his reinterpretation of the Virgin Birth as well as his rationalisation of certain biblical events.

Related to his doctrine of prophethood is his view on "consensus" (*ijmā'*) : " 'This must be kept in mind that only so many words of the men to whom revelations are made as relate to religious matters do we Muslims consider as revelations . . . but if those people were to utter any such words as relate to worldly affairs only, we would not believe them as revelations'."[150]

He based this thesis on his insistent notion that the prophet's mission pertains solely to the religious domain ; in secular matters, Muḥammad, like any other human, has no authority. He cited in support the verse: "In sooth, I am only a man like you" (xviii. 10). Elsewhere, he wrote : " 'We are obliged (*majbūr*) to follow the sunnah of the Prophet in religious matters, and we are permitted (*mujāz*) to do it in worldly affairs'."[151]

It reveals his desire to separate the "purely religious" from temporal matters, which are unified in Islam under the *Sharī'ah*. Its crystallisation and solidification centuries ago does not allow for an evolution permitted (according to the Muslim modernists) by the Qur'ān. Society is stilted, because the entire *Sharī'ah* has become sacrosanct. Therefore, Sir Sayyid insisted on Muḥammad's own admission that the social prescripts enunciated by him (and thus unrevealed) did not have the same binding force as the religious (revealed) laws. It "proves" that Muḥammad did not object to progress, provided it is based on Islamic principles.[152] Here, again, Sir Sayyid and orthodoxy parted ways.

In final analysis, the modernist rejected traditionalistic interpretations which ran counter to the new age ; he was not always Qur'ānic ; certain ones were imbued with a mystical tinge ; others were influenced strongly by Western ideas. An incongruous fusion resulted, which explains the contradictions, the opposite conclusions of what he intended, and the opposition by his coreligionists.

Doctrine of Man. Sir Sayyid maintained that man—a created being—is part of the natural order, and subject to its laws.

His *anthropology* is seemingly tripartite : soul, body and mind. The body is the decaying part cut off after death ; the mind is the "rational" faculty ; the soul survives upon decease. He did not concentrate on the question whether mind is part of man's body or soul. Inasmuch as he stated only that the soul lives on, he must have held that the mind was part of the perishable body (matter) rather than that there was an identity substance-wise between it and the soul.

He had an eschatology, for he posited belief in the soul's immortality and an after-life, in resurrection and the Last Day.

> As for the nature of man's soul and the faculties belonging to it, what happens to it after death by way of resurrection and how the day of the hereafter will be and what the reality of paradise and hell and what the nature of the reward and punishment of the hereafter, all these things are beyond the comprehension of man. [They are invisible phenomena which Allah] unfolded . . . by allegories, which suit human understanding. . . . So all this is not outside the law of nature. Rather, all these are allegories and metaphors of the state of the hereafter. . . .[153]

Sir Sayyid was unwilling to speculate on the soul's nature; the mystery of man and death awed and silenced him.

The "states of the hereafter" result from a soul's activities on earth: " 'By doing well and by sinning the soul instantly enjoys happiness or suffers affliction, as a mirror reflects immediately the image of an object put before it. . . . After death, when the soul becomes separated from the body. . . it still keeps that nature or condition it had when, by means of breathing, it was associated with the body'."[154]

Was this "condition" or "nature" decreed by God ? This question leads to Sir Sayyid's *doctrine of predestination*. His thesis is that God freely acted in giving all creatures a nature, and the First Cause knows all that occurs—in past and future—in this world, but humans have free use of all potentialities granted them by God.[155] On the one hand, man seems to have free will and choice ; on the other, he is in " 'the sphere of God's knowledge,' " but " ' the knowledge of God does not compel (him) to those sins'."[156] God's foreknowledge is non-restrictive in the sense that the element of compulsion is absent from it. Allah's sovereignty and man's responsibility thus are both safeguarded. Is this view in accordance with Scripture ? The Qur'ān does not give a precise theory of predestinarianism. It stresses God's justice, and in this respect it teaches : "On a certain day shall every soul come to plead for itself, and every soul shall be repaid according to its deeds ; and they shall not be wronged" (xvi. 112).

It also says, however, that God is the author of good and evil (xci. 8), while elsewhere (iv. 81) it maintains: "Whatever good betideth thee is from God, and whatever betideth thee of evil is from thyself." The orthodox

theologians, faced with the problem of how a just God could let an upright man go astray, solved it by the doctrine of *iktisāb*, meaning that the individual acquires all actions so as to become responsible for them despite their foreordainment by Allah. This thesis is not fully accepted by Sir Sayyid who, nevertheless, agreed with orthodoxy on what might be called a restricted predeterminism.[157]

In a faith structure such as his, where the Deity is depersonalised and man lives under the "law of nature," a predeterminist view is the logical one, because he must submit to that law's inexorably fixed course. Sir Sayyid maintained this thesis particularly in his *theory on personal prayer* (*du'ā'*).[158] According to him, personal prayer does not alter God's decree. Its sole purpose is to affirm the child-father relationship, humility (symbolised by the *ṣalāt*-ritual),[159] and give solace and power to a troubled person. He agreed with the Qur'ānic view that prayer is a good deed (xi. 116). However, it furthermore states that worship of Allah (including prayer) may lead to greater favours from the Divine (ii. 145), implying that prayer might influence Him. This is also the orthodox, but not Sir Sayyid's, view. Muḥsin-ul-Mulk wrote despairingly of his friend's position on this issue :

> What is the use of a god who can neither hear our prayers nor fulfill our needs beyond the usual means ? In that case to pray to him would be the same as to kneel before a lifeless idol of stone. . . . And when everything is hidden from our eyes and our knowledge about this empiric world is very limited and defective, then why should we deny. . . that there exists a relation between God and His worshippers in both directions, and that prayer has an influence in this relation ?[160]

Sir Sayyid's distant hard God could not find warmth in pious men's hearts. Unlike them (and the Ṣūfīs), he advanced a metaphysical theology devoid of belief in His nearness to man.

He was not unorthodox in his affirmation that prayer is a good deed. Would this imply acceptance of the retribution doctrine ? He said, indeed, that a soul's activities on earth would determine its *post-mortem* state. It is difficult to accept this assertion in the light of his causal theory. If prayer cannot change God's decrees, then His foreknowledge means compulsion rather than His prior awareness of a soul's activities without predetermining them. The good deed is Allah's rather than man's own. The logical conclusion would seem to be that the human being cannot work out his salvation, because it is fixed ultimately by his Creator. It involves a fatalistic aspect : if all that happens in the life of mankind is prearranged, then humans need not act. The Indian Musalmans' decay, furthermore, could be seen as caused by Allah ; consequently, they must patiently wait until His decree for improvement becomes effective. The impatient Sir Sayyid could

and did not hold such a view. Neither did he entertain the thought--also implied—that the Divine sent him (as an educator) to improve his people's lot. It seems inherent, too, in his doctrine of prophethood, although (as pointed out) it is quite contrary to the Qur'ānic teaching that Muḥammad is Allah's last messenger (preceptor).

Sir Sayyid was orthodox in agreeing to man's innate goodness (in contrast to the Christian doctrine of human sinfulness), but not in repugning heaven and hell as literal *post-mortem* abodes. His thesis that they were "states" may have been influenced by Sufism, which describes "union" in analogous terms, and perhaps also by the Hindu belief in the soul's "acquisition" of good or evil.[161]

Sir Sayyid's belief in Resurrection and the Last Day is clear from his interpretation of the Qur'ānic passage : "His (is) the kingdom, on the day when there shall be a blast on the trumpet" (vi. 73). He considered it a metaphor and explained it as follows : " 'at a certain moment on the Day of Resurrection, as God has fixed in the laws of Nature, all shall rise up and be assembled, in the same way as by a blast on the trumpet in an army all are assembled and begin to spoil for the fight'."[162]

It implies his acceptance of the orthodox doctrine of bodily resurrection, which seems rather inconsistent with his thesis of *post-mortem* "states". His negation of the trumpet blast as an actual forthcoming event is contrary to the orthodox belief in the preliminary sign,[163] but it is in accord with his own non-anthropomorphic views.

Sir Sayyid's doctrine of man does not deviate from that acknowledged by Islamic orthodoxy in its large traits (the soul's immortality, bodily resurrection, the doctrine of retribution, Judgment Day). The Muslim theologians, however, rejected his causal theory as well as his non-literal approach.

To summarise, Sir Sayyid stood, historically, in the Indo-Wahhābī tradition, to which Muslim Modernism (as stated) is indebted for its reformist (purificational) aspect. He was influenced by the Mu'tazilite and Ash'arite traditions, in particular with regard to his rationalism and stress on God's eternity and unity, developed fully by al-Ghazālī (1059-1111 C.E.). Despite this scholar's ultimate repudiation of scholasticism in favour of mysticism, he synthesised faith and reason. His system was henceforth accepted as orthodox.[164] Thus, various currents within the Islamic theologico-philosophical tradition bore upon Sir Sayyid. So did Sufism, to which he also was exposed in his childhood. Particular European influences have been indicated. They may have strengthened his rationalist inclinations. Since the impressionable age of twenty-one, he came in daily contact with men nurtured in the science of reason and he had been in British service[165]

for five years before he published his short biography of Muḥammad. Consequently, his scientific interests were rekindled and his modernist views, ripened by his European journey, stirred up. Essentially, Sir Sayyid attempted to mingle Islam's rationalistic currents with those permeating European civilisation and pointed to the Qur'ān as Allah's testimony to the harmony existing between science and religion, reason and faith. "He attracted to himself and his school the supposedly derisive name 'naturalist,' by his policy of 'interpreting the word of God by the work of God'. Conformity to nature was the criterion for judging the different religions ; and Islam is the true religion in that it does so conform."[166]

His was a system of "natural" metaphysics, because he accepted all principles that he considered to be in accord with nature as good, and repudiated all that he felt were in opposition. Thus he used "nature" as the criterion for religious values.[167] It may also be called " 'rational Supernaturalism' " because he acknowledged God's existence and intervention in human history, symbolised by the revelationary event.[168] Nevertheless, his conception was too radical for the Muslim orthodox who held " 'that in the light of modern ideas there is neither God, nor vurk āf Gād [work of God] ; and that in fact man is but an advanced monkey who will perish'. "[169] Sir Sayyid, in turn, accused them of being " 'stuck in the marsh of adherence to ancestral beliefs'. "[170] He stood condemned by orthodoxy (and Muslim modernists in other Islamic lands) for advancing a purely materialist (Naturist) doctrine, advocating the existence solely of Nature, and misguiding Islam to disbelief in God and religion as taught by the Qur'ān.[171]

> You abuse and revile the Muslim commentators and call them imitators of the Jews. But you trust the sayings of the atheists of to-day to such a degree that you rely completely on their doctrines and you turn all the verses of the Koran from their obvious meaning . . . although neither the context nor the words nor Arabic idiom corroborate your interpretation.[172]

Thus wrote Muḥsin-ul-Mulk[173] to his friend. Despite his acknowledgment that "the existing books we possess" are insufficient "to meet the needs of these times" and his assurance that he was not "an opponent of new ideas," he warned Sir Sayyid that he would prefer to remain "stuck in a marsh," unless he was certain "that having struggled out of it, there are no risks of falling into a deep and dark cave full of fire."[174] He furthermore told his friend that the latter's theology would be regarded as "feeble," because it was founded on such Qur'ānic postulates as belief in Allah, in Muḥammad's mission, in the Resurrection "and other religious tenets." In effect, the difference between the modernist Sir Sayyid and his conservative correspondent was "only a question of degree,"[175] although the latter found it serious enough to reproach "Ahmad Khan . . . for propounding a view of

the Qur'ān which neither God, nor Gabriel, nor Muḥammad, nor his Companions, nor his people, nor ordinary Muslim folk, accepted."[176] According to them, no fundamental religious principle can be said to conform to "the law of nature".

Despite orthodoxy's fierce repudiation of Sir Sayyid's "natural religion," its influence throughout India became widespread, to judge from the following letter addressed by an Indian Muslim (Muḥammad Wāṣil) to al-Afghānī (in 1880) :

> Nowadays, the word Neitchur, Neitchur, has resounded in our ears. It has reached us from all regions of India, from the kingdoms of the East and the North, from Oudh, Punjab, Bengal, Sind and Hyderabad in the Deccan. There is not a small town, a capital city that does not have a sect bearing this surnoun : Neitchuri.
>
> It seems to us that the number of those bearing this surnoun will grow in time, particularly among the Muslims. . . .[177]

Mr Wāṣil's prognostication in due time would prove to be true. The younger generations in Muslim India—large numbers, if not the majority, among them trained at Aligarh—took Sir Sayyid's message to look afresh at the Qur'ān to heart.

To this day, they are carrying on the spirited battle—transmitted to Pakistan—with the theologians. It began with Sir Sayyid's energetic attempt to liberate his coreligionist countrymen from the shackles of traditionalism so as to permit them to march forward on the road to progress.

Many a man would have been exhausted by writing voluminous time-consuming Commentaries, by carrying on correspondence, making speeches, all aimed at effecting an Indo-Muslim turn of mind. Not Sir Sayyid, who still found time for educational and political endeavours.

Sir Sayyid, the Social Reformer. Journeying through Western Europe, he became amazed at its level of socio-cultural development and its atmosphere of freedom, which had fostered it. He decided to effect social reform among his (Indo-Muslim) brethren by teaching them the distinction between (revealed) religion and social (man-made) doctrine.

Three chief problems, derived from his denying a religious origin to social laws, confronted him : (1) their validity in modern times ; (2) the theologians' authority in social matters ; (3) the individual's role.

(1) *The Validity of Social Laws.* Until Sir Sayyid's time, they were considered by the Muslim world generally as an integrate part of the *Sharī'ah,* the Code based on the Qur'ān, *hadīths*[178] and *sunnah.*[179] After its formulation during the first Islamic centuries, it was acknowledged as the guiding pattern of government as well as of religious and social conduct. It gained sanctity when it came to be regarded in its entirety to have its source in

God's Law. All subsequent laws were derived by an inward process (e.g. through analogy or *qiyās*) ; that is, by consulting the views of medieval Muslim theologians. Thus they were derivative, not "original" in nature, and did not reflect a modern spirit. Sir Sayyid (as all modernists) rejected the theory that the entire *Sharī'ah* has a Divine source. He wished to drive a wedge between its religious and social injunctions, claiming that the former are revealed and, hence, immutable, but the latter evolved during human history to suit society's growth ; therefore, they were not decreed by God and could, indeed must, be altered. His aim was to show that the distinction between spiritual and secular precepts is legitimate in Islam, making possible a transformation of the social pattern answering to needs of a modern age.

Nevertheless, he acknowledged the *Sharī'ah's* validity in one respect, viz. the custom of *Pardah* :[180]

> Many articles appeared in various newspapers on the *pardah* of women, and some of my dear friends whom I call "flesh of my flesh", and some of our leaders whom we call the pride of our community, are against *pardah.* Although people think me to belong to the new fashion, and although I am not of the old school, yet I am still conservative by nature and I disagree with the opinion of my friends and those leaders, and I consider the *pardah* which is customary among the Muslim women as the best we can have.[181]

Either this was his sincere conviction or he feared, perhaps, that a different attitude might have resulted in even greater hatred felt towards him by the *'ulamā'*. He did not feel that the custom bestowed a position of inferiority upon Islamic womanhood and apparently clung to the old notion that they must be protected. *Pardah* fulfils this need. Furthermore, it is mentioned in the Qur'ān, which also asserts that Muḥammad, himself, practised it. He might have regarded it, therefore, not as a part of tradition (social laws) but as truly belonging to the revelational sphere. In any case, it was indisputably a *sunnah* of the Prophet and, hence, to be followed. Needless to say that he was orthodox on this issue.

The theologians could not subscribe to his view, however, that a part of the *Sharī'ah* is not based on Holy Writ and, consequently, unrevealed and man-made. Their argument was that if the *Sharī'ah* is based only partly on Holy Writ, then the rejection of any of its portions as revealed necessarily implies the like negation of a correspondent part of the Qur'ān. It would mean that the Scripture is not entirely revealed, which is contrary to orthodox belief. Sir Sayyid insisted on reinterpreting everything in Scripture that he considered in discord with the new spirit. It does not solve the problem, particularly as he insisted that Muḥammad did not claim eternal validity for the social laws which he (not God) prescribed.[182] They are found,

however, in revelation, forming the basis of the *Sharī'ah*. This question has remained the subject of debate between the modernists and the orthodox until the present time.

(2) *The Authority of the 'Ulamā'*. Throughout the Muslim era, the theologians have occupied a preferential status in Muslim lands as the interpreters of the *Sharī'ah*. They developed the institution known as "consensus" (*ijmā'*), due to Islam's expansion after Muḥammad's death beyond the Arabian Peninsula, and the confusion that arose concerning the rules on which the administration of newly-conquered lands were to be based. It succeeded to the "individual interpretation" (*ijtihād*), in which Muslim philosophers and theologians had engaged until the end of the fourth century H. Henceforth, the "consensus" of the theologians—founded on the Qur'ān—became the supreme guiding principle in all Islamic territories, including north-western India. It is applied to every domain of life : religious, political, economic and socio-cultural. It has become sacrosanct and is enforced on all Muslims, because it is believed to hold the community (or "body of believers") together.

Sir Sayyid's (and the modernists') view that the social precepts are not derived from God challenged the traditional concept concerning the rule of law in the Islamic world. It implies that the theologians, themselves, are guilty of attributing to man-made decrees a Divine origin and an immutable nature similar to that ascribed to the religious prescripts. He shattered their tenacious assertion that *all* laws are given by Allah and, hence, their self-image of being His appointed custodians of the *Sharī'ah* [183] From their viewpoint, his repudiation of the infallible social laws constituted a violation of the holy order instituted by the Creator. They resented it undoubtedly also, because it questioned the qualifications and status of a group which had special training for and, during centuries, had been entrusted with, the task of interpreting God's law, be it in the religious or any other domain. Few among them recognised the strain experienced by (Indian) Islam in the nineteenth century. If they did (like Muḥsin-ul-Mulk) —particularly with regard to the struggle between traditionalist and modernist interpretations of the faith—they still refused to accept the essential need for some change in their viewpoint. They generally[184] have been unwilling to concede that certain modern modes of thought might not be contrary to the Islamic teachings. Inasmuch as they determine their community's stand on all issues, aggregately falling under the head of religion, and decree whether or not certain forms of thought, rite, behaviour, are permissible, they bear great responsibility. Sir Sayyid was quick to seize this as ground for a valid accusation that they compromise the Indian Musalman's well-being, for they characterise everything "modern" as an

un-Islamic innovation. Thus he held them to some extent responsible for the inability of India's Muslims to pull themselves out of the morass in which they had fallen.[185]

The theologians contemporary with him could have played a more positive role by examining how enlightenment could be brought without undermining the essential nature of Islamic belief. Sir Sayyid felt that a legalist attitude unequivocally opposed to all modernisation stifles Islam's innate dynamism, and that changes (innovations) not necessarily lead to secularisation.[186] The *'ulamā'* insisted that (his) modernism injected foreign strains, thereby debilitating the Muslim faith and way of life.[187]

(3) *The Individual's Role.* The theologians' rejection of innovation is related to their insistence that the *bāb al-ijtihād* ("the door of independent reasoning") is closed.[188] Sir Sayyid fumed against this attitude :

> By this erroneous belief (i.e. that the door of ijtihād would be closed and that nowadays a *mujtahid* would be superfluous) we do harm the Islamic religion and society seriously. We should be aware of the fact that times change and that again and again we are confronted with new questions and new needs . . . . In other words : to-day also we want mujtahidin.[189]

Reinterpretation by individuals experienced in the science of Islamic law (*fiqh*) is imperative. For only thus can the medieval hull be shed, Islam's genuine character displayed and its people revitalised. It implies, of course, repudiation of a large part of the decrees (congealed into the *Sharī'ah*) formulated by the jurists of yore. He said on this issue : " 'It is possible that these men are right, and it is possible that they are wrong. We, however, are followers of Islam, not of views and opinions of X, Y and Z'."[190]

It is a plea for a (partially) new Code developed through modern analysis. Apart from the implications related to the revelationary and substantive[191] aspects (previously discussed), two other main problems emerge : that of authority and of reopening *ijtihād.* The theologians have strongly opposed the reopening of the "door of independent reasoning," because they fear that it may lead to anarchism. They have held stubbornly that there is no need for the kind of reinterpretation demanded by the modernists whose demands (they feel) endanger the characteristic Islamic outlook on, and mode of, life. Sir Sayyid disagreed with their thesis, insisting that medievalism had imprisoned his community and its hold must be broken. This can be done solely by *ijtihād.* Unlike the Muslim theologians, he held that not its "reopening," but its remaining closed, is disastrous, as it forfeits the advances that otherwise would and should result.

The other problem is that the new group of interpreters—versed in modernist theory—undoubtedly would challenge and overshadow the *'ulamā'*,

whose power subsequently would diminish. The latter regard "traditionalism" and "modernism" as erroneous terms, because Islamism—in faith, rite and custom—has eternal validity and fresh meaning for every Muslim generation. Permitting the rise of *mujtahidīn* not only means that the Islamic community would be cut loose from its firm moors, but would empower (by *ijmā'*) a group of inexperienced persons to take over the role of men seasoned by traditional training. The former would not protect their religion from the modernist onslaught, because they, themselves, advocate it. What would happen if those genuinely concerned with it and its believers' fate would lose the authority to impose safe limits and fade from sight ? A new civilisation, no longer to be regarded as Islamic, would arise in the Muslim world. To permit *ijtihād*, therefore, would constitute a betrayal of the revelation entrusted by God to Muḥammad and by the Prophet to the Muslims. To give permission (*ijmā'*) for the appointment of *mujtahidīn*, destroyers of the faith, would be breaking the pledge given to Allah and His Apostle by its trustees, the *'ulamā'*. Thus reasoned the Indo-Muslim theologians.[192] They were unable to stifle Sir Sayyid's voice ; nevertheless, their view hitherto has prevailed.

Sir Sayyid, the Educator. A Persian institution of higher learning (*madrasah*) opened at Moradabad (in 1859), was Sir Sayyid's earliest educational experiment. About the same time,[193] he published a Review of Instruction, in which he insisted that India's Muslims be trained in English and the sciences. He criticised the British Government for imparting learning to Indians in the vernacular without investigating whether these languages had sufficient textbooks (in history, political and other sciences) available, were suitable for translating such works,[194] and sharpened a student's intellectual faculties (keen perception, persuasiveness of speech, etc.). He concluded :

> The Urdu language cannot satisfy to those three conditions. Therefore it is the duty of the government to change completely the system of education. . . . And it should start instruction in that language through which the real aim of education can be attained. It is my firm conviction that it should abolish *in toto* the system of imparting instruction in the Indian vernaculars, and that it should only continue with English schools."[195]

Throughout his life, Sir Sayyid campaigned for the inclusion of the (modern) sciences in the Indo-Muslim curriculum.

His school in Moradabad closed when he was transferred to Ghazipur. Here he opened—with subscriptions donated by wealthy Indians[196]—another institution, which taught its students (including Hindus) Arabic, Persian, Urdu, English and Sanskrit. His purpose was to give Indian youth (regardless of creed) a liberal education. For some years (until 1867),[197] his

educational policy remained non-communal.[198]

Sir Sayyid also started a Scientific Society at Ghazipur, which moved with him to Aligarh (in 1864). Its main purpose was the translation of English works on various sciences (history, agriculture, algebra, etc.)[199] into Urdu.[200] It represents a departure from the policy he had expressed earlier in his Review of Instruction: namely, that scientific subjects could be taught solely in English. Probably, he wished to speed up the diffusion of Westeen educational materials among his people, the majority of whom did not know English. In 1866, the Scientific Society—called subsequently Aligarh Institute—was moved to a building of its own, creating the opportunity of presenting regular lecture series given by Englishmen on diverse subjects. From that year on, it published a periodical, called at first *The Scientific Society Paper*, and shortly afterwards, *The Aligarh Institute Gazette*. Its contents covered a wide spread of topics: science, politics, social matters, current events, and reports of the Society's meetings and lectures. Urdu articles of interest to English residents in India were printed bilingually. The purpose was twofold: to acquaint them better with the Indian attitude, and create a more harmonious relationship—based on mutual understanding—between them and India's Muslims.

Sir Sayyid's transfer to Benares (1867) did not affect the Society's literary activities. But a change in his attitude occurred during this year. It resuled from demands by this city's Hindu residents that in all government courts Hindi and its (Devnagri) script replace Urdu and its (Persian) characters. Its manifestation became apparent during an interview he had at that time with Mr Shakespeare, then Benares's Commissioner. Sir Sayyid recorded it himself as follows:

> When in those days this question (of language and script) was the subject of much talk in Benares, I discussed with Mr. Shakespeare the instruction of Muslims, and he was surprised at what I told him. At last he said: "Today is the first time that I hear you speak about the progress of the Muslims only. Previously you appeared to think always of the welfare of the Indian people in general." I said to him that I was now convinced that not in any work could both communities co-operate. The opposition of those people who regard themselves as educated is not yet fierce, but in the future it will increase. [201]

Undoubtedly, another reason, too, prompted Sir Sayyid to express such a thought: his realisation that the Hindus had advanced far more rapidly than India's Muslims and that henceforth he had to promote the welfare of his own religious community to prevent its total eclipse by the Hindu body.[202]

His educational activities were interrupted by his sojourn in Europe, during which he also studied the University system at Cambridge. Upon his

arrival in India, he founded "A Committee for the Better Diffusion and Advancement of Learning Among the Mohammedans of India" to determine the reasons why so few Muslims sat in the government schools and colleges.[203] An essay contest offering three prizes was held. Thirty-two compositions were received, and an extract of their arguments was made and published (in 1877). The main reasons they gave for lack of Muslim attendance in the British schools were : (*a*) Islam regards the reading of English as unlawful ; (*b*) no time is allotted for attending to religious duties, including the Friday services ; (*c*) the absence of Muslim teachers and the neglect of Muslim students by Christian and Hindu instructors ; (*d*) the sciences taught in the Islamic languages (Arabic, Persian, Urdu), are far worthier than those given in foreign tongues (and instruction in English is difficult for those who have not mastered it) ; (*e*) books containing material hostile to the Islamic faith are used ; (*f*) the Government educational system is opposed to the Indo-Muslim customs. Sir Sayyid, himself, maintained that while the Muslims were not fully in the right, nevertheless they were correct in holding that instruction in the English schools was inadequate to meet their needs ; and that they, themselves, should inform the Government how to adapt it to their requirements.

Years later, when asked by his son Maḥmūd whether religious prejudices mainly caused India's Muslims to shun British educatation, Sir Sayyid replied by giving four reasons: " 'their political traditions, social customs, religious beliefs, and poverty.' "[204] Their aversion to the British —which stemmed from the Government's negative attitude towards them —expressed itself in their rejection of the English language as well as the sciences taught in this tongue. Furthermore, prejudice, vanity and self-conceit rooted in the pride of their " 'socio-political position' " also led to their repudiating English education as worthless and to an exaggerated emphasis on " 'their own literature, metaphysics, philosophy, and logic.' "[205] They could not admit that other languages, basides Persian and Arabic, could offer useful knowledge. Having based their moral philosophy upon religious principles, " 'which they believed to be infallible,' " they felt they could dispense " 'with the necessity of European science and literature.' " The poverty of India's Muslims " ' is only too obvious to require any comment.' "[206]

Having examined—on the basis of the essays—what type of higher education would suit India's Muslim youth best, the first Committee gave way to a second one, called *Fund Committee for the Foundation of a Muslim College*.[207] On its behalf, Sir Sayyid published a poster (in July 1872). It was occasioned by the demand of some individuals, offering money to such an institution, that property were to be bought in order that it be erected in a

fixed place. In his poster, Sir Sayyid assured that the College would be built away from the large towns so that its students would not fall prey to temptations, could concentrate on the most necessary task, viz. their studies, and " 'that their manners and morals should improve.' " He was not anxious to see it established in Delhi, which had nothing to show but " 'some ruined walls, and the tombs of some of the most learned and noble personages'. "[208] He prepared a scheme for the administration and educational system of the proposed institution and presented it to the Committee (in February 1873), which forwarded a copy to the Government to obtain its acceptance and support by grants-in-aid. He then began campaigning actively and asked everyone of his friends to form branches of the Fund Committee. Meanwhile the champions of the old educational system (i.e. the *maulawīs*) grew stronger, endangering the Commitee's future. It decided, therefore, to forestall any profound opposition by opening a primary school (as part of the College), which would serve as a model and show India's Muslims that a modern education was not un-Islamic. This school was inaugurated at Aligarh on 24 May 1874 (Queen Victoria's birthday). Meanwhile, a piece of property was obtained there for the erection of the College.[209] The Government condition that a draft of its buildings be submitted to it was met. Collections continued to be received (with some difficulty). Finally, its building stone was laid (by Lord Lytton, the Viceroy) in January 1877, and classes begun on 1 January 1878.

There were two departments : (*a*) an English department, in which university courses were run, and (*b*) an Oriental department, in which modern sciences were taught in Urdu, and the old culture and learning in Persian and Arabic, while for English one period was fixed, as being an obligatory second language. The last department however had a short existence. Too few students entered it, as it could not promise them sufficient livelihood for the future.

In the first department the students were prepared for the intermediate B A., B.Sc., M.A., M.Sc., D.Sc. and LL B. examinations of the Allahabad and Calcutta universities, to which the College was affiliated. The imparted subjects were English, Political Economy, Philosophy, History, Mathematics, Chemistry, Physics, and when the Oriental department was closed, Persian, Arabic and Sanskrit. The first period of each day's work was devoted to lectures on Theology and attendance at these lectures was enforced by regulations as stringent as those relating to the ordinary classwork of the College.

All the Muslim boarders were also required to pray five times a day and, except in the case of a reasonable excuse, to fast in the month of Ramaḍān. [210]

In addition, character-building was an important element—neglected in most of British India's educational institutions. Sport and debating teams as well as other social activities formed part of its student life, pattern-

ed after that found in England. Aligarh's success can be gauged from the statistics : for instance, in 1893, 17.6% against the Government census figure of 11.2% for Oudh and N.-W. Provinces—which came under the influence of this college—graduated from it.[211]

Aware that one institution would not solve the problem of education in Islamic India, Sir Sayyid wished to establish a national learning centre. For this purpose, he set up the *Muhammadan Educational Conference* whose aims were to spread the best of Western education among India's Muslims; support and ensure the continuance of private training centres headed by their divines: investigate the religious instruction in English schools founded by Muslims and see that it is conducted on the highest possible level; inquire into the state of the vernacular schools which had the older curriculum[212] and restore those in ruin. This was a concession to the conservative *maulawis*, whom he assured "that sciences belonging to the domain of Arabic . . . should be taught as before."[213] He furthermore stated that the religious endowments (*waqfs*) should not be violated.[214]

To attain its goals, the Conference proposed that annual meetings be held in different towns to discuss educational views and policies (among them the education of Muslim girls) and that committees be established, serving the parent body in various ways (e.g., in trying to obtain scholarships from local wealthy Muslims for poor students ; reporting on the decay or improvement of schools, etc.). These were, in fact, among the resolutions passed by the Conference. It also voted to levy an obligatory tax of one per cent on an Indian Muslim's income to support his younger countrymen's better training.[215]

Sir Sayyid's educational endeavours, in summary, were (*a*) communal in the sense that they were aimed chiefly at the Indian Musalman's advancement (although Aligarh accepted students of all creeds) ; (*b*) mainly focussed on the highest, college level, stressing the Liberal Arts programme ; (*c*) and concentrated on males.

The communal issue has been discussed. He did not exclude Hindus, but was principally concerned with giving his coreligionists a preparation similar to that received by the former in the British schools. The reasons were plain : to catch up with non-Muslims, fill the competitive Government jobs, and assume fresh responsibility in the body politic. It was stated, too, that the primary school, founded as part of Aligarh College, was necessitated by an exigency. The Fund Committee's members, rather than Sir Sayyid alone, decided upon it. Although he was interested in strengthening the lower centres' curriculum, his concrete efforts were directed all towards higher (college) education—for males.

He did not advocate public training for Muslim girls. On this issue, he

expressed himself as follows : " 'People may be astonished that though I have in many affairs progressive ideas, I hold about the education of girls views resembling those of our elders. . . . In India the time is not yet ripe to found schools for the education of girls and to imitate the girl-schools of Europe'."[216] He accepted the custom of private tutoring, thereby rejecting the notion that (Indo-Muslim) womanhood is unenlightened. " 'A sort of indigenous education of a moderate degree prevails among them, and they study religious and moral books in Urdu and Persian, and in some instances, in Arabic'. "[217] He suggested neither any Government measures inducing India's Muslims to send their daughters to its schools nor the establishment of special girl institutions by the authorities. A hint that the education of Islamic womanhood is unsatisfactory seems to be given in the following statement : " 'The present state of education among Mohammedan females is, in my opinion, enough for domestic happiness, considering the present social and economic condition of the life of the Mohammedans in India'. "[218] Poverty and "backwardness" were two primary causes, to which must be added the scarcity of good educational institutions and staff, of funds to build the former, train the latter, and maintain both, for his attitude which, therefore, might not be regarded as negativistic as it was prompted by the actual situation in Islamic India. He felt the primary urgency to be the education of boys, traditionally the family's breadwinners. Furthermore, he may have feared even a greater opposition from the conservatives, had he pushed through any public scheme for women. He had enough difficulties, arising from their hostility towards modern education, in getting support for Aligarh. For the time being, he thought it wiser to concentrate on the training of males.

> The fact is that no satisfactory education can be provided for Muslim girls as long as most of the Muslim boys do not receive proper education. When the present generation of Mohammedan men is well educated and enlightened, the circumstances will necessarily have a powerful though indirect effect on the enlightenment of Mohammedan women, for enlightened fathers, brothers, and husbands will naturally be most anxious to educate their female relations.[219]

Education is a weapon forging new ideas ; social, educational, and political. Once the primary problem has been tackled (and somewhat solved), the other—less urgent—issues could be handled. He was certainly aware that progress could not be fully satisfactory, unless female training kept some pace with that attained by the men. He urged the Aligarh student body not to repugn the necessity, " 'if you would really seek to elevate the social position of the people, of educating your girls.' "[220] This statement seems to support the (earlier expressed) view that he did not reject the need for a

better training of Indo-Muslim womanhood, but considered it—for the reasons stated—of secondary importance at that time.

Sir Sayyid did not make Indo-Muslim restoration dependent upon rooting out illiteracy, attainable by extending primary schooling. This is what he said :

> There are people who think that we should educate the people by spreading primary education. . . . Indeed it is a matter of rejoicing that in so short a time the nation has begun to care for the education of the people . . . but I must confess that in my opinion by such aspirations they neglect what should come first, i.e. the spread of the highest education for Muslims, and that their attention is directed to what should come in the second place instead of what should preponderate.[221]

His emphasis on higher education (noted earlier) reveals his cenception of what its ideal must be : the fostering of learned men and leaders :

> The subjects of instruction (in a university-course) are many, but not in any subject is a sufficient knowledge acquired. The result of this is that by it neither an important author, nor a great scholar has been produced, whose name would be lasting, or who could have influence on his people. This is a great handicap for moral and social progress.[222]

He criticised the existing University education as inadequate for two explicit reasons : no deep study of any particular topic and, consequently, the training of "half-educated people," a great disaster for Islamic India, desperately in need of (progressive) guides. Does it imply a feeling that the training given at the English centres cannot produce men of breadth, fully conversant at once with their own and European cultural traditions ? Perhaps. Aligarh was founded to bequeath both to Indo-Muslim youth. Its educational aims were neither solely economic nor political in nature;[223] "its founder admonished its students that knowledge can be " 'mechanical and fruitless. . . . See that this be not the case with any of you'."[224] Its ideal was a Liberal Arts education, whose nature and objectives are universal in scope.

Sir Sayyid, the Politician. His political philosophy has two main foci : Hindu-Muslim and Muslim-British relations.

Hindu-Muslim Relations. Sir Sayyid regarded himself at once as a staunch Muslim and an Indian patriot. It was not until the 1880's that he assumed a communalist attitude in the political domain,[225] characterised by his concern for the survival of the Indo-Muslim community. Prior thereto, he busied himself with the "India Question". He set up a British India Association at Aligarh (in 1866) to acqaint British Parliament and the

English people with the India viewpoint and grievances. Sir Sayyid's address to this Association (10 May 1866) reveals his and its viewpoint. He said on that occasion that Queen Victoria's government had not concentrated sufficiently on the needs of the Indian population. He also scored the Indian public for not demanding greater participation in the government of their land.[226] The Association did not have a long life, because its founder was transferred in 1867 to Benares (until 1869) and it was hard enough to keep his three-year old Scientific Society alive. He, himself, increasingly moved into the direction of political communalism. Chief reasons for it were the decline of Hindu liberalism, the numerical issue ; a Hindu majority and a large Muslim minority ; the economic factor : the Hindus' advancement far beyond that of the Muslims' ; and the language question.

Regarding the first-mentioned aspect, he witnessed the battle between the Hindu moderates[227] and extremists.[228] The cries, "Back to the Vedas" and "Arya for the Aryans," raised by the Arya Samaj,[229] stressed the glorious Hindu past, throwing the Islamic interlude into oblivion. Politically, it implied the demand for a Hindu Government, throwing the Muslims under their rule. These emotional slogans were not based entirely on fact, because a large proportion of India's Muslims descend from Hindu converts to Islam. However, extremism is never based on fact. Pathologically self-centred and purity-minded, it rejects all groups that do not submit to its doctrine and usually tries to convert, subjugate, or eradicate them. This was the fear felt by Sir Sayyid and many other Indian Muslims.[230] It was aggravated by the numerical factor. The total Indian population was estimated at approximately 180 million by 1857,[231] 250 million in 1881, 283 million in 1901, growing to 400 million by 1945.[232] Its Muslim sector numbers 70 million in 1875[233] *versus* about 232 million total or representing over one-third ; by the beginning of the twentieth century it comprised one-fifth and by 1945 one-forth or about 100 million. A sizable minority indeed !

The third reason for the anxiety felt by Indo-Islamic leadership were the serious economic deprivations suffered by their countrymen and their inadequate education—discussed previously[234]—so that they were ill-prepared to participate in India's professional, administrative and growing industrial life. The fourth was the language question which fits into the much large problem of political relations. The demand by Benares's Hindus that Urdu be replaced by Hindi in the government courts and their attempt to have the Scientific Society issue all of its publications in Hindi, meant a movement toward Muslim suppression. Having heard about their second effort, Sir Sayyid wrote to Muḥsin-ul-Mulk (on 29 April 1870) :

" 'This is a proposal which will make Hindu-Muslim unity impossible.

Muslims will never agree to Hindi, and if Hindus, also following the new move, insist on Hindi, they also will not agree to Urdu. The result will be that the Hindus and Muslims will be completely separated. . . . One objection is from my own temperament, which is keen for the welfare of all Indians—Hindus as well as Muslims—and the other fear is that at present the Muslims are under a cloud of ill-luck and adversity. . . .' "[235]

The last section of this quotation refers particularly to the separation of business enterprises between Hindu and Muslims; it keenly conveys his concern with his coreligionist countrymen as well as his genuine interest in the Indian people as a whole. A few months later (on 26 December 1870) he founded his "Society for the Educational Progress of Indian Muslims," a fererunner of Aligarh College. These four categories were significant portents of Hindu-Muslim tension. He deplored the growing friction between the two groups and pleaded for unity. " 'Do you not inhabit the same land? . . . Remember that the words Hindu and Mahomedan are only meant for religious distinction—otherwise all persons, whether Hindu or Mahomedan, even the Christians who reside in this country, are all in this particular respect belonging to one and the same nation'."[236]

This statement reflects his (*a*) unwillingness to accept religious distinctiveness as the basis for political separatism; (*b*) acknowledgment of unity as India's experience and future; (*c*) hope that the trend of superimposing a distinct political identity upon different religious groups would be halted. It was, indeed, a warning reiterated since 1867—that the rift might grow and a plea that it be prevented. He desired (after the Western example) a merger of diverse groups under a central administration; guaranteeing to all minorities the right to exist and safeguarding their respective interests. Soon, however, he saw that a Hindu-dominated government would not follow this pattern. He felt that the Indian National Congress (founded in 1885) did not adequately defend Muslim interests. When it suggested a wider form of self-government, Sir Sayyid opposed it:

> The proposals of the Congress are exceedingly inexpedient for a country which is inhabited by two different nations . . . Now suppose that all the English . . . were to leave India . . . then who would be rulers of India? Is it possible that under these circumstances two nations—the Mohammedan and Hindu—could sit on the same throne and remain equal in power? Most certainly not. It is necessary that one of them should conquer the other and thrust it down. To hope that both could remain equal is to desire the impossible and the inconceivable[237]

He no longer spoke about India being one nation; he now used this word in its plural form. It was an admission of its failure to subordinate communal to national interests. He was forced to acknowledge henceforth the existence of two groups, whose religio-social divergences formed the

basis for political separatism. Inasmuch as the majority would not fight for the (large) minority's rights, India's Muslims had to have their own political oraganisation. Consequently, Sir Sayyid founded the Upper Indian Mohammedan Defence Association (in 1889) as a counter-measure to the Congress. He made it clear also that he favoured communal *versus* joint electorates to prevent his coreligionists from being dominated by Hindu representatives in the provincial legislatures.[238] Well acquainted as a Legislative Council member, with the idea of direct representation, he said in a speech (on 15 Jan. 1883):

"'The system of representation by election means the representation of the views and interests of the majority of the population and in countries where the population is composed of one race and one creed, it is no doubt the best system that can be adopted. But, my Lord, in a country like India, where caste distinctions still flourish, where there is no fusion of the various races, where religious distinctions are still violent, where education in its modern sense had not made an equal or proportionate progress among all the sections of the population, I am convinced that the introduction of the principle of election, pure and simple, for representation of various interests on the Local Boards and District Councils would be attended with evils of greater significance than purely economic considerations, So long as differences of race and creed and the distinctions of caste from an important element in the socio-political life of India, and influence her inhabitants in matters connected with the administration and welfare of the country at large, the system of election, pure and simple, cannot be safely adopted. The larger community would totally override the interests of the smaller community and the ignorant public would hold Government responsible for introducing measures which might make the differences of race and creed more violent than ever.' "[239]

The hope for amicable Hindu-Muslim co-operation had dimmed.[240] He regretted it, because he was an Indian at heart. His loyalty to the Muslim cause, however, bound him to be its advocate, even if it meant the pursuit of a course which might disrupt the country's political unity.

Indo-Muslim Relations with the British. Sir Sayyid considered British rule a blessing, because it brought order (after the chaos wrought by the Mutiny) in, and Western civilisation to, India. He looked upon the English race as " 'the representative of all knowledge,' "[241] the cultural Messiah(s) bringing enlightenment to the Indian people. His view was not shared by the Indo-Muslim majority, whose reticence limited its contacts mostly to (foreign) petty civil service officials.[242] The latter, mainly preoccupied with executing the orders received from the British administrators at Calcutta,[243] were concerned with the Indian Musalman's welfare as little as their superiors, whose chief interest was to govern. Neither group of administrators displayed any desire to investigate the reasons for the Muslims' withdrawal from public life. The negative attitude displayed by the British

authorities and the aloofness maintained by the Indo-Islamic community did not contribute to an amicable association with one another.

No effort was left unspent by Sir Sayyid to improve this situation. By his writings, speeches and personal contacts, he tried to give the British a greater understanding of Islam's essential nature and aspirations. He criticised the authorities for declaring the Indian Musalman guilty of conspiracy, holding them, instead, responsible for the Mutiny.[244] He censured them for not studying how Indo-Muslim youth could be drawn into the English schools and adults into the administration's better jobs. Also, he scored them for their unconcern about Indian Islam's economic plight. Nevertheless, he remained loyal to the British, whose culture he eulogised and whose protection (it will be seen) he regarded as essential. They acknowledged, in turn, his services to the Crown and his coreligionists. His attempt to promote friendship between the *rāj* and the Muslims was no where so manifest as at Aligarh; throughout Islamic India (with some exceptions) the relations remained lukewarm.

His cordial feelings towards the British were increasingly inspired by the communalist issue. The growth of Hindu extremism aggravated the sense of insecurity which he (and India's Muslims generally) felt. It strengthened his conviction that if the governors left the country, his co-religionists might fare worse. Therefore, friendship between them must be cultivated to assure his community's safety. In his later years, he no longer regarded the British solely as restorers of peace and messengers of civilisation. He made the accusers of India's Muslims into their protectors against the Hindus. Henceforth, he condemned any action which he feared might antagonise the administration. The motif of Indo-Muslim political salvation now had entered into his policy of conciliation.

I am in favour of the consolidation of the British Government, not because of any love or loyalty to the British, but only because I see the welfare of the Indian Muslims in that consolidation. And I feel that they can emerge from the present state of decline only with the help of the British government."[245]

It explains his refusal to support the National Muhammadan Association,[246] which aimed at training his co-religionists in political and organizational principles and, above all, he feared, might assume an anti-British attitude at a time when Hindus had manifested serious hostility towards the Muslims. It clearly shows why he denounced the Indian National Congress ("from 1887-8 onwards"[247]—with its long-range aim of self-government—as "the fomenter of 'unreasonable discontent'."[248] Lastly, it reveals the reason for his "indifference to the consensus . . . not so much of the '*ulamā*' as of the middle-class intelligentsia," who, against his advice, supported the

Ottoman Sulṭān's ('Abd al-Ḥamīd's) claim to the Caliphate.[249] He expressed himself as follows on the issue:

> We are devoted and loyal subjects of the British government. . . . We are not the subjects of Sultan 'Abdul Hamīd II; . . . He neither has, nor can have, any spiritual justification over us as Khalīfa. His title of Khalīfa is effective only in his own land and only over the Muslims under his sway.[250]

He was unconcerned with the problem of unity in the Islamic world and held the modern political concept of the citizen whose duty it is to support his country's—and not any other's—Government. The British were India's *de facto* rulers and, therefore, its Muslims were bound to give allegiance to them and not to a foreign potentate. The welfare of his co-religionist compatriots was his chief passion and, hence, he felt that the *Pax Britannica* must be preserved. " 'Even if the British Government decides upon pursuing a policy hostile to the Turks, we are enjoined by our religion to obey our rulers loyally'. "[251]

His insistence that India's Muslims give allegiance to the British rather than to a foreign *Muslim* potentate ultimately was motivated by India's internal political circumstances. He acted in good faith, which has never been questioned by his Indo-Muslim contemporaries.[252] After his death, many among India's Muslims continued his conservative policy of co-operation. Eventually, the majority deviated from it, demanding self-government in an independent Muslim State. They, nevertheless, also were inspired by Sir Sayyid's political doctrine, which had two facets: one of co-operation and another of Indo-Muslim self-assertion. One Pakistani, who has died since, wrote:

> These events, which Sir Syed Ahmad Khan had seen with his own eyes and lived through, made a profound impression upon him and determined his politics to the end of his life. He was anxious to save his community from extinction and enable it to live once again a life of honour in the country. That became the sole motive of his politics. With this end in view he sought to keep the Muslims from all political agitation and tried by all means in his power to bring about reconciliation between the Muslims and their British conquerors. It has become a fashion these days to decry Sir Syed's policy, but they forget that in the conditions prevailing in his day no other policy was possible without dire consequences for the Muslim community in India which was then threatened with extinction.[253]

Another, still living, contryman of his writes: "His policy of loyalty was based entirely on reasons of national interest."[254] This statement can be interpreted to refer to India's population generally, but also to its Muslims in the communalist situation.

Both historians quoted here witnessed that the stress on self-expression

became the overriding force in twentieth-century Indo-Muslim politics.[255]

Appraisal of Sir Sayyid's Contributions. Judge, educator, politician, theologian, journalist, traveller, Sir Sayyid was exposed to the swift changing tide of the nineteenth century—spanned almost fully by his own life—which engulfed India. The Mutiny was the starting and turning point in his career. The former glory of (Indian) Islam and its subsequent decay spurred him on to every activity by which he hoped to restore its greatness and splendour. He spread himself, perhaps, in too many directions, but their radii convened in one point, for education was his central concern.

His travels gave him the breadth of thought, which thrust him completely into a modernist frame of mind. Henceforth, he brandished—to the dislike of the conservatives—the sword of reason before their eyes: " 'wherever one goes or turns, reason remains the only base upon which knowledge, certainty and faith can be founded.' "[256] The problem faced by him (and the Muslim modernists generally) was the acceptance of the Qur'ānic Revelation and its finality and, at the same time, the entertainment of doubts about the social ethic pursued in the Islamic world. The perfection of the Book is guaranteed; the jurists and the theologians are indicted for committing the error of ascribing to their own views Divine sanctity. Theirs are unrevealed, man-made sources, subject to befitting the evolution of the world. To prove the point, Sir Sayyid insisted on Muḥammad's self-appraisal as a human, i.e. non-divine, being, whose social prescripts were not God-given. In line with modernist thought, he distinguished two levels in the sacred Bible; one, comprising those injunctions eternally valid (Allah's existence, unity, creation, eternity) and the other, pertaining to the social decrees, which are mutable.

Sir Sayyid believed that scientific rationalism is the essential nature of the Muslim faith which, therefore, is supreme over all other religions. He attempted to link diverse trends prevalent in the West with similar (earlier) currents in Islam, which thus could be shown not to be inimical to rationalist thinking. Involved in multiple activities, he had little time to sift the better from the worse, the more from the less suitable aspects of European civilisation transmitted to his country. Unfamiliar with the growing religious scepticism in the West, he thought of its—as well as the Islamic—scientific and liberalist heritage only as bearing positive results. He was unaware of the ill effects of an all too quick assimilation—born from his anxiety to give India's Muslims rapid booster shots—so that he cannot be condemned for the growth of scepticism among them. There was no time to wait for the distillation of ideas which (theoretically) should

precede action based upon them. Usually, it is embodied in after-thoughts on the past. Furthermore, non-traditionalism would have germinated in any case among the younger generations as the modernist breeze was wafting from other Islamic lands.

His Muslim opponents denounced his theology,[257] his educational policy and his behaviour[258] as un-Islamic. Nevertheless, he affirmed his religion's basic tenets[259] (defending them also against non-Muslim critics) and tried to instil respect for the Qur'ān among that portion of Indo-Muslim youth cut adrift from traditionalism. Unlike most of his coreligionist countrymen, he was a realist keenly aware of the forces of change besetting India. He desired above all that they should not drown its Muslim population.

The founder of the Indo-Muslim modernist movement brought them hope and self-reliance.[260] He failed in converting the theologians to his point of view and thereby became responsible for the rift between the orthodox and the modernists in Islamic India. Neither the *'ulamā'*—who have not relented to this day—nor those Muslims condemning him for his pro-British (and hence "pro-imperialist") attitude have done him justice. Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān dedicated his life to the defence of Indian Islam ; his apologetic had a constructive character, because it included the theme of salvation. It is embedded neither mainly in his theology nor in Aligarh University, but in the new trend of thought he forged (through his journal, other writings and lectures, which reached a wide audience) as a preparation of India's Muslims for the twentieth-century world.

2. *Sir Sayyid's Associates*

Sir Sayyid attracted a number of men desirous of effecting socio-educational reforms after the Western model. They are known aggregately as the "Aligarh school," because they propagated Sir Sayyid's reverence for nineteenth-century European civilisation.[261] Among them were Chirāgh 'Alī, Muṣṭafā Khān, Professor Khudā Bakhsh,[262] and *Nawāb* Muḥsin-ul-Mulk.[263]

Chirāgh 'Alī[264] joined many Indo-Muslim modernists in contributing articles to Sir Sayyid's *Tahdhīb.* His book, entitled *Proposed Political, Legal and Social Reforms in the Ottoman Empire and Other Mohammedan States* (1883) is one of the earliest Indo-Muslim modernist works apart from those written by Sir Sayyid. Its thesis is that " 'Islam as a religion is quite apart from inculcating a social system. The Mohammedan polity and social system have nothing to do with religion'."[265] He thus followed Sir Sayyid by advocating the separation between the revealed immutable Law and unrevealed mutable precepts. He rejected thereby the tight relationship between the religious fundamentals and the social practices. The first, of course, refer to the general tenets of faith : belief in God's existence, creation, etc. The

second pertain to the civil aspects of the *Sharī'ah.* The former are eternal and unchangeable. The latter answer to the needs of a particular era and, therefore, are modifiable. Chirāgh 'Alī held that they no longer suffice for modern times and must be overhauled. He was concerned particularly, too, with the economic situation and the conditions facing Islamic womanhood. He held that such modern devices as banking must be introduced to modernise and improve his country's financial structure and life. His pertinent view implied a rejection of the Qur'ānic decree forbidding usury.[266] By arguing that it is unrevealed, i.e., an economic measure answering the needs of Muḥammad's time, the thesis that banking (with its levying of interest) is permitted by Islam can be advanced. On this issue, Chirāgh 'Alī was totally unorthodox.

Concerning the position of Indo-Muslim womanhood, he demanded that they be educated better and permitted to participate more directly in life's affairs. To advocate their socio-educational improvement is not against the historical tradition, for Muslim women did receive some education at home and, particularly in earlier times, attended schools specially founded for them. However, Muḥammad, himself, had declared that they have less intelligence than men[267] and instituted the custom of *pardah* among his household.[268] The implications were not solely seclusion, but also a depreciation of a woman's contributions to society except as a childbearer and mother. Chirāgh 'Alī's insistence on more equal treatment seems, therefore, contrary to Qur'ānic teachings, Muḥammad's (and to a great extent) the Community's *sunnah.* Again, the argument that the custom of *pardah* and the belief in the intellectual inferiority of females are derived from the social situation prevalent in the sixth to seventh centuries C.E. led to the (foregone) conclusion that the pertinent biblical decrees were unrevealed. He could insist, therefore, that marriage, divorce and other social laws be revised.[269]

With respect to both aspects, Chirāgh 'Alī went far beyond Sir Sayyid, who was unconcerned with the economic problem and (as noted) preferred to retain an orthodox attitude towards the position of Indo-Muslim womanhood.

Politically, he supported his countryman's stand on the Caliphate, for three main reasons : viz. contrary to accepted belief, he felt that it was not a Divine institution[270] so that the changes were not contrary to Allah's Revelation ; autocracy must give way to representative government ; the Indian Musalman owes loyalty solely to his own country's rulers.[271] On this question, therefore, he stood in direct opposition to the general Indo-Muslim consensus.

Chirāgh 'Alī (unlike Sir Sayyid) did not expound his views in theological commentaries, but, nevertheless, he was concerned as much as his

famous compatriot with the Indo-Muslim community's revitalisation. Fully rejecting the traditional way of life, he demanded a thorough transformation of the entire system to which his coreligionists hitherto had adhered. He regarded revision of the legal structure built up in the medieval period as an imperative necessity. He argued that a great part of it was developed by the theologian-jurists whose *ijmā'* served to sanctify their own decrees. Therefore, he considered modification essential and did not regard such an attitude as defying the Qur'ān's teachings, which he (and other modernists) maintained permits progress.

Despite his suggested reforms, Chirāgh 'Alī did not propose the building of an un-Islamic society, but rather a revision in the nature of an adaptation. The substratum must continue to rest on the Qur'ān, but the structure to be erected thereupon ought be built on new principles developed in, and enabling the advance of, the West. Here, again, he stood in Sir Sayyid's tradition.

Muṣṭafā Khān[272] was another of Sir Sayyid's contemporaries interested in the modernist movement. His *Apology for the New Light* (1891) is primarily a defence of the new trend and reflects the animosity felt towards it in its early period. The book's title is a satirical reply to the critics hurling the epithet of "the new light" at its advocates. Its contents centre mainly on the past and present conditions of Indo-Muslim civilization. It takes up Sir Sayyid's earliest theme of Mughal grandeur,[273] but unsentimentally points to its lying in the irrevocable past. Reminiscing on it does not alter the fact that, since then, Indo-Muslim civilisation has become sterile. The eyes must be fixed on the present. The task of reconstruction is an urgent one and the only way it can be successful is to adopt "the new light," that is, European culture, for it has lifted the westerners from a feudalistic into a scientific-minded stage and has induced a modern spirit. He felt that an equally good Muslim civility can be built up despite the absorption of foreign innovations.

As a modernist, Muṣṭafā Khān was convinced that rationalism is the key to progress ; he regarded it as an invaluable contribution. His defence purports to contrast Indo-Muslim decay with the advancement of the West and focus attention on the essential need to accept those principles engendering it.

Muṣṭafā Khān, like Sir Sayyid, was an apologist, with this difference that he defended "the new light" against Indo-Muslim critics, while his contemporary tried to assuage the foreigners' attacks on Islam. He did not contribute to the philosophy of the Aligarh movement, but his willingness to take up his pen in its favour made him one of its loyal members.

Shaykh Khudā Bakhsh of Calcutta (1877-1931) also belonged to the

modernist circle. He, too, attributed the decay of the Indo-Muslim community to external factors; that is, he did not consider it due to a default intrinsic to the faith.

> Islam possesses an inherent force and vitality which nothing can weaken or destroy. It carries within it germs of progress and development, and has great powers of adaptability to changing circumstances. There is nothing in its teaching which conflicts with or militates against modern civilization, and the moment Moslems realize the truth, their future will be assured and their greatness only a question of time. Modern Islam, with its hierarchy of priesthood, gross fanaticism, appalling ignorance, and superstitious practices, is, indeed, a discredit to the Islam torn into factions; instead of culture we have indifference to learning; instead of liberal-minded toleration we have gross bigotry. But this intellectual darkness must necessarily be followed by intellectual dawn, and we trust that it is not now far distant or too long in coming.[274]

This statement reiterates the modernist theme of Islam's evolutionary character. It urgently appeals for reforms to modernise this religion, whose teachings it considers progressive. The mode suggested is to discard all that is extraneous such as, for example, supernaturalism and theology. The residue: the two cardinal principles of belief in Allah's unity and Muḥammad's apostleship,[275] are held by Khudā Bakhsh to be Islam's real foundations. He thereby expressed agreement with the view that the continuation of an "archaic" code would be injurious to the Indo-Muslim community[276] and acknowledged the implication of such a contention, viz. that the social prescripts are unrevealed. He went a step further than Chirāgh 'Alī by advocating the exclusion of these and the economic decrees from the Qur'ān, which he considered an ethical guide, not a civil law code. He did not feel that its status as Holy Writ would be undermined by cutting it; rather he believed that such a measure would enhence its genuineness.

Khudā Bakhsh's stress on Islam's simplicity derived from the need that its (Indian) adherents, unhindered by religious enunciations, participate fully in all spheres of life. His conviction that it cannot be distinguished from any other true faith was born from his desire to prove that it is as progressive as, particularly, Christianity. His view may have been influenced also by Western universalism and Hinduism.

The following passage clearly indicates his chief ideas:

> Islam must be on the defensive against the West. We must use the weapons forged in the West. Everywhere we see Western education, Western methods, Western ways of agitation, Western social customs and the Western call for freedom and self-determination. But this wave of westernism has not weakened Islam but drawn us closer to it. Alzurkani said 200 years ago, "Decisions may be made in the measure of new circumstances." Such is the true spirit of Islam. Universalism is its key; the unity of God its battlecry;

the brotherhood of man its cardinal tenet ; a will to conquer its aspiration. The rest is the creation of theology and not essential to Islam."[277]

The first part of this quotation appears to be a warning against Islam's corrosion by Western ideas. Nevertheless, the application of European principles is urged, because as they are not regarded as weakening, but as strengthening, factors. This method is not held by Khudā Bakhsh to be an imitation, which he opposed, because it would result in something un-Islamic. Rather, it is an adapation, which neither he nor any other modernist considered to lead to a structure not wholly Muslim by nature.[278]

The thesis that new decisions are permissible (quoting an authority to support it) implies rejection of *ijmā'*. Only when the "door of *ijtihād*" is reopened, can decisions to revise the social, legal and economic precepts be made and the modernisation of the Indo-Muslim way of life achieved. It meant, of course, his repudiation of a great part of the *Shar'īah*. He felt, however, that the transformation could not be successful unless the Muslim woman's training was bettered. He scored such social practices as easy divorce and polygamy, *pardah*, child marriage and the denial of Muslim widows' right to remarry.[279] He was not certain that "Islam does not sanction" polygamy, but held that it is not "conducive to the interests of society".[280] Neither it nor the "free and full use" made of "the power of divorce" by "the lord of creation" breeds "a high regard and reverence for womankind."[281] Although he felt that the conditions of Indo-Muslim womanhood had improved—due to European influences—the task still remained to create an awareness among their menfolk for the need "to purify the stream of domestic life and the social system."[282] He thus demanded (similarly to Chirāgh 'Alī) the overhauling of the Islamic social structure, which could be done solely by making decisions befitting the new spirit.

The enumeration (in the above-mentioned quotation) stresses Muslim unity, brotherhood and universalism. It is true that Muḥammad preached these doctrines. Their meaning deepens, however, if projected against historical situation of Khudā Bakhsh's time, when foreign forces were threatening the unity of the Islamic world (in 1912).[283] His reiteration may echo al-Afghānī's exhortation that the Muslims form an "indissoluble bond" (i.e. a strong political *bloc*) against the colonialist powers.[284] His statment that "Islam must be on the defensive against the West" would then gain political significance. Contrary to al-Afghānī's revolutionariness, Khudā Bakhsh preferred to remain pro-British and use the peaceful educational method to reawaken Indo-Muslim political self-Consciousness.[285] Furthermore, his appeal was universal, as it was addressed to non-Muslims (particularly), promising redemption to all willing to live together under God's peaceful

banner. It was a negative message, because it was born from fear for the Ottoman Empire's—and Mecca's and Medina's—fate and sought to refute Islam's reputation as on exclusive religion. Nevertheless, it had a positive aspect, for it attempted to conciliate the Muslim and Christian peoples into a universal, i.e. not a specifically Islamic, brotherhood.[286] On this point, he was non-scriptural, because the Qur'ān advocates the world's redemption in the sense of a univeral conversion to its creed.[287]

Lastly, he demanded (also in the aforementioned statement) that the Indian Musalman exert himself in the cause for progress. His emphasis on the will is extremely important in this respect, because it involves the human personality's reconstruction. Only if man wills it, can he remake himself and society. As God's vicegerent, it is his duty to participate in life's affairs. Ignorance incapacitates him and results in his indolence, and, consequenlly, his and his community's dissolution. If he remains inactive and uneducated, he wills it so and thereby opposes God. Rejection of the new thus is seen as an act of rebellion against the Creator. It becomes man's duty to develop his intellectual capacities to the fullest extent so that he may assume the role assigned to him by Allah. The pursuit of such a course puts the human being in harmony with His will, which is Islam's essential meaning.

How can progress be achieved? By instruction, according to Khudā Bakhsh, who worte: "Education may not be the cure for all social evils, but it undoubtedly goes a long way towards regenerating a community."[288] The aim is "materialistic," as terrestrial improvement is the goal. It has, nevertheless, a spiritual dimension, because it leads to salvation. The concrete terms, it means the creation of a modern social order, founded on the Qur'ān's essential teachings. Such a purpose, again, is not seen as being alien to, but in accordance with, Islam's genuine spirit and the duties Allah has imposed upon the Muslims. The medieval code—developed by the theologians—no longer gives life; adherence to it is contrary to the evolutionary attitude found in Holy Writ. And yet, Sayyid Khudā Bakhsh also wrote :

> The old system, with all its faults, had many redeeming virtues. . . . As a result of religious beliefs, the standard of morality was high, and the effect of public opinion necessarily severe. . . . I do hold that a community without deep earnest religious faith and scarcely attain much good.[289]

The modernist thus deplored the slackening hold had by "the old system". He wrote, indeed, that the English Penal Code was less effective a check on immorality and criminality than was the sense of responsibility to God infused by the code.[290] Ultimately, then, it contained some value, which was derived from its spiritual teachings. "Mohammedan civilization was the outcome of Mohammedan faith, and nothing but Islam can again give to the Mohammedans what they have lost—their civilization, their

culture, and their empire."[291] Khudā Bakhsh thereby warned against too complete an assimilation of foreign elements which might result in de-islamisation and against a complete abandonment of the *Sharī'ah*, founded partly on the Qur'ān and, therefore, containing some revealed decrees. He feared ultimately too radical a transformation of his community, involving a break in the continuity and the danger of too rapid a movement lacking balance, which was spurred by the eager desire to go swiftly forward. By pleading that the Islamic religion serve as a check on the progressive tide to assure that its values will not be lost, the modernist turned conservative. In appraising his contribution, the following may be said. Khudā Bakhsh did not deviate from Sir Sayyid on most issues. He accepted the thesis that harmony exists between revelation and science, rejected miracles and other "irrational" supernaturalist beliefs and acknowledged the distinction between Divine and human legislation. He wished to retain solely the revealed prescripts in the Qur'ān (whereby, as stated, he stood nearer to Chirāgh'Alī), but followed Sir Sayyid in accepting allegory as the interpretative mode of certain Biblical passages (e.g. Moses crossing the Red Sea). He differed from his famous countryman by stressing the Qur'ān as being mainly an ethical code, Islam's simplicity and equality with other faiths, and the human will as a criterion of judgment on man's relationship with God. Although his emphasis on ethics echoes Sir Sayyid's concept of the preceptor, it seems closer to the doctrine of Pragmatism, which insists on the functional aspect His repudiation of theology, that is, of fhe elaborate structure built up by the medieval "doctors," implies a dislike for the artificial. His conception of Islam as a simple faith is novel and influenced, perhaps, not solely by the need to rid it of its cumbereome kernel (the Code),[292] but also by the Christian missionaries' description of Jesus's faith as as an integral part of life. Nevertheless, he insisted on performing the ritual, one element of which in particular, viz. the five daily prayers, involve interruptions (which he did not consider injurious to economic life). His assertion of Islam's equality with other faiths—which links with his theme of universalism—is contrary to Sir Sayyid's belief in its superiority. It contains an accusation of Indo-Muslim arrogance (which the latter also had criticised) and, too, of Christian misinterpretation. It may express some defeatism, because Khudā Bakhsh acknowledged non-Muslim cultural (and political) supremacy, believed to have been derived from a dynamism fed by the Christian religion. His theme of man's will as the predetermining factor in a society's transformation is not among the tenets held by Sir Sayyid, who insisted that the Muslims *must* accept the new : an imperative approach contrary to Sayyid Khudā Bakhsh's voluntarism. However, it also contains such an element, as the latter acknowledges the necessity for progress,

while Sir Sayyid's doctrine involves man's will, for obviously improvement does not occur unless man actively promotes and, hence, *wills* it. Nevertheless, the two men differ in their emphasis in this particular instance.

Khudā Bakhsh joined Chirāgh 'Alī in pleading for the enlightenment of Indo-Muslim womanhood, and strongly rejecting all social practices injurious to her and, ultimately, her society. Both were far more outspoken than Sir Sayyid on this issue. He agreed, however, with the latter that in their time politics had little importance. "Our immediate field of work," he wrote, "lies in spheres social, religious and educational. We must, for the present, banish politics from the programme of our activity."[293] He insisted on Indo-Muslim co-operation with the British to root out "sedition and anarchy,"[294] because he, too, felt that advancement can be had only in a peaceful environment. He thus shared Sir Sayyid's political views which, together with his conviction that education is instrumental in a commpnity's revitalisation, puts him solidly in the "Aligarh school".

The inconsistencies in his writings derive from the tension resulting from his desire for progress, his awareness that India's Muslims must ride with the tide and his anxiety that it might undermine Islam's foundations if the process of Europeanisation were not halted.

> The world moves and we move, or if at all, we should move, with it. . . . To claim perfection is to shut the door against progress. . . . It is certain that the party opposed to progress has not a very long lease of life left to it. . . . New ideas . . . are seething in the intellectual and emotional cauldron of our day. And hence the stir and activity in our community. . . .[295]

He considered advancement to be essential, but also felt that it must have a moral content, which only the Muslim religion can give. "He did not, however, adopt the theory that he was but restoring Islam to its pristine purity; rather he innovated consciously, striving for a modern religion."[296] Sayyid Khudā Bakhsh could not stop the forces of innovation which he had helped to unleash. He was more keenly aware than Sir Sayyid and others, however, that Islamic progressivity must remain founded on its own religious and civilisational content. He did not discuss, however, the problems arising from the question as to how this could be done. The modes of reinterpretation and exclusion were the sole ones which he (and most modernists) adopted, without considering that these, too, apart from borrowing from the West, might lead to a non-Islamic way of life.

Sayyid Mahdī Alī, better known as "Muḥsin-ul-Mulk" (1837-1907),[297] was a civil servant at first in British and then, for almost twenty-two years, in Hyderabad's employ. He settled upon his retirement (in 1893) at Aligarh, succeeding his friend Sir Sayyid, as Secretary of its College. The association between these two men went back many years, as Muḥsin-ul-Mulk wrote

articles for the *Tadhīb.* The correspondence between them, nevertheless, reveals their serious disagrement, which he characterised as a divergence of degree rather than substance.[298] He rejected his friend's theology, which he said resulted in a religion neither recognised by Allah, Gabriel nor Muḥammad. From an orthodox viewpoint, he was right, as the following arguments purport to show.

For instance, if reason is the knower of God's existence, then the implicit trust, which is a vital aspect of pious belief, is lost. Reason may state that God does not exist, although Sir Sayyid emphatically held the contrary to be true. Nevertheless, the implication is present, particularly as the First Cause is pushed so far back into the Heavens that He becomes a stranger to man. In fact, did Sir Sayyid not say that reason cannot know God's nature? Trust neither philosophises nor asks questions. It accepts and satisfies the believer. Apart from the repudiation of God as being a First Cause and reason as the knower of His existence, other aspects in Sir Sayyid's theology irked Muḥsin-ul-Mulk. His friend's rejection of abrogation and miracles detracted from God's greatness and omnipotence. Such statements as God's "operational promise" and "verbal promise," said to be in accord with each other because of their reputedly common origion, are foreign and meaningless to Islam. Sir Sayyid's allegorical method, his uncertainty concerning the real nature of the *post-mortem* states as well as his repudiation of the Virgin Birth and traditional teachings about Jewish and Christian doctrines do not accord with Muslim fnndamentalist beliefs. In rejecting all of these theses, advanced by the modernist, the *Nawāb* championed the orthodox cause in the theological domain.

However, he affirmed his support of "new ideas" in the educational field, as he admitted that the existing textbooks were insufficent for the needs of his time. His association with Aligarh meant his acceptance of its sevised educational system, which did not include, however, Sir Sayyid's theology. This is proven by his profound interest in the College whose enrolment, due to his efforts, increased from 343 at Sir Sayyid's to 800 by his own death.[299]

The causes of Mohsin ul-Mulk's success are to be found in his tact, industry, shrewd commonsense, and deep devotion to his work. He was more than sixty when he took over the reins of office but he worked harder than most young men do. He toured extensively—including a month which he spent at Rangoon—to carry the message of Aligarh to his co-religionists and neglected no device to make the College more popular and more influential. But the real secret of his success lay in his disarming temperament, and sweet, winning personality. . . ."[300]

The result was not only the numerical growth of Aligarh's student body, but also the acceptance of it among the *'ulamā'* and some men who

had been politically hostile to Sir Sayyid.[301] He, furthermore, assumed the leadership of the Muhammadan Educational Conference upon its founder's decease, thus assuring its continuation and, in its political role, presentation of the Aligarh point of view.

Muḥsin-ul-Mulk occupied, in fact, a middle position between the modernist and conservative factions in Islamic India. He remained theologically fundamentalist, accepting *ijmā'* in the religious realm, but was unorthodox in subscribing to educational modernism, thereby supporting innovation. He severely rebuked Sir Sayyid for his attempts at reinterpreting entirely the fundamentals of the Muslim faith, which implied an internal process of revision. Apparently, he was unaware of the consequences arising from educational reforms, which he seems to have regarded rather as an external method, which would not harm the religious domain.

Like Sir Sayyid, he was involved in the Hindi-Urdu controversy. When Sir Antony Macdonnel, then Governor of the United Provinces, ordered the issuance of a law on 18 April 1900 ending the privileged status of Urdu in government, the Indian Muslims were shocked. Muḥsin-ul-Mulk then decided to found an Urdu Defence Association to serve as a forum of protest and present the Muslim viewpoint. It held its first meeting at Aligarh on 13 May 1900. Becoming deeply involved in the controversy which resulted in disputes with Muslims and English authorities who threatened to cut off their financial support of Aligarh College, he finally presented his resignation as its Secretary. The Trustees refused to accept it and he had no other choice but to remain at the helm of its affairs and relinquish his protest movement. Not for long, however, Sir Antony hardly had left the U.P. or Muḥsin-ul-Mulk organised the "Association for the Advancement of Urdu" (*Anjuman-i-Taraqqī-i-Urdū*) as part of the Muhammadan Educational Conference. Thomas (later Sir Thomas) Arnold was appointed as its first chairman to avoid any trouble, This Association later became reputed for assuring the promotion of the Urdu language and the "orderly growth and enrichment of Urdu Literature."[302] The long struggle for Indo-Muslim development and recognition, begun by Sir Sayyid, was continued directly by his associates, including Muḥsin-ul-Mulk.

"What were the latter's political views ? Like his friend, he repudiated Indo-Muslim submission to the Ottoman sultan-caliph, stressing the religiously-binding allegiance due to the British."[303] It meant his indifference to the consensus on this issue (which involved the unity of the Muslim world) and, implicitly, agreement with the theologians' view that British India had remained *dār-ul-Islām*. He did not consider his political position to be opposed to his religious viewpoint, although (as noted) an element of contradiction seems to arise from such an attitude.[304]

His other activities (such as his assistance in organising the deputation to Lord Minto and the Muslim League)[305] are a further development of Sir Sayyid's communalist views.

On Muḥsin-ul-Mulk's death (1907), sixty-six year-old Mushtāq Ḥusain, alias "Viqār-ul-Mulk" (1841-1917) was elected to and accepted the post of Secretary at Aligarh. Formerly a teacher and Sir Sayyid's appointee as head of Amroha's poor-house, he became his reader while Sub-Judge at Aligarh and associated with Maulvī Samī Ullah Khān in running its elementary school. He, too, then had a long association with the founder of Indo-Muslim modernism as well as with Muḥsin-ul-Mulk whom he followed to Hyderabad (in 1875) where, with one brief pause, he held high appointments until his resignation (1892). During this period, he continued his interest in Aligarh College. Subsequently (1892-1900), he retired from public life having settled again at Amroha. When the clash between Sir Antony Macdonnel and Muḥsin-ul-Mulk broke out, he resumed his activities on Aligarh's behalf. Between 1901 and 1907, he was his former colleague's associate in running the College and then became his successor (as noted).

One problem emerging in Sir Sayyid's own lifetime during the principalship of Theodore Beck) and under his administration (when Archbold occupied this office) was the relation between the Secretary of the College Board, who was an Indian Muslim, and the Principal, a European Christian. Under the Trustee Bill, wide powers had been given to the latter so that little, if any, interference by the former was tolerated. In short, Viqār-ul-Mulk lay the issue before the Board members who agreed that the Secretary had intervention rights in some College affairs. He thus carried the victory. Behind this long dispute probably lay the conviction that Aligarh College should not be run as a British Government institution. The Governor's disavowal of such an aim, expressed in one of his letters to its President,[306] seems to support such an interpretation. Right of intervention by the Secretary meant, in effect, that control over College affairs would not slip out of Muslim hands.

The Nawāb also furthered Sir Sayyid's idea of the need for a Muslim political organisation. He suggested (in 1900) that the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental Defence Association be revived. To this end, a first meeting was held at Lucknow (October 1901) and he toured the land to obtain support for it. An active and effective Muslim political organisation was not created, however, till the Simla Deputation had taken place (on 1 October 1906).[307]

He shared at first Sir Sayyid's pro-British feelings for the same reason: to safeguard Indo-Muslim political rights. This is what he said on the issue:

" 'We are numerically one-fifth of the other community. If at any time

the British Government ceases to exist in India, we shall have to live as the subjects of the Hindus, and our property, our self-respect, and our religion will be all in danger. . . . If there is any device by which we can escape this, it is by the continuance of the British Raj, and our interests can be safeguarded only if we ensure the continuance of the British Government.' "[308]

The cause for his change in attitude resulted from the British decision (1911) not to partition Bengal, reversing an earlier one which had Muslim approval. It occasioned Viqār ul-Mulk's article, entitled "The Fate of Muslims in India," published in the *Aligarh Gazette* (20 December 1911), stating :

" 'It is now manifest like the midday sun, that after seeing what has happened lately, it is futile to ask the Muslims to place their reliance on Government. Now the days for such reliance are over. What we should rely on, after the grace of God, is the strength of our right arm, for which we have, before us, the example of our worthy countrymen.' "[309]

In other articles and letters he maintained his new political doctrine in spite of Indo-Muslim criticism for abandoning Sir Sayyid's co-operation policy. His insistence that his coreligionist countrymen retain " 'their own national organization' " and his rejection that they " 'join the other large group,' " meaning the Indian National Congress, gain significance if seen against his growing anti-Britishness. Sir Sayyid had felt that both an Indo-Muslim political organisation, expressing its people's political desires, hopes and aims, as well as their co-operation with the British could be pursued at the same time. He would have agreed with the beautiful simile formulated by the Nawāb, that, without vigorous Indo-Muslim exercise of political rights, they would be " 'just as a river (which) loses its identity in a vast ocean.' "[310] The Nawāb's dissent with his predecessor lay in cutting the ties with the British. " 'It is true,' " he said, " 'that many a time disappointments point the way to suicide, and the suggestion that we should join the Congress is a result of similar disappointments—for which the present Government is responsible—but suicide is never advisable.' "[311] When he died, a new era in Indo-Muslim politics had opened:

A critique of him must include the charges that : Aligarh's standards were lowered under his administration,[312] resulting in disputes among the students representing various Muslim sects[313] and the alienation of the Shī'ahs, who then founded their own College at Lucknow.[314] Nevertheless, his association with Aligarh meant his acknowledgment of its importance and his encouragement of Indo-Muslim youth to drink from its fountains of learning. His efforts to promote greater enthusiasm among his coreligionist countrymen for exercising political self-expression and leadership must be counted equally among his contributions. Lastly, he cut them off from a pro-British orientation and set the Indo-Muslim ship towards a new course.

All writers discussed so far stressed the following : (*a*) Indo-Muslim economic and educational decay; (*b*) the need for their revitalisation; (*c*) the urgency of a modern education to reach this aim ; (*d*) European civilisational brilliance (excepting the two Nawābs although their association with Aligarh could be interpreted as also subscribing to this theme) ; (*e*) Islam's pliable and evolutionary nature ; (*f*) the distinction between revealed or immutable and unrevealed or mutable laws (accepted neither by Muḥsin-ul-Mulk nor Viqār-ul-Mulk) ; (*g*) the reopening of *ijtihād* by demanding the support of *ijmā'* for it (neither Nawāb accepted its theological aspects) ; (*h*) pro-Britishness (at first followed, then rejected by Viqār-ul-Mulk). Starting with Sir Sayyid, they made valuable contributions by creating an awareness (among a portion of their countrymen) that a new (Western) type of education was essential for reactivating and securing their society's advancement. Except for Muḥsin-ul-Mulk and Viqār-ul-Mulk who, also, "had a strong religious bent of mind" which "became firmer" in the course of time and which he tried to inculcate in the Aligarh student-body, they heralded a way of life liberated from the dead weight of traditionalism, proclaiming it to be essentially Islamic. The Qur'ān (reinterpreted) and *Sunnah* (particularly of the Prophet) formed the groundwork of the new *Sharī'ah* they proposed. The new (resultant) Code, therefore, was regarded by them as sacrosanct as the old one, but more genuine, because it was not overlaid with man-made (unrevealed) accretions. The modernisation they suggested could be seen as a *via purgativa* ; once the process has been completed, the Islamic faith and way of life should rest on truer spiritual foundations. Theirs was an idealism based on admiration for Western civilisation and on the concept of the human being as the agent of transformation.[315]

Their contributions were negative, because most of them eulogised excessively the culture of the West and accepted uncritically all that it had to offer. They did not look for those principles which would have been most valuable to Indo-Muslim progress. Muḥsin-ul-Mulk and Khudā Bakhsh were the only two men aware of the inherent dangers of too complete an acceptance of all that was European. Nevertheless, they shared Sir Sayyid's optimism, because they firmly believed in Islam's flexibility and its potential for achieving progress.

The treatises they wrote were mainly in English and understood, therefore, by a small westernised group in Islamic India. The masses—unable to read—had no access to, and would have had little understanding of, these sophisticated works dealing with theological, social, political and economic theories. Steeped in tradition, they could not have accepted, moreover, the modernist interpretations. Yet this small group of men—the *avant-garde* in

Indo-Muslim modernism—diffused Sir Sayyid's views among the intelligentsia, thus creating a larger audience and greater knowledge of and support for them among those who were to become Islamic India's leaders.

The exclusive reliance on Western standards as criteria of comparison was not followed by all Indo-Muslim modernists. A group arose which did not look westward, but inward, that is, searched within Islamic history for life-giving principles (although the stimulus came from their implicit acknowledgment of European superiority). They do not belong, therefore, directly to the Aligarh movement; their emphasis on the need for progress, however, links them with it. The three outstanding representatives of this divergent trend in Indo-Muslim modernism are Alṭāf Ḥusayn, Muḥammad Shiblī and 'Amīr 'Alī.

Alṭāf Ḥusayn (1834-1914), more popularly known as Ḥālī, had formed a close friendship with Sir Sayyid (whose biographer he became) and, like others, wrote articles for the *Tahdhīb*. He bewailed the Indo-Muslim decay:

> Come ! and see our abysmal decadence,
> See the fall of *Islam* without recovery,
> Once you see the ebb of our sea,
> Never shall you believe that a
> Flow succeeds every ebb ![316]

He championed modern education and social progress, but insisted that their aim was an inner revitalisation. In his great epic, *Musaddas*, he repudiated the thought that Muslims should westernise; on the contrary, they ought to look at their own past. Their coreligionists of an earlier age had the vitality and ability to produce a civilisation as brilliant as that developed by Europe. It is unneccesary, therefore, to look at the West as the world's supreme culture-builder.

The "ebb' refers, of course, to the decay that sets in after a great era has gone. The "flow" symbolises the onward movement of Time (the carrier of history) within which the regenerative process—ordered by God—continuously takes place. The unseen current underlying the ocean's tides is present also in Time's tidal waves. It never ceases and, therefore, is not static. It engenders hope for betterment, possible only if the Muslim integrates himself with the active forces present within history. The implication of turning back into Islam's golden era is to point to the activism prevailing at the time, which is proof of a non-passive attitude.

Essentially, Ḥālī's message is the same as that given by Sir Sayyid, namely, progress, achieved only by a modern education. The latter's post-Mutiny horizon, however, was bounded by that event and by the immediate sphere within which he worked. Alṭāf Ḥusayn fastened his eyes upon the splendorous epochs in Muslim history to reveal to his audience the great

results to which keen interest and activity lead. Like the Prophet of Islam, he used history as a lesson to be taught to his contemporaries. Its aim (as stated) was the disclosure of the Muslims' great achievements generated by their dynamism and enthusiasm for learning. He differed, however, from Sir Sayyid by advocating Indo-Muslim support for pan-Islamism.[317] His epic expressed in this regard his countrymen's feelings.

His poetry, written in Urdu, found a far wider circle of readers than the works composed in English. It had, furthermore, an emotional appeal, for it pointed to past Muslim—not (then) contemporary European—grandeur and supported the Muslim rather than the British cause.

Ḥālī's approach had its dangers : if the past is stressed, a soporific element, acting as a negative remedy, is introduced. Musing does not generate activity. It also undoubtedly strengthened the conviction of those groups, insisting on Islam's superiority and resisting any foreign methods. It was precisely this latter attitude, which the poet wished to combat and soften towards acceptance of the new so that creativity might be engendered again in Islamic India. He had no desire to nurse his Muslim countrymen to sleep, but held before them the promise of revival, to serve as a lesson that their faith did not look askance on, but itself, had nurtured progress. Politically, he disregarded any possible negative consequences which (Sir Sayyid had feared) might result from subscribing to the pan-Islamic cause. Emphasis on the Muslim past was a powerful emotional stimulant breeding anti-foreign sentiments, expressed by Ḥālī in terms of loyalty to the doctrines of unity and brotherhood in the Muslim world. Unlike Sir Sayyid and other Indo-Muslim thinkers, he was not oriented towards a narrow nationalism, but towards Islamic religio-political "trans-nationalism," which knows of no frontier.[318] These facts and the use of Urdu distinguish Ḥālī from the anglicist attitude displayed by the founder and followers of the Aligarh "school". His vision of Islam as a dynamic progressive faith, however, links him with that tradition.

Ḥālī's political sentiments can be summed up in two words: Indian nationalist. He used his pen fervently in the cause of Hindu-Muslim unity.

> If you desire the good of your country,
> Then do not consider any compatriot of yours as a stranger,
> Be he a Muslim or a Hindu :
> Be he a Buddhist, or a Brahmoo,
> Look on them all with the eyes of friendship ;
> Consider them like the pupils of your eyes."[319]

In one of the *Musaddas*, he sang :

> This alone is devotion : this is true religion and faith,
> That man should help his brother man.[320]

Did he stand in the Aligarh tradition ? A split occurred in Ḥālī's lifetime among its members between those adhering to Sir Sayyid's policy of British co-operation and those, including Viqār-ul-Mulk, preferring self-reliance. However, another orientation, initiated by Sir Sayyid, was Indo-Muslim political separatism. This was continued by Viqār-ul-Mulk. Could it be said that, as this tide grew stronger, Ḥālī tried to prevent it ? He represented a minority viewpoint among India's Muslims who, in due course, adhered to a separatist policy.

Despite his conservative upbringing in the Islamic *madrasahs* and the influence upon him by the anti-modernist scholar, Muḥammad Fārūq, Muḥammad Shiblī, called Nu'mānī (1857-1914), linked himself with Sir Sayyid's educational modernism by accepting an assistant professorship of Arabic at Aligarh (1883). He was then twenty-six years old and returned recently from a pilgrimage to Mecca. Sir Sayyid took to the young man and encouraged his protege to develop his writing talents. After nearly a decade of teaching, Muḥammad Shiblī undertook a journey through the Near East,[321] which had become astir by the fomentation of modernist and new political ideas (such as constitutionalism and pan-Islamism[322]). Upon his return to India, he resumed his duties at Aligarh, from which institution he resigned upon Sir Sayyid's death (in 1898). The reason was his discontent with its educational policy. In his conversations with Sir Sayyid, he had stressed "a mingling of the old and the new.' "[323] He felt that modern education of the type presented at Aligarh, at least under Sir Sayyid's leadership, did not give a religious foundation. After leaving Aligarh, he worked hard to make the then newly established "Society of Muslim Theologians" (Nadvat-ul-'Ulama', founded in 1894)[324] and whose principal he ultimately became (in 1908), a success, A clue to his thinking can be found in an article written by one of his proteges, Abu'l Kalām Āzād :

" 'All the examinations of the causes of our decline and decay lead to the conclusion that there is nobody to shepherd our confused and dispersed flock. But the group of people which the school at Nadva-tul-Ulama is producing, through its education and training will bring together and lead this flock which has lost its way.' "[325]

Was it an open bid for educational leadership in Muslim India or did it express a feeling imbued by his preceptors which he never could shed and now hoped to infuse into the modernist education? He saw to it, after all, that English was included in the Nadvah's curriculum, knowing well that its knowledge was absolutely essential for Indo-Muslim advancement. His strong criticism of Aligarh as an institution training " 'job-hunters' "[326] was not unfounded, because Sir Sayyid wished to broaden Muslim participation in government. Civil service examinations had to be passed and Aligarh

prepared its students for them. Despite his critique, he remained in contact with Muḥsin-ul-Mulk and Viqār-ul-Mulk, the two men who tried to keep Aligarh College within religious conservative bounds.

Liberalism and conservatism were the two contending forces for Muḥammad Shiblī's soul, the first in the sense of curricular modernisation without, and here the second appears, giving way to secularism. Can the two be united ? The clergy's strong rebuke of his censuring a colleague,[327] forcing Shiblī to resign as principal (1913) seems to point to a negative answer. Can it be maintained earnestly that his censure was the major or only reason for his ouster ?[328] Or did his educational reform measures at the religious institute draw the fire of the *'ulamā* who seized upon this incident as a convenient way of getting rid of their principal ?

The short year left him was devoted to lecturing, writing and the founding of a "Writers' Institute" (Dār-ul-Muṣanniffin), known also as "Shiblī's Academy," at Azamgarh, for the promotion of Islamic scholarship and Urdu literature.

He fervently wished to assist in the revivification of the Indo-Muslim community. In the "Preface" to his book, *al-Kalām*, he wrote :

> . . . a new defence of Islam is necessary in face of the new Western influences, a defence which should comprise not only Muslim theology, but Muslim society, institutions and history because the modern West evaluates a social system on all these counts."[329]

He almost repeated Khudā Bakhsh's words, but the two men differed substantially in their orientation and methods. Shiblī, it is true, was a liberal, but he neither stressed Islam's simplicity nor repudiated its theological heritage (as Sir Sayyid had done).

Like Sir Sayyid, Muḥammad Shiblī wished to revive the Islamic rationalist (Mu'tazilite) tradition. His purpose was twofold : to show that earlier Muslim theologians had displayed a scientific attitude and to link this progressive movement, innate to Islam, with the modernist current of his time. He endeavoured (similarly to the theologian al-Ghazālī) to fuse the rational with the religious, but he stressed the application of reason, whereas his famous predecessor turned away from it and became a mystic. For this reason, al-Ghazālī's system found acceptace among the fundamentalist Muslims, while Shiblī's views were not favoured. He was considered by them (as much as Sir Sayyid) a freethinker.[330] The fact remained that he had been associated with Aligarh, an institution taboo in the eyes of orthodoxy. In turn, he was equally critical of their opposition to rationalist thinking. Nevertheless, he opened the door by his attempts to conciliate the *'ulamā'* to a form of development which did not repudiate Islam's theological heritage. In this respect, Shiblī felt closer to Muḥsin-ul-Mulk than Sir Sayyid. He favoured,

furthermore, Ḥālī's backward glance, but he desired not only to give an incentive, but to make a serious search for specific principles fostering the creative and forward-looking attitude prevailing in great eras of the Muslim past. He shared the view, expressed by all Muslim modernists, that the decay of the (Indo-) Islamic community was due to exterior circumstances. He, too, was optimistic, because he believed that the Muslims have the faculties enabling them to attain achievements and that Islam permits them to be creative. He also agreed with Sir Sayyid and other members of the Aligarh movement that a modern education is essential to reach the intended goal. Shibli (like Muḥsin-ul-Mulk) supported Aligarh, because it was an educational reform centre, although he (like Ḥālī) ultimately became dissatisfied with its "limited achievement".

His political views were shaped at first by Sir Sayyid, under whose influence he wrote an article supporting "the orthodox view that the true Khilāfat ended with the first four Khalīfahs, and that even in the sense of univeral monarchy, the Khilāfat was the privilege of the Quraish."[331]

He thereby also ignored his Muslim countrymen's consensus on this issue. Later, however, he reverted to favouring the Khilāfat cause. His change of mind, undoubtedly, was influenced by Ḥālī and, ultimately (like the poet) by al-Afghānī. Again, it must be said that the stress on Islamic greatness weaves a theme of counterpoint in which Western creativity remains an important, although not a dominant, mode.

In final analysis, Muḥammad Shiblī followed Ḥālī in surveying the past. He advocated neither purification (pursuing a non-Wahhābī trend) nor adaptation of Islam to a foreign civilisational form (which Muḥsin-ul-Mulk, Khudā Bakhsh and Ḥālī also had rejected). He mainly urged acceptance of a rationalist outlook, which he did not regard as un-Islamic. It is bred (he felt) by a modern education, which he, therefore, supported. In this respect, he stood in the Aligarh tradition. He repudiated, however, its founder's theological modernism. He diverged from it also politically, by supporting ultimately the *Khilāfat* cause. Lastly, Muḥammad Shiblī (like Ḥālī) wrote in Islamic India's vernacular tongue, although his works were sophisticated prose treatises, which had less appeal among the unschooled masses than the poet's epic.

The Honourable Amīr 'Alī (1849-1928) descended from a Shī'ite family which had come from Khurāsan to India under Nādir Shāh[332] and entered first the service of the Mughal and Awadh[333] courts and later that of the East India Company. He was trained at the "Hooghly" (Muhammad Siniyya) College near Calcutta, where he studied Arabic and English, Islamic literature and law. He then went to London to pursue his legal studies

(1869-73), and received a Bachelor of Laws Degree. Upon his return to India, he taught in his field and became active in national politics forming a Muslim organisation in 1877. Subsequently, he was nominated to the Bengal Legislative Council (in 1881) and (in 1883) to the Viceroy's Council, being the only Muslim among its three members. Upon his retirement from the Bengal Legislative Council (in 1904), Amīr 'Alī settled in England.[334] Having gained recognition as a jurist, he was appointed (in 1909) to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London, being the first Indian to attain this honour. He did not remain politically inactive as he had joined the Muslim League (founded in 1904) and was one of the founders of its London branch (on 6 May 1908).[335] He left it (in 1913), because of the affection he felt for Great Britain. After the end of the First World War, he became a prominent champion of the Khilāfat movement.[336]

He also wrote some important books, which increased his reputation as a great scholar.[337] During his student years in London, he completed a work entitled *A Critical Examination of The Life and Teachings of Mohammed.*[338] It is a defence and eulogy of Islam, and became the basis of another: *The Spirit of Islam.*[339] He also gained fame for *A Short History of the Saracens*, describing the great Islamic civilisation built up in Spain during the Middle Ages. It has remained a classic until today.[340] Another small volume, entitled *Islam.* summarises the main tenets of the faith.[341]

The themes in all of these books are the same. Briefly summarised, they are: Muḥammad's excellence, Islam's supremacy and the deterioration of Judaism and Christianlty, Christian intolerance and Mnslim liberalism.

Amīr 'Alī, the Religious Thinker[342] Muḥammad's excellence is described by Amīr 'Alī as the fulfilment of the Prophet's mission where others (e.g. Jews and Christians) failed, that is, in the spiritual enlightenment of Arabia's tribes.

> The Mission of Mohammed was now accomplished, and in this fact—the fact of the whole work being achieved in his life-time—lies his distinctive superiority over the prophets, sages, and philosophers of other times and countries;—Jesus, Moses, Zoroaster, Sakya-Muni, Plato. . . . All had departed from this world with their aspirations unfulfilled. . . . It was reserved for Mohammed to fulfil his mission and that of his predecessors. It was reserved for him alone to see accomplished the work of amelioration. . . . May not the Moslem justly say, the entire work was the work of Providence ?[343]

In addition to his religious achievement, the Prophet was eulogised as the Perfect Man, displaying love, kindness and generosity towards his family, servants, the poor, children and orphans, self-denial (willingness to forgo a meal, simplicity of dress and house furnishings), hospitality and forgiveness. In his earliest work, the modernist drew an idealised portrait of Islam's

founder. It is an uncritical (contrary to the book's title) and apologetic approach, which remained the basis of his views.

He summarised Muḥammad's faith as consisting of belief in God's existence, unity, power, mercy and immateriality and in man's obedience, charity, gratitude and "accountability for human actions in another existence."[344] His acceptance of Divine immateriality or incorporeality meant his subscription to Mu'tazilite doctrine. In stressing human submission to God, he was orthodox, but in his interpretation he was a modernist. He disagreed with those believing that the submission is absolute in the sense of a passive acknowledgment. The Muslim is a striver after righteousness, that is, one who exerts himself in doing his duty.[345]

> In its ethical sense it signifies *striving after righteousness*. Man is a free agent within his limited sphere : the ordinances of God lay down the eternal principles of human conduct. He has pointed out two courses—the one leading away from Him, and that is *evil* ; the other bringing man to Him, and that is *good*. Every individual is free to choose and follow whichever course he likes, and receives his deserts accordingly.[346]

The themes of activity and moral responsibility are related in Amīr 'Alī's thought.

> Every son of man is . . . responsible to his Lord for the use he makes of his life. He will be asked whether the powers he had been endowed with were applied to promote the good and the happiness of his fellow beings or to their detriment ; and his reward or punishment . . . will depend on . . . the manner . . . in which he had obeyed the behests of his Creator.[347]

These statements imply clearly repudiation of predestinarianism, insistence that man is the maker of his own world, total acceptance of "the conception of progressive evolution"[348] and of resurrection, the Day of Judgment, and retribution. He was orthodox only in his profession of the last-mentioned three doctrines. His rejection of eternal punishment as "repellent to Islam,"[349] because it is contrary to God's mercifulness, is not un-Islamic. However, he followed Sir Sayyid in rejecting the Qur'ān's statements about the *post-mortem* abodes as literally true ; they were "drawn to suit the comprehension of the people among whom and the age in which the New Gospel was preached."[350] They rather refer to *states* of felicity and misery. Amīr 'Alī thus accepted the doctrines of interpretation and conditional understanding as formulated by his famous countryman.

> The compatibility of the laws of Mohammed with every stage of progress shows their founder's wisdom. The elasticity of the laws is the great test of their beneficence and usefulness, and this merit is eminently possessed by those of Islam.[351]

Islam's superiority over other faiths also consists in its rationalistic

nature, thus preventing the decay that had befallen the Jews and Christians. The former, known as the

> great conservators of the monotheistic idea . . . showed what strange metamorphoses can take place in the thoughts of a nation, when not aided by a historical and a rationalistic element in their religious code.[352]

The latter, despite Jesus's great spiritual example, had degraded into an ignorant, superstitious, monastic-oriented and seclusive people.[353] Amīr 'Alī held their inability to understand their prophet's precepts responsible for the doctrine of Divine sonship, which (he felt) Jesus, himself, never preached.[354] The great esteem he accorded to the Christian teacher agrees (as indicated)[355] with Qur'ānic doctrine.

Religious disintegration, bred by unreasonableness, results (according to Amīr 'Alī) inevitably in social decadence, and is in such evils as polygamy and slavery. These two ancient institutions, practised by all peoples of old, were perpetuated by Christendom, whose (Catholic) prelates, disregarding the prohibitive decree concerning marriage of the clergy, often had several wives. He considered it unfair to criticise Muḥammad for having subscribed to customs which existed in pre-Islamic Arabia and persisted in his time, but accused Christianity for consciously supporting them, thereby disobeying Jesus's teachings and promoting decay. "The greatest and most reprehensible mistake committed by Christian writers is to suppose that Mohammed either adopted or legalized polygamy."[356]

His limitation (to four wives) "struck at the root of the evil,"[357] and, in fact, implies monogamy, because it has a restrictive clause, which reads : "and if ye . . . fear that ye shall not act equitably, then (marry) one only" (S. iv. 3).

In another tract, Sayyid Amīr 'Alī analyses the legal position of Islamic womanhood to counter the impression among foreign nations that "Muslim women are mere slaves."[358] Briefly enumerated,[359] as a daughter, she has the right to inherit from her parents and to choose her own mate after she comes of age (at fifteen). As a wife, she is entitled to a "dower," own and dispose of property, inherit from her husband (a fourth if she is childless, an eighth if there are children), and earn wages. As a mother, she has an honoured position, and is permitted to keep custody of her son(s) until the age of between seven and nine, when a tutor must be found, and of her daughter(s) until attainment of maturity or marriage, which she may arrange. She, furthermore, may inherit from a deceased son, which legal right is not granted her by Western law.[360] She has the same social privileges as a man in so far as they concern the making of contracts and holding of public jobs (e.g. judgeships).[361] Polygamy and seclusion (*pardah*) are "aristocratic" customs practised by ladies of rank. The former (as stated) is a primitive institution

and the latter is compared to the sitting of a judge in court, and hence "sitting behind a screen is a mark of honour."[362] The legal position of Islamic womanhood is affected by neither institution.[363]

Slavery was not abolished under Christian rule, because the system of serfdom prevailed. The master "had the power of life and death over" his slave(s) whom he considered his property.[364]

> The Islamic Code dealt a blow at the institution of slavery, which, had it not been for the deep root it had taken among the surrounding nations and the natural perversion and obliquity of the human mind, would have been completely extinguished, as soon as the generation which then practised it, had passed away. . . . Mohammed's religion provided for its gradual but absolute extinction.[365]

Muḥammad strictly forbade their mutilation and assassination and considered their emancipation among man's most pious acts.[366] He, himself, gave an example by treating them humanely and releasing them (Zaid, for example) from bondage.

Persecution, actively encouraged by the Church, is contrary to Islam's tolerant spirit. It has never forced itself upon those professing different creeds.

> By the laws of Islam, liberty of conscience and freedom of worship were allowed and guaranteed to the followers of every other creed under Moslem dominion. The passage in the Koran, "Let there be no forcing in Religion," is the grandest testimony to the principle of toleration and charity. . . . Mohammed did not merely preach toleration; he embodied it into a law.[367]

Amīr 'Alī did not consider the payment of tribute (*jizyah*) by non-Muslims as an external symbol of second-class citizenship. Rather, he saw it as a fair ordinance, expressing legally the protective policy exercised towards them by the Islamic State. By comparison, he found it far more liberal a practice than persecution, forced conversion or extermination.

> This principle of the love of humanity was practised towards every nation subject to Moslem power. A nominal tribute was the only compensation they were required to pay for the observance and enjoyment of their faith. Once the tax or tribute agreed upon, every interference with their religion . . . was regarded as a direct contravention of the laws of Islam. Could so much be said of other creeds?[368]

In other words, Muslim tolerance extended into the international sphere as well, in contrast to methods employed by Christian (Catholic and Protestant) States.

> From the first slaughters of Charlemagne, with the full sanction of the Church, to the massacre and enslavement of the unoffending races of America, there is an unbroken series of the infringement of international duties . . .[369]

Islam went to war solely in self-defence; Christianity "in order to stifle freedom of thought and liberty of belief."[370]

Sayyid 'Alī's statement that Islam was tolerant towards non-Muslim groups (implying an indictment of other faiths) as well as his projections regarding certain (mentioned) Muslim and Christian practices are uncritical[371] His motive was apologetic, of course, as he wished to show his religion's pre-eminence. He felt that it alone inculcates the highest conception of the Deity (unity), human virtue and dignity (Graeco-Roman conception), a sense of "utter sinfulness"[372] (Christian view), reliance upon and recognition of the duties under God. "Thus Islam combines all the highest principles which have actuated humanity from the time it saw light on earth."[383] They derive from its rationalistic spirit, which Muḥammad (in a famous saying attributed to him) sanctified in the following words :

> "It is related that God created Reason, and it was the most beautiful being in His Creation,—and God said to it, "I have not created anything better or more perfect or more beautiful than thou, blessing will come down on mankind on thy account, and they will be judged according to the use they make of thee. "[374]

Lastly, the modernist described Muḥammad's faith as activist and undogmatic.

> The grand central figure of Mohammed arises before our view, clothed in all the majesty of prophetic greatness. King, chief, magistrate, and spiritual guide, he rules the heart of men with his heaven-inspired genius. Men gather from all quarters of the globe to listen to his wonderful words, which breathe energy and force and infuse new life into the dormant heart of humanity. It was an age of earnestness and faith, marked by the uprise of the Soul against the domination of aimless, lifeless philosophy. It proved the utter futility of inane talk when in collision with active principles.[375]

It means that Islam is progressive so that there is no reason to reject contact with Western civilisation, which (like the earlier association with Persia) is fruitful. The maintenance of a formalistic attitude is contrary to Islam's spirit and experience. Were not the Traditions sieved by earlier Muslim theologians, who rejected as many as 500,000 and retained solely 8000 as legitimate ? Why then should orthodoxy insist that the last recension has moulded Islam in its final cast ? Such a restrictive legalist attitude prevents enlightenment and, indeed, is unlike Muḥammad's forward-looking dynamism.

Concerning the Prophet's undogmatic attitude, Sayyid 'Alī said : "Appeal is made to the inner consciousness of man, to his intuitive reason alone."[376] The phrase "intuitive reason" illuminates Amīr 'Alī's trend of thought. It is an apparent contradiction, because intuition is not "reasonable" and reason is not intuitive. Reason's method is scientific, as it

concludes after deliberation upon experience or experiments; intuition gives immediate enlightenment. There is neither a tendency toward mysticism (which stresses intuition and is anti-intellectual) nor seemingly toward rationalism (which is intellectual). And yet, it means precisely the support of the rationalist enterprise. It is one of those curious terms (coined through Western influence[377]), which attempts to combine the Islamic religious doctrine of submission with a philosophical rationalism that has the freedom to inquire into, and at the same time acts as the confirmer of, faith. In effect, he wrote:

> Nor is the Islamic belief in disharmony with scientific thought. To quote a recent writer, "The religious doctrine of ceaseless moral accountability is identical with the scientific doctrine of ceaseless cause and effect. As science postulates matter and force are indestructible, so religion postulates that the human soul is indestructible."[378]

He quoted a foreign source to prove the modernist thesis that revelation and reason support rather than contradict each other. Thus he tried to convince his audience that Muḥammad, himself, held a rationalistic attitude.

Amīr 'Alī, the Politician. Sayyid 'Alī's political thinking is obvious from the purposes of his (thirty-four-branch) Central National Muhammadan Association set up in 1877.[379] They were

> primarily to promote good feeling and fellowship between the Indian races and creeds, at the same time to protect and safeguard the Mahomedan interests and help their political training.[380]

These words reflect at once a national and a communal attitude. As an Indian, he wished to maintain peace between the various faith groups in his country; as a Muslim, he wished to assure his coreligionists' welfare. To this end, he wished to train them in political principles.

> Amīr 'Alī sensed, expressed and fostered a nascent political self-consciousness in Indian Islam, disagreeing with the then conviction of Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān . . . as to the adequacy of modern (Western) education for the Indian-Muslim community as a guarantee of its position in the country.[381]

It implied his acknowledgment that modern education is vital, but also that instruction in politics must be given. Obviously, he opposed orthodoxy's contentions that traditional learning was the best as well as Sir Sayyid's (and Khudā Bakhsh's) views that India's Muslims should concentrate for some time mainly on academic subjects and on effecting educational and religio-social reforms. Amīr 'Alī's attitude possibly reflects a growing political interest, at least among middle-class Muslims, due in part to a waxing concern about the local situtation and to the increasing number

of Muslim youths who had become exposed to Western learning. It seems evident from what he, himself, wrote :

Seventy years of English education and the gradual diffusion of Western knowledge have created among the more presperous classes a perception of the responsibilities and obligations of Government and awakened in them a sense of their rights. . . . And the spirit of collectivism and organisation which has given birth to so many political and semi-political institutions exercises its legitimate influence. . . ."[382]

Amīr 'Alī had founded his Association clearly for the purpose of preparing India's Muslims to take upon themselves the responsibilities accruing from, and sharpening their further awareness of, their rights.

While he and Sir Sayyid disagreed on this particular objective—Sir Sayyid did not accept Amīr 'Alī's invitation to join the latter's Association as he had founded Aligarh only two years earlier and was preoccupied with its development—they saw eye to eye on three political issues, namely, the need for protecting Indo-Muslim rights,[383] increasing participation (of Indians generally) in the administration, and maintaining good relations with the British. He advocated " 'a wider application of the principles of local self-government, the employment of Indians in the higher posts of State service, and the admission of Indians to higher ranks in the Indian Army.' "[384] Such a policy, he felt, would create a sense of trust and self-reliance and make Indians more conscious of their responsibilities and duties " 'as citizens of a great Empire.' "[385] He negotiated with the British to this end even while in England. He did not support, however, any scheme for self-government. His loyalty to Great Britain was so great that he resigned from the Muslim League (in 1913) in protest against its alliance with Congress for "Home Rule". He had lived in England for some years (since 1909) and thus did not immediately witness the situation at home. His pro-British feelings, therefore, may have been influenced less by the communalist issue than were Sir Sayyid's sentiments, although it does not preclude its having had some bearing on his amicability.

It seems rather strange that when the First World War ended, he became a *Khilāfatist*, which appears contrary to his pro-Britishness. Undoubtedly, it was an emotional reaction fed by the shock of Ottoman (Muslim) defeat and the fear of seeing Islam's holy places fall under non-Muslim control. Is it an anomaly that he supported at once the cause of Muslim unity and loyalty to the European rulers of India ? Perhaps not, if the first is seen as a spiritual and the second as a political motif. It is quite possible to give religious allegiance to one, and political loyalty to another, head. His attitude on this issue differed from Sir Sayyid's, because the latter saw *Khilāfatism* mainly as a political movement,[386] which he found incongruous with Muslim loyalty to his native land and a policy of friendship towards the

authorities.

Appraisal. Sayyid Amīr 'Alī was a Mu'tazilite in his acceptance of the doctrines of Divine immateriality and freedom of the human will as also in his attempt to define Islam as a rationalist faith. He was a Murji'ite in his rejection of eternal Divine punishment. He is more consistent than Sir Sayyid on this issue ; if man's freedom to choose is maintained, then predestinarianism must be given up. Sir Sayyid seems to have subscribed rather to the orthodox view, because he had said that whatever God had decreed, no one could alter. Both men, moreover, disagreed on the worth of Islam's older theology, which Amīr 'Alī not so much repudiated as used to illustrate earlier Muslim creativity, while his senior countryman wished to rewrite it. Again, the former assumed an historical focus by orienting himself towards the Islamic past, while the latter's perspective remained bound by the (then) present conditions in India, comparing it with the European situation. In this respect, Amīr 'Alī followed Muḥammad Shiblī, but, unlike him, used a comparative approach, as he wished to show not solely Islam's greatness, but its pre-eminence as a religion and a civilisation over every non-Muslim faith and culture. His view, supported by the Qur'ān, demonstrates his conception of his own religion despite his insistence that this attitude—which implies exclusivity—is foreign to it.[387] It linked, however, with his demonstration of tolerance towards other faiths, not found in either Judaism or Christianity. Islam's greatness is proven, furthermore, by its theological identity with them, because, like Judaism, it taught the doctrine of unity, and it has the theme of Theism in common with Christianity. "Unitarianism and Theism are neither more nor less than the Islam of Mohammed, shorn of the disciplinary rules."[388] Lastly, its rationalist nature made it possible to succeed in the spiritual and moral elevation of a portion of mankind. Unlike those before him, he did not only say that Islam permitted new learning for purposes of advancement, but he held that it *is* essentially progressive. This attitude, reflected in Sir Sayyid's attempt to rewrite Islamic theology and in Muḥammad Shiblī's insistence that Islam is a rationalistic faith, is the final crystallisation of these modernists' thinking. Amīr 'Alī thus stood clearly in the Aligarh tradition. Like some others associated with it, such as Muḥsin-ul-Mulk, he saw its strong and weak points, but despite the orthodox leanings both men had, Sayyid 'Alī favoured it far more by *reassessing its work in all its aspects* rather than accepting it only in the educational domain (as Muḥsin-ul-Mulk did). He keenly felt the need for stressing Islam's greatness (thereby following Muḥammad Shiblī) to offset an over-evaluation—made by the Anglicists led by Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān—of European civilisation. He was the first to write a critique of the West and state that it could learn a great deal from Islam. His defence of his own

civilisation, generally seen as an apologetic, was at once a judgment, which was negative concerning the European, and positive concerning his own, heritage. In the light of what has been stated here it could be regarded as a serious attempt to balance the modernist and orthodox views. His eulogy of Muḥammad, furthermore, might be seen as a direct reply to the missionaries' exaltation of Jesus and as an endeavour to put the Prophet of Islam and his teachings in a new perspective at a time of theological dispute and Muslim political disenchantment.

If, basically, he did not contribute much to the modernist movement, it is significant to note that he strengthened it by his own analysis of Islam's nature and his conclusion that it is a rationalistic, dynamic faith. He reached, the same verdict pronounced by Sir Sayyid and other modernists, namely, that progress is essential and that it can be achieved because Islam is not opposed to it. As stated, he went a step further, declaring that progressivity is inherent in Islam's very nature.

Sayyid Amīr 'Alī was another Indo-Muslim modernist luring his countrymen back to the past, although he intended his message to be a lesson for his own time. His eulogy of Islamic greatness made it difficult for Muslims to appraise it realistically and, undoubtedly, appealed greatly to the conservatives. Nevertheless, his views, as shown, were very different from those held by the anti-modernist group.

A note of activism is sounded occasionally but it took a later writer, Muḥammad Iqbāl, to pound on it and reorient India's Muslims towards the future.

Teacher, jurist, politician, scholar and writer, the Honourable Sayyid Amīr 'Alī was an outstanding man dedicated to the Indo-Muslim cause.

Chapter III

THE ORTHODOX REACTION

1. The Split in Indo-Muslim Educational Tradition

The split refers to the opposition which modernist education, symbolised by Aligarh, encountered. It implies a division into clashing schools of thought on the contents and aims of formal instruction in a changing society. It is not to be regarded solely as a counter reaction to new concepts drawn from non-Muslim sources, although the preceding discussion has shown the great impact that foreign influences had on Indo-Muslim modernist views. It must be seen also as an outward expression of Islam's inner tension concerning its appropriate character in a world radically different from that of its birth and infancy.

To appreciate the intense opposition to Sir Sayyid's educational philosophy, a brief summary of the views expressed by former eminent Muslims in India and abroad on the nature and aim of Islamic training is necessary. Since the rise of Islam, the *'ulamā'* had assumed the role of judging on the appropriate nature of the Muslim way of life, including education. Inasmuch as they were religious guides and teachers, they assured that the training given had a spiritual content. According to them, learning meant instruction in the Qur'ān, the Prophet's Traditions and Islamic Law, which alone give knowledge benefiting human society. Any training not related to His Revelation (and Law) was considered inappropriate, because it bred a worldly, ungodly attitude. In other words, subjects that did not fall within the religio-legal domain were suspect.

Was this also Muḥammad's view ? It seems not, because apparently he regarded all subjects—the scientific and the theological—as Divinely given. The Qur'ān, in exhorting the Bedouins to convert to Islam, states:

> Seest thou not how that God sendeth down water from the Heaven, and that by it we cause the upgrowth of fruits of varied hues, and that on the mountains are tracks of varied hues, white and red, and others are of a raven black ? And of men and reptiles and animals, various likewise are the hues. Such only of his servants as are possessed of knowledge fear God. Lo ! God is Mighty, Gracious (xxxv. 25).

True, this verse is revealed to show Allah's greatness and the grandeur of His creation. The word "knowledge" means here the conscious awareness that the world is a Divine production, but it explicitly alludes to the diversity encountered, both with regard to species and colour.[1] The subjects cited

are classifiable under various scientific headings (Biology. Zoology, Botany). Furthermore, the statement that fruit grows in the earth's soil as a result of rain falling from the sky is scientific, even though it is put in religious terms.

If the ḥadīth, " 'Seek ye learning though it be in China,' " is authentic, it would substantiate the thesis that Muḥammad encouraged universal learning among the Muslims. If it is not, the Qur'ānic verse quoted may suffice as proof, for it indicates that *all* knowledge is God-given. The argument, then, can be presented that it becomes, in effect, a duty to pursue the study of the natural sciences as well. The use made of the resulting knowledge is conceived, however, in religious terms: it must lead to wisdom and (non-material) self-improvement of the Muslim individual and his community.

The enthusiasm with which Muslims in the Abbasid era studied all topics (including medicine and optometry, wherein they influenced European men of science[2]) is close to the view that the pursuit of secular subjects need not be rejected for fear they may breed ungodliness.

This attitude was not held by most of the *'ulamā*, who denied the philosophers' theory that a rational nexus between cause and effect exists.

> According to us the connexion between what is usually believed to be a cause and what is believed to be an effect is not a necessary connexion; each of two things has its own individuality and is not the other . . . e g. the satisfaction of thirst does not imply drinking, . . . and so on for all the empirical connexions existing in medicine, astronomy, the sciences and the crafts. For the connexion in these things is based on a prior power of God to create them in a successive order, though not because this connexion is necessary in itself and cannot be disjoined—on the contrary, it is in God's power to create satiety without eating, . . . and so on with respect to all connexions. The philosophers, however, deny this possibility and claim that it is impossible. . . .[3]

The theologians' assertion that there is no logical connection between cause and effect led them to an acceptance of miracles and a denial of natural law. God determines and performs all acts. Therefore, the raising of the dead, for example, cannot be disproven, even if "the habitual course of nature is in opposition to it."[4] Consequently, the study of the natural sciences, based on rationality—of which life is not regarded as a condition by the theologians (contrary to the philosophers' view)—was looked at askance by the *'ulamā'*.[5]

They could not stem the scientific tide in most parts of the Caliphal realm, but undoubtedly influenced Sulṭān Maḥmūd of Ghazni,[6] who forbade the teaching of any subjects "except Qur'ānic commentary, the traditions of the Prophet" and Islamic Law[7] in the Punjab. Their anti-scientific mood was strengthened by Ṣūfism[8] with its non-worldly and anti-speculative orientation. It is clearly expressed by Shaykh Sharaf-ud-dīn Yaḥyā of Manir,

who lived in Bihar towards the close of the fourteenth or the first decade of the fifteenth century.[9] He wrote: " 'Intellect is a bondage; faith, the liberator.' "[10] He stressed "outer and inner" seclusion, which he defined as refuge from this world to continuous reflection on God (purification, as he called it). He frowned on any kind of intellectual activity, including theology, because it is a non-intuitional discipline. " 'Real knowledge,' " he held, " 'wells up from the Fountain of Life, and the student thereof need not resort to senses and gropings.' "[11] This view certainly does not foster secular studies! In India, at least, the Ṣūfīs and the *'ulamā'* joined together in preserving the religious content of education. According to both groups, learning is God-oriented, but they differ in their mode of instruction inasmuch as the theologian-teachers use the Qur'ān as their main text, while the mystics stress a mental course,[12] which (they insist) engenders a kind of wisdom far superior to that derived from the pursuit of non-religious subjects.

Shāh Walī Ullāh disagreed with this view. His use of the phrase " 'revelation and reason' "[13] implies from an educational viewpoint that the religious and rationalist disciplines are complementary and, therefore, the latter, like the former, may be said to have been instituted by Allah. This non-restrictive approach, on the one hand, accords with that presumably held by Muḥammad and, on the other, with the spirit displayed by Muslim groups in Abbasid times. It allows a "liberalist" training without it being necessarily strictly "secular" in nature. On this issue, Shāh Walī Ullāh differed profoundly from the conservatives (and, of course, the mystics), who were in the majority and insisted on a *status quo* in intellectual (as in religious) life.

This is reflected by the (Indo-Muslim) curriculum which (as stated) remained more or less fixed since Sultanate days. In the *maktabs* (primary village schools), which abounded by the ninteenth century in the North-Western Frontier Province and Eastern Bengal—centres of profound Islamic zeal[14]—memorisation of the Qur'ān, some Arabic, Urdu (the local language) and elementary arithmetic were the main subjects taught. In the *madrasahs* ("colleges"),[15] which trained the theologians and teachers for the *maktabs*, the programme developed in the course of time[16] consisted of Arabic, Qur'ānic recitation, Ḥadīth and *Tafsīr* ("exegesis"), Islamic theology, law,[17] and history. *Mulla* Niẓām al-Din (1679-1748) devised a curriculum for the *madrasah*, known as the Farangī Maḥall (at Lucknow)[18]—headed by him—which stressed, apart from the subjects mentioned, grammar, logic, philosophy and physics. The *Dars-i-Niẓāmī*—as this course of study is called—represented a revolution in the realm of Indo-Muslim education, which hitherto had stressed those topics falling more immediately under the heading of religion. Its scientific programme, however, is based on ancient Greek

laws, not on the new theories which Europeans were evolving. Also, it is limited to physics; all other sciences are excluded. The argument that they have no place in a curriculum offered by religious learning institutions is demolished by the *mulla*'s inclusion of one of them. From a critical viewpoint, the *Dars-i-Niẓāmī* is not well-balanced and concentrates on Islamic studies. Seen in the context of Indo-Muslim educational history, however, it was an improvement on the traditional curriculum. Its success can be measured by the fact that—despite the conservatives' opposition to the sciences and philosophy—it was adopted by India's many *madrasahs*.[19] "One result of the numerous *madrasahs* was a degree of specialisation in the Indian schools. Gradually the following picture emerged: Grammar in the Punjab; Ḥadīth and Tafsīr at Delhi; Logic and Philosophy at Rampur; Law and Theology at Lucknow."[20]

In other words, the older resistance was worn down. However, the curricular modification did not (as in the West) open the way to scientific predilection. Despite its inclusion in the curriculum, the philosophical inquiry did not extend itself beyond the categories of speculation which concerned medieval Muslims and which were reformulated finally by al-Ghazālī.[21]

Also, the traditional Islamic pattern of learning was the rote system. The students had to learn the given texts by heart and to digest (where applicable) the views of renowned past commentators, themselves drawing upon earlier famous colleagues who, in turn, consulted the canonical theologian-philosopher-jurists. Niẓām al-Dīn's preference for the exposition of ideas rather than textbook learning constituted a deviation from the traditional training method. His was an attempt to instill into the students some understanding of the material presented to them. He introduced thereby a "liberalist" approach, rejected by the theologians, because it might breed a questioning attitude, doubting the accepted theses, and desiring to study and arrive independently at certain conclusions which might not be acceptable to the dogmatists.

Another important contribution to the domain of subject-matter was made by Shāh Walī Ullāh, who was so bold as to translate the Qur'ān into Persian.[22] It was a radical enterprise for this Revelation was given in Arabic (Allah's "speech") and, hence, not to be translated and transmitted in a vernacular language. The significance lay in making Holy Writ available to a segment of India's population, which hitherto had depended on the theologians for teaching and interpreting the Divine injunctions.[23] Shāh Walī Ullāh furthermore expounded the meanings and reasons for God's commandments,[24] i.e. he felt that the Muslims should know what these rules signify and why they are given; they should not be memorised without any explanation. Like Niẓām al-Dīn, he also repudiated thereby the time-honoured

method of learning by rote in favour of a system inculcating understanding of that which is taught. Nevertheless, a rigid curriculum and form of learning remained in force in Islamic India, as proven by the increasing stress on logic and the growth of textbooks by the twentieth century.

When the British came to India, they founded schools of their own and introduced a secular curriculum. They did not abolish the private Muslim institutions which continued to flourish. Few Muslims attended the Western educational centres for the reasons and with serious consequences noted earlier;[25] to repeat: opposition by their religious leaders to all that was foreign and thus regardad as un Islamic, which attitude resulted in the decay of the Indian Musulmans. The British must bear as well some of the blame, because in no way did they assuage Indo-Muslim feelings by making curricular adjustments, enabling Islamic India's youth to partake of European education.[26] The big question remains, however, whether India's *'ulamā'* would have consented to the attendance of the young at the English schools if the British had provided for an adjusted curriculum. The majority among these religious leaders opposed, after all, Sir Sayyid's efforts in this direction. Their influence was such that his modernist theology was not taught at the institution founded to infuse life and meaning in an archaic curriculum unrelated to the needs of the time. Their succession to its leadership determined its future educational policy, which reflected their adamant refusal to accept the changed spirit of life.

The purpose of Sir Sayyid's reform movement—in all its aspects—was to fit his coreligionist countrymen into the new pattern of life that had dawned in India. According to him and his followers, the sciences and English (the language of the governors) must be major components in a Muslim curriculum if it is to prepare youth adequately so that they could assume the tasks a modern society would demand of them. Most of the *'ulamā'* feared that the training proposed by Sir Sayyid and his circle would detract from the central role occupied hitherto by religious subjects. Their anxiety was not entirely unfounded.[27]

The continuation of older, but more particularly the foundation of newer, traditional-minded religious training centres in Islamic India can be interpreted undoubtedly, therefore, as a reaction against the impact of Western rationalism, which (as shown) some Indo-Muslim thinkers linked with similar currents innate to medieval Islam. Apart from the European influences reflected in its founder's thinking, Aligarh might be said to have continued (in its maiden years) the tradition of such "progressives" among India's Muslims as Niẓām al-Dīn and Shāh Walī Ullāh. Its subsequent conservative pull mirrors the opposition—shown to be engrained in the history of Indo-Muslim education—to a strongly rationalist tide. The split thus can

be said to have occurred at Aligarh itself, but it became most apparent at the other religious institutions of learning dotting Islamic India.

2. *The Religious Seminaries and New Schools and Colleges*

Innumerable private Indo-Muslim centres of learning sprouted up in the wake of Aligarh. This development might be regarded as a positive consequence of Sir Sayyid's influence on Islamic India's educational life, because he could be said to have stirred its leaders' consciousness for the need of more and better training institutions. Unfortunately, it is not entirely true, if their educational philosophy rather than their numbers is considered. Most of them have constituted a reaction against the modernist trend for the following important reasons :

(*a*) The dying out of the anglicist group ;

(*b*) The refusal by many men, associated with Aligarh—among them Viqār-ul-Mulk, who succeeded Sir Sayyid as its leader—to accept fully its founder's views ;

(*c*) The influence exercised by the orthodox *'ulamā'* throughout Islamic India ;

(*d*) The lack of support for modernism by the majority, i.e. the peasantry, rooted in tradition ;

(*e*) The inability of this as yet small Western-educated group to have its preferences enforced ;

(*f*) The growing pro-Khilāfat mood among Muslim India's religious leaders and the general population, reflecting an anti-European as also a conservative attitude.[28]

While Aligarh continued to teach a liberal arts programme, inclusive of scientific subjects, it has been stressing (even after 1947) the Arabic and Persian languages and Islamic culture.[29] It has applied, therefore, Muḥsin-ul-Mulk's rather than Sir Sayyid's educational philosophy. Consequently, traditionalism triumphed. The argument could be advanced that a modern curriculum must not necessarily neglect those subjects which have moulded and form part of a society's cultural heritage. Few would dissent. The emphasis, however, does not fall on the exclusion of traditional topics, but rather on the question whether the new should not be included or perhaps stressed at the expense of the older ones. Sir Sayyid insisted that English and the sciences (embracing economics, modern history and geography) are as important as Islamic subjects. Few among his contemporaries and subsequent generations agreed with him. The acceptance of a traditional course of study was too deeply ingrained to be obliterated by one man's theories. As a result, the seminaries and many other training institutions, founded subsequently to Aligarh, presented (with some exceptions) the older

curriculum and methodology of learning.

It is, of course, impossible to treat all the institutions that arose. The most outstanding learning centres, particularly those falling within the private non-secular category, have been chosen as their leaders and graduates still represent a powerful force in determining Indo-Muslim (and, also today, Pakistani) policies on all levels. Among those to be discussed are the Farangī Maḥall at Lucknow (seventeenth century), the Dār-ul-'Ulūm at Deoband (1866), the Anjuman-i-Ḥimāyat-i-Islām at Lahore (1885) and the Nadwat-ul-'Ulamā' also at Lucknow (1894). Although the Farangī Maḥall is chronologically earlier, as it was founded in late Mughal times, it became ultimately the least important of the named *madrasahs* and, therefore, is covered last. The Anjuman, standing in a different category, was set up nearly a decade before the Nadwah. Consequently, and because it may have been stimulated by Sir Sayyid's educational efforts as well as broadened their base by extending them also to pre-college groups, it will be dicussed first.

The Anjuman-i-Ḥimāyat-i-Islām was set up at Lahore (in 1885), but soon had many branches throughout the land. Its programme was manifold: to propagate Islam; reply intelligently, either in writing or verbally, to charges made against this faith; give a suitable training to Muslim boys and girls; provide the poor and orphan children with "all possible educational aids."[30] Its chief aims were to save them from apostasy, raise the intellectual, moral and social conditions of the Indo-Muslim community, create and preserve friendly relations between the various Islamic sects, and imbue an awareness of the advantages to be derived from supporting the British.

> The purpose, clearly, is to give Muslims a good modern education, and, along with it, religious instruction of a more orthodox type than is given in Aligarh institutions. They are eager to increase female education, and have nine girls' schools in Lahore. They have two very large boys' schools in the same city, and also an Arts College, called the Islamia College. . . . Islamic Theology is taught daily in each of the classes. . . .[31]

They have established "Muhammadan vernacular and Anglo-vernacular schools for the education of Muslim youth . . ."[32] in various other Indian towns. Their earnest desire to give (segments of) Indo-Muslim youth a non-traditional education was determined greatly by their defensive attitude (as their title shows). The Society's reason for existing, therefore, could be said to be negative, although their self-assumed task of educating the young is a positive endeavour. Did it succeed in giving "a good modern education"? The answer depends upon the viewpoint taken. The term "modern" implies (from a Muslim angle) specifically the inclusion of subjects which did not

form part of the traditional Indo-Muslim curriculum. On the other hand, *orthodox* religious instruction was given as well, probably to offset any secularist tendencies that might be awakened in the students. In other words, the Society aimed at giving an education that was not void of, but rested on, a (strong) theological base and, at the same time, included secular subjects. They thus imitated the Aligarh example with the significant difference of providing a stricter religious training. Their *Ḥamīdiyyah* School, however, has concentrated mainly on Islamic classical studies. Its purpose has been to train teachers and theologians. In its curriculum and spirit, this Academy has approximated the atmosphere and training prevalent in the religious seminaries.

The Society sent out "Christian perverts" and those born in the Muslim faith "to preach against the Christian religion" and induce converts from Islam to return to it. Their efforts resulted in an increased interest among their coreligionists in Islam, diminishing their attendance at Christian mission schools and chapels, and raising their number participating in mosque services.[33] Furthermore, the Anjuman tried to infuse a feeling of Islamicness among all age groups. Their work was not limited, then, to those attending school, but had a social dimension as they tried to reach wide segments among the Indo-Muslim community. Lastly, they published newspapers, books and pamphlets to refute anti-Islamic propaganda, infuse greater enthusiasm for their faith and assure its dissemination. In all these respects, their programme was extended beyond the scope of institutional education.

In appraising their achievements, the following may be said. The Society's assurance that their schools would and did present orthodox instruction carried weight for it soothed parental anxiety about their offspring's preparation to assume the necessary religious duties in adult life. The Anjuman's insistence in remodelling the other portion of the curriculum revealed their awareness that the traditional study course no longer sufficed for the modern world. By teaching English to greater numbers of Indo-Muslim youth, they opened new avenues of employment at a time when it was the language of the administration. The economic motif was extremely important as Muslims were enabled to compete with Hindus in the examinations for public posts. Another most significant result was that those mastering the European tongue could read works in the original, pregnant with political ideas. The Society thus aided in increasing the receptivity—especially among the middle classes—towards the "revolutionary" concepts of a nation's right to freedom and, hence, self-government. Finally, by founding schools for Muslim girls (whose education focussed rather on their future role as wives and mothers), the Society transcended Sir Sayyid's

experiments and the sentiments of the orthodox, who objected to outside education for their daughters, because it meant breaking the tradition of *pardah*.[34] On this issue, the Anjuman took a modernist stand ; they were, indeed, one of the few private organisations (and perhaps the sole one) to establish learning centres for its womanhood in Islamic India during the late nineteenth century. The Society's influence has been extensive, because they have reached a far larger group (of various age levels) than did Aligarh —which was limited to a select student body—and thus contributed to the moulding of Indo-Muslim opinion.

An educational programme of a more modern and less academic kind was offered by the Jāmi'ah Millīyah Islāmīyah ("Islamic Community University"), founded in 1920[35] at Aligarh (but moved to Delhi's vicinity in 1925). "It was a secession movement from the official, imperialist-entangled Muslim university of the Sir Sayyid Aḥmad tradition ; students and some teachers . . , under a group of tents . . . set up a . . . rival, thoroughly nationalist and free."[36]

Modernist and traditional points of view "co-existed" at this new institution,[37] which reflected, far more than Aligarh, the desire to span the bridge between them. It has maintained a kindergarten, a six-year primary and six-year secondary school as well as a two-year University. Its primary school programme has leaned towards "emphasis on (Indian) arts and crafts" and aimed at developing individual initiative.[38] Urdu is the language of instruction throughout, but English is a compulsory subject. Its secondary-school curriculum has differed little from that presented by the (British and, subsequently, Indian) Government-controlled institutions except that Islam (or Hinduism and Sanskrit for the few Hindu students) is included. On this level, commercial arts (such as book-binding, printing, carpentry) are taught so that the stress is non-academic (non-classical). The Dalton Plan, advancing individual *versus* simultaneous group instruction and permitting a student's progress at his own speed, has been introduced. Its University offers a course which "aims at a critical appreciation of contemporary society, and at the inspiration of that appreciation, and of religion, to social service and responsible co-operative citizenship."[39] The degree which it bestows does not enable its holder to enter Government or certain other fields of employment. It qualifies him primarily to enter the trades, become a social worker or teacher. The Jāmi'ah has opened a Teachers' Training Institute with a nearby model school where students are prepared for giving instruction in the villages. It, furthermore, has entered the adult education field, reflecting the growing awareness of the need to teach the vast illiterate masses which had little, if any, formal training. Lastly, it has established an Urdu Academy for the publication of original works in this tongue and

the translation of foreign-language books. It also has been issuing a monthly Urdu periodical, printing children's literature, a fertile field (then as now) of which it was in its earlier period, at least, one of the sole promoters.

In conclusion, the Jāmi'ah was a movement of protest against Aligarh's political rather than educational policies. Theologically, it tried to steer away from conservative primacy by assuring a strong voice for liberalism. Nevertheless, its progressive ardour has been stilled somewhat by the religious stress (a phenomenon witnessed also at Aligarh). In its attempt to remain nationalist,[40] it did not succeed entirely either, for it has drawn primarily Muslim students. An educational centre which does not contain a fair proportion of different religio-social groups cannot be considered nationalist. Its stress on Urdu (rather than Hindi) as the language of instruction and translation also points to a communalist orientation. Its curricular programme, unlike that found in most of the Indo-Muslim learning institutions at the time, has been directed towards a utilitarian goal: to assure for its students entry into non-white-collar jobs. It correctly forecast Islamic India's future needs in the labour market and saved a small group at least from unemployment. In this respect, it has been far more realistic than those institutions and groups insisting on an old-type classical education.

The Dār ul-'Ulūm ("School of Theology") at Deoband (in Saharanpur, India) has its historical inception in the idea of keeping alive the older religious knowledge. The Ṣūfī, Ḥājī Muḥammad 'Ābid, is accredited with being its founder, while to Muḥammad Qāsim (died 15 April 1886) is attributed its successful development.[41] It opened its doors in a small mosque (on 14 April 1866) and grew into an eminent training centre for Sunnite theologians and teachers serving India's *madrasahs*. Apart from al-Azhar University at Cairo, the Deoband seminary "is the most important and respected theological academy of the Muslim world."[42] It had "about 500 students in the 1920's[43] and 900 in 1931, out of whom 368 were from U.P., 185 from Bengal, 150 from N.-W.F.P. and Punjab, 26 from Assam and Burma, 17 from Chinese Turkistan and 26 from Bukhara." Since the Partition in August 1947, it has continued its programme. Apparently, few students from Pakistan attend it at present, "but numerous institutions in East and West Pakistan have been started by those who had studied at Deoband and the educational traditions of the mother institution are being maintained."[44] Its motto being preservation of the older religious learning, its curriculum is traditional.

This "most orthodox of all Muslim seminaries in India"[45] derives its tradition "ultimately from the movement of Shāh Walī Allāh Dihlawī and the Indian 'Wahhābīs'."[46] It is reformist as it wishes "to rid the Muslims of the theological corruptions, the ritual degradations, and the material ex-

ploitation to which they have fallen prey since the British occupation."[47]

Its theologians have attempted, indeed, to cleanse Indian Islam of all "foreign" matter, such as saint-worship, superstition, etc.

Philosophically, Deoband adheres strictly to "the premisses of Islam; within the limits of those premisses it is relentlessly rationalist."[48] Its "theological atmosphere is that of an unmitigated scholasticism; the professors use exclusively the old categories of thought."[49] Unable to comprehend the nature of the demands made by contemporary society, they have refused to acknowledge the need for reinterpreting Islam accordingly; the "door of *ijtihād*" must remain closed. "Their ideal is traditional Islam at its purest—with a strict enforcement of the Canon Law."[50] Advocating restoration and resisting innovation, they represent a static group in Islamic India.

Their desire to maintain the *status quo* is clear also from their defence of polygamy and their opposition to the compulsory education of Muslim girls. They may not be adhering strictly to the Qur'ān if its restrictive clauses are stressed. On the other hand, they uphold the Islamic tradition initiated by Muḥammad.[51] Deoband's theologians reject compulsory female education on the ground that it would force women out of *pardah*, contrary to the Scriptural decree.[52] Compulsory education for boys—although not mentioned specifically in their Holy Writ—could be supported by Muḥammad's (asserted) encouragement of learning and his acknowledgment that they become the breadwinners.[53] Also, Muslim males have been trained in schools—private and State-supported—since early times so that the relevant tradition exists.[54] The Deoband group thus has followed at once the Qur'ān, the reputedly canonical *ḥadīth* and the *sunnah* of the Islamic community in accepting public education for Muslim boys and rejecting it for the girls. They regard the training of Islamic womanhood at State-supervised institutions as an innovation (*bid'ah*), since neither the Prophet, nor Indo-Muslim educational history favoured it. Consequently, it challenges the theologians' consensus (*ijmā'*) and must be opposed.

Lastly, it founded the Jamī'at ul-Anṣār (1906), at whose meeting Aftāb Aḥmad Khān of Aligarh College was present,

> and it was agreed that Deoband seminary would make special arrangements for teaching religious subjects to the graduates of Aligarh College, while similar facilities in respect of English would be provided at Aligarh to those who had completed their studies at Deoband. Maulana's most fruitful effort in this direction was his inauguration of Jamia Millia at Delhi in spite of serious illness, shortly before his death in November, 1920. This institution which was originally set up for students who had discontinued studies at Aligarh during the Non-Co-operation movement incorporated many features of Deoband.[55]

The meeting occurred a year before Muḥsin-ul-Mulk's death ; as pointed out, he and his successor, Viqār-ul-Mulk, had repudiated Sir Sayyid's modernist theology.[56]

Deoband followed a different political road from that pursued by Aligarh (at least prior to Viqār-ul-Mulk's administration of the latter College).[57] It was anti-British and "favourably disposed toward Congress during the First World War," whose nationalist programme it, as most Muslim *'Ulamā*, supported. Generally, however, they abstained from direct political participation until 1918.[58]

By educational background and personal attitude, Deoband's theologians have been unable to appreciate the pull of social forces at work in the twentieth century. They persistently maintain that salvation lies in reviving the old order and their discontent derives from their inability to do so. Had they been more flexible, they might have played a constructive role in steering their community through very difficult times. They have refused to compromise, however, with the result that the deadlock between them and those modernists rejecting religious as well as educational traditionalism is unbroken.

The Nadwat-ul-'Ulamā' ("Society of Muslim Theologians") was founded at Lucknow (in 1894), by, "some religious-minded Government servants, *ulama* and Sufis who wished to bring the *ulama* together and remove sectarian differences."[59] Its principal aims to be : educational improvement in the Arabic schools ; Islam's propagation ; conciliation between quarrulous Muslim groups ; social reform ; and the community's general betterment.[60] It set up a Divinity School (*Dār-ul-'Ulūm*) at Lucknow.[61] The Nadwah seminary's aim has been "to provide a more enlightened education"[62] for Muslim youths wishing to become *'ulamā'*. "The young men undergo a very serious training, lasting at least eight years, in all branches of Muhammadan theology ; and in addition they are taught English, Geography and Mathematics. . . . The curriculum as a whole is a great advance on the old education. . . ."[63]

The Nadwah trains and sends out Muslim missionaries ; publishes an Urdu monthly (*al-Nadwah*) attempting to harmonise modern with Muslim thinking and holds an Annual Conference. It also has founded an orphanage at Cawnpore. It, therefore, may be said to follow the groundwork laid by the Anjuman-i-Ḥimāyat-i-Islām with regard to the curriculum, religious instruction, missionary and social work. But, unlike this predecessor organisation, the Nadwah has been (and still is) primarily a seminary providing higher education for Muslim boys ; it has not founded any schools for girls. In this respect, it approximates Deoband. Again, the Nadwah and the Anjumnn share the awareness that their community is undergoing change,

differing thereby from the Deoband group ; however, the first apparently is the only one among these three institutions permitting reinterpretation, "though not for laymen."[64] "But their answers to those problems are either conservative in the old sense or hesitantly 'liberal'—liberal so belatedly as to be conservative in effect."[65]

They have felt, for instance, that the custom of veiling might be modified, but it should not be abolished altogether, and they neither have rejected nor accepted compulsory education for Muslim women. In other words, they have admitted that a transformation has occurred and *ijtihād* is essential to solve the new questions arising in a non-feudal order. Nevertheless, they have not suggested any effective measures to deal with these problems. Reinterpretation as proposed by them seems to have rather an academic nature inasmuch as it remains (in accordance with the orthodox view) the theologians' privilege. Since the *'ulamā'* have refused hitherto to permit the reopening of *ijtihād*, its real value to the community at large remains ineffective.

Finally, the Nadwah tend to be more progressivist curricularly and theologically (at least, they favour *ijtihād*) than the Deoband group, thereby reflecting Shiblī's influence,[66] but their attempt to come to grips with the issues of a Muslim society in flux has been largely neutralised by the weight of conservatism. Their attitude (held by all groups among the theologians) that too radical a departure from classical Islam might bear disastrous consequences (such as irreligion, materialism, anarchy) continues to act as a powerful restraint on their "modernist" inclinations.

The Farangī Maḥall at Lucknow,[67] although older than Deoband and the Nadwat-ul-'Ulamā', ranges third in importance. Its views approximate those of the Nadwah group, but its curriculum is less "progressive". In this respect, it stands closer to Deoband. While it supports (like the Nadwah) the theologians' right to engage in reinterpretation, it rejects secularisation in consonance with orthodox views. It supports, in effect, such social practices as the seclusion and veiling of Muslim women and is opposed to their compulsory education. It disagrees, therefore, with the Nadwah that some modification of older customs in answer to modern needs may be necessary (whereby it conforms with Deoband's views). Again, *ijtihād* is a lukewarm acknowledgment of their society's suffering the pangs of change and, basically, reflects the desire to remould it along old lines. For this reason, no fear exists that reinterpretation may open the sluices of heretic canals of thought for, ultimately, it remains under the control of theologians committed to the defence of classical Islam. This viewpoint is quite distinct from the attitude towards *ijtihād* taken by the modernists, who feel that it should serve as an agent of modernisation, thus facilitating the transition.

To conclude, the Farangī Maḥall and the Nadwah theologians (unlike those connected with Deoband) have made some adjustment (although the former less so than the latter) to the pressure exerted on the Indo-Islamic community in recent times. "But they have no positive programme, beyond the dogged conservation of the values that they have already understood."[68] In the last analysis, they share with the other—orthodox as well as "liberal"-minded—*'ulamā'* groups the desire to hold the reins of progress in check for fear that, otherwise, the tide of unbelief may engulf their people.

Lastly, the Farangī Maḥall's political platform was pro-Pakistan in contrast to the Nadwah's support of Indian nationalism. Neither seminary engaged extensively in political work ; its major objective was (and is) the salvation of the Indo-Muslim commnnity.

Among the many smaller educational institutions in Islamic India may be mentioned the Madrasah-i-Ilāhiyāt at Cawnpore. This theological seminary apparently was established with the aim of repelling the attacks made by the Arya Samaj upon Islam. It was founded, consequently, to stem Hindu, not Christian, propaganda.

Its curriculum has been small in comparison to that presented by the larger religious schools. "Six subjects are taught, the *Koran*, Islamic theology and philosophy, the defence of Islam, Christianity, Western science, and Sanskrit."[69] It might be said to display the Jesuit philosophy towards learning, which is centered on the principle that one can demolish an adversary's arguments only if one is well-schooled in his tradition. The inclusion of Sanskrit and Christianity in its curriculum must be regarded primarily, then, as a desire to train its students in Hindu and Christian theology for apologetic purposes. Some of the missionaries it trained learned English as well. They have been sent among their ignorant coreligionists as well as those professing other faiths.

Final observations about the *Madrasah-i-Ilāhiyāt's* programme are as follows :

(1) Islam's defence has been its—as most other (mentioned) learning centres'—aim ; whereas the latter's principal "enemies" professed that faith, its main adversary has been Hinduism.

(2) It was one of the few, but not the sole, Islamic "college" to include Sanskrit and Christianity in its curriculum for the reason stated ; to repeat : the desire to train students in the tradition of those whose theological position and arguments they might have to counter.

(3) Its curricular orientation seems similar to that exhibited by the Nadwah's *Dār-ul-'Ulūm* at Lucknow with this difference that English apparently did not form an official part of its course series (while, as noted, the Lucknow seminary does not offer Sanskrit). Also, like

the Nadwah, it trained missionaries. Possibly, therefore, this Lucknow institution served as a model for the Madrasah-i-Ilāhīyāt.

(4) Despite its modernist-oriented curriculum, due to the presentation of modern scientific subjects, it must be characterised, nevertheless, as theologically conservative. It, too, can be said to have played, therefore, a negative role in assessing Indo-Muslim needs for the new era.

The organisations discussed so far to a greater or lesser extent have been or still are important educational bodies in Islamic India. Two other groups, despite their non-institutional nature, must be mentioned, because they have exercised great influence upon the Indo-Muslim community.

The Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā'-i-Hind ("Association of Indian Muslim Clergy") was founded in the 1910's, when the Khilāfat movement was gathering momentum.[70] Like the Deoband theologians—who have supplied the Jam'īyat's leaders[71]—they have been a strictly orthodox group, sounding the call for a return to "pure" Islam. They have branded any transgression (i.e. innovation) as an infringement of the Divine Law which (they have held) is eternally fixed. Unwilling to acknowledge that their community has been outgrowing its feudal state, they rigidly have opposed any modernist trends and swelled the number of reactionary Muslim bodies advocating statism. It has been active particularly among the rural masses.

Politically, the Jam'īyat was anti-British, pro-Congress and nationalist (in a non-communalist sense[72]) as it preached Hindu-Muslim unity. At first, it opposed the Muslim League's separatist platform,[73] but seconded, at its Lahore conference (in 1942) the demand for Islamic India's autonomy and (in 1945) envisaged a federation of self-governing provinces with such powers as these were willing to concede to the Centre.[74] The Jam'īyat's influence has waned under the modernist educational programme pushed through by Pakistan's Government(s). It ceased to function as an organised theological body under Pakistan's military regime,[75] but it, undoubtedly, has remained a subdominant force in Indo-Muslim society.

The Sīrat movement founded in the 1920's by the schoolmaster 'Abd al-Majīd Qarashī, too, gained impetus. It originally wished to popularise Muḥammad's personality, but later tried to introduce Urdu sermons during Friday (congregational) prayers. For this purpose, it formed a distribution service permitting the *imām* (congregation leader) to select rather than, himself, write a sermon. While it is not a school in the institutional sense, nevertheless, it represents an important educational development, because of its attempt to declassicise Indo-Muslim orientation. The main road chosen to pursue this goal has been the translation of Arabic, English and other modernist works into Urdu. It thus has played

its role imbuing the growing number of literate middle-class people with new ideas, and, at the same time, stressing the Urdu language as their vernacular transmitter. Here it took up the tradition started by Sir Sayyid, whose Urdu journal contributed to the advancement of the Indo-Muslim tongue as a literary vehicle, and continued by many of his followers.

Also, it might be considered a secularising force for the very reason that it stressed works by Muslim modernists[76] apart from those written by Christian authors. However, its concentration on Muḥammad undoubtedly countered the tendency to despiritualise, because it implies some emphasis —if indirect—on the God-given nature of Islamic belief and culture. In its popularisation of the Prophet of Islam, the Sīrat movement may have been influenced on the one hand by the Hindu idolisation of Krishna and on the other by the Christian apotheosis of Jesus the Man. However, it was motivated by its desire to liberalise Indian Islam, in which it was influenced by Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān and others.

The movement under discussion, therefore, may be seen as a genuine attempt to find some common meeting ground between the orthodox and the modernists in Islamic India. It agrees with both groups that the essential values of the Muslim faith must be preserved, but stands closer to the modernist viewpoint that they can and should form the basis for a socio-legal structure effective in these new times. The danger of its attitude is, nevertheless, that it approximates revivalism rather than liberalism, for it does stress Muḥammad's ways and demands implicitly at least adherence to them.

It is not a theological training centre, whereby it differs fundamentally from the other institutions to which reference has been made. Yet, it has constituted an educational attempt of some significance, for the general public, the student body as well as the theologians. Lastly, the Sīrat movement epitomises the profound problems involved in the tense struggle waged in Islamic India since Sir Sayyid put forth his programme.

In conclusion to this section, two specific points must be made, namely, with regard to the curriculum, the religious training centres mentioned have been stressing Islamic classical studies, including the Arabic language. The inclusion of English in certain programmes in no way has changed the traditional Muslim philosophy of learning which regards religion as the underlying essence of society. The chief reason for this attitude has been throughout that faith gives permanence to a world in flux. Without a spiritual basis, the Islamic community loses its uniqueness, its valid reason for existing, and (ideally) its unitary bond. This view has been propagated forcefully by the *'ulamā'*. It leads to the second point, namely, that on the whole the theologians have not contributed, but remained opposed to and

aloof from, the modernist movement. Politically, however, many ultimately became progressive by supporting the right of Muslim-majority areas to become autonomous provinces in a Federated Indian Union.[77]

3. *Muḥammad Shiblī and the Nadwat-ul-'Ulamā'*

The statement that attempts to modernise Indo-Muslim (private) education on the whole were ineffective is supported by Shiblī's own tragic experience. As principal of the Nadwah's Divinity School (in 1908), he immediately began to renovate its curriculum.[78] Here was a man who, far less anglicised than many of his contemporary leading compatriots, nevertheless was dissatisfied thoroughly with the old pattern of Islamic education in India. Undoubtedly, he was attracted to the Lucknow seminary, because of its avowed desire to train its students in modern—apart from classical—subjects. It implied a realisation that a course study, based solely on Muslim theology and antiquated sciences, no longer sufficed. In other words, its curriculum aimed at some degree of conciliation between the older and newer learning. The Nadwah's *Dār-ul-'Ulūm* in this respect imitated to some extent the programme initiated by Sir Sayyid in Aligarh. Shiblī's discontent with the latter's regress into conservatism pushed him into the former, which offered him also greater incentive, because it had appointed him its head. He felt that, in this capacity, he could contribute far more to Indo-Muslim education, because he had now a say in the formulation of its policy. Unfortunately, his modernist innovations were resisted by his colleagues. "Before long he had to leave, so much opposition did he arouse."[79]

Why did the Nadwah group appoint him? They must have known about his earlier outspokenness against the type of education prevailing on the Indo-Muslim subcontinent. In the very year that the Nadwat-ul-'Ulamā' was founded (in 1894), Muḥammad Shiblī sharply criticised the old Islamic curriculum and mode of teaching :[80]

> His general criticism is that infinite importance is given to the text, its meanings, its deductions, and its variations, but the larger aspects of the subject itself are not dealt with. In theological education, two things must be specially borne in mind : the acquisition of the particular science, and depth of thought, and power of independent study. He also finds that *'arabiyah*, that is, real command of Arabic, is not of the required standard, and that not much attention is paid to the Qur'ānic sciences. In particular, the inimitable style of the Qur'ān (*i'jāz*) receives scant attention. And finally the sciences taken over by the Arabs from the Greeks are learned as they had been handed down from the Arabs during medieval times with no substantial advance.[81]

Better knowledge of subject-matter and improved teaching techniques constitututed Shiblī's clarion call. Unlike Sir Sayyid, he did not only stress the foreign, technical, topics, but also wished to strengthen the classical

curriculum. The Nadwah Seminary desired to revitalise Islamic education. Shiblī felt similarly. His orientation as well as his renown as an historian and his experience gained at Aligarh made him their best choice. The judgment proved to be erroneous, not because he was unqualified, but because his reforms ultimately were too radical. At this (as at any other Indo-Muslim) seminary, the dilution of its original educational policy was (and remains) the chief problem.

This leads to the second question formulated earlier, namely, why did Shiblī's reforms raise such a storm? The answer is that his desire to revitalise Islam "from within"[82] implied a thorough overhauling of the curricular content and teaching mode. The majority of the staff at the Dār-ul-'Ulūm, having been trained in the classical tradition, could not accept his insistence on modernisation of the curriculum. His demand that rote learning be abandoned for independent examination of given texts did not seem, but was in effect, contrary to the Nadwah's stand on *ijtihād*. Its reservation to a select group of Muslim theologians excluded necessarily the student body. Therefore, Shiblī's desire to instill the "power of independent study" ran counter to the Seminary's traditional-mindedness.

His critique of the poor teaching standards, as compared to contemporary European (English) and medieval Islamic practice, possibly raised feelings of insecurity among his subordinates, most of whom knew no better way to impart knowledge and were apprehensive lest they might be replaced. It aroused hostility particularly, because they feared that tampering with content and technique would corrode the genuine nature of Islamic education. Their self-appraisal was negative from a critical viewpoint, as they were satisfied with the system to which they had fallen heir and of which they had become jealous custodians.

The clash was inevitable since the theologians could see no reason for the improvements demanded by their principal. In contrast to their educational philosophy, learning meant to Shiblī understanding of texts, not their verbal repetition, ignoring their meaning, and the quoting of medieval commentators. In this respect, he stood in Niẓām al-Dīn's tradition (despite his rejection of this master's curriculum as inadequate for the twentieth century). Implied in his view was that most of the old commentaries had lost their validity; new ones answering the needs of the "now" must be written, a task demanding as much knowledge of the Qur'ān, medieval theology, philosophy and jurisprudence as of modern currents of thought, particularly those detectable in the Islamic, and, specifically, in Indo-Muslim society. Shiblī had a profound reason for feeling so strongly on the subject. In practice, the *ijmā'* of the community had begun to make itself felt by his

time. How could its members make decisions on important issues unless they had been trained to this end ? Education no longer sufficed (according to him), unless it prepared his people adequately towards assuming this great responsibility. His educational philosophy contained, indeed, a democratic aspect for it threw the role of decision-making on the individual rather than on a select self-appointed *bloc* of leaders. Again, it went against the grain of Islamic tradition.[83]

Clearly, no common meeting-ground existed—as was originally thought —between Shiblī and the Nadwah theologians, because he was more, and they less, modernist than had been believed by respectively either party. Since neither wished to or even could yield to the other for fear of giving up cherished principles, Shiblī was forced to abandon his headship (in 1912). Nevertheless, his influence on the seminary has not been lost entirely.

> It gives students mild courses in English, modern history, politics, in addition to the traditional subjects ; and there is a somewhat rationalist air. However, a true liberal position has by no means been achieved ; either here or, virtually, anywhere else in the theological world of Indian Islàm.[84]

Yet, its curriculum is somewhat more modernistic and thus, as also in the study of modern Arabic and the writing art introduced by Shiblī, it has perpetrated in part at least their erstwhile principal's reforms.

The following final conclusions seem to arise from the discussion in this chapter. The problem tackled by Muḥammad Shiblī, Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān and other like-minded Indian Muslims in the past (and present) is an agonising one. It raises the immense dilemma concerning the essential purposes of education. Must it be religious or secular (i.e. liberal) ; attuned or not to the "materialist" outlook of modern times ; and, lastly, will the spiritual character be lost if the traditional topics are revised and given equal (if not less) attention than the newer subjects ? The modernists have argued that Islamic education must be updated in order that Muslims be made fit citizens of the new world ; it does not necessarily lose thereby its religious base. The conservative-orthodox group has insisted, on the other hand, that education remain untied to any given epoch so as to guarantee its essential aim : to rear God-fearing individuals ; it will lose this primary function if it is cut loose from its religious moorings and made to serve contemporary "material" needs.

The underlying theme is whether a secular (liberal) education can and does foster a spiritual attitude. Liberalism is by definition not narrowly concentrated on one particular discipline ; consequently, it opens the mind to a wider perspective, allowing it to roam more freely and gain (from) inquisitiveness and reflection. The theologians have rejected it, because they regard it as essentially un-Islamic and, therefore, unable to breed spiritualism.

In assuming this fundamentalist attitude, they have ignored the historical fact that their country has been drawn (forcibly) into the whirling chasm of a changing order of life. Its contact with the British generated politico-social changes and stimulated the desire among the Indo-Muslim intelligentsia to shake off excessive traditionalism holding the masses in bondage. Battered by innumerable foreign ideas, the community found itself in a tragic situation as it had no choice but to catch up with, if it did not wish to be swallowed up by, an increasingly scientific-minded world. Sir Sayyid's educational philosophy and experiment reflected the dilemma facing his people and represented his acute prognostication of the cure. His friend Muḥsin-ul-Mulk and other like-minded men held that education must serve but one purpose: the training of Muslims *as* government servants, scientists, etc Sir Sayyid stressed the education of, for example, scientists, *among* his coreligionists. The distinction is clear: Muḥsin emphasised the religious, non-functional, Sir Sayyid the technical, aspect as being of primary significance. Again, the time element makes Sir Sayyid's diagnosis the more dramatic. He felt that time was of the essence—it was already late for India's Muslims. The subsequent decades have proven him to be correct. The theologians' insistence that education be primarily of a non-functional, that is, classical, nature spells catastrophe for the masses searching for jobs in a technological society. Had they been willing to recognise that the inexorable process of change has engulfed their community, they would have been able to allow for (if not fully approve of) the focus of modernist education, acting as consultants to assure its Islamic base. This might not have been so difficult, because some groups among them have distinguished between a "purely secular" and a "liberal" programme, the former being void of, and the latter embracing, religious instruction. Therefore, the former type has not found favour with the private Indo-Muslim learning centres. Their critique of modernist education is based on their *a priori* conclusion that it is secular in nature.[85] This is an incorrect appraisal, discarding the above-mentioned distinction. The modernists have claimed, rightly so, that unless the old categories of thinking are discarded, their community will crack under the impact of the new forces. From their standpoint, the theologians, who have prided themselves upon being its guardians, would be responsible for its collapse. Unfortunately, however, the latter have claimed that any substantive changes would result in a non-Islamic pattern of thought and life. Over seventy years after Aligarh's foundation, an eye-witness reported:

> There is no suggestion anywhere that the 'Ulamā are as yet abandoning their strict and rigid outlook and the only visible effect of modernism has been to produce the Jam'īatu'l-ulamā, which has brought some sort of discipline and cohesion into what had been a quite amorphous body of

theologians. It remains to be seen whether their unification will continue to preserve their orthodox conservatism or whether it may assist a general movement forward.[86]

Regrettably, the answer is that the dilemma, which faced Islamic India in Sir Sayyid's time, hitherto has not been solved. It does not mean, however, that orthodoxy has won the battle. Indeed, it is comforting to know that the modernist educational philosophy—as advanced by Muḥammad Shiblī rather than Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān—is practised by the present Government of Pakistan. Under its Second Five-Year-Plan, an Institute of Islamic Studies has been founded with the purpose of carrying on research "to define Islam in terms of its fundamentals" and "to interpret the teachings of Islam so as to bring out their dynamic character in the context of the intellectual and scientific progress of the modern world."[87] It was, indeed, the core of Shiblī, whole programme, which aimed at forging a new structure, filled with the essential principles of the Muslim faith and characterised by the dynamic creativity which its representatives had displayed in past times. His desire to liberalise the curriculum of the Nadwah Seminary, his writings and speeches were all focussed upon this one major goal. It was the fruition of the grandiose vision of a man—Sir Sayyid—piercing into the dawn of a new era, a vision which had lost somewhat the Islamic identity, but recovered it in its further ripening. Their fall on the rocks of dissent may be momentary in the vast historical spectacle, for the voices decrying their dream may be drowned in the swelling chorus clamouring to make it a reality for the salvation of Indian Islam.

Chapter IV

THE AḤMADĪYYAH MOVEMENT

1. *Introduction : The Life and Personality of Mirza Ghulām Aḥmad*

The ancestors of Ghulām Aḥmad emigrated from Central Asia to India during the sixteenth century of the Christian era. Led by Mirza[1] Hādī Beg, they settled in the Punjab where they received a large area of land about seventy miles east of Lahore. On this land, Mirza Hādī Beg built a fort which he called Islāmpūr Qādiyān (later called Qadiyan) where he took up residence.[2] He bore the title and exercised the function of *Qāḍī*, which was bestowed upon him by Bābur, the first Mughal Emperor of India.

Sikh persecution forced Mirza Hādī Beg's descendants to flee from Qadiyan, but during the rule of the Sikh leader, Ranjīt Singh, Ghulām Aḥmad's family returned to this city and received back a portion of the family's property, namely, Qadiyan and some nearby villages. When the British extended their rule over the Punjab, they not only acknowledged these proprietary rights, but also resumed the land grant (*jāgīr*) bestowed upon the family during Mughal times; instead of this land grant, however, they paid a small pension to the family's head. The leadership devolved in the course of time upon Mirza Ghulām Murtaḍā, physician by profession. A younger son, whom he named Ghulām Aḥmad, was born to him on 18 June 1839.[3] When the lad had reached his sixth year, his father engaged a Persian tutor who taught Ghulām Aḥmad for four years. Between the ages of ten and seventeen, the boy's education was in the hands of a pious scholar of Arabic. He became well trained in Arabic, Persian, and Urdu, as also in the Qur'ān and Islamic religious literature. When Ghulām Aḥmad's education had been completed, his father obtained for him a subordinate position in the Deputy Commissioner's Office at Sialkot. During his stay in that city, Ghulām Aḥmad met some Church of Scotland missionaries with whom he spent many hours in religious discussion and so obtained first-hand knowledge about the Christian faith, which he later supplemented with intensive reading. He became thereby well prepared for the task carried out in subsequent years.[4]

His disinterest in worldly affairs and lack of business acumen were manifested during his four-year term at Sialkot and after his return to Qadiyan. Anxious to recover some of his family's former affluence, Mirza Ghulām Murtaḍā had been engaged in law-suits to win back his ancestors' estate. He

set his son to work, but it was almost immediately apparent that Ghulām Aḥmad had no material ambitions. His father's suggestion that he should study law was also fully rejected. Disappointed that his efforts to assure for his son some financial well-being met with apathy, Ghulām Murtaḍā left him fence for himself, dying shortly afterwards (in 1876). His elder son, Mirza Ghulām Qādir, now became the family's head, but he followed his father into death a few years later. As he had no children, his brother Aḥmad had to take over.[5]

For a number of years, Mirza Ghulām Aḥmad lived in reticence at Qadiyan, lost in the study of the Qur'ān, the *ḥadīth*, and the Scriptures of other faiths. This period of concentrated study bore fruit. In 1880 appeared the first two parts of the *Barāhīn-i-Aḥmadīyyah* ("Aḥmadīyyah Proofs"), which was well received for its originality and power, although its exposition of Islamic doctrine already contained the seed of later Aḥmadīyyah teachings.[6] Ghulām Aḥmad's public announcement on 4 March 1889 of having experienced a divine revelation marks the official beginning of the Aḥmadīyyah Movement. It also signified the start of a new career for Ghulām Aḥmad, who henceforth felt entitled to receive homage from all Muslims and became the fully accepted leader of those who accepted his teachings. Two years later, in 1891, Ghulām Aḥmad declared that he was the expected Mahdī and the promised Messiah,[7] and clarified his position in three books : the *Fatḥ-i-Islām* ("Conquest of Islam"), the *Tanzīh-i-Marām* ("Purification of Dreams"), and the *Izāla-i-Auhām* ("Removal of Superstitions").[8] Violent opposition to his view, which not only went against the grain of accepted Muslim belief, but which led Ghulām Aḥmad to virulent attacks on other faiths, broke loose from three quarters : Muslim (whose spokesman was Maulvī Muḥammad Ḥusain), Hindu (Arya Samaj, represented by Pandit Lekh Ram), and Christian (led by 'Abdullah Ātham). Henceforth, Ghulām Aḥmad remained embroiled in controversies until death silenced him.

One of his former friends and co-workers, Maulvī Muḥammad Ḥusain, turned arch-enemy, obtained a legal pronouncement (*fatwā*), the first of many, against him (in 1891). It was signed by a number of Indian theologians, who thereby formally declared Ghulām Aḥmad and his followers to be heretics, sanctioning their destruction.

> . . . Maulvi Muhammad Husain advocates the wholesale murder of the whole Ahmadiyya community and its leader. . . . Maulvi Abu Said Muhammad Husain is the oldest and bitterest foe of the movement. He was the man who travelled over the whole of Northern India to prepare against the members and founder of the Ahmadiyya Movement a big *fatwa* of Irtidad or heresy (death being the punishment of a heretic) in which he secured the seals and signatures of nearly two hundred Maulvis. . . .[9]

Henceforth, Ghulām Aḥmad was hailed into court innumerable times, but it stimulated rather than silenced him, as he became increasingly active in religious affairs and vocal in the denunciation of his enemies. Various vernacular Aḥmadīyyah publications continued to pour off the press in ever greater numbers; among them must be mentioned the English monthly, *The Review of Religions*, devoted to the discussion of a large variety of non-secular subjects, including religious movements and conferences taking place abroad.[10] Ghulām Aḥmad attended many such meetings, among them the Lahore Conference of Religions, which took place in December 1896, and at which he read a paper entitled "The Sources of Divine Knowledge," summarising the Aḥmadīyyah theory regarding the Islamic doctrine of salvation and the purity of the Qur'ān.

In spite of his busy career, Ghulām Aḥmad found time to rear a family, which gave him the badly needed peace after yet another lecture, another trip to attend some meeting or other. Amidst the din of life, he would retire to his quiet study in Qadiyan to prepare still one more of his many articles and again enflame the world against him.[11] On 24 February 1899, an order was issued against him by the Punjab Government, mainly through Maulvī Muḥammad Ḥusain's efforts.[12] The purpose of this Government order was to make Ghulām Aḥmad promise henceforth:

> To refrain from publishing any prediction involving the disgrace of any person, or in which anyone should be represented as an object of God's displeasure.
>
> To refrain from publishing any challenge to appeal to God to indicate by the signs of his displeasure, such as disgrace, etc., the party in a religious controversy which is in the wrong.
>
> To refrain from publishing any writing purporting to be an inspiration the object of which can be reasonably taken to be the disgrace of any person, or the representing of him as the object of the Divine wrath. [13]

Ghulām Aḥmad had been in the habit of engaging his enemies in "prayer-duels," by which he believed God would destroy them. He cited in one article a number of Muslims who thus met their well-deserved fate, for " 'every one who rises against him is sure to be knocked down.' "[14] Ghulām Aḥmad regarded as proof of his power the one-sided duel undertaken by him with John Alexander Dowie,[15] whose death he felt was the result. Ghulām Aḥmad failed to understand why Christendom would not acknowledge his power after he had wrought this miracle. Need it be said that he did not fully keep the promise to which the Government order bound him?

His energies, however, were sapped by the constant tensions which life made him endure, and in his later years, his physical strength and aggressiveness diminished. As he felt death approach, he drew up his will, [16] which

was published in December 1905, three years before he was laid to rest. Its main purpose was to give advice to his followers and lay down their theological beliefs which he had expounded in his books, articles and addresses as well as organisational pattern and their duties.

In May 1908, Ghulām Aḥmad came with his wife to Lahore to seek medical aid for her and to attend a religious conference. Death, caused by intestinal disorder,[17] struck him in that city (in May 1908). A paper, entitled "The Message of Peace," which Ghulām Aḥmad had prepared for this conference and had hoped to have read in his presence, was delivered shortly after his decease by an Aḥmadīyyah, Khwājah Kamāl-ud-Dīn.[18] In this Message, Ghulām Aḥmad not solely extolled Islam, but he also wrote :

> My dear countrymen, that religion does not deserve the name of religion which does not inculcate broad sympathy with humanity in general, nor does that person deserve to be called a human being who has not a sympathetic soul within him.[19]

Ghulām Aḥmad was laid to final rest in a simple tomb at Qadiyan, which has become a shrine for Aḥmadīyyah pilgrims.

What kind of man was the founder of Aḥmadīyyat ? In his youth, he had already exhibited a serious bent of mind, which his teachers must have developed further, and a profound interest in religion. In the years following his return to Qadiyan, which he devoted to intense study, a hate of the world came upon him. He also developed certain peculiar traits, such as a craving for sweets and eating bits of earth.[20] These traits can be explained in conjunction with his hatred, for the sweets become a symbol replacing the bitter (hatred), and the earth itself, on whose surface the bitter events of life unfold themselves, becomes the symbol of warm refuge and, hence, of love. The eating of bits of it could thus be interpreted as a magical act through which strength-giving love is consumed.

Ghulām Aḥmad's physical condition was imperfect, as he suffered from dizziness and diabetes. Dreams and visions, in which he always played a primary role, haunted him since the years of his youth. He was nervous, absent-minded and when he began to receive revelations, "profoundly moved by their mysterious nature and easily convinced of their having proceeded from a supernatural source.[21] His claim that he had received divine revelations thrust him into the centre of public attention. The validity of these revelations baffled many of Ghulām Aḥmad's contemporaries. Among them was an Indian Christian teacher, called Mr Daniel, who visited Ghulām Aḥmad at Qadiyan and asked him to fill out seven questions dealing with his mental processes. The first two of these primarily attempted to explore whether brain disease or mental aberrations in Ghulām Aḥmad's

near-of-kin might not account for Ghulām Aḥmad's state of mind. The diseases (diabetes and dizziness) alluded to in Mr Daniel's questions "were foretold by our Holy Prophet as being the signs of the promised Messiah."[22] The answer, given by the editor of the *Review of Religions*, presumably with Ghulām Aḥmad's approval, does not deny Ghulām Aḥmad's mental and physical deviations, but neither does it admit their nullifying the validity of Ghulām Aḥmad's revelations. Another scholar interested in solving the question of validity was Dr H. D. Griswold of Lahore, who knew Ghulām Aḥmad personally.[23] He concluded that Ghulām Aḥmad was probably a victim of "'unconscious self-deception.'" He also stated (and here he agreed with Dr Griswold) that there was some sincerity in Ghulām Aḥmad's belief in the validity of a number of his revelations, but

> that he later . . . produced alleged revelations that had been deliberately forged, in the interests . . . of a growing ambition and an ill-disguised cupidity, a mass of reliable evidence compels us to believe.[24]

Ghulām Aḥmad's revelations mostly contained prophecies of his enemies' humiliation or death, and not all of them (perhaps constituting the majority) did come true. One of these may be cited not only to give an example of the nature of his revelations, but to show the violent reaction it engendered. He had prophesied Pandit Lekh Ram's[25] death within six years after foretelling it and the beginning of the 'Īd festival soon afterwards. The Pandit was murdered four years after Ghulām Aḥmad's prediction.

> The members of the Ārya Samāj, and many others, not unnaturally believed that the prophecy and the murder had a sinister connection of cause and effect quite different from that which was urged by Ahmad.[26]

A number of his prophecies referred to political events, such as the unpopular partition of the province of Bengal.[27] In February 1906, Ghulām Aḥmad prophesied, "'relating to the order that had been given concerning Bengal at first, they will be conciliated now.'"[28]

When the unpopular Lieutenant-Governor of the new province (that is, Assam and Eastern Bengal), resigned, Ghulām Aḥmad was jubilant, for his prophecy that the Government of England would adopt a conciliatory policy had come true.[29]

He prophesied births (boy or girl), sickness and earthquakes, many of which did not take place, although he could allegorise an expected earthquake as he did not predict its exact date or place and could keep his prophecy ready for future use. He did admit, however, that he might not always foretell correctly. "'It also happens that an error occurs sometimes in the interpretation of a prophecy, for, after all, prophets are mortals.'"[30]

This view would make the validity of all revelation doubtful as its understanding by the recipient himself can be erroneous. It contradicts,

in fact, the Islamic theory of revelation. The orthodox Ṣūfīs[31] hold that a mystic vision must be checked against revelation to ascertain its validity. This means that prophetic revelation does not admit of error whether in its essence or in the recipient's understanding of it. Ghulām Aḥmad's statement, on the other hand, would negate not only the fundamental importance of the Scriptures as Divine Revelation, but would furthermore cast in doubt the validity of his asserted prophethood, because he could have misunderstood the significance of the revelations on which he based his claim.

Some of his enemies also boasted of having the power of mystic vision.[32] Ghulām Aḥmad continued spreading predictions, however, and not even the Government could silence him.[33] His followers grew in number (from *c.* 313 in 1896 to *c.* 15,000 in 1901)[34] and requested in 1900 that they be officially registered by the name of "Aḥmadīyyah" in the Government of India census records. Their request was granted and, henceforth, they were acknowledged formally as being a distinct Muslim group. In an effort to explain Ghulām Aḥmad's appeal, Mr Walter wrote :

> those older Ahmadīs whom I have questioned as to their reasons for joining the movement, have most of them laid greater stress on the personal impression made upon them by the Mīrzā Sāhib's forceful and winning personality than on the nature of his peculiar teachings.[35]

It is for the individual reader to judge whether Mr Walter's statement is entirely unbiased. Prior to reaching a conclusion, however, one must ask oneself the question how Mr Walter's explanation can be justified fully in view of the movement's continued growth after Ghulām Aḥmad's death, when the founder's personality was lost to the new converts. Another explanation, but by no means the only one, might perhaps be that Ghulām Aḥmad's reappraisal of what Islam and religion in general must be, if it is to have meaning in this stormy age of conflicting opinions, fulfils the needs of the dissatisfied. He set an example of dignity and was willing to suffer for the claims he put forward. "His persistency in affirming his claims in the face of the most intense and bitter opposition is magnificent."[36] What greater praise can be given by man to man as this laud offered to the Prophet of Qadiyan !

2. *Mirza Ghulām Aḥmad's Teachings*

The Qur'ān is the Bible of the Aḥmadīyyahs, belonging, as they do, to the Islamic community. They agree on many points with orthodox Muslim belief. The Aḥmadīyyahs, for instance, accept the Islamic doctrine that the Qur'ān has an eternal heavenly counterpart and that it was revealed by the Archangel Gabriel to Muḥammad, the Prophet of Islam.[37] They believe that Allah's will is revealed to man through the Qur'ān, whose every word is His, and not that of any human being.

. . . it is an admitted fact that every portion of the Holy Quran . . . was believed to be the Word of God. It is, therefore, quite unreasonable to suppose that some portions of the Holy Quran were written while others were not.[38]

The Aḥmadīyyahs base their argument that the Qur'ān was written down during Muḥammad's lifetime on the reference to it as "the Book" (*al-kitāb*) : "And thee We have sent down the *Book of the Koran* with truth, confirmatory of previous Scriptures, and their safeguard. . . ."[39]

They also profess that Allah is One, Eternal, the Creator of the universe and of man, and that Adam was the first human fashioned by Him. They accept the Qur'ānic doctrine of angelology and the Prophets who appeared prior to Muḥammad. Like all good Muslims, the Aḥmadīyyahs heed Allah's warning that the evil-doer shall be punished and the believer shall reap his reward. They live in conformity with the social laws laid down in the Qur'ān. Their claim, then, that they represent "pure Islam" appears to be fully justified. Ghulām Aḥmad's announcement, however, that he is a prophet and his interpretation of some of Islam's teachings were rejected by the majority of the Muslims, who accused him and his followers, and after his death, by his own adherents.[40]

He laid down the axiom "that all assertions and arguments shall be drawn from, and based on, the Holy Qur'ān,[41] and the *ḥadīth*. His originality did not consist in doing so—because all Muslim theologians and thinkers take the Qur'ān and the *ḥadīth* as their guides—but in his interpretation of "the Book" in order to prove the validity of his views. His claim to prophethood shook the Islamic world, which firmly believes that Muḥammad is the seal of the Prophets and that with him prophethood ends.

Basing themselves on the Qur'ān (which states that there are Prophets of different degrees, e.g. Sūrah ii. 254, xvii. 57, vi. 93), the Aḥmadīyyahs distinguish between two types : those experiencing major inspiration (*waḥy*) and others having minor inspiration (*ilhām*). Muḥammad belongs to the first group, for he was a law-bearer (like Moses) ; Mirza Ghulām Aḥmad must be classified in the second group, as he came to restore and re-establish the Law after mankind have forsaken it" (like Jesus).[42] What is exactly meant by "*ilhām*" ?

"'It is the living and powerful Word of God in which he speaks to or addresses one of his servants whom he has chosen. . . .' "[43] It is not the inspiration of human genius, but it springs from the Divine Source, which uses man as an instrument for the purpose of reinterpreting in changed circumstances the Law revealed to mankind in earlier times.

. . . Almighty God prophesied by the mouth of his prophets that after nearly six thousand years from the time of Adam, when great darkness would pursue upon earth . . . he would breathe into a man the soul of truth

and love and knowledge spiritually after the likeness of Adam, and he would be called the Messiah, because God would himself anoint his soul with the ointment of his love. . . . I am that Messiah ! let him who will accept me,[44]

The darkness mentioned by Ghulām Aḥmad referred either to a general state of degradation or to the eclipse of 1894.[45] Moral degradation undoubtedly had undermined civilisation. " 'Luxurious habits, transgression, drunkenness, gambling and laziness have gained the upper hand.' " The maulvīs are to blame for this decadence, for they " 'fabricated poisonous traditions' and their own lives are corrupt."[46] Among the many other signs which Ghulām Aḥmad said were predicted in the Qur'ān and the authentic Traditions were the plague (it ravaged India and other lands in 1903), a new mode of transportation (railways replaced to some extent the caravans), " 'the increase of knowledge, the mixing together of people living in distant lands.' "[47] " 'Again, it had been written that the *Mahdi* would be born in a village called *Kadaa*, and he was born in Qadian, which the common people call Kadia or Kadi.' "[48]

There could be no doubt in the Aḥmadīyyahs' opinion that Ghulām Aḥmad was the Mahdī ("one who guides") and the Promised Messiah, particularly because he appeared after an interval of between twelve and fourteen centuries (the same span which separated Christ and Moses) and God had revealed his name.

And *remember* when Jesus the son of Mary said, "O Children of Israel ! of a truth I am God's apostle to you to confirm the law which was given before me, and to announce an apostle that shall come after me whose name shall be Ahmad ![49] (Sūrah lxi. 6).

Mirza Aḥmad and his followers repeatedly quoted this verse to prove that it refers not to Muḥammad, but to himself, because he bears the name Aḥmad.[50] However, his real name means "servant of Aḥmad," that is, Muḥammad's servant, for Aḥmad is another name for Muḥammad. Therefore, Aḥmad's contention that his advent is foretold here has no solid basis.

In claiming that he was both the Promised Messiah and the Mahdī, Ghulām Aḥmad differed from established Islamic belief, which distinguishes between these two figures according to their respective functions, although expecting their simultaneous appearance on the Last Day. The Mahdī is a man of flesh and blood, sent to lead Muslims on their last holy war (*jihād*) to establish Islam as the ultimate religion of mankind.

Ghulām's interpretation is that the second Adam is not only the Mahdī, but also the Promised Messiah ; in other words, both functions are fulfilled by one person. He could declare, therefore, that "Mahdī" is not another title of the "Messiah" and that he, too, exercises either function.

He regarded himself furthermore as " 'the real intercessor of mankind, because I am the perfect image of the great intercessor who was born

thirteen centuries ago and rejected by the blind men of his time."[51] By declaring that Muḥammad's spirituality had pervaded his whole being and that he had inherited this Prophet's " 'untold perfections,' " Ghulām Aḥmad could claim that he was the intercessor. However, he viewed the intercessor's function to be more in the nature of a mediator. He thus differed from the Islamic belief that Muḥammad, though acting as mediator while alive, will intercede only on the Last Day. The problem might be solved by accepting the merging of personalities; namely, the same man is sent by God under various names at different times in human history. However, Ghulām Aḥmad did not claim to have been Muḥammad in an earlier existence and Islamic orthodoxy certainly would have rejected such a claim as violently as it has denied the validity of the Aḥmadīyyah's teachings.

His announcement that he was the Mahdī reveals his agreement with the commonly accepted Muslim doctrine (which has no Qur'ānic basis) that the Mahdī would establish Islam on this earth. It would also imply consonance between his and the Islamic (not Qur'ānic) view that a holy war shall be fought by the Mahdī to impose Islam upon the non-believers (i.e. non-Muslims). This was not the case, however, as Ghulām Aḥmad was strongly against conversion by force, which view has been (and is) shared by many Muslims.

Ghulām Aḥmad wrote that " 'to believe in me as the Promised Messiah and Mahdī is to disbelieve in the popular doctrine of *jihād*.' "[52] Elsewhere, he said that at the Mahdī's and Messiah's advent, " 'there shall be no bloodshed and no *Jehad*.' "[53] He was asked why, if he rejected *jihād*, it was sanctioned during Islam's early days. He answered that a holy war was necessary at that time for self-protection against, and later to punish, the barbarians.[54] In other words, he regarded *jihād* as a defensive measure. One of the underlying reasons for his view was his fear that anyone could claim to be the Mahdī without the portent signs and upset national and international peace. His fear was not entirely ungrounded in view of the warning addressed by a self-styled Mahdī of the Sudan to the Christians: " Remember that so long as Islam is not completely established in the whole of the world, the sword of the Mahdī will not be sheathed.' "[55]

The relative peace enjoyed by all segments of the Indian population under British rule was given as another reason. " 'This Government is for the Muhammadans a heavenly blessing. . . . Fighting and jehad with such a Government is absolutely unlawful.' "[56] This quotation implies Ghulām Aḥmad's pro-British feelings (manifested also by his father), his awareness that the Muslims were a minority in India and that he and his adherents formed a small unpopular group among India's Muslims so that they would not have a chance if they were to start a *jihād*. However, if they were attacked *en masse*, they must defend themselves and wage a holy war for

purposes of self-preservation. This accords fully with the Qur'ān where it is written: "And fight for the cause of God against those who fight against Him but commit not the injustice of attacking them first: God loveth not such injustice" (ii. 186).[57] Ghulām Aḥmad was not original, therefore, when he said that Islam shall be propagated upon the Mahdī's and the Messiah's advent "by heavenly signs only and not by any display of physical force. . . ."[58]

The Muslims believe that God, not man, speaks in the Qur'ān.

The Qur'ān is the word of Allah revealed to the Holy Prophet Muḥammad, whose own words are preserved in the tradition. It is from A to Z, with the arrangements of chapters and even vowels, from Allah. It is the perfect and final code of law, and the words of the Prophet, as embodied in the traditions, are its commentary.[59]

It is inconsistent with this belief, according to the Aḥmadīyyahs, to accept the theory of the Qur'ān's abrogation.[60] Muslim theologians accept three ways in which one of its verses can be abrogated:

(1) in the sense and in the letter (of which only one exception survives in a tradition, and, hence, is non-scriptural and not binding upon Muslims);

(2) in the letter, but not in the sense—which would be binding if supported by Muḥammad's authority and the unanimous agreement of his Companions,[61] but no tradition has preserved any such passage;

(3) in the sense, but not in the letter—these are in the Qur'ān, but they are not binding for their sense has been abrogated.[62]

A long controversy has raged in the Islamic world on the subject of abrogation. Generally, Muslim opinion has tended to divide itself, one group believing that abrogation refers to previously existing laws which have been partly confirmed, partly superseded, by the Qur'ān; another segment maintaining that abrogation refers to the Qur'ān itself, because certain verses, revealed at Mecca or during the early days at Medina, no longer applied after the Muslim community had expanded and new circumstances prevailed, so that they had to be replaced by other Qur'ānic passages. However, should circumstances similar to those of early Islamic days return, then the passages at present abrogated would again apply.

The Aḥmadīyyahs are mainly concerned with the third way of abrogating a Qur'ānic passage or verse. They reject it for a number of reasons, among which the most important are:

(1) The Qur'ān is God's Word;

(2) Abrogation can be accepted only if "it is based on the unanimous testimony of the body of companions similar to the testimony which we have for its inclusion in the Qur'ān."[63]

(3) The revocation of a Qur'ānic verse or passage should have been publicised, for how else could a Muslim know that it is no longer binding?

Had there been a Divine revelation telling the Holy Prophet that any verse had been abrogated, it was his duty to make it as widely known as the verse itself. . . . It is utterly absurd to suppose that a law was promulgated and made binding upon all the Muslims and its violation was threatened with severe punishment, yet it was annulled without any information of it being given to those who were enjoined to act upon it.[64]

Not every Muslim knew the entire Qur'ān and, if he did, he would still not know which was the abrogating and which the abrogated passage, "because such decision required a sound knowledge not only of the Qur'ān, but also of the Arabic idiom."[65] And, furthermore, Muḥammad would certainly have received a revelation concerning any passage to be abrogated which would then not have found its way in the Qur'ān. That it is in the Qur'ān is clear proof to the Aḥmadīyyahs, and those Muslims agreeing with them on this matter that abrogation does not apply to the Qur'ān itself—which view they share with Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān.[66] Those Muslims who maintain, on the contrary, that the abrogation of Qur'ānic verses is implied, cite in particular two passages in support of their thesis:

Whatever verses We cancel, or cause thee to forget, We bring a better or its like. Knowest thou not that God hath power over all things? (ii. 100).

And when We change one [sign] verse for another, and God knoweth best what He revealeth. . . . (xvi. 103).

As to Sūrah ii. 100, they advance (according to the Aḥmadīyyahs) the argument that Muḥammad did not memorise previously existing books or laws, and, therefore, could not be caused to forget them, so that abrogation necessarily refers to Qur'ānic verses. In the absence of any tradition going back to the Prophet or the *body* of Companions, such a reading, according to the Aḥmadīyyahs and those Muslims rejecting the application of the abrogation doctrine to the Qur'ān cannot be declared valid.

There is no trustworthy tradition showing that any verse of the Holy Quran was thus irretrievably lost from the Holy Prophet's memory. [But] if we accept this reading as explaining the true significance of the text, our position will be virtually this that Almighty God at first revealed a verse to the Holy Prophet, then immediately made him forget it and then instead of revealing again the same verse to him revealed another verse in its place which was like it. It is ridiculous to think that any such thing ever happened.[67]

It is presumed that Sūrah xvi. 103 was revealed at Mecca, "because of the taunts of the Jews on the abrogation of certain Qur'ānic passages. . . . Now there were no Jews at Mecca and, therefore, there could be no such

taunts either."[68] Furthermore, the pertinent traditions refer apparently only to abrogation of some revealed passages. This led the Aḥmadīyyahs, and that Muslim group sharing their view on the subject, to conclude that it could not refer to the substitution of verses apparently revealed prior to it at Mecca, because, in fact, these had not yet been disclosed.

This consideration makes the meaning of the verses very clear. The changing of one verse or commandment could not mean the changing of a Quranic verse or commandment, for the verses or commandments which are declared to have abrogated previous verses or commandments had not been revealed up to that time. [There is no reference, therefore, to] a Quranic verse or commandment, but an injunction which was acted upon previous to the revelation of, and which was abrogated by, the Holy Quran. [This consideration, in addition to those stated previously, applies also to Surah ii. 100] for that verse was revealed at an early date at Medina when very few injunctions and prohibitions of Islamic law had been revealed.[69]

In other words, the verses abrogated belong to earlier (Jewish and Christian) Scriptures, superseded—according to the prevalent Islamic opinion—by the Qur'ān, which in part confirms, in part cancels, them. Ghulām Aḥmad did not reject abrogation as this would have been contrary to what is stated in the Qur'ān, and so he did not deviate from Islamic doctrine, but for the reasons stated, he could not accept its application to Muslim Scripture. His conclusion did not make a fresh contribution to the theory of abrogation ; as stated, it has been held by one group of (non-Aḥmadīyyah) Muslims.

In the Qur'ān, God speaks to man and, therefore, *all* its injunctions must be obeyed. If a Muslim fails in the performance of the prescribed duties, he will incur Divine wrath and burn in Hell, but if he carries them out, God will reward him by sending him to Paradise. Admonishment that man exert himself to do good is an integrate part of the Book's message. While a small group of Muslims (the *Jabrīyyah*) believe that man has no free will, orthodox Islam preaches the doctrine of limited free will. Indeed, strict predestinarianism would be inconsistent with Allah's mercy and justice ; if a man were predestined to say, think and do evil things, how could he be held responsible for his sins, repent and be forgiven ?[70] The Qur'ānic verse (xvii. 14) : "every man's fate have We fastened about his neck" is not always interpreted to mean that all human actions, thoughts, words have been foreordained from eternity, but rather that men are bound by a different heredity and environment and thus are limited in their endeavours. The preferred exposition presented by Muslims to support the belief in limited free will "is a doctrine of *iktisāb*, according to which, although each individual action is foreordained, the individual 'acquires' it by identifying himself with it in action and he becomes responsible."[71] For is it not also written : "let him then who will believe : and let him who

will be an infidel" (xviii. 28). If man were not held responsible for his own actions, the consequences: rejection of Allah's message as revealed in the Qur'ān and ensuing complete moral indifference, would be disastrous.

The Aḥmadīyyahs believe that every human is born pure but can be tainted by evil which "comes from outside as the result of conscious action (which includes thought) or reprehensible omission."[72] The word "outside" refers not to the heavenly origin of a final decree,[73] but to the arena of human activity. Although they agree with Muslim orthodoxy that a man can sin in three ways (by thought, word, and action), they reject not only the foreordainment of every action, but also the belief in limited free will and hence, too, the doctrine of *iktisāb*, for which they feel no need exists. According to them, man is free to choose between good and evil; he can only profit by doing right:

> For his own good only shall the guided yield to guidance, and to his own loss only shall the erring err; and the heavy laden shall not be laden with another's load. We never punished until We had first sent an apostle (xvii. 16).

Man alone must take full responsibility for not fulfilling God's demands. On this subject, Ghulām Aḥmad would appear to assume a slightly different standpoint from that held by the Muslim majority—including Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān[74]—but many Muslims throughout the ages have shared it.[75]

Mechanical adherence, however, to the rites prescribed in the Qur'ān have " 'no value in the sight of God,' "[76] wrote Ghulām Aḥmad, whose position here was consonant with orthodox Muslim belief. He had seen that many who called themselves orthodox did not carry out the prescribed acts with genuine devoutness. He observed that many pay *zakāt* ("purification"), a tax imposed on all Muslims (ii. 40),[77] but are indifferent about the way they earn money or perform the prescribed pilgrimage to Mecca (ii. 192) only to be called a pilgrim.[78] The pious significance of these rites thus is negated.

> There can be no denying the fact that the vast majority of Muhammedans who claim to believe in the true God have really no faith at all.[79]

> Forms and ceremonials have again got the upper hand, while the inner life, the essence of the law, the spirit that gave life to the form itself, is quite gone. Mosques and monasteries are full of bodies, but the soul is not there.[80]

Ghulām Aḥmad was not entirely wrong in his diagnosis of religious default, which seemed to him (and orthodox Islam) particularly acute at a time modernism was gaining influence. It is a problem with which present-day Muslim (and non-Muslim) leaders are more than ever concerned.

Basing himself on the Qur'ānic teaching that an individual repenting for his sins and returning to a life under God, will gain His love,[81] he stated that there are three stages in the terrestrial life of mankind;[82] these are:

the animal stage, when man's "uncontrollable spirit" was inclined to evil; the moral stage, when man's conscience restrains his "bestial appetite" and enables the development of "noble qualities and a virtuous disposition" (although relapses occur),[83] the stage of "the soul at rest," when it flows "unrestrained toward its Maker"; "it is in this life and not after death that this great transformation is worked and that . . . access to paradise is granted to it."[84] While this division in itself would probably not be rejected by the Muslims, the philosophy on which the formulation rests, namely, that the transformation at first is wrought by human effort, which only later receives divine assistance, contradicts the above-mentioned doctrine of predestination.

Ghulām Aḥmad furthermore distinguished between three states or worlds through which man passes.[85] They are as follows:

> The first world is the present one which is called the world of earning and of the first creation. It is here that man earns a reward for the good or bad deeds he does. . . .
>
> The second world . . . between the present life and resurrection . . . called *Barzakh* . . . is . . . the intermediate state between death and after life.
>
> . . . The state of *Barzakh* is that in which the soul leaves the mortal body, and the perishable remains are decomposed.[86]

In the *Barzakh* state,

> every soul receives temporarily a new body to be in a position to taste of the reward or punishment of its deeds. This new body is not a body of clay but a bright or a dark body prepared from the actions of this life. . . . In short, the new body granted in the *Barzakh* becomes the means of the reward of good or evil.[87]
>
> The third world is the world of resurrection. In this world every soul, good or bad, . . . shall be given a visible body. . . . How this can be brought is not a matter to wonder at, for God is All-Powerful and nothing is impossible with Him.[88]

To what extent does this view coincide with or deviate from prevalent Islamic dogma? The statement that human effort accounts for an individual's ultimate destiny does not (as stated earlier) run contrary to Qur'ānic teaching. Neither is there any difference of opinion as to an interregnum judgment (the *Barzakh* state), which Islam also propounds. However, the Islamic Traditions present a theory about man's state immediately after death, which has no Qur'ānic foundation. It also differs to some extent from Ghulām Aḥmad's view. According to the Ḥadīths, man has a body, a soul and a spirit. Upon an individual's death, the soul remains with the body in the grave, while the spirit is brought up to Allah for an interregnum judgment, to be reunited upon the Day of Judgment with its former body and the soul. Ghulām's view is that man has a body and a soul, that immediately after death the soul is severed from the body, which decomposes rapidly, and assumes an

interim body—light or dark depending upon whether its owner committed good or evil during his earthly existence. He talked about "the spirit of evil which loves darkness."[89] He also wrote: "When the complete embodiment of the actions takes place, the soul flashes of a sudden in perfect brightness and glory, and shows itself so far as the spirit can be seen and there appears a plain movement of life."[90]

He apparently used the words "soul" and "spirit" in a synonymous sense, for the phrase "the spirit of evil" seems to imply that it is the inner nature (soul) of evil which prefers darkness to the "Divine Light".[91]

While Islam teaches an interregnum judgment, it does not seem to have the absoluteness which Ghulām gives to the *Barzakh* state, in which the body assumed by the soul is an indication of the future reward. Popular Islamic belief has it that the *spirit* of an evil man is imprisoned in a bird's crop, while that of a good person gets a taste of Paradise. As said earlier, Muslims generally believe that it is only upon Judgment Day—when the unification of man's three elements takes place—that the individual receives a body.

Ghulām Aḥmad is fully consonant with orthodox Islam in his belief that there will be resurrection (the third world), judgment (as a result of which the final body is to be bestowed) and reward or castigation (depending upon an individual's behaviour while on earth). He fully rejected, however, the Qur'ān's physical descriptions of Hell and Paradise;[92] there are neither "inwrought couches," fruit-bearing trees set in luscious gardens, "aye-blooming youths," lovely maidens in Paradise; nor do the flames burn in Hell. These descriptions are to be taken symbolically (as Sir Sayyid also said[93]). "In the next life . . . the services of God's creatures, which a man has performed simply out of His love and to which faith and the desire of good deeds are the only incentives, shall be symbolized into the trees and rivers of paradise."[94] From his viewpoint, a literal acceptance of passages describing the pleasures enjoyed in Paradise or the tortures suffered in Hell would be contradictory, for the physical body is gone and the spiritual body is of a different nature.[95]

> In short, heaven and hell, according to the Holy Quran, are images and representations of a man's own spiritual life in this world. They are not new material worlds which come from outside. . . . We call them material not in the sense that there shall be trees planted in the elysian fields just like those that are planted here below, and that there shall be brimstone and sulphur in hell but in the sense that we shall there find the embodiments of the spiritual facts of this life. Heaven and hell, according to Islamic teachings, are the images of the actions which we perform here below.[96]

If the Qur'ān is taken literally as God's word, it would be sheer heresy to doubt what He says. Theoretically speaking, interpretation would not be permissible, but orthodox Islam accepts it. Muslim fundamentalists, them

selves, base their views on traditional exegeses of the Qur'ān so that their disagreement with Ghulām Aḥmad does not concern the issue of interpretation, but that of reinterpretation along non-traditional lines Consequently, they disagree with Ghulām Aḥmad's doctrine of Heaven and Hell, although many orthodox Muslims no doubt concur with it.

Ghulām Aḥmad ultimately did not deviate from accepted Muslim belief that all men, the good as well as the wicked—the latter after having suffered Hell's tortures—will finally be saved. When asked personally about his view on this point, he said at first that only believers (that is to say, those accepting his message) would enter Paradise and that all others forever would be excluded from it. "When pressed, however, he declared that there was hope that they and, in fact, *kāfirs* of every variety might reach Paradise ultimately."[97]

Among the unbelievers are not only apostates from Islam and non-Muslims,[98] but also non-Aḥmadīyyahs. The Muslim faith teaches strictness towards the apostates, but gives them full opportunity to recant and return to the fold.

"A man guilty of apostatizing is allowed a three days' respite if he desires it, after which, refusing to recant, he is to be killed. If he recants and again apostatizes he is again given the opportunity to reconsider. So in the third offence, but the fourth time he must be killed at once. His recantation must include renunciation of his espoused religion, as well as acceptance of Islam. He may lawfully be killed on sight, however, only the murderer in this case receives a reproof."[99]

The Aḥmadīyyah view is that an apostate from Islam can recant as many times as he wishes, but that God will punish him the third time. It opposed the traditional Islamic theory that an apostate (*murtadd*) may be killed by another human. The religious grounds for this view are the firm conviction that faith is not a matter of compulsion and that Allah, Who is witness to all human acts (liv. 52-53), Himself, will punish those rejecting His teachings. "Verily, they who believed, then became unbelievers, then believed, and again became unbelievers, and then increased their unbelief—it is not God Who will forgive them or guide them into the Way" (iv. 136). The Qur'ān, itself, therefore does not "contain the slightest reference to any kind of punishment being inflicted upon the apostate."[100] Apart from the Scriptural evidence cited by Ghulām Aḥmad, his opinion probably was prompted also by his awareness that Muslim orthodox regarded him and his followers as heretics.[101]

The transformation of an unbeliever into a believer reaches its culmination when man acts in full accordance with God's will and submits to it voluntarily and completely. Such a person has attained the supreme spiritual

state to which any human being can aspire. His soul rests "contented with God" and will "taste of union with, and the love of God."[102] He enters not "a prospective paradise," but "paradise in this very life."[103] Ghulām Aḥmad's description of the *mū'min*, the pious man who walks under God, harmonises with the relevant orthodox Islamic conception according to which the *mū'min* enjoys union with his Maker, not in the sense attributed to it by the mystics, but in the sense of an absolute merger of his with the Divine Will. Ghulām Aḥmad's statement that the true believer enjoys Paradise on earth, meaning that he does not have to wait until death to enter it, indicates, however, a departure from accepted Muslim belief. Was he thinking ot a terrestrial community of saints, such as the Ṣūfīs'? His personal inclinations and interpretation of what Islam essentially is perhaps led him to regard this sect as the most devout among Muslims. His writings, however, do not reveal Ṣūfī influence. It is true that he used such terms as "union with God," which could reflect a Ṣūfī flavour. Muslims, too, generally speak of union between man and God as a merger of the two wills effected by a man's voluntary submission to Allah's Will, which is the precise meaning of the word "Islam". This goal can be reached by all who follow the Five Pillars of the Creed, viz. the *Shahādat*, [104] which Ghulām Aḥmad called "the first and the foremost principle of Islam,"[105] prayer, almsgiving (*zakāt*), fasting[106] during the month of Ramaḍān, celebrating the revelation of the Qur'ān, and the pilgrimage to Mecca.[107] He, himself, wrote:

> The essence of the religious code of our faith is contained in Islam and the Fatiha. These are two channels which lead to the fountain of salvation and the only safe guides which lead us to God. [108]

Ghulām Aḥmad acknowledged the importance of the rites, including prayer "as taught in the opening Sura of the Holy Quran, known by the name of Fatiha."[109] How, then, must his concept of "inner becoming" (*Innerwerden*) be interpreted? He expressed it as follows: "the soul of man naturally feels for a true and perfect knowledge of God."[110] If this sentence is interpreted along monistic[111] Ṣūfī lines, then the conclusion is that he followed a non-rationalist form of interpretation. On the other hand, he subscribed to the traditional doctrine of salvation and of the *mū'min*, implying that "inner becoming" is a deepening of the personality resulting from profound study of and reverence for Revelation. If one acknowledges a contradiction in his thought, it may derive from the mingling of two different systems, one postulating duality, to be overcome by adherence to rites and pious behaviour, the other insisting on essential unity and the experiencing of it through absorption into Divinity. The other explanation would be that the contradiction is caused by his wording, therefore, is apparent and that, in reality, a fundamental difference exists between Ghulām Ahmad's and the Ṣūfīs' doctrine of unity.

It remains to be said that he did not conflict essentially with Islamic teachings on man's moral development, Divine reward and punishment, bodily resurrection, Hell and Paradise,[112] but that he differed from them in his interpretations. He rejected the prevalent Islamic view concerning capital punishment for apostasy. His assertion that he was a prophet constituted, however, the most important deviation from orthodox Muslim belief. It was this claim that had as its radical consequence the creation of a new sect in Islam.

3. Succession and Secession

Succession.[113] The Aḥmadīyyah view on succession gains dimension if it is projected against the background of Islamic history.

Muḥammad neither had male descendants, nor did choose a successor. Upon his death, the leadership of the Islamic community devolved upon his father-in-law, Abū Bakr (one of the first converts to Islam), and after his decease, successively on 'Umar, 'Uthmān and, lastly, Muḥammad's cousin and son-in-law, 'Alī.[114] These four rulers (caliphs or *khalīfahs*), were chosen[115] by agreement among a small group of Muslims. This procedure of selecting a successor to Muḥammad during the Republican Period in Islamic history (632-61 C.E.), although it was not practised for many centuries to come,[116] gave nevertheless the religious sanction to the modern political theory of popular election, applied today in the Islamic world.

It also gave rise to conflict after Islam's spread beyond Arabia, and to a schism in the Muslim world. The main contention was whether the rule of men not of Muḥammad's lineage was justified. The Sunnites (i.e. those who affirm the *sunnah* or customs followed)[117] have maintained that succession need not devolve solely upon members of Muḥammad's family, but that capable leaders who are not of his blood can be elected as his successors (caliphs)[118] and thus become the heads of the Muslim community.[119] The Shī'ites[120] have held that the rulership should be confined to Muḥammad's family through the line of 'Alī whom, they assert, the Prophet had appointed as his successor, having received a Divine revelation to this effect; and that 'Alī and his descendants,[121] due to their blood-ties with Muḥammad, inherited the Prophet's qualifications to rule. They thus developed, apart from the doctrine of heredity, that of the *imāmate*; namely, that secret knowledge was vouchsafed to the heads of the Islamic community (the *imāms*) by virtue of their relationship to Muḥammad and that, therefore, they were chosen by Allah as the Muslims' leaders.[122] This secret knowledge (which is passed on by his descendants to each other) follows strictly the succession and is not based exclusively on blood-relationship to the Prophet of Islam.[123] The *imām* "is a spiritual and religious leader as

well as a secular one, endowed with a mysterious power transmitted to him from his predecessor. As such he stands far superior to any other human being and enjoys impeccability (*'iṣmah*).[124] Consequently, his decrees, which are not binding on the Sunnīs, are regarded by the Shī'ites as infallible (*'iṣmah*) that he, similar to the Pope, enjoys a status far supeior to that held by any other person.

The doctrine of the *imāmate*, developed by the Shī'ites, may be regarded as their reaction to secular rule (*mulk*),[125] which they (like most Muslims) do not consider to have Divine sanction. The *khilāfat*, in contradistinction to the *imāmate*, does not propound blood-relationship to Muḥammad as an essential prerequiste for leadership of the Muslim community and, according to the Shī'ites, is not based, therefore, on Divine authority. The doctrine of the *khilāfat* is built on the view that no man can inherit Muḥammad's qualifications because of their unique nature so that succession to him (*khilāfah*) means essentially "succession to the soverignty of the state."[126] From the Shī'ite point of view, the *khilāfat* is purely secular in nature and, therefore, not legally valid as a spiritual leadership. This distinction, emphasised by the Shī'ites since the beginning of Umayyad rule in 661 C.E., has remained until today the sharp divisive factor between Shī'ite and Sunnite.

Returning now to Aḥmadīyyah Islam, the question is : Does it follow the Sunnite or the Shī'ite doctrine of succession?

> It is not necessary that the Head of the Community should be, in any way, related to the Holy Founder of the Movement, as, for instancə, his First Successor was not related to him either by blood or by marriage, nor, on the other hand, is it necessary that the Head of the Community should not be related to the Holy Founder of the Movement, as, for instance, I have the honour to be his son.[127]

It can be inferred from this quotation that the Aḥmadīyyahs accept the principle of election and the view that the prophet's successors must not necessarily belong to his house, so that they adhere to the Sunnite rather than the Shī'ite doctrine of succession. Furthermore, it is clear that they also assign to the word "*khalīfah*" the traditional meaning of "successor to the Prophet," without the implication, given in Shī'ite doctrine, that the successors have esoteric knowledge. And yet, they emphasise that the caliph "combines in his person the exercise of spiritual as well as secular authority."[128] Do they use the word "spiritual" in the sense of supreme defender of the Islamic faith and world, the interpretation given it by Sunnite historians?[129] Or does it have at least a tinge of the Shī'ite conception? The answer to this second question probably must be in the negative, when taking into account that relationship is not stressed. It

could be affirmative if the doctrine of transmission of knowledge, implicit rather than explicit in the quotation, is considered by the Aḥmadīyyah leadership of importance.

They have interpreted the role of the *khalīfah* in terms of modern political concepts; namely, government by representation and a democratic election procedure, although these are sanctioned (as noted) by earlier Islamic practice.

> In Islamic terminology the Sovereign or *Khalifa* is that representative individual whom the people of a country elect for the protection and supervision of their individual and collective rights. Islam does not acknowledge any form of government other than a representative government. The Holy Quran has used the word, *Amānat* (trust), in describing the Islamic conception of government, that is to say, the *Khalifa* exercises power that is *entrusted* to him by the people, and not power which is assumed by him of his own will or power which is inherited by him as a birthright.[130]

Arbitrary government, inherent in authoritarianism, is denounced and rejected. The quotation not only puts into relief the contradistinction between the Islamic form of leadership and secular sovereignty, but severely criticises the British, who had become India's rulers irrespective of its people's will. The caliph, however, says the Aḥmadīyyah, "is absolute in the sense that," in certain important matters, he has the authority to "override the opinion of the representatives of the people," but "he cannot override . . . the Islamic constitution by which he is bound."[131] In an economic sense also, he is restricted to the use of a sum voted for him; he cannot help himself whenever he wishes to public funds to satisy his personal needs. As long as he governs in adherence to the rules laid down in the Qur'ān, he cannot be removed from office once he has been elected. He holds a lifelong appointment; should sickness prevent him from duly carrying out his functions he may designate someone to act on his behalf.[132] Should he die, an election must take place immediately to confirm his choice or appoint another to the *khilāfat*.

To sum up the Aḥmadīyyah position: the *Khalīfah's* role is seen in terms of the Muslim community's spiritual and political guidance. Its likely agreement on the nature of this office with Sunnite Islam has been indicated. His function within the Aḥmadīyyah society implies the leadership of a non-sovereign, non-universal group. It differs in this respect from the position of the Abbasid and Umayyad caliphs who held supreme political power in the Islamic world, which the Aḥmadīyyah *khalīfahs* do not have. The latter govern only a specific sect and, in reality, their function relates rather to the administrative than the political domain. It is highly improbable that Ghulām Aḥmad was influenced by contemporary affairs, for he died in

1908, some years before the fear for the end of the Caliphate arose and nearly two decades prior to Indo-Muslim efforts to keep this institution intact. He could not have hoped for Aḥmadīyyah leadership of the Islamic community for the reason that the old institution was still intact and because of the hostility toward his own sect by India's Muslims. Possibly, such a desire grew during the succession of his son,[133] who witnessed the ebbing attempt for preservation, particularly by Muslim India, and extinction of the Caliphate. On the other hand, the founder's self-appraisal as prophet, which embraced religious and political guidance of the growing Muslim world by Muḥammad may have let the Aḥmadīyyah to hold a similar conception.

Secession. The Aḥmadīyyahs, of course, like the Shī'ites, can be called "secessionists," but the former seceded from the Sunnites, who are regarded as the orthodox group in Islam, on doctrinal grounds. A similar schism took place within Aḥmadīyyah Islam, caused by divergences of opinion regarding the claims made by Mirza Ghulām Aḥmad.

The first Aḥmadīyyah *khalīfah* elected immediately after the founder's death was Maulvī Ḥakīm Nūr-ud-Dīn. He had been a physician at the court of the Mahārājah of Kashmir for a number of years. Attracted to Ghulām's teachings, he became one of the first converts to Aḥmadīyyah Islam. His great learning and wisdom made him the popular choice of those Aḥmadīyyahs who had assembled at Qadiyan for Ghulām Aḥmad's burial, and his election was apparently confirmed by the majority of the Aḥmadīyyah community. Wise, charitable and practical, he "proved himself to be a great spiritual guide and leader."[134]

Nūr-ud-Dīn's *khilāfat* marks the beginning of the organisation of the Aḥmadīyyah movement. It was Ghulām's will that Aḥmadīyyah affairs be discharged by a committee, to be known as the Chief Aḥmadīyyah Society (*Ṣadr Anjumn-i-Aḥmadīyyah*, also translated as the Central Aḥmadīyyah Association),

> which (it was assumed by all, though not clearly stated in the will) was to be under the direction of the elected head of the movement. . . . Nūr-ud-Dīn, as the first *Khalīfa*, abstained from assuming undue authority, and considered himself merely a servant of the *Anjuman* to do its bidding.[135]

Despite Nūr-ud-Dīn's capable leadership, disagreement arose among the Aḥmadīyyahs and became so serious that a split became unavoidable. The dissension manifested itself very early in his leadership, but an incident in 1913 brought it fully into the open. One of the founder's former pupils and a leading Aḥmadīyyah at the time, Khwājah Kamāl-ud-Dīn, expressed his sentiments when, in that year, the realignment of a road made necessary the removal of an abutting portion of a Cawnpore mosque. This

Government action[136] aroused the entire Indo-Muslim community. Kamāl-ud-Dīn's public protest, and the fact that he and his party had joined the All-India Muslim League, towards which Ghulām Aḥmad had felt hostile and which action was contrary to his stipulation that the Aḥmadīyyahs should abstain from all political activities, were regarded as a violation of Ghulām Ahmad's rule by his followers.[137] He was strongly criticised by Mirza Bashīr-ud-Dīn Maḥmūd Aḥmad, in an article published in *al-Faḍl*,[138] which he edited. Leading Aḥmadīyyahs now grew ill-disposed towards Bashīr-ud-Dīn Maḥmūd who, they felt, used the prerogative of his family ties (he was Ghulām Aḥmad's son) in assuming undue authority.[139] There were now two dissenting parties in Ahmadīyyah Islam : one led by Bashīr-ud- Dīn Maḥmūd, the other by Kamāl-ud-Dīn. Towards the end of Nūr-ud-Dīn's life, Kamāl-ud-Dīn's party distributed a statement—prepared by Maulvī Muḥammad 'Alī[140]—to the effect that Ghulām Aḥmad's will did not imply the need for a *khalīfah* ; therefore, the *khilāfat* should be abolished and the Working Committee put in charge of Aḥmadīyyah affairs. To the demand that the *khilāfat* be abolished, Ghulām Aḥmad's son :

> Mirza Bashir-ud-Din Maḥmud Aḥmad was most uncompromisingly and determinedly opposed. He made it quite clear to Maulvi Muhammad Ali immediately after the death of Khalifa-tul- Masih I, that on the question of the continuance of the Khilafat he could not be a party to any compromise, but that on the question who should be the next Khalifa he was prefectly willing to accept whatever Maulvi Muhammad Ali might propose.[141]

Matters came to a head when Bashīr (twenty-five years old) was elected upon Nūr-ud-Dīn's death in 1914. Maulvī Muḥammad 'Alī (aged fifty by then) withdrew from Qadiyan with some who shared his way of thinking.[142] His withdrawal constituted the official secession in Aḥmadīyyah Islam. He set up a new party—popular among the Western-educated Aḥmadīyyahs—at Lahore under the name of the Anjuman-Ishā'at-i-Islām ("Society for the Spread of Islam"). In Kamāl-ud-Dīn's absence,[143] Maulvī Muḥammad 'Alī became its first president.[144]

The disagreement between the two parties was clearly not at first theological in nature, although it did involve the validity of the claims made by Mirza Ghulām Aḥmad. But once the Ishā'at-i-Islām had been formally established, it did develop divergent theological views. Those held by the Qadiyan group are briefly summarised :

(*i*) Mirza Ghulām Aḥmad was a prophet, but, unlike Islam's founder, he had minor inspiration and was not the giver of new laws ; rather he was an interpreter of those laid down in the Qur'ān to give them significance in modern times. This deviation from the Aḥmadīyyah founder's belief is due to his son's reassessment.[145]

(*ii*) All Muslims who do not accept Ghulām Aḥmad as a "prophet," to mean rather reformer, reject God's prophets and, therefore, must be regarded as unbelievers. Ghulām's pre-eminent position as a Muslim reformer is vouchsafed, but his idea of having been a prophet has been rejected.

(*iii*) Aḥmadīyyahs neither may follow non-Aḥmadīyyah Muslim leaders in the congregational services nor say funeral prayers for those standing outside their community.

The Lahore party presents the following views :

(*i*) Mirza Ghulām Aḥmad was a reformer rather than a prophet despite his self-image. At first, there was a serious disagreement between the Lahore and Qadiyan groups on this point, but, subsequently, the latter subscribed to the former's interpretation.

(*ii*) The *Khilāfat* is not accepted by the Lahore Aḥmadīyyahs. They reject its underlying concept of absolute spiritual authority invested by Divine right to Aḥmadīyyah *Khalīfahs*. Theirs is rather a modern approach to leadership of a community. The Lahore party's head is called *Amīr* (president), not *khalīfah*.

(*iii*) The strict prohibitions governing Aḥmadīyyah-non-Aḥmadīyyah relations, necessary in the movement's early days, no longer need to be observed. Lahore Aḥmadīyyahs follow non-Aḥmadīyyah leaders in congregational rites and say prayers for deceased non-Aḥmadīyyah Muslims.

This comparison may be concluded by saying that the Lahore Anjuman's activities have stimulated intensely the Qadiyan party, whose zeal and faith in their founder's teachings assumed even greater significance since it was challenged by its offshoot.

The secession, as mentioned, took place immediately upon the election of Bashīr-ud-Dīn Maḥmūd by the Qadiyan group to the *Khilāfat*. He then assumed the title of Ḥaḍrat Khalīfatul Masīḥ II. Having had his father as his main teacher,[146] he inherited from him an inclination toward religion. His failure to pass the matriculation examination at the High School maintained by the Aḥmadīyyahs at Qadiyan was made up by his intense study of the Qur'ān and other Islamic writings during his parent's last years and those spanning the first *Khalīfah's* reign.

> While still in his teens, he started the publication of a monthly journal called "The Tashis-ul-Azhan," which was devoted mainly to the discussion and exposition of religious doctrines and problems of an intellectual basis . . . a study of his writings of that period reveals a depth of learning and a profundity of thought that are truly amazing.[147]

Mr Walter, who had "two conversations with him at Qadiyan, in January 1916," has written that Bashīr-ud-Dīn Maḥmūd "strikingly resembles his father in appearance, in his sedentary habits and in his readiness

and cleverness in controversy. He is also, like his father, a semi-invalid."[148] The difference between this and Sir Ẓafarullah Khān's account is difficult to reconcile, but one is a Westerner's, the other an Aḥmadīyyah's appraisal.

Did Bashīr-ud-Dīn Maḥmūd adhere strictly to his father's teachings? The Initiation Form to be filled out by those converting to Aḥmadīyyah Islam and formulated by him includes the following tenet:

> I consider the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of God be on him) to be the *Seal* of Prophets and also believe in all the claims of the Promised Messiah (peace be on him).[149]

It contains two striking deviations from Ghulām Aḥmad's principles; they are, first, the confirmation of Qur'ānic teaching concerning the ending of the prophetic line with Muḥammad and the Islamic doctrine about the Messiah.

In effect, he has distinguished between the lawgiver, viz. Muḥammad for Islam, and those called prophets or clarifiers of a given Revelation who may be regarded also as reformers. Stress on this second mentioned function of his father is quite unlike Ghulām Aḥmad's self-image. Despite his admission to having revelations and visions, he has not called himself a prophet. The reason for his sharp difference with the Aḥmadīyyah founder's major theological principles, the fierce opposition to them by the Islamic world and his personal desire to bridge the religious chasm between it and his sect.

He set forth his religious views as well as those on the Muslim community's political and economic norms, in a book, entitled *Aḥmadīyyat or The True Islam*, to which reference has been made. His commentary on the Qur'ān also presents the Aḥmadīyyah approach.[150] In addition, he has written many papers, a number of which have been sent to eminent persons (such as the Duke of Windsor, the late Amīr Amānullah of Afghanistan, the former *Niẓām* of Hyderabad, to mention but a few),[151] with the request that they accept Aḥmadīyyah Islam. His editorship of *al-Faḍl* has been mentioned. He has filled also many speaking engagements, whose topics cover the whole range of human affairs.

These many activities did not prevent him from founding the *Anjuman Anṣārullah* ("Society of the Helpers of God") to stir the Qadiyan Aḥmadīyyahs to intenser action, and the *Anjuman-i-Taraqqī-i-Islām* (Society for the Advancement of Islam") "to supplement on the religious side the work of the Ṣadr Anjuman.[152] It devotes itself mainly to missionary activities, which will be discussed in the following section.

4. Organisation and Propagation

Upon his election to the *khilāfat*, Mirza Bashīr-ud-Dīn Maḥmūd was

faced with the tremendous task of reorganising the affairs of the Aḥmadīyyah community. Its one and only organ, the Ṣadr Anjuman, was not properly set up to handle the many needs of a growing membership. This *khalīfah's* energetic leadership, combined with talents of organisation, transformed the Ṣadr into an efficient administrative body. Guided by his conviction that only a representative form of government is acknowledged by Islam,[153] Bashīr-ud-Dīn Maḥmūd effected the following changes. He divided the Ṣadr into a number of departments: the Treasury (to which audit and accounting sections are attached), the Department of Community Organisation (of the Aḥmadīyyahs); the Department of Social Relations (to deal with the Government and other communities); the Department of Education; the Department of Missionary Work; the Department of Publications; the Department of Social Affairs (in charge of hospitality). Each Department is headed by a secretary aud the several secretaries are responsible to the president of the Ṣadr, who acts as the chief secretary of all the Departments.

In 1922, Bashīr-ud-Din Maḥmūd established the *Majlis-i-Mushāwarat* (a House of Representatives in United States' political terminology), consisting of delegates nominated (to about 75%) by the Aḥmadīyyah community and (the balance) by the *khalīfah*. The reason why the *khalīfah* nominates one-fourth of the *Majlis* is tnat adequate representation of those Aḥmadīyyah groups which otherwise would not be properly represented, thereby is assured. The total membership in the *Majlis* has not yet been finally determined; it has risen from 500 to 600 members in the mid-'forties to about 1500 in 1958.[154] The *Majlis* sits once a year, although it may be convened for a special session if an emergency happens. When in session, various committees are formed to examine the respective series of items on the agenda. Reports are prepared and presented during a plenary session, when an oral vote is taken on these reports and on the committees' recommendations which accompany them. The *khalīfah* is present at the plenary session and, having heard the affirmative and negative votes (cast orally), gives an immediate decision. He usually submits to the majority opinion, although his view may differ and he is not obliged to accept it. If he disagrees radically, his vote alone counts and must be accepted by the dissenting majority.

He is assisted in the government of the Aḥmadīyyah community by an Advisory Council whose members he chooses at his discretion. This Council receives from the secretary of the Ṣadr's Treasury Department prior to the end of each financial year the (annually) prepared budget estimate which it passes on for study to the *Majlis's* Finance Sub-Committee. The latter submits the report with its recommendations to the *Majlis* which then returns it to the *khalīfah* with iis own suggestions. The *khalīfah*, in turn,

requests the Economy Committee to examine the financial proposals made and subsequently approves the final budget for the coming year. He has the power to sanction excess expenditures, but must report these to the *Majlis* during its next session. The budget includes a small allowance for him, but he does not touch it, as he has a private income and personally contributes to the Ṣadr's funds.

Bashīr-ud-Din Maḥmūd also has established branch *Anjumans*, which are to be set up wherever some Aḥmadīyyahs reside. Each branch is headed by an *amīr* ("governor") whose duty it is to organise the Aḥmadīyyahs living within a certain radius of his Anjuman, regulate the local Aḥmadīyyah affairs as far as possible—depending upon the size of the group and local circumstances—along the pattern followed at the Centre, and send reports to Ṣadr headquarters. Each member is obliged to pay a minimum of 6¼% of his annual income into Ṣadr Anjumn funds, in addition to some other (non-specified) contributions so that an Aḥmadīyyah's average financial obligation to his community reaches between 10 and 30% per year.

Furthermore, he set up the Aḥmadīyyah judicial system (the *Qaḍā'*) in 1925. It deals solely with civil law cases such as need not be brought before the country's courts and, unlike them, levies no fees. Any Aḥmadīyyah wishing to go to an ordinary court has to obtain first permission from the appropriate Department of the Ṣadr. All legal disputes between Aḥmadīyyahs are handled by the *Qaḍā'*. The *khalīfah* also must accept the *Qaḍā'*'s recommendations and decisions if he is a party to a case. Responsibility for the execution of its decrees lies not, however, with the *Qaḍā'*, but with the secretary of the Department of Community Organisation. "The whole system, of course, works on a voluntary basis and the only ultimate sanction behind its successful and efficient working is the moral and spiritual value that every member attaches to his membership of the Community."[155]

The Aḥmadīyyah's educational programme was not ignored by Bashīr-ud-Dīn Maḥmūd. The Department of Education took over the maintenance of an English High School at Qadiyan, which had predated the Ṣadr's re-organisation and had become affiliated with the University of the Panjab prior to 1918, as also various primary schools and a college for the study of Islamic religion and philosophy (*madrassah*). By 1918, a programme for the education of Aḥmadīyyah women had been initiated so that they had some advantages not shared by many Indo-Muslim women at that time. Since then, a high school for Aḥmadīyyah girls has been opened. Although the Aḥmadīyyahs believe in educating their women so that these may contribute to the well-being not only of their families, but of their community, they advocate the females' complete separation from the men in all activities and adherence

to the custom of *pardah*.[156] Furthermore, the education of women does not follow the curriculum in the boys' schools which teach a greater variety of subjects. An Intermediate College for Boys, opened in 1944, has since become a degree-giving institution. Another, which is similar to the first learning centre as it does not grant any degrees, is now in operation. Furthermore, a Theological School, a Theological College and a Science Research Institute have been added to the Aḥmadīyyah male educational institutions.

Moreover, three social organisations were founded by Bashīr-ud-Dīn Maḥmūd, dividing the Aḥmadīyyah community's male members according to age: the *Aṭfal-ul-Aḥmadīyyah*, whose members are between eight and fifteen years old, and which teaches them the ideals of Aḥmadīyyah Islam and the consonant pattern of conduct; the *Khuddām-ul-Aḥmadīyyah*, to which belong those between the ages of fifteen and forty (constituting the most dynamic group), who are taught physical endurance, the dignity of manual labour—in which they must periodically participate—integrity, discipline and respect for the Aḥmadīyyah ideals which "they are expected to illustrate in their own lives";[157] the *Anṣār-Ullah* whose members are over forty years of age and whose activities—though they do not exclude physical stress—are mainly of an intellectual nature.

The Aḥmadīyyah women also have their organisation, the *Lujnah-i-ināth* ("Association of Women"), which was founded in 1922. The aim of this association "is to promote the pursuit and diffusion of knowledge among women; to make women alive to their duties as guardians of the future; to teach them how to help the poor and to contribute their share to the public welfare."[158] It has established branches in the subcontinent's various larger towns where a sizable Aḥmadīyyah group resides. These branches are all closely connected with the "central body from where necessary instructions are sent."[159] It has sections for the smaller girls, but the majority represented by those above fifteen years of age are not subdivided, the reason being that they marry early and that women of all ages assist each other and mingle freely together.

The Lujnah has its own funds. A small monthly subscription is charged and some additional collections made when needed. Its members make or collect all kinds of articles (e.g. handkerchiefs and tablecloths) which they sell, thereby raising profit which is added to the Association's funds. It initiated another scheme shortly before 1939 to prevent poor women from begging. This scheme, among others, comprises voluntary educational programme, such as teaching reading, writing, the Qur'ān to other women, an effort said to be successful. One of the Association's largest member groups is found at Sialkot, where it opened a school for female education. The

Lujnah members hold an annual separate gathering at Aḥmadīyyah headquarters at the same time as the Ṣadr convenes. The women's meeting is entirely managed by the central Lujnah.

The educational and social programme developed by Bashīr-ud-Dīn Maḥmūd has as its aim the welding together of a solid community firmly rooted in Aḥmadīyyah Islam. He was not satisfied, however, with centering his attention and energies only on the development of his flock. He was anxious to increase his community in size and for that purpose he engaged in an intensive programme of propagating Aḥmadīyyah Islam. To that end he founded the *Taraqqī-i-Islām*, which is mainly concerned with propagation and with the collection of the *zakāt* (spent in accordance with the *khalīfah's* instructions). Prior to Bashīr-ud-Dīn Maḥmūd's efforts in this direction, which have resulted in an extensive network of missions spreading over all continents,[160] the propagation of Aḥmadīyyah Islam was not so methodically undertaken. Its adherents nevertheless grew in number.[161] A Government Census report covering Orissa, Bihar and Bengal during 1901-11 states that :

> The Ahmadīyya doctrines appear to have been first introduced in Bihar in 1894, when a Musalmān missionary of Bhagalpur became a convert. The movement has already gained a considerable number of adherents from among the educated and well-to-do classes. . . . The sect has even made its way into Orissa. . . .[162]

The same report also mentions strong Muslim opposition to Aḥmadīyyah doctrine which was rejected formally " 'at a large meeting held at Monghyr, in June 1911' " when Ghulām Aḥmad, " 'after long controversy . . . was denounced as a heretic and renegade.'[163]

One of the Christian missionaries (the late Rev. W.F. White) stationed in 1913 in East Bengal's Brahmanbaria district, described their manner of proceeding : " 'They do not carry on any open propaganda, but work quietly in the villages trying to propagate their tenets. Occasionally some lecturers come from other places, but they are not allowed to lecture in public gatherings.' "[164]

While the majority of Aḥmadīyyahs were found in the Punjab, where Qadiyan, Ghulām Aḥmad's birthplace and centre of activities, is located, a sizable Aḥmadīyyah group was found by 1918 in the Deccan, where it was introduced by Maulvī 'Abdullah of Timapur, one of the founder's followers.[165] Other numerous Aḥmadīyyah communities were found in certain parts of Bengal and Malabar.[166] *The Bombay Advocate* of 31 August 1915 reported as follows on Aḥmadīyyah efforts in Malabar : " 'The Aḥmadīyyah movement among the Musalmāns, which had its origin in Gurdāspur, in the Panjab, has secured about three thousand followers in the Moplah Centre of

Cannanore in North Malabar.' "[167]

On 19 June 1916, a meeting was held on Slave Island on which a report was published in the *Ceylon Independent*. Having covered various details, the report continued : " 'Resolved that a revised scheme for a mission to Java and the Far East be submitted to headquarters. Resolved that the printing press be established at Slave Island, and a journal in English and Tamil be started, to be called Islam. . . .' "[163]

The Aḥmadīyyah movement had been active in Ceylon since 1917, but it was not until 1951 that a regular mission was opened there.[169] Since the establishment of the Taraqqī-i-Islam, propagation efforts have been doubled and well organised Innumerable booklets, pamphlets, and translations of staple works (such as Bashīr's and his father's books) pour off the Aḥmadīyyah presses in innumerable vernacular languages. Well-trained Aḥmadīyyah teachers travel to the four corners of the earth to lecture and convert. Missions have been opened in London (the Ṣadr's English mission is entirely separate from the one started earlier by Khwājah Kamāl-ud-Dīn), the European and American continents and Africa, while Aḥmadīyyah missionaries journeyed before the Second World War through Central Asia. Its Gold Coast mission is the third largest and another growing mission is found in Indonesia. Apart from the extensive literature and textbooks—distributed to all missions—mosques and schools have been built. The majority (about 500,000) of the Aḥmadīyyahs, however, are found today in Pakistan, where headquarters were set up after the Partition in 1947 at Rabwah. The old Aḥmadīyyah establishment at Qadiyan, nevertheless, is maintained.

Conversion to Aḥmadīyyah Islam is accomplished by filling out an initiation form[170] and, if one is a non-Muslim, by changing one's name. This procedure is regarded as being administrative and theological in nature. The underlying basis for this view (as stated by Mr Zaighun) is that the filling out of the initiation form constitutes, in fact, a silent repetition of, and affirmation of adherence to, the Aḥmadīyyah creed. However, prior to filling out this form, the convert-to-be has to read the "Condition of *Bai'at*" (that is, of initiation in Aḥmadīyyah Islam) which is an affirmation of the Aḥmadīyyah articles of faith, and which is printed in pamphlet form.[171] While it is preferable to come in person to Rabwah for the formal conversion, notification by letter expressing adherence to the *Bai'at* is accepted from those unable to make this journey. Upon conversion, one is liable to all duties imposed by the *Khalīfah* upon every Aḥmadīyyah.

An annual two-day conference is held at Rabwah during the Christmas holidays. Accommodations and meals are provided at no cost for the participants who, however, must pay for transport themselves. The Department of Social Affairs is in charge of finding suitable accommodations. At the

1958 meeting, about 105,000 Aḥmadīyyahs were present. Considering the number of those who attended, which increases yearly, it is faced with a difficult task. The accommodations (in and near Rabwah) are limited ; more transportation vehicles must be provided to and from the meetings. Should the attendance swell in the next fwe years, the conference halls might not be sufficiently large to hold all participants. Either new buildings for conference purposes must then be built or open-air meetings held. The latter choice might not be preferred, because it might provoke hostile attacks from non-Aḥmadīyyah Muslims. The former would mean tremendous expenditures, which might weaken the Ṣadr's not too solid financial foundations.

Bashīr's zeal and dynamism, his unceasing devotion to organise, consolidate and expand the Aḥmadīyyah community, his eruditeness and affable personality, have gained for him the respect of many—among them the most outstanding—Aḥmadīyyahs. He has laboured unceasingly to win converts for the principles in which he so firmly believes, to weld Aḥmadīyyah membership into a solid harmonious community, ardently desiring that Aḥmadīyyah Islam, one day, shall become victorious in the world.

The Anjuman-i-Ishā'at-i-Islam has not as vast an organisation as its rejected parent which, in turn, does not recognise its illegitimate offspring. It has patterned its programme, which embraces education and propagation, however, upon that established by the Ṣadr Anjuman. Unlike the older Anjuman, the Lahore party does not yet have as vast a membership, an organisation and a missionary programme. To educate its youthful members and train missionaries, it had opened in 1915 a college at Lahore which no longer exists, however. It was superseded in 1916 by a "Muslim High School and Senior Cambridge Local College" (also at Lahore). In 1918, it opened a hostel for Muslim collegiate students in that city.

Its missionary activities are not based on the exclusive propagation of Aḥmadīyyah Islam, but on a wider appeal to the Muslim creed,[172] although it has been noted that the older Anjuman now is following a similar road. Its missionary work abroad is centered mainly in England, where headquarters were established by Kamāl-ud-Din[173] at Richmond in 1912. Another mission was opened in London (in the same or the following year). It made news when it succeeded in converting a prominent Irish peer (Lord Headley).[174] In August 1914, Kamāl moved the Richmond mission to Woking, Surrey, where a mosque had been built earlier "by the late Professor Leitner, a former Principal of the Oriental College, Lahore, and given by the heirs after his death to the Muslim community."[175] Kamāl's chief goal was to expound Islam and thereby attempt to eradicate the many misinterpretations which had accrued through the centuries in the Christian West.

To this end, he delivered many lectures on Islam and started the publication of (the afore-mentioned) *Islamic Review and Muslim India.*

Apart from Friday prayers, the Anjuman-i-Ishā'at-i-Islām has fostered in England lectures on religious, scientific and literary themes (the last two activities mentioned have been sponsored by the London Muslim Literary Society). The Lahore party's missionary efforts in India are counteracted by the intensive propagation efforts made by the former parent body. Like the Ṣadr, the Lahore Anjuman has started vernacular publications. An Urdu edition of the *Review* has appeared, as also a Malay edition, distributed in Singapore. An Urdu tri-weekly, prepared at Lahore, is swelling the younger Anjuman's vernacular literature. Maulvī Muḥammad 'Alī (the first president of the Lahore Anjuman)[176] had completed by December 1917 an English translation of the Qur'ān, which differs from other (Aḥmadīyyah and non-Aḥmadīyyah) translations on certain points which have been discussed earlier.[177]

The Lahore Anjuman, also, has a printed Declaration Form,[178] which all converts-to-be must fill out, and requires a change of name for non-Muslims. When conversion has taken place, attendance at its prayer meetings becomes obligatory as well as the discharge of all duties incumbent upon the Lahore Aḥmadīyyahs. These include financial contributions to support the work of the Anjuman. An annual gathering takes place each December at Lahore.

As mentioned previously, the Lahore Anjuman is far smaller than Ṣadr Anjuman, and lacks the dynamic leadership of a man like Bashīr-ud-Dīn Maḥmūd. Yet, it might in the future seriously contest "orthodox Aḥmadīyyat," because it can, as a result of its divergence on some of the principles laid down by Mirza Ghulām Aḥmad, appeal to the wider Muslim community.

"Orthodox" Aḥmadīyyat has forged a split in Sunnite Islam, thereby adding to the already many diverse Muslim sects. The Lahore Anjuman pursues the aim of unifying the divided world of Islam. It could play a vital role in stimulating the awareness that the true Islamic ideal is unity (*tawḥīd*), and may have influenced the Rabwah group in assuming a modified theological attitude, which allows for reintegration into the Muslim world. The Ṣadr Anjuman and the Lahore Anjuman pursue for the time being their respective activities. It is impossible to predict that they will ever merge.[179]

5. Relationship with Non-Muslims and Non-Aḥmadīyyahs

A. With Non-Muslims. (*1*) *Judaism.* Ghulām Aḥmad declared that by the authority of the revelations received by him from God, he fulfilled the predictions made by all the earlier prophets of the Jews. His argument rested

on two main points : first, the relationship between Jews and Muslims, as also between Moses, Muḥammad and himself ; and second, prophecies in the Qur'ān and the Old Testament foretelling Ghulām's coming. He developed his thesis in the following manner. Muḥammad was related to the Jews because he was the descendant of Ishmael, Hagar's son by Abraham (*Gen.* 16 : 4, 11) ; this patriarch "was neither Jew nor Christian ; but he was sound in the faith, a Muslim" (Sūrah iii. 60, cf. also xvi. 121). Consequently, Ghulām Aḥmad, being a Muslim, also bears a relationship to the Jews. Furthermore, it is written in the Qur'ān that God divulges "His secret" only to those Apostles who please Him (lxxii. 26, 27) ; among these were Moses and Muḥammad, so that the latter's function was the same as that carried on by the first : to reveal the Divine Law to mankind, with that difference that some parts of the Torah no longer apply to the circumstances of Muḥammad's time, so that the Qur'ān is at once "the confirmation of previous revelations" (ii. 19) and their consummation. And God Himself revealed that Abraham, and Jacob after him, had said to the Jews : "'O my children ! truly God hath chosen a religion for you ; so die not unless ye be also Muslims'" (ii. 126, and also 127). There can be no doubt, then, that Muḥammad, because of his relationship to the Jews, and his God-given calling to continue Moses's function, is the prophet of the Jews as well. Should they still be dubious, their own Scripture will efface their objections to accepting Islam, as it contains many references to Muḥammad ; for example, it says: "I will raise them up a prophet from among their brethren, like unto thee ; and I will put My words in his mouth, and he shall speak unto them all that I shall command him" (*Deut.* 18 : 18).[180]

Since Muḥammad had sprung from the Semitic cousins of Moses's followers, "it was necessary that the Promised Messiah should arise from among the followers of Muḥammad."[181] And like Moses and Muḥammad, Ghulām Aḥmad also came from the East, as it was written: "Who hath raised up one from the east," cited by him as proof that he fulfilled Old Testament prophecy. Standing in a direct relationship to the Jews and succeeding Moses and Muḥammad as the prophet of mankind—for which (he argued) there is proof in the Torah and the Qur'ān—the Jews have no reason to reject him as their prophet. If they remain obdurate and will not hearken to God's will that they shall become Muslims (ii. 127) and accept him as the fulfilment of the predictions made by their own prophets, they — Ghulām Aḥmad said— will surely be punished by God.[182]

(2) *Christianity.* He cited Qur'ānic, Old Testament and New Testament passages to prove the validity of his claim that he is also the Messiah of the Christians. His interpretation of Christian doctrine is based on the Qur'ān, although he differs from it in some respects. Muḥammad 'Alī's exegesis of its

passage relating to Jesus's birth[183] reflects the Aḥmadīyyah viewpoint. It is to be regarded as a different interpretation of, rather than a radical departure from, Qur'ānic teaching.

In rejecting Jesus's divinity, he concurs, but deviates from it again in his analysis as follows. Although God announced to Mary "a word of God,"[184] it does not have the connotation given to it by Christians, "There is no equivalent of *the* in the original, and hence to Mary was announced only *a word* from God." Thus, Jesus "is but only one" of God's words.[185] The reason for this approach was, of course, to validify his claim.[186] He acknowledges, however, the possibility that "a word" signifies God's announcement to Mary that she shall bear a son, [187] agreeing thus with other Muslim commentators. He rejects conception by the Holy Ghost and states that the Christian view is entirely "at variance with the whole tenor of the Holy Quran."[188] The phrase "a spirit from God"[189] is also interpreted wrongly by Christians as "a spirit *of* God"; in the Qur'ān, it does not signify divinity.[190]

Neither the performance of miracles nor the power of prophecy were regarded by Ghulām Aḥmad as proofs of Jesus's divinity, for others, too, had such powers. Moreover, the first were not all efficacious,[191] and the second often inaccurate,[192] such as, for instance, Jesus's prediction that decay, foreboding the world's end, would set in during his own lifetime (Matthew 24 : 34). Had Jesus been God, he would have been the only one to perform miracles (the Qur'ān reserves them to Allah), and *all* his prophecies would have come true. Verily, Jesus himself did not claim divinity :

> In short, I hold him in abomination, who, being born of a woman, says that he is God, although I declare Jesus Christ to be free from the charge that he ever claimed divinity for himself. With me such a claim is the most horrible sin and an arch-heresy, but I, at the same time, know that Jesus was a good and righteous servant of God, who never presumed to assert Godhead.[193]

Ghulām Aḥmad's negation of the Holy Ghost and the Trinity—belief in which (he felt) diminishes God's glory—and of Jesus's divinity, accorded fully with the Islamic doctrine that God is one and with the Muslim view that such tenets were contrary to the core of Qur'ānic teachings.

His view that Jesus had no more importance as a prophet than any other is not fully in accord with orthodox Muslim belief. Ghulām denied that Jesus died on the Cross and was resurrected. "He died as every man that is born of a woman dies. He is dead . . . and the dead never return to earth."[194] He did not ascend to heaven in his clay body.

Disavowal of Jesus's crucifixion and resurrection[195] were formulated by Ghulām Aḥmad in the following way: Jesus was put on the Cross (which, as

stated, the Qur'ān denies[196]), taken down (unlike those crucified with him) in a swoon without broken legs, laid in the sepulchre where his wounds healed (probably due to his disciples' care) ; recovered, he undertook on God's demand a journey to Israel's ten lost tribes living in countries other than the Holy Land, to bring them God's message; his mission completed, he went to India to study; there he died a natural death and was buried in Srinagar (Khān Yār Street), Kashmir (which information was furnished Ghulām Aḥmad by revelation and historical evidence), in what Kashmiris called "the tomb of an unknown prophet, named Yūs Āsaf."[197]

Regarding Jesus's crucifixion, Ghulām Aḥmad stated that Jesus was actually on the Cross (although he did not die on it), which view is the more modern one. It, again, remains a matter of interpretation. His repudiation of the Christian doctrine of Jesus's resurrection agrees with the prevalent Muslim view. To give it a more solid foundation, he presented the story of Jesus's journey to India, although it is not based on authentic sources.

The denial of Jesus's death on the Cross and his resurrection gave Ghulām Aḥmad the solid groundwork on which to build his negation of the Christian atonement doctrine. He said that it is "mere folly to think" that an innocent man would sacrifice himself (willingly) or be sacrificed by God "for a people who are deeply immersed in sin or involved in error."[198] It would, indeed, be contrary to the Qur'ānic doctrine of punishment and its teachings that Allah is Just and Merciful, which imply that all men are responsible for themselves, anyone not guilty of sin will not be castigated, and that no one individual can take away the sins of another or of humanity as a whole. The elements of atonement, according to Ghulām Aḥmad are belief in God, prayer, repentance, fasting and almsgiving. His view on atonement, again, is entirely in accordance with the doctrine presented by the Qur'ān.

He rounded out his portrait of the Prophet Jesus by denying the latter's unique status as mankind's intercessor.

> In fact . . . , all the prophets are regarded as intercessors by the Muslims and to say that Jesus will be an intercessor on the day of judgment is not to distinguish him from other prophets but to say that he is also one of the prophets of God.[199]

In particular,

> Jesus will be a witness against the Jews and the Christians on the day of judgment, against the former for their rejection and persecution of him, and against the latter for their taking him for God, a doctrine which he never taught them.[200]

Ghulām Aḥmad's acceptance of the doctrine of intercession (as indicated)[201] is not fully consonant with the Qur'ān, but it is supported by the

ḥadīths. His theory that Jesus will act as an intercessor agrees with his interpretation of intercession as mediation as well as with orthodox Muslim belief that Muḥammad ultimately will intercede for all mankind on Judgment Day.

Having expounded his views on Jesus, he asserted that he now assumed the former's function for the Christians. He reasoned as follows. Jesus, himself, had foretold "the advent of a Prophet 'like unto him.' "[202] He said: "For I tell you, you will not see me again, until you say, 'Blessed be he who comes in the name of the Lord' " (Matthew 23 : 39). This prediction "clearly shows that only those shall be able to see the Messiah again who believe that a man is to appear IN HIS NAME," while those persisting in their belief that Jesus shall come again himself will wait forever "and their waiting shall be in vain."[203] As further scriptural proof for his claim, Ghulām Aḥmad cited Jesus's prediction that an apostle shall succeed him " 'whose name shall be Ahmad!' " (lxi. 6). This verse, however, does not support his contention that he fulfilled Jesus's prophecy.[204] To remove all Christian opposition, he said: " 'My name is Jesus, Son of Mary.' "[205] He did not use the phrase "Son of God" so that (contrary to Mr Walter's opinion)[206] he made no claim to divinity. He stated that he had received a revelation declaring that " 'spiritually Jesus and I are one in essence. It is for this reason that my advent is his advent.' "[207] Ghulām Aḥmad did not mean thereby that Jesus's soul "was incarnated in him,"[208] but that Jesus's spirituality had pervaded Ghulām Aḥmad's whole being and the latter could say, therefore, that he "inherited . . . 'the perfection of Jesus Christ.' "[209]

By claiming that he was the Promised Messiah for the Christians, Ghulām tried to prove that "he had appeared in the power and spirit of Jesus."[210] He went so far as to assert superiority over Jesus for his miracles were greater and his prophecies " 'of a far better quality in clearness, force and truth, than the ambiguous predictions of Jesus.' " His superiority lay furthermore " 'in being the Messiah of Muhammad.' "[211] If the Christians refuse to accept Ghulām Aḥmad's claim, they do not (according to him) truly believe in their own Scriptures.

> He who denies me denies Jesus also. He saw me and was pleased, and, therefore, he who sees me and is not pleased with me is not of us, neither of me nor of Jesus . . . blessed is he who recognizes me, and undone is the person from whose eyes I am hidden.[212]

Christians like the Jews have paid no heed to Ghulām Aḥmad's stern warning and continue to adhere to their faith. However, he apparently was able to counter forcefully the arguments presented by Christian missionaries, thus relieving the Muslims "from the predicament in which they had hitherto been placed in religious controversy with Christians.[213] This is clear from

a letter addressed to Ghulām Aḥmad's son, Bashīr-ud-Dīn Maḥmūd, during the early years of his *khilāfat* to the then *Niẓām* of Hyderabad, an excerpt of which is quoted :

For example, it was the practice of the Christians to take in Musalmāns by such arguments as the following : "Mark, how our Messiah is still alive, while your prophet is dead." "Our Messiah used to bring the dead to life. Your prophet did not bring any dead to life." . . . "Your prophet will not visit the earth again, but our Messiah will once more come to the earth to purge it of its corruption, and it is he who will overthrow the perils of the later days." "Now say truly, which of the two is superior ?" The argument was such as could not possibly be escaped by the Musalmāns. . . . By proving that Jesus died a natural death, the new reformer gave a fresh lease of life to Islām, and now the Musalmāns are for all times saved from falling prey to the Christian missionaries.[214]

This claim is one-sided as will be shown later.[215] Mr Walter, who visited Qadiyan in the same year this letter was written (in 1916), found there a vigorous enthusiasm for Islam "unusual in India" at that time.[216] He thus substantiated the statement made by Bashīr-ud-Dīn Maḥmūd.

(*3*) *Hinduism.* Ghulām Aḥmad first announced publicly that God had declared to him in many revelations that he was the *avatār* of Krishna during his Sialkot address on 1 November 1904. The same argument used by him when asserting his Messiahship for the Christians , Jews and Muslims, was advanced, for he said in his address : " 'Spiritually, Krishna and the Promised Messiah are one and the same person, there being no difference except that which exists in the terminology of the two people, Hindu and Muhammadan.' "[217]

He had attacked Hindu belief hitherto, because he had negated it as a mixture of polytheism and nature-worship, condemning the Vedas as myths giving rise to idolatry in worship and immorality in the celebration of festivals. *Karma* and transmigration were scored, because they are contrary to reason and divest " 'the Divine Being of all his glorious attributes and of his power and control over the universe.' "[218]

Ghulām Aḥmad did not say much about the Brahmo Samaj ("Society of God"), a Hindu reform movement founded to span the chasm between Hinduism and Christianity and to create a religion comprising the principal tenets of both faiths. He regarded it as opposing rather than assisting Christianity's spread, no doubt because its founder, Rammohun Roy, firmly stood his ground against charges made by Christian missionaries.[219]

Another movement, the Arya Samaj ("Society of the Aryas"),[220] the only missionary group in Hinduism, was severely attacked by Ghulām Aḥmad. Its adherents consider the Vedas to be divinely inspired and accept the doctrines of *karma* and transmigration—rejected by the Aḥmadīyyahs—

although they believe in one God. Soul, matter and God—together constituting a kind of trinity in their system—are regarded by them as being eternal. Ghulām Aḥmad wrote that such a theory, which asserts the co-eternity of matter and soul with God, " 'borders actually upon atheism, and is practically a denial of the need of God's existence.' "[221] They also formerly advocated the social doctrine of *Niyoga*, a form of temporary marriage, which was the other main focus of Ghulām Aḥmad's attack.[222]

Once he had announced that he was the "Brahman Avatār," which " 'it is not good to oppose,' "[223] Ghulām Aḥmad veered, at least outwardly from bitter hostility to a suppler manner toward the Arya Samaj. He did not relinquish his objections to its views, but introduced these by the sentence: " 'As Krishna I now warn the Āryas of some of their errors.' "[224] They, however, did not change their hostile attitude toward Ghulām Aḥmad and his teachings, expressing themselves in "inordinate language," which prompted a leading Aḥmadīyyah to write that freedom is being misused and that "it is time for the Government to . . . forbid by law the use of abusive language concerning the great religious leader. . . ."[225] In short, the members of the Arya Samaj as well as the majority of Hindus ignored Ghulām Aḥmad as their *avatār*.

(*4*) *Sikhism.* The Sikhs also had their *gurū* in modern times: Mirza Ghulām Aḥmad. He bolstered his claim by stating that the founder of Sikhism, Nānak (1469-1538), had been a Muslim who had come to teach Islam to the Hindus.[226] Nānak taught that: " There is but one God, whose name is true, the Creator . . . immortal, unborn, self-existent; God the great and bountiful. Repeat His Name."[227] He emphasised " 'submission to and worship of the One God, the Omnipotent.' " Although he regarded worship as an important means by which to approach God, he also felt that " 'God cannot be overcome by ceremonial acts.' "[228] Man is dependent upon Divine grace for salvation which can be attained by practising truth.[229]

While these teachings present an Islamic aspect, Nānak's system also reflects a Hindu strain, which is not surprising as he was born into Hinduism. He did not only employ its metaphors, but some of its basic beliefs such as God's immanence; *māyā*—"illusion" in Vedantic monism, but "delusion" in his system;[230] *karma*, which Nānak ascribed to the Divine Will; transmigration and rebirth, conceived as a form of punishment from which a man may be saved by God's grace. Nānak transformed these beliefs so as to make them "scarcely reconcilable with Hindu philosophy."[231] He scorned idol-worship and all that distracts from God, with Whom man should be preoccupied exclusively.

Ghulām Aḥmad contended that Nānak, not having taught *dharma* (the

Hindu religious code whose essential purpose is cosmic union), had renounced Hinduism and that the latter's doctrine of Unity "is clearly the Muhammedan doctrine as explained by the *Sufis*, and there is no trace in it of the Hindu doctrine."[232] Ghulām Aḥmad's discovery of the cloak (reputedly worn by Nānak) convinced him that Nānak was a Muslim, for on it are written many "verses of the Holy Qur'ān, especially those refuting the false doctrines of other faiths with regard to Divine Unity and attributes. . ."[233] Another proof cited by the Aḥmadīyyah in support of his view was that Nānak counted many Muslims among his followers, which proved to him that the *gurū's* teachings did not occupy an intermediate position between Hinduism and Islam, for if this had been true, no Muslim would have accepted them. Ghulām thus concluded that Nānak was a Muslim. It was only after the *gurū's* death that Sikhism became an offshoot of Hinduism, which was due to the disappearance of the Muslim element, resulting in Hindu leadership.

This conclusion permitted Ghulām Aḥmad to proclaim that he was the *gurū* of the Sikhs, for he stood in the same tradition as Nānak and could assert a spiritual relationship with the founder of Sikhism.

(*5*) *Bahāism*. The founder of this movement, Mirza 'Alī Muḥammad of Shiraz (in Iran) said that he had become the "point" (*Nuqṭah*), that is, the centre on which all earlier dispensations converged[234]) for he fulfilled the prophecies of Islam (the return of the twelfth *imām*),[235] of Judaism (he was Elijah), of Christianity (the Angel preceding Jesus's coming), and of Zoroastrianism (the first—called the "Dawn"—of the three chosen ones to appear on the New Day). Mirza Ghulām Aḥmad did not accept such "vague assertions" for which "there is no proof at all," not even in their sacred book, the *Bayān* (sealed to outsiders) to judge from the statements made by those Bābīs who had access to it.

> Accordingly there is not the slightest proof that the prophecies whose fulfilment is claimed to have been brought about by the appearance of the Bab were really fulfilled in his person, and the advocates of Babism fail to make up the deficiency. A prophecy cannot be fulfilled by the mere assertion of a person that he has appeared to fulfil it. On the other hand, there must be unmistakable signs and clear and definite indication to make the fulfilment of a prophecy certain. In the case of the Bab . . . there are clear indications showing that these prophecies were not fulfilled in his person.[236]

One of these "clear indications," cited by Ghulām Aḥmad as proof that the Bāb's claims were groundless, was an eclipse which took place (in 1894) long after the Bāb's death. The claims of his successor Bahāullah (on whose teachings Bahā'ism is centred) that he had come in fulfilment of Muslim, Christian and Jewish expectations was rejected by Ghulām, because they

"were not in accordance with the Muhammedan expectations or the prophecies of Islam . . . his claims are actually at variance not only with Muhammedan expectations and prophecies but with the very principles of Islam." They are, in fact, "entirely inconsistent with the claims of Bahāullah as set forth by himself."[237] The chief reasons given by the Aḥmadīyyah why Bahāullah's claims were not in accordance with Islamic prophecies were as follows. Bahāullah had announced that Resurrection Day had set in with his appearance, which, he said, was referred to in the Qur'ān (xxix. 24), for it clearly stated that he and his adherents would be cursed. Such an interpretation seemed to Ghulām Aḥmad either "sheer ignorance of the Quran or an over-zealousness to make everything a prophecy of Bahaulla's appearance. . . . No sane person could take these words for a prophecy of Bahaulla's appearance."[238]

The Bābī's claim that he was the Spirit of Truth mentioned in the Gospels is rejected by the Aḥmadīyyah because "the true interpretation" of Jesus's second advent, as given by the Qur'ān, is that a Messiah among the Muslims shall appear in the spirit and power of Christ.

Bahāullah's assertion that he was called by God's name in the Old Testament did not deserve comment; Ghulām Aḥmad passed it over in silence.[239]

Ghulām Aḥmad considered his claims, as against those put forward by the Bāb and Bahāullah, to be valid, because the Scriptures foretell his advent and the signs predicted to occur at his coming have all taken place. Therefore, it would be wise for the Bahā'īs to accept him rather than Bahāullah as their *mahdī*, if they wish to be regarded as true Muslims.

(6) *Buddhism.* Ghulām did not have much personal contact with Buddhism. Yet, he made some statements in which the Buddha was underrated.

> Whenever a man has been deified God has shown his weakness and infirmities in all points. Buddha was made a God, but in the discharge of his duties as a husband and a father, the most sacred of the obligations of man towards man, he was an utter failure. Nor was he able to observe the other duties towards his fellow-beings, and thus entirely neglected one of the two parts of the law. As to the other part, *viz.*, his duties toward God, he offers no better example. He did not believe either in miracles or in the acceptance of prayer. Thus he could not find out the path in which the elected of God have walked.[240]

His argument here differs somewhat from that given for Christianity, namely, he said that Christ had not called himself divine, but he did not state this of the Buddha. The records indicate that the Buddha did not claim divinity for himself, but that he was given this attribute by his adherents,[241] a fact which Ghulām Aḥmad either did not know or did not

want to divulge. The Aḥmadīyyah could have called himself the final Buddhist deliverer on the basis of Buddhist belief and supported his assertion by the argument that Gautama's teachings are not too divergent from those presented by Islam. He does not seem to have made such a claim, however. The explanation given by Mr Walter[242] is that Buddhism was "practically non-existent" in North-West India during Ghulām Aḥmad's time and that, therefore, the Aḥmadīyyah did not make many references to it in his writings. Since then, Buddhism has enjoyed a revival in India, while Aḥmadīyyah missionaries have been sent to Burma, where Buddhism is the main faith. They, nevertheless, have some guiding principle—as given by Ghulām in the quotation cited—for developing counter-arguments to Buddhist beliefs.

(7) *Zoroastrianism.* Ghulām Aḥmad seems to have paid little, if any, attention to the possibilities that this faith offers to one claiming to be the deliverer of mankind. He could easily have asserted the identity between Islam and this faith, which (according to present-day Zoroastrians) does not teach duality (e.g. belief in the opposing principles Ahriman, the evil one, and Ormazd, the good one), but belief in one God. Zoroaster, furthermore, divided human existence into an earthly and a supra-earthly life and admonished his followers to pursue a moral conduct (summarised by good will, good thoughts, good acts) which leads to Paradise. He also developed an eschatological doctrine with its belief in the end of the world, Judgment and Resurrection Day. His followers believe, too, that 3000 years after Zoroaster a Saoshyant ("Deliverer"), born from Zoroaster's seed, shall descend to earth to cleanse it from evil and make Mazdaism[243] victorious. Ghulām Aḥmad thus could have pointed to the similarities existing between Islam aad Zoroastrianism and, on this ground, have claimed that he is the Saoshyant whom they expect.

B. Conclusions. The preceding discussion has shown that Ghulām Aḥmad was critical toward other faiths and has revealed his conviction that he had been called upon by God to fulfil in his person the prophecies made in the Scriptures (Old Testament, New Testament, Qur'ān, Upanishads) foretelling the advent of a Messiah. In the case of Sikhism and Bahā'ism, he made his claim on the basis of analogy between their and Islamic teachings. While Buddhism and, in particular, Zoroastrianism would have offered fallow ground for such an assertion, they did not concern him as much as the other faiths. The reason for this unconcern partly has been given by Mr Walter. Yet, a deeper motive may have pushed the Aḥmadīyyah to his aggressive stand, especially towards Christianity and Hinduism, because these two faiths presented a serious challenge to the Indo-Islamic community.

Christian propagation efforts, successful to some extent in India during

the first decades of the nineteenth century, achieved little gain during the period in which Ghulām Aḥmad lived, which Christian missionaries, themselves, conceded. Besides, Christianity had not won many converts from amongst the Muslims. The letter written by Bashīr-ud-Dīn Maḥmūd[244] presents, therefore an exaggerated picture of their success, but it reveals the arguments they advanced and the difficulties which faced the Muslims in countering them. The really serious challenge, however, was presented by Hinduism. Muslims and Hindus lived side by side and, consequently, the sharp differences between their respective faiths was blotted out in those areas where daily social intercourse led to common participation in each other's rites. The Arya Samaj, actively pursuing missionary activities, directed its attention in Ghulām Aḥmad's time toward the half-converted Muslims living in rural areas.

Ghulām Aḥmad, too, saw a danger : Islam threatened on the one side by Christianity, on the other by Hinduism. To eliminate the danger, he cut out the core of Christian belief by attempting to show that the New Testament itself did not support Jesus's teachings. He tore Hindu beliefs apart by saying curtly that they were not founded on Divine revelation. Bahā'ism came under attack probably not only because it, too, was a threat to Islam, but because Ghulām Aḥmad could not accept claims so similar to his put forward by anyone else. His voice soared above the choir of non-Muslims to proclaim to the world Islam's supremacy and admonish all mankind that God had sent him as the fulfilment of their Messianic hopes. Ghulām Aḥmad's message is echoed in an article written two years after his death :

> The Zoroastrians, the Hindus, the Buddhists, the Christians and the Muslims all have been expecting the advent of this messenger . . . to appear in the east. . . . A study of these prophecies shows that they all refer to one and the same personage. That prophet has already appeared and he is no other than Ahmad of Qadian.[245]

All Aḥmadīyyahs subscribe to this statement, which summarises in a few lines their founder's teachings. Many among them wend their way to Qadiyan to bring silent tribute to Mirza Ghulām Aḥmad, for he brought them new hope and new life.

The claims presented by Mirza Ghulām Aḥmad had their root in his conviction that he was the reformer sent by God to all mankind. In the biographical sketch, it was pointed out that early in his youth he had dreams of playing a central part on life's stage. These assumed shape : Ghulām Aḥmad became, indeed, an important figure in the religious sphere. Thus he was transformed from a rejected youth into a venerated leader of one Muslim group. Yet, the majority of Muslims were hostile to him, because his assertion that he was a prophet ran counter to the Islamic doctrine

that Muḥammad was the last in a series of prophets. Neither could they accept Ghulām Aḥmad's teachings, which constituted a reinterpretation of the Qur'ān unacceptable to orthodox Muslim belief. It has been shown that it was particularly because of his claim to prophethood, that a split in Aḥmadīyyah Islam occurred.[246] Henceforth, there were two opposed Aḥmadīyyah parties, each of which has gone its separate way. While the older group remained aloof from the Muslim world around it, the younger *Anjuman* did not separate itself so sharply from, but rather addressed itself to, the wider Islamic community. The consequences of separation, suffered at first by all Aḥmadīyyahs, bore heavily on the Ṣadr once the schism had occurred. The relations between it and the Muslim world have been marred by unfortunate incidents. They did not solely manifest themselves during the early days in the collection of *fatwās* or in written and verbal denunciations, declaring Ghulām Aḥmad and his followers to be non-Muslims and advocating their punishment by death, a fate which was, in actuality, suffered by some Aḥmadīyyahs in Afghanistan. Thanks to the British Government, a neutral party to the dispute, they were saved from such a cruel fate in India. In Malabar, tension had reached suched such a pitch that the Aḥmadīyyahs did not venture outdoors for some time and a number of them had to leave Cannanore. Here, as in India, it became a common practice among the Muslims to deny Aḥmadīyyahs entrance to the mosques. This led to Court action brought by a party of Aḥmadīyyahs against a group of non-Aḥmadīyyahs, who had refused them the use of a mosque in Dilawarpur, Monghyr district (on 2 December 1911) for private prayer services. The plaintiffs felt that as Muslims they had the right to enter any mosque and pray individually or collectively. The Court of First Instance ruled that since the plaintiffs were Muslims, they were entitled to attend mosque services and pray individually behind a Snnnite *Imām*, but that they were not entitled to form their own congregation for purposes of praying in the mosque. This suit as well as an appeal to the District Judge, who gave public declaration of the Court ruling, were dismissed. Both parties then submitted the case to the Patna High Court.[247] The brief on the case included the following:

> The important question in the case is, whether the plaintiffs are entitled to pray as a separate congregation in the mosque, i.e. behind an Imām of their own. The claim is an extravagant one, and there can be little doubt that if it is allowed, there will be serious trouble in the mosque. The plaintiffs contend that every mosque is dedicated to the worship of God, and is open to any Muhammadan . . . who chooses to pray in it. [There is, however, no authority for their contention that they should be allowed services in a Sunnite mosque] with their own Imām. Such an arrangement appears to be unknown to the Muhammadan law. . . . As already stated, the

plaintiffs regard orthodox Sunnis as infidels. The orthodox Sunnis, in their turn, regard the Ahmadis as infidels, and have, we are told, formally denounced them as such. [If the plaintiffs were conceded the right they have requested], there would almost inevitalby be serious trouble in the mosque.[248]

Therefore, the plaintiffs' claim was rejected and the appeals dismissed. Henceforth, the Aḥmadīyyahs either had to give up their contention and follow an *imām* who did not recognise Ghulām Aḥmad or they had to build their own mosques. They reverted to the second measure.

The Lahore Anjuman's members have not experienced this difficulty, because they do not feel averse to following a non-Aḥmadīyyah *Imām* in mosque services.

Aḥmadīyyah relations with the Christians were not marked by the latter's physical or economic reprisals against this Muslim group. If they answered Ghulām Aḥmad's charges at all, it was only to refute them as well as his teachings on the basis of Christian doctrine. This faith, however, no longer, represented as serious a challenge to Islam in Ghulām Aḥmad's day as in earlier years. The Christian missionaries in India, contemporary with him, acknowledged, in fact, that they had converted very few Muslims (and Hindus) over a long period of time and they did not share the feeling expressed by Bashīr-ud-Dīn Maḥmūd in his (earlier quoted) letter that their efforts were successful among the Indian Muslims.[249] Generally, relations with the Christian community in India, and later in Pakistan, were not cordial, which was due not so much to Christian conduct as to Aḥmadīyyah aloofness. One incident, however, occurred after Pakistan's creation, which incited Christians living there. Ghulām Aḥmad had written a book in which he injured the sentiments of Christians and they took legal action to prevent it from being published. After proper hearing, the Pakistan Government proscribed this book on the ground that it purposely hurt the feelings of a group which forms a part of Pakistan society. He thus was chastised posthumously by the very group which he had criticised so bitterly.

The Lahore Anjuman is as hostile toward Christianity as Ghulām Aḥmad was. Their members also pursue anti-Christian propaganda, probably advancing arguments similar to those presented by him. Christians apparently do not formulate refutations distinctly against the charges made by this Aḥmadīyyah group, but generally against Aḥmadīyyah teachings concerning Christian dogma.

The Hindu-Aḥmadīyyah relationship, as indeed that between Muslims and Hindus, has not been a very happy one. During Ghulām Aḥmad's time, ill-feelings between the two major groups in India had increased and,

although he hoped that they would be able to live peacefully together, the fulfilment of his wish would never be brought about by attacks on the Hindu faith. While many observers then resident in India attributed the antagonism to political reasons, Ghulām Aḥmad felt that it was born from religious differences. Both views have to be taken into account in evaluating the Hindu-Muslim relationship. Ghulām Aḥmad's denunciation of the Arya Samaj was not suffered in silence by its members. They formed the main Hindu opposition group to the Aḥmadīyyahs, abusing them and their founder in their publications and platform speeches.

Jews, Zoroastrians and Buddhists apparently did not answer Ghulām Aḥmad, probably because the first two groups did not have a stronghold in India and because he did not say much pbout the third. Bahāism, however, is a real challenge for which reason he demolished its claims. If the Bābīs had struck back at all, they could have turned his arguments against him by saying that he misinterpreted the Qur'ān and that his claims have not been proven true by the actual events. Since they had suffered severe persecution (their founder was imprisoned and other leaders exiled from Iran) and only started to gain in numbers during Ghulām Aḥmad's time, it is unlikely that they would have paid attention to his denunciation of their doctrine.

The antagonistic feelings between Aḥmadīyyahs and the outside world were inflamed by Ghulām Aḥmad who went so far, as mentioned, to call even non-Aḥmadīyyah Muslims, Sunnite and Shī'ite, apostates. He denounced the latter as a heretic (*mushrik*) for believing in *Imām* al-Ḥusain's intercession which he and Sunnite teaching regard as *shirk*. The two sects do not worship, except occasionally, in each other's mosques, because the Shī'ites mainly attend services led by a *mujtahid*. This religious leader not only believes in the return of the twelfth *imām*, but alone is regarded by them as qualified to exercise this function. On the other hand, intermarriage is permitted between Sunnites and Shī'ites and there is no restriction on girls of either group that they marry exclusively within their own denomination. If inter-marriage takes place, often a double ceremony, following respectively the Sunnite and the Shī'ite rite is celebrated or the wedding may be performed in accordance with the ceremonial of the bride's denomination. In general, Shī'ite-Sunnite relations have been neither always happy nor unhappy. It is only when sectarian feelings arise among them that flare-ups shatter their undisturbed relations.

The Ṣadr Anjuman does not accept the Shī'ites as Muslims and neither are the Aḥmadīyyahs considered to be Muslims by them or the Sunnites or, in fact by any other Muslim sect.

In view of this disharmonious relationship, the question arises how the

Aḥmadīyyahs related themselves to the rest of mankind in their social and busines dealings with them.

All Muslims, including the Aḥmadīyyahs, stress marriage as the main pillar on which a moral society is built. Do the Aḥmadīyyahs permit inter-marriage with non-Aḥmadīyyahs, including Muslims ? Theoretically, they do, for the Qur'ān permits inter-marriage of Muslims with the "People of the Book," i e. Christians, Jews and (as pointed out by Muslims posterior to Muḥammad) Zoroastrians. In practice, however, such mixed marriages as take place are contracted mainly by Muslim men, for their children would still be reared as Muslims. This would not be the case if a Muslim girl weds a non-Muslim, unless he becomes a convert to Islam.

The Ṣadr Aḥmadīyyahs state that marriage with non-Aḥmadīyyahs and non-Muslims is permitted by consent—said not to be based on religious reasons—given by the former community's head. In practice, again, it is the Aḥmadīyyah male, not the female, who would receive a permit to wed a non-Aḥmdīyyah, although mixed marriages, particularly with non-Muslim women, no doubt are very rare. The Aḥmadīyyah girl is kept in strict seclusion (*pardah*) that it seems difficult for her to marry outside the group, unless she breaks the Aḥmadīyyah rules (which, with few exceptions, would make her an outcast).[250] In fact, non-Aḥmadīyyah Muslim men hardly have social intercourse with Aḥmadīyyah families having daughters. The reason given by the community for keeping their girls in *pardah* is that it fosters modesty and continence, because the object of desire is removed from sight, thus heightening morality and bringing peace to the household.[251] In times of duress, no inter-marriage with non-Aḥmadīyyahs is permitted in order to foster the relations within the group and ensure a new generation of Aḥmadīyyahs to strengthen that community both morally and numerically.

The Anjuman Aḥmadīyyahs, who address themselves to the wider Muslim body and do not separate themselves so strictly from the non-Aḥmadīyyah world, undoubtedly permit inter-marriage of both sexes with Muslims of other denominations, but, like them, feel averse to inter-marriage with non-Muslims.

It may be observed, in concluding this section, that neither the Aḥmadiy-yahs nor the Muslims generally are unique in their reluctant feelings toward inter-marriage, which are shared by many adherents of other faiths.

The economic relations between Aḥmadīyyahs and non-Aḥmadīyyah Muslims have not always been agreeable. Boycotts in the early days neither improved the former's well-being nor helped to cement more cordial relations between these two groups. Other unfair practices were to raise prices for Aḥmadīyyah purchasers, sell them merchandise at higher prices than warranted, and give them less in weight than they paid for. Such

conduct is certainly contrary to Ghulām Aḥmad's emphasis on honesty in all dealings between men, and the Qur'ān, itself, has a number of rules laying down what might be called a "fair trade practices law."[252] His son, Bashīr-ud Dīn Maḥmūd, added only the acceptance of competition, as it intensifies a man's striving after improvement and at the same time increases his fellowmen's well-being. He regards commerce as another important aspect of economic relations ; it, too, adds to the wealth and progress of his community and the world at large.[253]

Honest dealings with all men, advocated by Ghulām Aḥmad, can be extended further to the domain of political relations. Ghulām Aḥmad demanded (as shown) that his followers restrain from actively participating in their country's daily political life. The Lahore Anjuman did not follow his demands in this regard, but the Ṣadr has adhered to them. This does not mean that Ṣadr leaders may not express themselves on political affairs or participate in them on a high level. In fact, Bashīr-ud-Dīn Maḥmūd has expressed himself often on political matters both with regard to India and to international relations involving the world as a whole, while one of the most outstanding Aḥmadīyyahs, Sir Ẕafarullah Khān, for a number of years led the Pakistan Mission to the United Nations General Assembly.[254]

In his political views, Bashīr-ud-Dīn Maḥmūd has been far ahead of his time. As early as 1924 (the date of the first edition of *Aḥmaddīyat*), he advocated a world federation on the grounds that nationalism leads to friction and war and that patriotism (reflected in aggressive foreign policies of one nation towards another to assert its ego) and love of mankind are incompatible. He has held that a federation of states would tend to neutralise excessive nationalism and aggressiveness, even though it should be so constituted that the member nations would neither lose their autonomy in local affairs nor their national aspirations (toward economic growth, cultural development, but not toward territorial expansion or domination of other states).[255] Bashīr-ud-Dīn Maḥmūd, therefore, believes in the United Nations, but regards it as a pale image of effective world government. His political theory, furthermore, is in harmony with the Islamic view that the Muslim world is one.

The Aḥmadīyyahs, then, are permitted to carry on business and high-level political dealings with non-Aḥmadīyyahs. Those outside the Islamic pale did not revert to unfair commercial practices against them for being Aḥmadīyyahs. The argument could be advanced that Muslim behaviour toward the Aḥmadīyyahs has not always been in accordance with the Qur'ānic Code; as the Muslims consider them apostates, boycotts and other unfair measures would, according to the Muslim view, be justified. [256] In the confusion that took place during the period of Partition, they—like every other

group—suffered severely. After Partition, they seem to have been able to carry on without too many disturbances. But a decade earlier, in the autumn of 1934, resentment against them flared up anew and led to Bashīr-ud-Dīn's adoption of the New Scheme, which meant an austerity programme and vigorous expansion of missionary efforts. He felt that these resentments against Aḥmadīyyahs were in part their own fault, because of their aloofness from the world around them. He, therefore, decided to institute a Prophet's Day, held yearly, on which representatives of different faiths are invited to lecture on various aspects of Muḥammad's life and teachings. This he thought would bring Aḥmadīyyahs and non-Aḥmadīyyahs in closer contact with each other, permitting an exchange of views and thus increase understanding among them. Another motive, that of trying to gain more converts, may also have been a reason for establishing this yearly gathering. To what extent non-Aḥmadīyyahs respond to the invitation it is difficult to say.

Bashīr, then, has a less restrictive view than Ghulām Aḥmad had, which is proven also by his excluding the latter's claim to being Islam's twentieth-century prophet. The son probably would not have been criticised by his father for his actions as long as the Ahmadīyyah belief and way of life were not affected. Would he have been disowned by Ghulām for omitting an important principle from the Aḥmadīyyah creed? Bashir's motive may have been not only his awareness that it is non-Qur'ānic, but, also, his hope for a reconciliation between his and the Lahore Anjuman as well as his stated desire to gain more converts from among Muslims. The future will tell whether his efforts will have the wished-for results.

The Aḥmadīyyahs stand alone and, like other Muslim groups, assert they have the truth. Yet, they dislike being called an Islamic sect, for they say that they represent Aḥmadīyyah Islam, that is : "The True Islam."

> . . . although the Aḥmadīyya Movement believes firmly in the Holy Quran and is a Movement of Muslims, it cannot be ranked merely as one of the sects of Islam. On the contrary, it claims that it alone presents to the world the real Islam that was revealed over thirteen hundred years ago, and that its special mission is to enrich mankind with the unlimited spiritual treasures in the Holy Quran.[257]

The son reiterates his father's message that the mission of Aḥmadīyyah Islam, unlike that of any other faith, is universal in nature. His active propagation efforts are aimed at realising the dream of both men : to establish Islam on earth. By bringing this about, all of mankind would be united under Allah ; *tawḥīd* would have become a reality. The whole world truly would be a mosque where humanity jointly worships and lives the highest moral life under God. A beautiful dream but, like all dreams, unrealisable.

Chapter V

THE GROWTH OF PAN-ISLAMIC FEELINGS

1. *Introduction*

India's pan-Islamic movement had a double origin as its sources lay in events occurring beyond and within the country.[1] It was launched in the late nineteenth century[2] by the Sulṭān Caliphs as a protest against the impact of Christianity.[3] It was concerned (like pan-Ottomanism[4]) with maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and (as also pan-Arabism[5]) with the creation of a Near and Middle Eastern *bloc* to ward off European aggression.[6] However, it differed from either of these currents by stressing unification under Islam's banner rather than under the rule of Turks or Arabs, although they were predominantly Muslim by faith. It had a religio-political dimension, because it put the hegemony of the Muslim world in opposition to Christian supremacy. In summary, pan-Islamism may be said to have been political, religious and intellectual[7] in its content and feeling, as it reflected (*a*) the contest of power ; (*b*) the desire to protect the Muslim faith ; and (*c*) its civilisation.

Pan-Islamism in India also stemmed partly from another external factor, viz. Anglo-Russian rivalry in the East between 1850 and 1880.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the most willing and eager supporters of the Ottoman caliphate in the earlier period were Central Asiatic and Indian Moslems, who, at the mercy of both British and Russian expansionists, frequently discussed the idea of a Moslem league and occasionally appealed to the Turkish sultan for aid.[8]

An eye-witness reported in 1877 :

I repeat therefore . . . that the Moslem population of India, amongst whom pan-Islamitic ideas are spreading from day to day, will not remain inactive in the future should the Christian West continue to indulge in the sport of modern crusades.[9]

The sources quoted show clearly that the Indo-Muslim community had been pan-Islamic especially during the post-Mutiny era. Its members were stimulated by the policy of imperialist nations, whose subsequent triumph over the Ottoman Empire opened the vital issue of the Caliphate's destiny.

Internal factors, too, strengthened Indian pan-Islamism. The rising Hindu-Muslim tension (in Bengal[10]) and the nationalist tide undoubtedly contributed to its growth. To what extent the movement reflected a continuing resentment against the British since 1857-8 it is hard to say. Certainly,

hostility smouldered for a long time, particularly in those areas which suffered economically. It must not be forgotten that East Bengal, for instance, smarted under the inegalities[11] and that anger was rekindled there and throughout Islamic India by the 1911 Act, decreeing the merger of the Muslim with the Hindu Province.[12] Such a policy antagonised the Muslim[13] masses as well as the intelligentsia and (as Mr Vambery predicted) again led to anti-British outbursts.

The differing views held at the time among India's Muslim leaders on the issue of pan-Islamism may be summarised briefly. Sir Sayyid's insistence on co-operation with the British (in consequence of the Mutiny's failure) implies secessionism, because loyalty to the Christian ruler is incompatible with allegiance to Islam's cause.[14] He preached internal orientation for the purpose of exclusive concentration on self-development, achieved solely in an atmosphere of trust aud friendship. He felt that sympathy openly manifested with political sentiments agitating other Islamic lands was not conducive to the supreme task of educating India's Muslims.

His younger contemporary, Sayyid Amīr 'Alī, called pan-Islamism " 'a figment of the brain, an invention designed to help in destroying the liberty of Mussulman natives.' "[15] This statement (made on the eve of the Balkan Wars[16]) did not repudiate its cornerstone of unity based on brotherhood—an integral part of the faith—but rejected the conscious development of an anti-European political movement, called pan-Islamism. He thereby also countered (Muslim and non-Muslim) contention that it had universal appeal throughout the Middle East. He was correct, of course, concerning its foundation. His repudiation of the movement, however, does not alter the fact of its existence either in India or abroad. His views undoubtedly were influenced by his pro-Britishness and his concern for Indo-Muslim welfare, which he possibly feared might be jeopardised if Indian Islam were drawn into the conflict then brewing between Turkey and the Western Powers. His statement, therefore, may have served as a warning to his countrymen to remain aloof It proves, indeed, his recognition of its emotional appeal which he wished to counteract.

The majority among India's Muslims dissented. In effect, Viqār-ul-Mulk (Sir Sayyid's successor at Aligarh[17]) expressed popular opinion by suggesting in 1911 that the Indo-Islamic community depended upon none but itself.[18] This was clearly an acknowledgment, resulting from dissatisfaction with the home situation, that its members could not rely upon the British (or the Hindus) for advancing and protecting Muslim rights. It implied that Islamic solidarity—national and trans-national—was the best policy for assuring self-protection.

This line of reasoning was enforced by the defeat inflicted upon the

Ottoman Empire by the Western Powers. The burning questions facing the Muslims at the time were the destiny of the Arab world (comprising Islam's holy places) and of the Caliphal State. Indo-Muslim agitation for assuring the former's sovereignty and the latter's continuance reached a new pitch during the early 1920's.

A younger generation of Indian Muslims spurned Sir Sayyid's plea for friendship with the British. Their leaders summoned them to the fight for Islam's (and India's) cause. Among the outstanding protagonists were Abul-Kalām Āzād and Muḥammad 'Alī.

2. *Abul-Kalām Āzād (1888-1958)*[19]

(*a*) ***Biography.*** Born in Mecca as son of a distinguished Indian theologian, Muḥammad Khairuddīn, who had migrated to Arabia during or after the Mutiny, Abul-Kalām, whose given name may have been Ghulām Muḥy-ud-Dīn,[20] subsequently was brought to India by his parents. They settled at Calcutta, West Bengal (from 1805 on) which became his home-town. He lost his mother a year later and was reared by an orthodox father. Tutored privately, the precocious boy entered his journalistic career at the age of fourteen,[21] and completed the traditional education course when sixteen (rather than twenty-five). He then taught logic, mathematics and "higher philosophy" to about fifteen students whom his father had gathered together. "It was soon after this that I first came across the writings of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. I was greatly impressed by his views on modern education. I realized that a man could not be truly educated in the modern world unless he studied modern science, philosophy and literature."[22] He then began to study English, making himself sufficiently proficient in this language, read the Bible (comparing it with Urdu and Persian versions) and, somewhat later, English newspapers with a dictionary's aid. He tells of the "great mental crisis" through which he passed at the time, due to his being born in an orthodox family which accepted all the traditional ways without any questioning, and the revolt against them. The agony lasted "for two or three years," until a new stage "came when all the old bonds imposed on my mind by family and upbringing were completely shattered. I felt freed of all conventional ties and decided that I would chalk out my own path. It was about this time that I decided to adopt the pen-name 'Azad,' or 'Free,' to indicate that I was no longer tied to my inherited beliefs."[23] A lecture which he delivered (by invitation) on the subject of "Rationalism in Islam" at a meeting of the Lahore Anjuman-i-Ḥimāyat-i-Islām in 1904 earned him some reputation. At one of these meetings, he was introduced to Ḥālī who, "it is said, took him to be the son of the learned writer of that name, whose articles he had seen and admired!" [24] He later met Shiblī, who took him to

Lucknow and after some serious discussions on politics, religion and other intellectual matters, offered him the editorship of Lucknow's organ: *An-Nadvah*. Abul-Kalām did not accept this offer. His father sent him to Cairo to engage in advanced Arabic studies at al-Azhar. Dissatisfied with its sterile traditional education, he apparently did not attend this institution.[25] In Egypt, he came into contact with the reform movement initiated by al-Afghānī and his disciple, Muḥammad 'Abduh. Back at Calcutta, he joined a secret (Hindu) revolutionary group,[26] but soon afterwards left on a journey (1907-8), taking him to Baghdad, Cairo, Constantinople (Istanbul) and Paris. At Baghdad, he became for a while the disciple of Ḥajj 'Alī Alussy (died in 1922). "This Hanafi *Faqih*," wrote Louis Massignon, who studied under him together with Abul-Kalām, "was the son of Nu'man Alussy, another of the Jala'l-'Aynayn, the defender of Ibn Taimiya. . . ."[27] Ḥajj 'Alī Alussy, himself, had as his intellectual preceptor Ṣiddīq Ḥasan Khān (died in 1880), the Indian *mujaddid* of the *Ahl al-Ḥadīth*,[28] and had participated in the Salafīyyah movement[29] "In Egypt I came into contact with the followers of Mustafa Kamal Pasha. I also met a group of young Turks who had established a centre in Cairo and were publishing a weekly from there. When I went to Turkey I became friends with some of the leaders of the Young Turk movement." During his talks with these various revolutionary Muslim groups, the latter expressed surprise at the political aloofness of India's Muslims in the country's (Hindu-led) struggle for freedom and interpreted it as flowing from pro-Britishness. As a result of these talks, "I was more convinced than ever that Indian Moslems must cooperate in the work of political liberation of the country. . . . I felt it necessary to create a new movement among Indian Moslems and decided that, on my return to India, I would take up political work with greater earnestness."[30] He travelled on to Paris, whence he hoped to proceed to London, but his sojourn was cut short by his father's illness (followed by death). Back in Calcutta, he brooded for a while upon "my future programme of action." He thereupon decided to venture into journalism, launching an illustrated weekly called *al-Hilāl* ("the Crescent") whose first issue appeared on 1 June 1912,[31] and followed the example of the *Waṭan*, the *Zamīndār* and the *Vakīl*, journals published in the Punjab and stirring up enthusiasm for Turkey. Its publication was "singularly well-timed," because Muslim India, in ferment, had abandoned the Aligarh policy of dependence on a foreign government and had begun to embrace Viqār-ul Mulk's political orientation.[32] Not only did *al-Hilāl* signify Abul-Kalām's official entry into Indian politics, but it also swept up the Indo-Muslim emotions by its pro-Turkish and, hence, anti-colonialist, tone. It signified Āzād's official entry into Indian politics. "*Al-Hilāl* created a revolutionary stir among the masses," because it preached

"strong nationalism" to Muslim India.[33] Apart from its political message, it also insisted on a modernist orientation by its cry : "Back to the Qur'ān!"[34] The British confiscated it in 1915, because of its anti-British mood.[35] Undaunted, Āzād started (five months later) another similar journal, which he called *al-Balāgh* ("the Message"). Unable to stop his publishing activities, the Government declared him *persona non grata* under the Defence of India Regulations, exiling him from the Punjab, the United Provinces, Bombay Province and (in April 1916) from Calcutta. He went to Ranchi (in Bihar) where he was interned in July of that year—which ended *al-Balāgh*—and was not released until 1 January 1920.[36] Present at a Delhi meeting held by Congress on 20 January—where he met *Mahātma* Gandhi for the first time—he supported the *Khilāfat* movement[37] (and, later, Gandhi's Non-Co-operation scheme).[38]

Strong Indian concerted action for self-government (*swarāj*) landed Āzād (and other Muslim as well as Hindu leaders) in jail. Acting as his own defence in his 1921 trial for revolutionary activities, he said, amongst other things :

> I believe that liberty is the birthright of every nation and individual. No man, nor any man-made bureaucracy, possesses the right to enslave human beings. Howsoever attractive the names that we may coin for slavery, slavery will remain slavery all the same. It is imposed on man by man against the will of God. Therefore, I refuse to accept the present Government as a rightful government, and consequently think it to be a national, religious and human duty to relieve my country and nation of their servitude. . . .
>
> I am a Musalman, and as such, my religious duty is the same. Islam does not recognize any autocracy or bureaucracy. . . . It . . . showed the world at large that all human beings held an equal rank, and all possessed equal rights . . . [39]

This is one facet of the truth (*al-ḥaqq*), which must guide all Muslims ; the other, especially applicable to the Indo-Islamic community, is that India is not formed of two nations (Hindu and Muslim), but forms one political unit. These views, expressed in *al-Hilāl's* first issues, remained the basic tenets of Āzād's doctrine. He declared, for instance, in his Presidential Address at Ramgarh (given in 1940) :

> I stand exactly where I stood . . . in 1912 . . . I have given thought to all those innumerable occurrences which have happened since then. . . . I repeat today what I have said throughout the entire period, that the ninety millions of Muslims of India have no other right course of action than the one to which I invited them in 1912.[40]

He (like so many others) suffered frequent imprisonment for adhering to and preaching his convictions ; "I cannot stifle the voice of conscience.'"[41] He

had become a well-known participant in Indian political affairs, serving as Congress President first in 1923 and, again, in 1940. In his years of freedom, he led many important conferences with the British particularly during the 1940's[42] to explore ways for reaching agreement on India's desire for freedom.[43] His frequent imprisonment (lastly from 1942 to 1945) did not intimidate him ; rather, it spurred him on to work for the causes in which he fervently believed. Unlike his Muslim countrymen, however, he could not acknowledge the seriousness of India's communalist problem and remained in his homeland after Pakistan's birth on 15 August 1947. He had been appointed meanwhile to the post of Education Minister (in January 1947), which he held until his death on 22 February 1958.

Integrity and courage, love of God and country, marked the man who heralded a new era in Indo-Muslim political thinking. He was a scholar as well as a politician and journalist. In addition to his many articles, he wrote his memoirs (*Tadhkirah*), while imprisoned during 1916-9; his "Letters from Jail" (*Ghubār-i-Khāṭir*)[44] as well as his *Autobiography* became very popular. His most significant scholarly work is the *Tarjumān al-Qur'ān* ("Commentary on the Qur'ān")—also begun while imprisoned between 1916 and 1919[45]—in which he uses rationalist logic to prove the validity of modernist theology.

(*b*) *His Doctrine*.—Abul-Kalām Āzād's earlier wide contacts with young revolutionaries in other Muslim lands determined him to enlist his co-religionist countrymen in the fight for freedom. He wrote in *al-Hilāl*:

> My resolve is not to seek a task, but to seek first men to do it. In this world, there never was any lack of tasks. But there has always been a dearth of men to undertake them. The present age is an age of wars. All around us are hosts of enemies, and there is not a single corner where armours do not ring. So, there is no lack of fields for action. Those who possess the spirit of a soldier and the courage of a hero must come out to face life as they find it and face its trials. I assert once again that there is no lack of tasks. What we really lack among us are patriots and fighters.[46]

These words sounded the call for Indo-Muslim militant action at a time the Islamic world was threatened by Western imperialism. He never forsook his campaign to obtain fighters for the cause of liberty. For instance, he said in his 1921 trial: " 'A true Muslim has either to immolate himself or to retain his liberty; no other course is open for him under his religion.' "[47] This was his slogan, his "ideal," to which he dedicated his life. It contained the essence of his political and religious doctrine, namely, freedom, meaning at once liberation from the yoke of foreign oppression and "hereditary" religion (*taqlīd*). Thus only can truth be served. His concept of "the truth" (*al-ḥaqq*), the underlying principle of his thought, has connotations for his pan-Islamic views and, therefore, needs to be examined.

The Religious Connotations of al-Ḥaqq. Abul-Kalām wrote in his "Commentary" : "Islam means the acceptance of truth and acting according to it."[48] What truth ? That which is expounded in the Qur'ān and not in the commentaries.

The Quran in its framework (*wa'ẓ*), its principles, its manner of speech and its way of demonstration—in fact in everything—is quite independent of all artificial and man-made canons. This is as it should be. The Quran in everything has a natural method, unsullied by artificialities . . . . When the Quran came, the group of Musalmans to whom it was addressed were accustomed to this type of speech. They were able to think in the simple terms of nature and life's experience (*fiṭrat*) for their minds had not been framed according to the artificial canons of civilization. As a consequence they understood the Quran exactly as was intended. When the Companions heard any verse of the Quran for the first time, they immediately understood its meaning. . . .[49]

In other words, the medieval commentaries with their antiquated and artificial thought-categories must be discarded. Muslims must return directly to their Scripture. How must they interpret it ? " 'On the basis of natural reason—and not merely on the basis of good faith,' " as did Muḥammad's Companions centuries ago.[50] Obviously, Abul-Kalām Āzād was influenced by Sir Sayyid's doctrine and agreed that, by applying "natural reason," the Muslim not only discards the artificial reasoning of the generations following the Companions, but is enabled to rediscover the "truth". This concept, however, needed still further clarification. He wrote, indeed, that " 'haq does not mean the "true religion" but should be taken in its dictionary meaning as life's correct path.' "[51] Also he stated: " 'The Quran says that the essence of religion is the same everywhere, viz to follow the path ordained by God. That path of Right holds not only for mankind but for the whole of creation.' "[52] His definition of *ḥaqq* as "life's correct path" implies that he related it to the notion of cosmic order, law, which (he asserted) rather than "religion" is the correct meaning of the Arabic word *dīn*.[53] Thus, *al-ḥaqq* becomes an all-embracing concept, involving a way of thinking, religion, culture, which corresponds with Islam's essential nature. He held that the right path is universal, viz. it transcends all doctrines, or paraphrased: God is the source of Truth. In commenting on Sūrah xxi. verses 92, 93, 94, Abul-Kalām wrote :

All the three unities are condensed in this one verse: The unity of brotherhood, the unity of God, and the unity of religion and worship. And these three unities are the essential principles of the message of the Quran. The Quran everywhere proclaims the same message, and lays the whole foundation of its teaching and warning on these. Unity of brotherhood means that in the multifarious diversity of mankind is hidden its unity. Forget not this. However diverse may be your races, countries, tongues, you are one family of

the human race, and you are really one brotherhood. Unity of God means that no matter how many different places of worship you may have established, no matter how many different conceptions you may have formed of Him, the differences you have created cannot make the Reality different. Just as you are one brotherhood, in the same way your Protector is also One, and no other. Unity of worship means that if there is one brotherhood, there should be one religion only and not more. Therefore right conduct consists in worshipping only one God and not to be divided and separated in this matter.[54]

According to this view, *all* of humanity constitutes a brotherhood under God. The legal implications would be that the Muslim is not essentially in conflict with the Christian world or, in other words, no tension exists between the *dār-ul-Is'ām* and the *dār-ul-Ḥarb* and a Holy War, therefore, has no validity. Ultimately, exclusivity of any kind is apparent rather than real, for all religions (as well as their founders and adherents) have a common origin and teach the same Truth.

If religion expresses a universal truth, why should there be such differences and conflicts among men professing different religions. Why should each religion claim to be the sole repository of truth and condemn all others as false ?[55]

One of the greatest causes of the differences and conflicts in this world is the unity of truth and the varieties of names and terms. Truth is one and the same everywhere, but it has various dresses. And our misfortune is that the world worships "terms" and not their meaning. Thus though all may worship the same truth, they will quarrel on account of differences of terms. If all the curtains due to external forms and terminologies could be removed and Reality were to appear before us unveiled, all the (religious) differences of this world would suddenly vanish and all quarrelsome people would see that their object was the same, though it had different names.[56]

This single religion, nevertheless, may be said to be Islamic, because it is the one found in the Qur'ān. Warning one of his correspondents that he " 'keep in view the difference between a religion and the followers of that religion' " he stated that the Qur'ān faced two alternatives, viz. either to "affirm the correctness of the followers of all religions or condemn them all." It could do neither the first, because of their opposition to each other, nor the second, for this would imply its negation of religious truths ever having been present in the world.

So the Quran chose a third path and declared : "All the religions of the world are correct, but their followers have deviated from the truth." . . . If these differences between the followers of religions . . . could be removed, then that which is true would be left with every religious group. . . . This is that "unity in Truth" (*mushtarik ḥaqq*), the spiritual content of which is found in all the religions of the world.[57]

It is present in the Qur'ān, which specifically states that "it confirmeth what

was revealed before it, and is a clearing up of the Scripturess . . ." (x. 38).

This point of view implies that all schisms are man-made or artificial and, hence, not real, and that redemption is a universal possibility. Every man acting in conformance with "the Truth" (contained in the Qur'ān) walks "the correct path" and, despite the fact that names are unimportant, may be called a Muslim.

The Political Dimension of al-Ḥaqq. " 'The Quran,' " wrote Abul-Kalām Āzād, " 'further defines the national characteristics of the Muslims as follows: "They are the witness to truth on God's earth." ' "[58] Therefore, *al ḥaqq* imposes upon them the duty to proclaim Allah's message of righteousness, equality, freedom to mankind. Again, Āzād said:

> . . . In fact, in my view the greatest proof of the truth of my religion is that it is another name for the teaching of the rights of man. I am a Mussalman, and by virtue of being a Mussalman this has become my religious duty. Islam never accepts as valid a sovereignty which is personal or is constituted of a bureaucracy of a handful of a paid executives. Islam constitutes a perfected system of freedom and democracy. It has been sent down to get back for the human race the liberty which has been snatched away from it. . . .[59]

All of mankind, including the Muslims, must be free to work out their destiny. This is the "truth"; it is taught in the Qur'ān and based on universal ("natural") law.

There are two ways to attain the desired goal, namely, by militant action and/or peaceful coercion.

> It is my belief that such opposing of violence with violence is fully in harmony with the natural laws of God in those circumstances under which Islam permits the use of such violence. But at the same time, for purposes of liberation of India and the present agitation, . . . it is my definite conviction that India cannot attain success by means of arms. . . . India can only triumph through non-violent agitation. . . .[60]

Both types of action are rightful for India's Muslims. Inasmuch as they are in the nature of a conflict between believers (Muslims) and those who have lost the truth (Christian imperialists), they fall within the category of a Holy War, fought not only to attain freedom, but to propagate the truth. The *jihād* against the British is legitimate, because it is just (*'ādl*);[61] therefore, it has the sanction of *ijmā'*. Since the entire Muslim world is in the same predicament, the *jihād* should be a joint fight in order that it be successful. Only if India's Muslims range themselves on the side of their brethren, do they fulfil their duties prescribed by God. Thus the brotherhood (*Ummah*) remains united and the danger of its being undermined by the Christian onslaught lessened. By so doing, they adhere to the truth. This was Āzād's basic doctrine of and justification for pan-Islamism.

Universalism, brotherhood—Islamic and international—war as well as peace, the truth and the lie, Indianism and pan-Islamism, all these have been shown to be kernels of Abul-Kalām's doctrine.

In a critique, the first question necessarily must concern itself with the origin of his concept of *al-ḥaqq*. It was mentioned in the biographical section[62] that he had studied for a while with Ḥajj 'Alī Alussy. This master had taught him the doctrine presented by Ḥusayn Manṣūr al-Ḥallāj who suffered martydom (in 922 C. E.) for having announced, "I am the Truth," a statement taken to mean "I am God". It has two implications: the first being a mystic's assertion that divine substance is in him and that, through a process of spiritualisation, he can claim "to know" God; the second, closely related to the first, is the affirmation of unity between Divinity and man. The second motif, viz. that of unity, is affirmed by the Qur'ānic doctrine of *tawḥīd*, which binds all Muslim believers together in the brotherhood following Allah's guidance as prescribed in His Scripture. Inasmuch as Manṣūr al-Ḥallāj belonged to the anti-nomistic group, the question is: whence did Abul-Kalām Āzād obtain his definition of *al-ḥaqq* as "life's correct path"? He may have derived it from the Muslim mystical tradition, for it teaches that there are "resting stations" for those disciples seeking spiritual unity under the sages' guidance. Possibly, he also was influenced by the Hindu concept of *dharma*, based on the notion of *Rta*, meaning cosmic law, order, which he considered to be the Arabic word's basic meaning. He related this notion apparently with the "natural laws of God". He obviously took this idea from Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān. Did Abul-Kalām imply that they define the right path which man can uncover because he possesses "natural reason"? Is his ultimately a doctrine of transcendentalism or immanence or are facets of both linked in his system?

In assessing this aspect of it, the conclusions are as follows. He was an eclectic as proven by his welding together three different principles, taken from various sources and giving the resulting concept, which he called *al-ḥaqq*, the triple meaning of Truth, right path and unity. In substance, his interpretation of *al-ḥaqq* seems to be influenced by ideas held by Manṣūr al-Ḥallāj, but his definition of the mode of apprehension, i.e. here the idea of "the path," was indebted partly at least to the Hindu notion, and is related to the biblical doctrine of life under God according to a definite prescribed course. Furthermore, he linked two entirely different viewpoints: rationalism allowing man to attain to Truth independent of any except Scriptural guidance seems wedded to the mystic's notion of spirituality inherent, and awaiting to be unfolded, in man.

Another problem to be considered is Abul-Kalām's emphasis on unity in so far as it pertains to the international scene. Again, it is two-dimen-

sional, because it contains religious and a political side, which relates, in turn, to the relationship between the various Muslim countries as well as between them and the rest of the world. The religious aspect will be discussed first.

His doctrine of unity, which is founded also on Muḥammad's conception of an Islamic brotherhood, enables its members to join together in spite of frontiers drawn up in this modern world. It preserves the sociopolitical bond contingent upon the profession of the same faith. By desiring to erect the brotherhood among all peoples, did Abul-Kalām Āzād advocate their conversion to Islam, whose adherents must act as "witnesses" to the Truth, or was it a plea to the British for averting the collapse of the *Ummah* constructed in Muḥammad's day ? As a Muslim, he should have hoped for conversion of the rest of mankind.[63] Only thus could unity and peace be restored. Political equality, social solidarity and religious identity —fundamental teachings of the Qur'ān—then would prevail. The reasons for men's quarrels would disappear, for all would acknowledge finally God's Law. As a professed liberal, however, could he equate the duty of conversion with his belief in " 'the truth of all creeds,' " for which he was criticised by fellow-believers ?[64] On the one hand, he wrote : " 'True religions may walk by different paths but they will reach the same goal.' "[65] On the other, he asserted that " 'there cannot be more than one path of truth.' "[66] The Qur'ān (vi. 154) admonishes : "follow no *other* paths lest ye be led astray from His Path." J.B. Kripalani associated with Abul-Kalām Āzād since 1920, assessed his friend's doctrine by saying :

> From the very beginning of his career, the Maulana Sahib was something of an internationalist. The circumstances of his birth, upbringing, and education and studies endowed him with a wide perspective. As an Islamic divine one would have expected him to be rather orthodox in his religious views. But his attitude towards religion was very liberal and catholic. . . . With his innate goodness, it was impossible for him to think that salvation for humanity lay through a particular religion. . . . Maulana considered that the essence of religion lay in moral conduct and, if one delved deeper into the dark recesses of life, in mysticism.[67]

Abul-Kalām apparently had difficulty in solving the tension between liberalism and Islamicness His attempt to relate the two led to his solution that all religions contain a kernel of "the Truth". God's Law as he saw it ultimately was that found in the Qur'ān. His idea that Truth transcends the terrestrial faiths would have led to universalism, as he disassociated it from his Scripture's teachings. He did not do so finally. Pan-Islamism, therefore, remained for him a Muslim rather than a worldwide movement, which seems proven by the anti-Western tone he gave to it.

How did Abul-Kalām Āzād define its *political* contents? Clearly, he did not

consider it "a figment of the brain," thereby disagreeing with Amīr 'Alī, but as an actual phenomenon of his time. In advocating the creation of a Muslim *bloc* and revolutionary methods to throw off the imperialist yoke, he was indebted to al-Afghānī. The *jihād* (active or passive) was permitted, because it was fought for a just cause.[68] It implies his acknowledgment of opposition between the *dār-ul-Ḥarb* and the *dār-ul-Islām*, which (from his viewpoint, at least) is anchored in human ignorance. It does not *really* exist, for ultimately all is rooted in unity.

The *jihād* is justified as a political expedient to remove imperialism; at the same time, it is a "crusade" to lead the impious onto the right path and, hence, to God. When these goals have been attained, an international brotherhood can be constructed. This *Millat*, containing all of mankind, constitutes a unity and is Islamic, because it conforms to God's Law laid down in the Qur'ān. It cannot comprise non-Muslims, because then there is schism, which is expressly forbidden by Scripture, which says (vi 160): "As to those who split up their religion and become sects, have thou nothing to do with them: their affair is with God only. . . ." The argument is that non-Muslims (in the sense of unbelievers in God) necessarily must be excluded from the pious community. At the same time, an effort must be made to bring them in. Consequently, the *Millat* becomes an international *Muslim* congregation, which can be called pan-Islamic because it includes the entire world, whose inner directive is God-given.

Abul-Kalām Āzād's pan-Islamic doctrine is founded on Muslim theories of unity and conversion, but has a connotation different from that which ordinarily is given to it. The classical jurists contended that a *jihād* against the "People of the Book" (*Ahl al-Kitāb*) is justified, because they do not adhere as yet *fully* to Allāh's tenets; in other words, they have distorted their own Scriptures and thereby incurred His disfavour.[69] They would have disagreed with his statement that all religions contain some element of truth, but might not have quarrelled with him on the issue that there is "unity in Truth," for God, symbolising the Truth, is one. They would have dissented from his view that, despite diversity, the human race forms one brotherhood, unless the conditional phrase: if they have been islamised, is implied.[70] No discord exists, of course, on the theory that the Qur'ān contains the Faith in all its purity. Abul-Kalām's pan-Islamic doctrine, as stated, is based mainly on Qur'ānic teachings, but it did not lose the modern political connotation. And yet, the militant anti-British platform is neither contrary to juridical nor to Qur'ānic dectorine, for imperialism means unprovoked attacks which Muslims have the right to repel. His theory seems to mirror also the tension between Christianity and Islam. He wished to dissolve the conflict, believing in consonance with

orthodox Muslim opinion that this aim only could be reached by establishing an identical religio-political fraternity. His message of unity and equality was, perhaps, a plea for friendship directed towards the Western Powers, particularly Great Britain. The fierce tone he adopted in his writings and speeches leaves no doubt, however, of the offensive in which he was engaged. Pan-Islamism, whose anti-British mood was contrary to Abul-Kalām's belief in the brotherhood of man, was a fiery movement, stirring up India's Muslim community. It was a modern political expression of Muḥammad's teaching to guarantee unity in the fragmented Islamic congregation. It also signified the desire for a universal conversion, enabling man to build the (Muslim) City of God on earth. Thus, unity and peace would be guaranteed for ever.

Lastly, the issue concerning his Indianism *versus* his pan-Islamism needs to be examined. It raises the question whether a Muslim's collaboration with Hindus and his choice to remain in India after Pakistan's creation are justified under Islamic Law. It will be presented in some detail in the appropriate chapter.[71] Suffice it to say here that he worked closely with the Hindu and Muslim leaders to gain India's freedom and that he could not subscribe to the Pakistan movement, which, he felt, was based on mistrust. His decision to remain in India after 1947 seems to imply his repudiation of, rather than his concern with, the restitution of an integrated self-functioning *jamā'at*. His Indianism would have been logical only if it had meant the realisation of his aim : to convert the Hindu majority to Islam. In practice, this was impossible. By his choice, he advocated allegiance not to a Muslim, but to a Hindu, Government, thereby following the "secular" principle that a man's faith does not necessarily dictate his political loyalty. Such a view is, however, contrary to his own doctrine which, as stated, in spite of its universalist tendencies, was anchored in Qur'ānic teachings.

3. Muḥammad 'Alī (1879-1930)[72]

(*a*) *Biography.* This Indo-Muslim patriot was born at Rampur, "a small Muslim princely state in northern India,"[73] where his father (whom he lost at the age of two) was a courtier. His mother insisted that he received an English education. After some training in his birthplace, he was sent to Bareilly (in 1889) and, afterwards, entered Aligarh College (June 1890), where Muḥammad Shiblī was one of his masters.[74] He then went to Allahabad University, which granted him a Bachelor of Arts Degree (1896) and, subsequently, to Oxford (Lincoln College), earning an Honours Degree (second class) in Modern History. After spending four years abroad (1898-1902), the youth went back to India, serving for a while as the head of Rampur's State Education Department. He left for a brief residence in

England (April-July 1902) to receive the Honours Degree and, returning home, proceeded immediately to Allahabad where he took, and failed, the High Court examination. Muḥammad 'Alī then entered the Baroda State Civil Service. During this period, he wrote an essay, entitled "Thoughts on the Present Discontent,"[75] an address expressing the objectives of Muslim University,[76] and contributed a number of articles to various newspapers and journals.[77] He also took a part in the founding of the Muslim League (set up in 1906). Due to the narrow scope of his work in Baroda, he requested a two-year leave from its Mahārājah, who granted the request. He decided to become a journalist and left for Calcutta, then the centre of British administration, reaching there on 1 January 1911. Here he launched *The Comrade*, an English weekly, which he said was " 'the comrade of all and partisan of none,' "[78] Its first issue appeared during the second week of that month.[79] With the translocation of the capital to Delhi,[80] Muḥammad 'Alī made this city his home. He continued publishing *The Comrade* and started an Urdu daily in 1913—a year after *al-Hilāl* was launched by Abul-Kalām Āzād—called the "Standard" (*Hamdard*) to gain a wider audience among the public non-conversant with English. It became immensely popular,[81] but the Government had appointed a censor and, consequently, it did not last long. He, himself, contributed very few articles to his Urdu paper.[82]

> *The Comrade* did not start with any bitterness towards the British Government, but the annulment of the Partition of Bengal and the political tension engendered by the Tripoli and Balkan wars, affected its attitude. Before long, there were other causes, which fed the fires of hatred. The controversy about Muslim University was one and before it died down, there was serious trouble at Cawnpore after the demolition, by the Public Works Department, of the portion of a mosque.[83]

It was particularly Muḥammad 'Ālī's denunciation of the British attitude towards Turkey[84] that caused British seizure of his press and journals, followed by his imprisonment on 15 May 1915 on the charge of sedition against His Majesty's Government. He was freed (together with Abul-Kalām Āzād) by Royal Proclamtion of 25 December 1919.

He now entered another stage in his political career, throwing himself into the *Khilāfat* movement[85] and journeying to Europe to enlist Western support for it (1 March-4 October 1920). Upon his return to India, he became Principal of the Muslim University, inaugurated on 29 October. By the end of December, however, he left Aligarh for Nagpur, appointing someone else (Mr Khwaja) as principal-in-charge. The reason for his departure was his desire to continue his political career. At Nagpur, he worked together with Mahatma Gaudhi, whose non-violent Non-Co-operation programme and demand for self-government *(swarāj)* he supported. He and

his brother then toured North and East India, urging the population to back the movement and returned to Aligarh in March 1921. His fiery speeches alarmed the authorities; Lord Reading[86] held an interview with Gandhi to gain precise information and understanding of the Non-Co-operation Movement and ascertain the extent to which the Muslim's statements conformed with the Hindu's interpretation. Gandhi (perhaps as a sarcastic gesture towards the British) agreeing with the Viceroy's assertion that Muḥammad 'Alī misinterpreted the nature of the Movement, asked the latter for an official statement, which he received. It pledged that " 'as long as we are associated with the movement of non-violent non-co-operation we shall not directly or indirectly advocate violence." '[87] The statement was regarded by the Moderate and the Anglo-Indian Press as an "apology" to prevent incarceration. This seems hardly likely in view of Muḥammad 'Alī's continued public appearances. Accompanied by Gandhi, he toured North and and East India (particularly Assam and Bengal). Enroute to Madras, they stopped at Vizagapata to make some speeches, but were arrested (14 September 1921) for sedition.[88] At his trial, begun at Karachi on 26 October, he gave his famous address to the jury.[89] He asserted that all men have religious freedom under the Queen's Proclamation of 1858 and that no one may act against his conscience before God, "the sole Ruler," even if the King himself may command him to do so. He scored English diplomacy, which was responsible for the Indo-Muslim resolve to work with Congress for self-government. The jury declared him guilty "under the minor charges of mischief, etc. . . ."[90] The judge, agreeing with its verdict, sentenced Muḥammad 'Alī to two years' imprisonment. Having regained his freedom, he went on a brief mission to Turkey. For some years thereafter he seems to have remained in the background.[91] His denunciation of the Nehru Report (which was published in 1928) "on Muslim communal grounds"[92] again drew attention upon him; the following year, he led a deputation to Lord Irwin (Viceroy from 1926 to 1931), asking that Muslims be exempt from the decree forbidding child marriage.[93] He went to London to attend the first Round Table Conference (1930),[94] but was so sick that he had to be hospitalised. He died there on 3 January 1931. In accordance with his request, he was buried in Jerusalem. Apart from his many articles, he wrote an autobiography: *My Life; A Fragment*.[95]

(*b*) *The Pan-Islamic Propagandist*. The brief biography here shows that Muḥammad 'Alī was a pan-Islamist, a *khilāfatist*, an Indian nationalist, and, lastly, a communalist. The present discussion focusses mainly on his pan-Islamism, as his other ideas will be examined where appropriate.[96]

In *The Comrade*, he gave a solid exposition of pan-Islamism, which is worth repeating:

Pan-Islamism, when we come to consider its etymology, is a meaningless tissue of passion and prejudice. If it means anything, it refers to the existence of a community of sentiment and aspiration among the Mussalmans of the world as brought into existence by their religion. In that case, Islam bears exactly the same connotation, being the name of a set of beliefs and ideals, common to the entire Mussalman races. Interpreting the word in this sense, no Mussalman need be ashamed of its application. His sympathies are co-extensive with his religion, and a race and a country has never captured him to the extent of the utter immersion in a narrow patriotism of the ideals which the acceptance of Islam has made his. . . . The Mussalmans have proved their loyalty as subject races under alien systems of government. They have developed the true civic sense and the necessary political consciousness as citizens of the State. Islam does not hamper such development. Territorial patriotism is not at all incompatible with the spiritual catholicity of a religion that has declared in a set of common ideals the brotherhood of man, and the supreme shallowness of the distinctions reared by the prejudice of colour and race. . . . Mussalmans know this that Pan-Islamism is the cry of the aggressive Europeans, and that from race prejudice, it has grown into a cult. . . . If Pan-Islamism is anything different from every-day Islam, the Mussalmans do not believe it. Its real significance can be explained by some of those gentlemen who founded the Pan-Islamic society of London.[97]

In other words, pan Islamism refers basically to the Islamic faith and ideals shared by all Muslims, which explains its universal nature (expressed by the word *pan* or "all"), and the trans-national sympathy felt by its adherents towards each other. This is part and parcel of the concept of brotherhood enunciated by the Prophet Muḥammad. Therefore, it is not a new doctrine, but rather the foundation of the *Millat*, formed in the seventh century of the Christian (equivalent to the first of Muslim) era. To say, therefore, that it is a subversive movement is entirely erroneous. If it were, India's Muslims would not support the British ; they do, however, which shows that they are not seditionists. Muḥammad 'Alī's accusation and defence remind one of Sir Sayyid's, although the circumstances differed in the nineteenth century. In effect, pan-Islamism is a Muslim defence against Western aggression. In an article, entitled "The Future of Islam," Muḥammad 'Alī wrote :

In India, the *Pioneer* cries . . .

"At all points the independent dominion of the Moslem is hemmed in and threatened. The future seems dark for its continuance in any part of the world."

That being the case we consider pan-Islamism only as a force for purposes of defence, not of defiance. . . .

So far as the phantasm is aggressive it is certainly as the Rt. Honourable Mr. Ameer Ali said, "created by Europe to create a prejudice against Islam."[98]

Not only does he denounce the false contention that pan-Islamism is a novel development, but also that it is essentially militant in nature. The

interpretation that it is aggressive is derived from the external situation. When an adversary prefers force to peaceful deliberations, opposition from the threatened party must be expected. The Westerners' attack is a triple one: on the Muslim faith, its institutions, its very territory including the holy places. Under such circumstances, solidarity is the more necessary, even if it has a negative aspect called disloyalty—from a European viewpoint. The positive facet: protection of faith and civilisation is far more important, for this is the believer's duty. To do otherwise would constitute rebellion against God. After all, the Europeans, themselves, have gone to war to save their civilisation and are still engaged in propagating it. Sedition, therefore, is not the case at all in India. Yet, the British seem to understand neither the essential character of pan-Islamism nor concede to the Muslims the right to preserve their own religion, culture and integrity. In *The Comrade* and *Hamdard*, he exposed the "lie"; namely, that the British government in London means well, exhorting its Administrators in India to be true to their word. Their behaviour shows, however, their lust for power and their insensitivity to Muslim sentiments. It is, indeed, they who stimulate animosity and the intense desire to strengthen, if any, the bond linking all Muslims together since the beginning of their history in a common effort to save themselves from extinction. If they say that pan-Islamism is aggressive, they are correct in so far as it represents an effort on the part of the Muslim world to withstand the violation upon its faith and heritage. Essentially, however, it is not a militant movement, but identical with the religion whose name it bears. It is symbolised by the *Millat*, this unique structure built on the pillars of spiritual enlightenment and peace. It must be saved at all cost from the threatened destruction, because not only does it reflect Muslim solidarity, but it alone attests to the dictum that God, not man, must be obeyed. In his address to the jury, he asserted:

> The world is not divided into two parts—one God's and the other Caesar's. No. . . . God is the sole Ruler. . . . And if the king or any other human creature . . . demand from you anything which is against God, then that demand is not to be satisfied. It is God alone whose demand is to be satisfied. . . .[99]

Allah created the *Millat*, of which He is the supreme Ruler; it is the spiritual-minded Community, whose laws are laid down in the Qur'ān. Islam, then, preaches brotherhood and peace and pan-Islamism is nothing more than the explicit confession on the part of all Muslims to adhere to its teachings. In effect, Muḥammad 'Alī hoped that "'Islam as a spiritual force one day would dominate the world, and with its simple rationalism purge it of the dross of superstition as well as of the Godless materialism.'"[100] He favoured, therefore, expansion of the *Millat* in order that it may embrace the whole of mankind. Only then can brotherhood and peace truly prevail.

In presenting an analysis of Muḥammad 'Alī's pan-Islamic doctrine, the following observations may be made. His interpretation of pan-Islamism as a defensive movement would imply (*a*) juxtaposition between the Christian and the Muslim world ; and (*b*) consequently, a political as well as a religious contest. He did not deny the existence of the struggle, but its definition as "pan-Islamic," which, he held, was a Western invention. His statement that pan-Islamism is basically the same as the religion whose name it bears, has been cited. He regarded it, therefore, as a universalistic spiritual movement, which essentially is not militant in character. This view, which seems indebted in part to Abul-Kalām's doctrine, does not seem entirely valid in view of the anti-British tone he adopted finally in *The Comrade*. It was stated, furthermore, that the creation of a universal brotherhood, conceived of along *Islamic* lines, implies a struggle with every other faith for world dominion. Perhaps, Muḥammad 'Alī objected more to the characterisation of the tension along political lines ; after all, he regarded pan-Islamism as not being at all "different from every-day Islam". It would mean his preference for defining it in terms of a spiritual movement, but even here, a "political" aspect is involved (as was pointed out), because the struggle between Islam and Christianity is not dissolved thereby. What conclusion, then, can be drawn ?

His assertion that pan-Islamism is not a new movement is correct if, historically, it is regarded as being co-extensive, and in its nature to be identical, with the faith. If, however, it is held to have been influenced by pan-Slavism (which he obviously denied) or by modern political circumstances (which he did not altogether dismiss), pan-Islamism can be said to have gained a new form in the sense, indeed, that it is *aggressively de*fensive rather than *of*fensive (as it was at the time of Muslim expansion). Hence, it is justified even as a military movement (*jihād*) as well as a political expression, which he called "territorial patriotism," which, after all, allows for self-defence. His statement, that Islam is "a set of common ideals" shared by mankind, implies furthermore that it supersedes all other faiths. Here he is Qur'ānic.

The inherent dilemma in his viewpoint is his rejection of the dual—political and spiritual—aspect of life in consonance with orthodox dogma without being able altogether to shed the politico-militaristic orientation forced upon him by contemporary circumstances.

His intensive efforts during the 1920's to save the Khilāfat implies his admission that Muslim obedience is due ultimately to a Muslim government, even if it is non-Indian and its centre lies outside his country. His thesis that Indian Islam could be loyal to the British Government if it protected its religion and rights[101] seems a contradiction in terms, if not in actual

fact. The British felt that he should be accused, and so they did, of sedition.[102] Besides, a lot had happened between Sir Sayyid's and Muḥammad 'Alī's time. The speeches and actions of the Indo-Muslim leaders had created a new mood: a longing for self-government under their own head. To that end, the Muslim League, which was to become *the* political organ of Islamic India was created in 1906,[103] that is, nearly a decade before he turned pro-Khilāfat.

In spite of his dying an Indian nationalist, refusing to accept communalism as a threatening divisive factor,[104] he unwittingly contributed to it by his fiery articles, speeches and activities. In his defence, he had said: "I will not be a party to . . . killing . . . for personal malice, but for the sake of my God and I will kill all."[105] By pronouncing such words long before the Pakistan movement officially got under way,[106] Muḥammad 'Alī could be called its Messiah. He shared with Abul-Kalām Āzād the desire to retain India's unity, on condition—implicit rather than explicit, of course—that it be islamised. How else could he have rationalised his intense longing for Indo-Muslim sovereignty?

4. *The Khilāfat Movement*

(*a*) *Doctrine.* A brief synopsis of the nature and evolution of *Khilāfatism* is essential for appreciating the enthusiastic support given it particularly by Indian Islam.[107]

The origin of the *Khilāfat* movement lies in the conception of rulership formulated by the Qur'ān, which states (xxxv. 37): "He hath appointed you His vicegerents in the earth." The Arabic term for "vicegerent" is *khalīfah,* which word was known in pre-Islamic times. In its verbal form (*khalafa*) it means "to come after the father" and, therefore, also "to succeed to the father". Hence, it refers to the son who becomes his father's successor or heir.[108] Inasmuch as Islam conceives of the God-man relationship in terms of that prevailing between father and son,[109] the notion of the vicegerent as Allah's successor in the sense of heir or deputy is not far-fetched. This interpretation did not prevail as will be seen. "In the classical literature, the word can be used for substitute used for the deputy of some official."[110] In effect, the term "caliph" received two different meanings (apart from the least popular one cited), viz. "successor to the Prophet" and "Successor to the Throne" or follower upon the last sovereign. Muḥammad combined the two functions of the "Apostolate" (*Rasā'il*) and the Sovereignty (*Imāmate*). In the former role, he was Prophet and lawgiver; in the latter, the military and political head of a budding Islamic State. The centre of his control lay in Medina rather than Mecca, for it remained his residence after his "Flight" (Hegira).[111] He had one major duty: to impose God's Law revealed to him and laid down in the Qur'ān. Consequently he

was God's deputy in the true sense and has remained the highest "official" in the Muslim world.

Upon his death, however, the problem of the Caliphate began. He had not assigned any successor, although his "appointment" on his death-bed of Abū Bakr as prayer-leader has been regarded sometimes as an explicit indication of the Prophet's choice. The implication then would be that Muḥammad preferred qualifications (and age, the index of wisdom at that time) to personal relationships in his successor's selection. In any case, the "Apostolate" came to an end upon his death for no one could assume his role of Prophet and lawmaker dependent upon revelation. Other men could act, however, as heads-of-state and Islam's protectors. When Abū Bakr, following upon Muḥammad as the Muslims' leader (632 4) was called " 'Caliph of the Apostle of God,' " he replied: " 'I am the Caliph of the Prophet of Allah, and I am satisfied with this (designation).' "[112] The next hand, 'Umar (634-44), hated the title " 'Caliph of the Apostle of God' "[113] and called himself "Commander of the Believers" (*Amīr al-Mū'minīn*). The interpretation is that they succeeded to Muḥammad's political leadership in contradistinction to his unique status as Prophet and lawgiver. However, the caliphs were obliged by their faith and eminent position to defend and propagate Allah's Law as decreed by the Qur'ān.

Despite the accusation that the Caliphate[114] had degenerated into a kingship during Umayyad rule (661-750), with the result that the *imāmate* or spiritual leadership no longer had much force, it had to be maintained in order that the religious laws (codified in the *Sharī'ah*) be preserved and applied.[115] Indeed, the *Sharī'ah* is the prime foundation of the Islamic Community (*Ummah*), whose development is guided by Allah and whose continuity is guaranteed by the infallible authority of consensus (*ijmā'*).[116] Although the continuity was broken, due to political rivalry, al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), writing two generations after al-Māwardī, stated that " 'there are those who hold that the *imāmate* is dead, lacking as it does the required qualification. But no substitute can be found for it. What then? Are we to give up obeying the law?' "[117] He said elsewhere: " ' whosoever he may be to whom the possessor of military power gives his allegiance, that person is the Ḥalīfa.' "[118] In other words, the oath was still considered necessary by al-Ghazālī, a view not held by all subsequent jurists.[119] The upheaval, caused by the invasions of the unislamised Mongols, destroying the Abbasid Caliphate with Baghdad's capture in 1258, demanded a new juridical foundation on which to base Muslim political theory in order "to safeguard the principle of the supremacy of the Sarī'a and the function of the Ḥalīfa as its upholder."[120] Subsequently, a new doctrine of the Caliphate was formulated, according to which "the Ḥilāfa lasted for thirty years only, and that

thereafter there was only an Imāma to which the caliphial titles were attached as it were by courtesy."[121] However, Ibn Jamā'ah's theory that the *Imāmah* belongs to any "military usurper" was not accepted by Ibn Khaldūn who distinguished "between secular kingship and the Ḥilāfa" and held "that it is only the righteous ruler who governs with justice and who enforces the Sarī'a as the law of the Community that is entitled to the style of Ḥalīfa or Imām."[122]

When the Ottomon sulṭāns succeeded to the *Khilāfat* in the sixteenth century,[123] they claimed to be *imāms* in their domains. Their use of the terms *dār-ul-khilāfah* and *dār-ul-imāmah* (apart from *dar-us-salṭanah*) shows that, despite the fact that they were usurpers, they (as Muslims) regarded themselves to be the upholders of the *Sharī'ah*. Juridically, however, the Ottoman Caliphate was solely an *imāmate*, "and it is noteworthy that neither in their formal protocols nor in their official documents are the Ottoman sulṭāns accorded the title of Amīr al-Mū'minīn."[124] In other words, this epithet, apparently first used by 'Umar, the legitimate bearer also of the title "caliph" (or *imām*), no longer had the equivalent meaning in later times, as it was reserved solely for those who upheld the *Sharī'ah*, even though they were not necessarily caliphs.[125]

If their political leadership did not extend to the entire Muslim world,[126] their religious supremacy theoretically did, Consequently, the Ottoman sulṭāns, appropriately titled *imāms* or "sovereigns," could be styled *khalīfahs* reputedly as upholders of the *Sharī'ah*. Rashīd Riḍā' described the Muslim mood in his time as follows: "The inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire, of Egypt, of Tunis and India, said : 'The supreme Caliph has said, the supreme Caliph has done.'"[127] It clearly shows that the Caliphate, despite the changes it suffered,[128] continued to symbolise universal religious leadership to assure the preservation of the law and the Community.

The painful reality of events during the First World War led to Muslim apprehension concerning the Caliphate's fate. The group most actively engaged to save it was found In Islamic India. Nevertheless, Turkey's Grand National Assembly, presided over by Ataturk ("the father of the Turkish nation"), abolished first the Sulṭanate (on 1 November 1922) and, later, the Caliphate (on 3 March 1924). "Thus an institution hallowed with tradition of thirteen centuries," wrote the Indian *maulavī* Muḥammad Barakatullah, "an embodiment of might and grandeur of the Orient in the eyes of European nations and a shield of defence for Islam during the last four hundred years passed away as if in a twinkling of an eye."[129] The decision to end the Caliphate reflects the view of a group of Turkish Muslims that the ancient edifice no longer suited the spirit of modern times. The legal question whether the Islamic Community could continue existing once it was deprived

of the *Khalīfah* did not concern them.[130]

(*b*) *Indo-Muslim Sentiments.* Prior to the Caliphate's abolition, India reached a supreme emotional pitch, characterised by two movements known as *Khilāfatism* and Non-Co-operation, designed respectively to retain the institution and to gain freedom from the British. It is particularly the first-mentioned one that is relevant to the present discussion.[131]

When it became clear from Allied military victories that the Caliphate was endangered, India's Muslims energetically tried to save it. One of the organisations sprouting up during this period was the *Khuddām-i-Ka'bah* ("Servants of the Mecca Shrine"), which "was chiefly concerned with defending by propaganda the integrity and sanctity of the whole Arabian peninsula and especially the Hijaz,"[132] birthplace of the Prophet and, hence, holy land for the Muslims. All India *Khilāfat* conferences were organised throughout the land and funds collected to support the cause. Muḥammad 'Alī together with his brother Shawkat, after emerging from prison, founded the Central Khilāfat committee and issued the *Khilāfat* Manifesto in January 1920 They urged the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford (1916-21), "to receive the Khilafat Conference Deputation,"[133] and informed him of the " 'minimum' " demands satisfactory to India's Muslims:

> Arabia as delimited by Muslim authorities and the holy places of Islam must remain under the control of the Khalifa, full guarantees being taken consistently with the dignity of a Sovereign State for genuine Arabic self-government should the Arabs desire it.
>
> . . . Islam has ever associated temporal power with the Khilafat. We therefore consider that to make the Sultan a mere puppet would add insult to injury and would only be understood by Indian Muslims as an affront given them by a combination of Christian powers. . . . [134]

The Manifesto also stated that " 'arrangements are in train for the deputation to proceed to England, Persia, America and Turkey through the kind assistance of His excellency.' "[135] Accordingly, a deputation, consisting of Muḥammad 'Alī (its leader), *Sayyid* Sulaymān Nadwī and Mr Sayyid Ḥusayn, sailed for England in February 1920, reaching there on 1 March. The next day he was received by Mr Fisher (the Education Minister) and, later, by Lloyd George on 17 March. The Prime Minister asked the Muslim deputy whether he was against the Arabs' independence and advocated Britain's handing them over to Turkish rule. Muḥammad 'Alī replied that he did not oppose Arab self-determination and was certain that, if Britain remained aloof, a satisfactory Turko-Arabic settlement could be reached. " 'To us,' he said, 'it is much more important that not a single stain should remain on the fair name of Islam.' "[136] He worked together with Amīr 'Alī[137] and pleaded the *Khilāfat* cause indefatigably before British Government representatives, party leaders and the public. In one speech, he explained

the essential nature of *Khilāfatism* :

We speak not for the Turks but speak for ourselves. . . . Islam does not recognize geographical and racial barriers such as the nationalism of modern Europe. . . . In a word, it is not national but supernational. . . . To the Muslims of India the Turk is not only a man but a brother . . . because he shares with us a common outlook on life and common institutions and laws that . . . perpetuate the culture of Islam. . . . And the embodiment of that common culture is the Khilafat. . . . And it has two centres. The personal centre is the Khalifa and the local centre is the Island of Arabia, the Sanctuary of Islam, the Land of the Prophets. The Khalifa is the Commander of the Faithful and his commands must be obeyed by the Muslims so long . . . as they are not at variance with the commandments of God and the Traditions of his Prophet. . . .[158]

He stated furthermore that the main rationale of *Khilāfatism* was the defence of the faith, which he characterised as "our first claim," while "our second claim is that the Island of Arabia . . . should remain in exclusive Muslim control . . . within the scheme of Ottoman sovereignty."[159] In another speech, given somewhat later, he placed the following resolution before the audience :

That this meeting urges upon the Government the necessity for taking into serious consideration, in the Turkish settlement, the religious obligations of the Muslims (who in India alone number some 70 million citizens of the British Empire) and the national sentiments of United India.[140]

His pleas fell on deaf ears as did the deputation's request for a hearing before the Supreme Council, meeting at San Remo. In a cable which it sent to the Allied Powers, it stated, amongst others, that no communication existed between the British Government and the Indian people and that its Muslims were not represented on the Indian Official Delegation.[141] Muḥammad 'Alī left London for Paris, where he was received by the Premier, Georges Clemenceau, on 12 August, two days after the signing of the Sevres Treaty. He then went on to Rome where he had an audience with Pope Benedict XV on 20 August. His efforts to obtain Western support for the *Khilāfat* cause were in vain. In a message sent to India, he wrote : " 'Our representations have, however, yielded no tangible results. . . . It now rests with our people to initiate such further action as may be called for . . .' "[142]

In his homeland, meanwhile, the agitation, in which Abul-Kalām Āzād and other distinguished Muslims[143] took part, continued. The failure to impress the Allies with their demands induced Indo-Muslim acceptance of Gandhi's Non-Co-operation movement.[144] The nationalist-minded Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā'-i-Hind ("Association of Indian Muslim Clergy"), founded early in the 1910's and representing theological opinion, also supported it, partly because it meant Hindu acknowledgment of Muslim claims. When Muḥammad 'Alī came back on 4 October 1920, the seeds of revolt had been sown.

India's Muslims, infuriated by the Sevres Treaty (1920) terms, determined along with the Hindus to rid themselves from British control. The subsequent events nearly seem to be an anti-climax to the drama. The 'Alī brothers, Abul-Kalām Āzād and many others were imprisoned during the latter part of 1921 in a Government effort to crush the "nationalist-Khilafat movement."[145] Gandhi called off his movement in February 1921, at a time when most leaders were in jail, which shocked the Muslims. "The emotional frustration that ensued was morbid."[146] It was aggravated by Turkey's declaring the Sulṭanate abolished. A new ruler[147] was invested with the title of *Khalīfah*, but shorn of all political power. Indo-Muslim demands that he retain his suzerainty over all of the Ottoman domains to ensure Arabia's inviolability, execution of the *Sharī'ah*, and unity was unheeded. At the Gaya session, held conjointly by the All-India Khilāfat Committee, the Jam'īyat-ul-'Ulamā'-i-Hind and Congress (Christmas 1922), Turkey's action was approved, but a request was made for the maintenance of the Caliphate, an indirect hint of the fear that it, too, might be terminated.

"The majority of educated Indian Muslims was soon paying little attention to the Indian Khilāfat organization ; for it was becoming fairly clear that nothing that organization did was likely to have much relevance or effect. The struggle was over, their enthusiasm was a spent force. Disillusioned, they turned their energies elsewhere."[148] At the Cocanada meeting of Congress (December 1923), presided over by Muḥammad 'Alī, it was decided to send a deputation—of which he and Āghā Khān, Sr., were members—to Turkey's Chief of State. The Āghā Khān, jointly with Amīr 'Alī meanwhile had sent a letter (from London) to that country's Prime Minister, pointing out " 'the very disturbing effects the present uncertain position of the Caliph-Imām is exercising among the vast populations who belong to the Sunnī communion.' " They expressed " 'regret that Islam, as a great moral and cohesive force, is losing among large sections of the Sunnī population, owing to the diminution in the Caliph's dignity and prestige, its weight and influence.' "[149] Ataturk felt irritated by Indo-Muslim interference and paid heed neither to the letter's nor the deputation's request. The Caliphate was ended, but the Indian Khilāfat Committee continued in existence. It "announced in 1925 that it had turned its attention to the communal welfare of the Indian Moslems:"[150] It also manifested interest in the Islamic Congresses which were held from time to time. At the time of Muḥammad 'Alī's death, it was assisting the organisation of such a Congress at Jerusalem (December 1931), but his brother, attending it, complained that it was far more Arab than Islamic in its orientation.[151]

Another stormy episode in Indo-Muslim history had ended. The Committee's quoted statement pointed to its new policy (communalism), which

raised fresh problems concerning the destiny of the Indian Mussalman without adequately solving the older ones.

In retrospect, the question may be asked why India's Muslims felt so deeply about the Caliphate. Firstly, they did not constitute politically a part of it since at least the thirteenth century, when the Delhi Sulṭanate was established. Secondly, two Mughal Emperors, Akbar[152] and Aurangzeb[153] (respectively the Dynasty's founder and its last important scion), were styled "Commander of the Faithful," a title which was shown to be seldom used by the Ottoman sulṭāns. It would imply that, despite the fact of the former's "alleged" supremacy, the Muslim world should have considered these Mughals as its religious leaders. However, this was not the case for the reasons shown; mainly, because the Caliphal office in the course of time did not lose its spiritual adjunct, despite the changed interpretation. Furthermore, the title "commander of the faithful," itself, underwent a change of meaning as the military aspect came to be stressed.[154] Therefore, India's Muslims (like all) looked to the Caliph as their supreme leader, in contrast to their rulers styled "sulṭāns" or "kings."[155]

Another reason was the internal situation; not only were they under British rule, but they also formed India's largest minority, a situation not faced by their coreligionists in other parts of the Islamic world. The exasperation, due to constant friction between the Indo-Muslim community and the authorities on the one, and the Hindus on the other, hand led them to the belief that their salvation lay with membership in the world of Islam, for unity means strength. This view, in so far as it meant the formation of a militant Muslim *bloc* capable of withstanding the allied Western powers, was advanced by al-Afghānī. It was he who "indoctrinated" indirectly the men leading India's Muslims into the fight. Abul-Kalām Āzād rejected *taqlīd* not only because he regarded it as incompatible with the modern spirit, but also because it implied unquestioning acceptance of doctrine and, hence, implicit obedience to others. His "revolutionary" attitude was directed partly against the theologians and partly against those Muslims and others wishing to impose views contrary to the teachings of his religion. Indeed, he aimed at Islam's reconstruction (*tā'sīs*), which he distinguished from what he considered Sir Sayyid's undiluted modernism (*tajdīd*) [156] His programme, attainable by the use of *ijtihād*, was religious. However, it also had a political focus, for it meant repudiation of submission to the foreign authorities, and, hence, of the Aligarh tradition with its stress on obedience and co-operation. Muḥammad 'Ali neither could accept such subservience, which to him was due exclusively to God. Apart from political reasons, they could not to the best of their conscience accept Christian rule, as it implies obedience to a Queen or King rather than to Allah, and submission to a set of laws not

based on the Qur'ān.[157] The fact that they and Muslims elsewhere remained "loyal" to the foreign authorities is explained by the former's military weakness and educational backwardness as compared with the latter's. Abul-Kalām Āzād's argument that basically all religions form a unity and Muḥammad 'Alī's statement during his tr al that essentially Islam and Christianity (and other religions) are alike, because neither advocates rebellion against God, are not to be contested. Yet, the former's doctrine of unity implied islamisation and the latter's attitude rejected adherence to secular laws designed to maintain the peace. From his standpoint, they were in violation of God's decrees, for they were un-Qur'ānic and did not curb non-democratic rule; therefore, they must not be obeyed, the implication being that solely those governing the *Sharī'ah* are valid for a Muslim.

It is interesting to note that the British accusation and Muḥammad 'Alī's argumentation rest on the same principle that provoked Sir Sayyid: sedition and its denial.[158] Does this prove that India's authorities never fully trusted the Muslims since the outburst of the Mutiny? Muḥammad 'Alī agreed with his famous predecessor that their coreligionist countrymen are not a rebellious people, for their record shows their loyalty to the authorities. He also accepted the orthodox view that Muslims have no right to attack unless in self-defence and reached the same conclusion as the nineteenth-century theologians in stating that they are not engaged in aggressive activities. However, he dissented from some as well as Sir Sayyid by asserting that cause for militant opposition exists, because the Muslims are being provoked by the Europeans and Islamic civilisation is endangered (a view which could have been held also after 1857). Consequently, a *jihād* ("peaceful" or otherwise) is justified. Sir Sayyid had said: " 'Even if the British Government decides upon pursuing a policy hostile to the Turks, we are enjoined by our religion to obey our rulers loyally.' "[159] He based his view on the theory that the "orthodox" Caliphate had ended with 'Alī's death (in 661 C.E.) and that the Turks did not belong to Muḥammad's tribe (the Quraysh).[160] Sir Sayyid thus accepted the evolution of that part of the doctrine and repudiated the rest, thereby negating the validity of the Ottomans' claim to the Caliphate. He had not lost his memories of the Mutiny with its sad events and failure and feared that any Indo-Muslim alliance with non-British Governments might have adverse consequences for the Indian Musalman. Above all, he wished peace to assure Indo-Muslim advancement. In part, then, his thesis concerning the Caliphate was influenced by the political circumstances of his time; in part, it may have been his genuine conviction based on theological argument. Nevertheless, his thesis was contrary to the theologians' *ijmā'* and was rejected by the majority of India's Muslims. The main reason was their acceptance

of the doctrine which became "orthodox"; another was the imperialist drive forcing them to seek allies among their coreligionists abroad It is doubtful, furthermore, that they ever fully accepted Sir Sayyid's policy of friendship, pursued (as stated) mostly at his Aligarh residence. Their "passivity" in his time is explicable by their need to recoup their energies and attain new learning; by the turn of the twentieth century, they had become sufficiently revitalised to demonstrate their impatience with British insensibility towards Muslim sentiments and desires. Incessant irritations due to frictions with the Hindus (who began to exalt their own religion and culture) constituted another significant reason why they backed the *Khilāfat* movement led by such men as Abul-Kalām Āzād and Muḥammad 'Alī. Had these internal circumstances not existed, India's Muslims, by virtue of their religion's teachings and their acceptance of the *ijmā'* (which thus expanded into a consensus of the "community") still would have had no choice but to support it. Even if the Ottoman claim itself were negated (constituting *ijtihād*), the institution of the Caliphate was meant to keep the *Millat*—founded on the *Sharī'ah*—together. This is essentially what Muḥammad 'Alī and Amīr 'Alī meant when repudiating pan-Islamism in so far as it referred to an aggressive movement. They saw it mainly as a trans-national brotherhood cemented by a common faith and civilisation. Their defence of pan-Islamism as a spiritual fraternity could have served as a strong argument against Indo-Muslim sedition. However, it might be said to have an aggressive element as well, since the pan-Islamic fraternity consists at once of "warriors for the faith," i.e. it forms also a military caste. Furthermore, Muḥammad 'Alī's statement that any "aggressive" element found in pan-Islamism is due to imperialist hostility towards his faith seems to echo the theory of opposition between the *dār-ul-Islām* and the *dār ul-ḥarb*, acknowledging thereby the Muslim world's right to unite against a common foe.[161] It is reflected also in Abul-Kalām Āzād's theology, advocating Islamic unity, which is (rightly so from a Muslim viewpoint) equated with univesal redemption. In other words, Muḥammad 'Alī and Amīr 'Alī were neither altogether right in considering pan-Islamism as a "phantasm" nor wrong in interpreting it as being internally a peaceful fraternity.

Were the modernists justified in supporting *Khilāfatism*? It is not mentioned in the Qur'ān that the government in the form of a Caliphate is essential for the continuance of the *Millat*.[162] In effect, this theory seems to have been propagated towards the end of Umayyad rule by the Abbasids to gain adherents for their cause. Consequently, if reinterpretation is essential to recover the basic truths, India's Muslims should have rejected *Khilāfatism*. Sir Sayyid, as a modernist theologian, would seem to be more logical in repudiating it, as also Khudā Bakhsh, who exulted in its abolition.

He said :

The abolition of the Khilāfat is the most momentous event of modern times. Far-reaching are its consequences for good. It is the final fruition of purely Islamic ideas long struggling into supremacy. It ends a fiction and ushers in modern as opposed to mediaeval ideas ; it lays open the path for the development of nationalism and removes the embargo on liberalism. It will fashion for Islam a new sense of unity founded on truth, upon cultural traditions and materialized interests.[163]

Their views were "unorthodox" as they dissented from accepted opinion (*ijmā'*) and, indeed, were rejected. On the other hand, the argument advanced by the supporters of *Khilāfatism* also has validity, if the meaning and implication of the word *khalīfah* are stressed. Succession in the sense of continuing to apply God's Law revealed to the Prophet Muḥammad indicates a certain form, which is cosmic in its extent. This would imply, however, that political and religious leadership must be exercised by one person (caliph), because Islam holds that the first is rooted in the second. Acceptance of a man, divested from any but spiritual supremacy, would seem incompatible, therefore, with the "orthodox" doctrine of the Caliphate. It is also contrary to the experience (*sunnah*) of the Community (*Ummah*) during the Middle Ages. Lastly, in support of this view, the following theory may be cited : " 'The Caliphate means that authority invested in a person replacing the Prophet in the double mission of defending the Faith and governing the world.' "[164]

The Indo-Muslim *Khilāfatists'* approval of a new caliph's enthronement, furthermore, raises more questions than can be answered here, such as whether Muslims have the right to depose him, and, if so, on what legally valid grounds ;[165] whether he can occupy that position if shorn of political power—an issue touched upon above; whether the *Imāmate* (Caliphate) is essential (obligatory), practical or unnecessary. Muslim opinion was and remains divided on these issues. Suffice it to say that the modernist Turks shifted from the Ottoman to the third position in repudiating the Caliphate as a necessary institution, contrary to the Indo-Muslim view which follows rather the standpoint taken by such jurists as al-Māwardī.[166] Indian Islam was concerned chiefly with upholding it despite its deterioration, although Muḥammad 'Alī had said during his trial that, if a caliph disobeys God, a Muslim may not execute his decrees (i.e. the vow of allegiance is no longer binding), implying, indeed, that "it constitutes a prevention both of the conclusion of the Caliphal contract and of the continuation of the caliph's authority."[167] He may not have drawn this logical conclusion, particularly while he was under duress. Indo-Muslim fear for the Caliphate's fate echoes, nevertheless, a basic problem, viz. whether the *Millat* can continue, when

the Caliphate ceases to exist. Professor Barakatullah (probably influenced by Rashīd Riḍā') points to a possible answer by saying that "Risalet (the Divine Mission) constitutes the foundation,"[168] i.e. it is a spiritual institution. It would negate the thesis—in agreement with the modernist viewpoint—that a political structure (and unity) is essential for the continuance of the Islamic Community.[169] It is derived, perhaps, from the Muslim legalists' interpretation of the word "territory" (*dār*) as a geographical area "which has a special character derived from the rules applicable to it, its inhabitants and all that it contains."[170] The caliph's legitimate jurisdiction extends to that region within which the *Sharī ah* constitutes the basis of government. His jurisdiction being based on religious law, unifying the *dār-ul-Islām* (which notion, itself, is derived from the juridical concept of the term *dār*), a conclusion, namely, that the Caliphate is mainly a spiritual institution, could be reached.

The fundamental question to be asked in this connection is: how did Muḥammad conceive of his role? Did he consciously aim at creating a political State? Despite the protesting voices heard among modernists,[171] he might have thought along such lines. Unless the available historical records misinterpret his role (which is unlikely), is it not clear from them that he made the ultimate decisions affecting the political (no less than the religious) affairs of the budding Muslim community? He was a conqueror for the faith, but he made it the foundation of Islamic life in all its dimensions.[172] Furthermore, his brotherhood principle would indicate that he preferred a large undivided Muslim State; after all, he wished to forge a loyalty of a non-tribal nature so as to unify the Arabs and hoped, also, that Islam ultimately would trfumph over every other faith. In other words, Abul-Kalām Āzād's statement that unity can prevail only after conversion to the "true" religion (Islam) would seem to be in accord with Muḥammad's conception of a universal State ruled by the Qur'ān. It would imply, in effect, the reconstruction of the Caliphate, a global politico-religious (or better, perhaps, religio-political) institution.

The reality being otherwise, *maulavī* Barakatullah appears to have offered the most acceptable solution; to repeat, "that the original object of the Khilafet was to perpetuate the mission of the Prophet."[173] It means that the institution could continue, in spiritual form, and he gave, indeed, a detailed plan for its re-creation.[174] His suggestions have not been carried out, for reasons among which the following seemingly were the most significant: (1) the inherited dogma (cited previously) that political *and* religious supremacy are both essential for the Caliphate's continuance; (2) the feeling among non-Indian Muslim modernists (particularly Turks and Egyptians) that it is an outmoded institution;[175] (3) behind-the-scene

contests among various groups each preferring its own candidates;[176] and (4) the impact of the European concept of nationalism with its attendant insistence on frontier lines (a divisive factor) and self-government (implying rejection of "foreign," i.e. British as also Arab, or Turkish, interference).

The last-mentioned theory ultimately prevailed in Islamic India. It was supported by such eminent thinkers as Dr Muḥammad Iqbāl, who, at the same time, bewailed the weakening of the brotherhood caused by the painful tension between a Muslim's loyalty to his Community and his "fatherland" (*waṭan*).

Chapter VI

MUḤAMMAD IQBĀL

What can I do ? My nature is averse to rest ;
My heart is impatient like the breeze in the poppy field ;
From the spark to the star, from the star to the sun
Is my quest ;
I have no desire for a goal,
For me, rest spells death !
With an impatient eye and a hopeful heart
I seek for the end of that which is endless.—*Iqbal.*

Muḥammad Iqbāl (1873-1938) was born at Sialkot (West Pakistan) on 22 February 1873 (over a year after Sayyid Aḥmad Khān had founded the Anglo-Oriental College). He was educated at the Government College of Lahore where he received his Master of Arts Degree in Philosophy (in 1899). At this early stage of his life, he manifested the tendencies of a fine, lyrical poet endowed with fervid imagination. In 1905 he went to study at Cambridge (England) where he chose to specialise in Philosophy and Persian. At Munich (Germany) he obtained the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (in 1908) upon his presentation of a thesis on *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia.* He returned to London where he became a Barrister-at-Law ; towards the end of 1908 he went back to Lahore where, after teaching in his old college for two years, he "set up a Barrister's practice."[1]

In India, he witnessed the growing friction between the two groups. Like other spiritual and political leaders of the Indo-Muslim community, he also felt the urgent need for some programme that would insure the political safety as well as the protection of the economic and social welfare, religious freedom and cultural pattern of that community. He took an active part in political activities, *though he was not a politician* per se. His political approach was anti-imperialistic and Pan-Islamic. During the First World War, he passionately defended Islam and Turkey, while he ardently denounced Great Britain.

He was chosen as president of the Muslim League[2] in 1926. In his address delivered at its annual meeting at Allahabad (1930),[3] he said, in part :

I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated

North Western Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North West India.[4]

This statement, made ten years prior to the adoption of a concrete political programme by the Muslim League,[5] clearly implies the poet's vision of a Muslim state on the subcontinent. No one, including Iqbāl himself, took it seriously; he regarded it more as the dream of a poet. Yet, future events were to give shape and reality to the dream.

Iqbāl accepted the invitation to attend the Round Table Conferences which were held in London in 1930-2[6] for the purpose of examining political reforms in the governing of India.[7] After the close of the last of these Conferences, Iqbāl returned to India and advised his Indo-Muslim countrymen to trust solely in their own people. Henceforth he lived a quiet life in Lahore.

A few years later, on 21 April 1938, after having contributed a priceless share to the heritage of not solely the Indian Muslims, not solely the Muslims, but of all men, Iqbāl died. If, contrary to Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, Iqbāl (who had also been knighted by the British)[8] did not agree with British policy and went so far as to show hostility toward the foreign ruler of India, he did continue the work commenced by the former in the sense of raising the Indo-Muslim community out of despair by infusing it with strength, and teaching it that it can and must play its role in the secular domain, for which it is not necessary to give up the Islamic heritage. Iqbāl (like Sir Sayyid) also favoured communal electorates and was opposed to Muslim participation in the Congress.

Through his poetry, Iqbāl reached the masses; through his sophisticated writings, he communed with the learned; and in both forms of expression he embodied his philosophy of God and man. If he was an Indian, he was also a Muslim in that he looked beyond the frontiers of India;[9] if he presented conservative ideas, he was a progressive and, from an orthodox Muslim viewpoint, a revolutionary. Above all, he was a humanitarian and an idealist. He was an inspirer of politics rather than a politician, which makes him supremely important in the movement for political independence of the Indo-Muslim community. The appeal which Iqbāl made through his poetry to the Indian Muslims had sweeping political effects. The poet's vision stirred up the ferment, to be "exploited" by practical political-minded men.

Among these, by far the most important was the late Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ (1876-1948) who, like Iqbāl, had been president of the League (in 1916) and had attended the Round Table Conferences in London. Iqbāl and Jinnāḥ were in constant correspondence with each other and the latter's gradual change of attitude toward a "communalist" approach was, at least, in part due to Iqbāl's influence. The poet's vision was ultimately translated by the political craftsman into a bold programme. In 1940, two years after Iqbāl's death, Jinnāḥ said: "No power on earth can prevent Pakistan."

History can attest to the truth of that statement. The Muslim League adopted it as its platform in February 1940, during its session at Lahore. The Indian Press designated it as the "Pakistan resolution". Seven years later, on 15 August 1947, Pakistan was proclaimed officially as an independent sovereign state. Its first Governor General was Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ, the Quā'id-i-A'ẓam, the Father of the Nation.

It is the mysterious force of history that brought together the poet and the politician at a time that circumstances ripened for this boldest of human efforts and achievements. The poet points the way. In the long chain of causes and effects in history—in this context, India history—the path had to lead to freedom, to self-expression In Indian Islam, at least, this self-expression implied an independent free state where the Muslim way of life would be adhered to, would be, so to speak, the life of the nation, and where Islamic culture would bloom and flourish. Iqbāl who did not only arouse the Indo-Muslim community into active restlessness, but gave its members a sense of direction based essentially on their own heritage, and Jinnāḥ, the practical politician who rallied to the cause of freedom, are the Lincoln and Washington of the free and sovereign Islamic Republic of Pakistan, whose citizens annually commemorate them in solemn ceremonies.

The most coherent statement of Iqbāl's philosophy is found in his *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam.*[10]

Iqbāl commences this work with an analysis of religious experience. The philosophical content of such experience is pure duration. The author refuses the concept of a fixed universe, replacing it with an ever expanding "free creative movement". He then proceeds to a discussion of the God concept, developing in this connection his interpretation of the Fall of man as narrated in the Qur'ān,[11] and of the immortality and freedom of man. The legend of man's Fall has as purpose 'to indicate man's rise from a primitive state of instinctive appetite to the conscious possession of a free self, capable of doubt and disobedience."[12] Iqbāl then continues to explore man's freedom of action and his immortality. "Man's first act of disobedience was also his first act of free choice."[13] Somewhat further he writes that man's individuality is not destroyed after death. However, "personal immortality . . . is not ours as of right; it is to be achieved by personal effort."[14]

In the chapter on "The Spirit of Muslim Culture" (Chapter V), Iqbāl emphasises that Muslim culture "fixes its gaze" on the finite, the concrete, which is a characteristic of the Qur'ān and with which knowledge begins; that there are two main ideas which "both form the foundation of the Qur'ānic teaching: "1. The unity of human origin,"[15] and "2. A keen sense of the reality of time, and the concept of life as a continuous movement in time."[16]

In the following chapter, he explains the "principle of movement" and other principles in the "structure of Islam" (i e. *Ijtihād*, *Ijmā'*, etc.).[17]

In the last chapter of the *Lectures*, raising the question whether religion is possible, Iqbāl denounces passivity, affirms that there are religious processes whose ultimate aim is identical with the final object of scientific processes, though both employ different methods The ultimate purpose is to experience the universe in a completely objective manner. "This final experience is the revelation of a new life-process—original, essential, spontaneous."[18] Towards the end of this last chapter, Iqbāl writes: "The final act is not an intellectual act, but a vital act which deepens the whole being of the ego, and sharpens his will with the creative assurance that the world is not something to be merely seen or known through concepts, but something to be made and remade by continuous action."

This very brief exploration of Iqbāl's *Lectures* serves solely to reveal the essence of his thought: passionate love for action (by action, Iqbāl means "spiritual activity" in the sense that activity must be guided by the principles of religion—in this context, Islam) and absolute negation of passivity; creation is not one act, but a continuous process; man has a unique status as a free, immortal individual (immortality in the sense of being saved through exertion of positive "personal offort"[19]), God's vicegerency on earth.

A more detailed analysis of the contents of Iqbāl's thought as well as his attempt to relate it to the daily life of the Muslim individual and the Muslim community is given in the pages that follow.

Iqbāl's Rejection of Passivity. Averse to pantheistic and mystical thought Iqbāl felt that the purity of Qur'ānic teaching had been spoiled by Greek and Persian influences. He calls Plato, who had no taste for action, "a philosopher of the sheep" because he is an exponent of contemplative philosophy.

Hinduism and and Ṣūfism hold to the concept of reabsorption of the individual entity (soul or "self") into the eternal "Self" and preach a negative approach to life on this earth, which is regarded as transitory. These religio-philosophical doctrines influenced and undermined Islam through the principle of negation which is rejected emphatically by Iqbāl on the grounds that the Qur'ān is empirical and hence teaches reverence for the actual and that the doctrine of negativism has had a paralysing effect upon the Islamic community in India Furthermore, he seems to have been of the opinion that it is chiefly the "complete authority in legislation" which has caused the stifling of personal development and "has reduced the Law of Islam practically to a state of immobility."[20] It is necessary, therefore, to restate the fundamentals of Islam, "to tear off from Islam the hard crust which has immobilized an essentially dynamic outlook on life, and to rediscover the original verities of freedom, equality, and solidarity with a view to rebuild our

moral, social, and political ideas out of their original simplicity and universality."[21] These fundamentals, briefly stated, are: the unity of God (doctrine of *Tawḥīd*);[22] God is the Creator, He is Omnipotent, Omniscient, Self-Subsistent, the sole Arbitor of men, Compassionate and Merciful; Muḥammad is His Prophet (the last in a succession of prophets); the Qur'ān, which is the Word[23] of God, is eternal and has been revealed to Muḥammad, and it is the final authoritative revelation of God. Apart from the Islamic doctrine of creation, which has been discussed, there remain to be mentioned the doctrines of sin and redemption, of the freedom of the will, of human destiny and immortality. Islam, like Judaism, but unlike Christianity, does not believe that sin is inherited; sin does not cling to man, but it is conceived in terms of good and evil acts and of forgiveness if there is genuine repentance. Adam signifies mankind (not just one man) and the creation of mankind represents the "ought" where, prior thereto, there existed only the "yes" and the "no". The Fall does not mean an irreparable sin, but the beginning of regeneration along a path that ultimately leads to man's exerting full command over all powers; the true vicegerent of God, to Whose Will man is harmoniously bent. Instead of the Day of the Lord filled with complete destruction,[24] there will be the day of joy. Paradise is not only in Heaven; it will, in the process of time, be the ultimate state of affairs on this earth.

It is this core of Islamic thought in which Iqbāl passionately believed. He not only reinterpreted afresh the teachings of Islam as found in the Qur'ān, but his genius allowed for poetic transformation of great beauty which swept the emotions.

In one of his poems,[25] for instance, Iqbāl develops the theme of man in the following manner: Man, says Iqbāl, has two elements: the Gabrielic or angelic, and the Satanic or rebellious. Were the Satanic element to conquer the Gabrielic, man would forge his own destruction; were the Gabrielic element to dominate the Satanic, man would become passive. But here, too, Iqbāl denounces passivity for it is the destroyer of man. Therefore, the rebellious element is necessary to incite man against passive or angelic goodness and produce a stream of energy. The tragedy of Satan lies not in that he must die, but in that he must offer up his life-blood to generate vitality in Adam. "Selfhood" cannot be built up with the Gabrielic element alone as its foundation. It is the attainment of goals on earth through good works and praiseworthy behaviour, which are the fruits of activity,[26] that man must strive for. In other words, man is a this-worldly creature (in contrast to the mystic), but his "this-worldliness" is contingent upon the spiritual. The question whether activity will not be supplanted by passivity once all goals are attained, does not seem to arise. For, as stated, the victory of the Gabrielic element would result in passivity and, hence, in destruction; and

furthermore, in the process of time, new situations constantly confront man, exerting him to activity. Consequently, activity must forever remain the secular creed, boistered by religion, of mankind.

In postulating his view of man or of what man "ought" to be, Iqbāl did not abandon Islamic principles And if he was influenced by foreign cultures and thinkers (French liberalist thought, as stated in the "Biography"; Bergson's concept of time as a process; Kant's view of the moral man; and many others), he amalgamated it all into a unity which, to him, was part and parcel of Islamic thought. The Qur'ān remained his principal source, but, as stated before, he reinterpreted its teachings He emphasised the dynamism of Islam and went to the Qur'ān to prove it. He emphasised the concept of creative evolution and proved that it was taught by the Qur'ān. He pounded upon the dignity of man, who was born because God willed it, and whose "self" or "soul" was therefore divine in nature; who was made the Lord's vicegerent on earth ("He hath appointed you His vicegerents in the earth"—Sūra xxxv., verse 30) and could voluntarily say "yes" or "no" to the Lord (although he "ought" to say "yes").

In a period when Islam was confronted by a "new World Order" and the Islamic community, not only in India, but throughout the world, had become shackled to the dreams of the past and, consequently, mostly inert, Iqbāl's message carried hope. He negated, so to say, negative thinking and reconstructed Islamic thought along the cardinal principles of Islam. He emphasised creative evolution, which makes activity possible and gives it meaning, and the development of individual uniqueness or "selfhood" (*Khudī*), which constitute the essence of his philosophy.

The Process of Creation. Iqbāl does neither conceive of life as a prefabricated pattern nor of the universe as a finished product.[27] According to him, life truly interpreted is a constant process of becoming (Artistotelian philosophy) and not a state of being (Platonic philosophy); every moment we become by ceasing to be what we are. Man has unrealised potentialities and it is through becoming that they can be realised (Aristotelian philosophy). But becoming implies change, for a movement is involved. One moves or develops from one "state" to or into another "state" (the word "state" is not to be taken in the Platonic sense). This movement or development takes place in time which can be defined historically as a series of events, psychologically as a series of human developments (mental, physical, behavioural).[28] The crucial point, however, is that "time does not stand still" (proverb); that is to say, it implies movement (past-present-future) and movement, in turn, implies change. Change can be creative and, hence, there is hope for a better future, because it is through change that man can develop from a potential to an actual being (Aristotelian terms) or, in popular phraseology,

can become his better self.

The process is regarded by Iqbāl as "genuinely creactive," bringing forth a range of possibilities which permit man to better himself and to exercise to the fullest extent his free choice. By exercising this free choice wisely, man can develop his potential into actual immortality.[29] It implies the development of mankind along a path that begins with the "I" or "self" and ends with the "Thou" (God).[30]

Selfhood[31]

(*a*) *The Ego and Its Development.* The terms "self" or "I" or "ego" are defined by Iqbāl as the "unique inter-relation of our mutual states."[32] With this phrase, Iqbāl places before his readers a most urgent problem that confronts the theologian as well as the psychiatrist; namely, "What is the nature of this I ?"[33]

Viewed negatively, the "self" is not a passive entity to be thrown hither and thither like a steerless ship upon the waves of a heaving sea. Positively conceived, the "ego" is an entity constantly in process of development through creative activity resulting from interaction with a dynamic environment. "The ego is not something rigid."[34] The "system of experiences we call soul or ego is also a system of acts."[35] The development of the ego is impossible if it does not remain continuously in contact with the dynamic forces of life. The "life of the ego is a kind of tension caused by the ego invading the environment and environment invading the ego. The ego does not stand outside this erena of mutual invasion. It is present in it as a directive energy and is formed and disciplined by its own experience."[36] It is neither fully complete at its birth nor is its development mapped out prior thereto [37]

(*b*) *Freedom of the Human Personality.* According to Iqbāl, the doctrine of the human personality as expounded in the Qur'ān is perfect and any faults attributed to it are due to its not havivg been put into practice or to its having been misinterpreted.

"Man is the trustee of a free personality which he accepted at his peril." The "peril" is that man must constantly make choices in a life full of changes that challenge him. He has the freedom to choose between the good and the bad, and it is up to him to justify his choice. He alone carries full responsibility for each choice made. Proper choice, which generates good actions,[38] is the mark of fully developed selfhood. It raises the individual to the divine level, making him capable of vicegerency on earth. Needless to say that wrong choices, which result in bad or evil actions, are evidence of human fallibility. This, joined with the doctrine of free will, presents a problem, not only for Iqbāl, but for all thinkers. The logical position is that, if man has

freedom of the will, why would he freely choose that which is wrong and which, as a result, would injure him? If Satan offers up his life-blood for the regeneration of man, why do man's actions exhibit the evil symbolised by Satan? The question could also be phrased in different terms: Why is there evil in a world created by God? According to Iqbāl, who, as a Muslim, gives the Islamic or Qur'ānic interpretation, there is evil in order that man may be constantly exerting himself to do good.[39] The implication of this view is that evil has no ontological status, because ultimately Satan is subdued by man under God.[40] Yet, the man of the Qur'ān, who is an inspiration and an example for all humans (in the Islamic view, the term "man" includes woman), is an ideal man. For, as stated previously, the Satanic element must remain if man is to be constantly exhorted to activity. Yet, Iqbāl questions whether God did well to place such a heavy weight on mortal shoulders by allowing man to incur heavy risks involved in (the freedom of) making choices.

(*c*) *Destiny of the Free Individual.* "As the Quran says: 'God created all things and assigned to each its destiny.'"[41] In the Qur'ān, destiny (*Taqdīr*) is described as pure time which "is regarded as an organic whole. Destiny is time regarded as prior to the disclosure of its possibilities." The "destiny of a thing" is "its realizable possibilities which lie within the depths of its nature. . . ."[42] Destiny, conceived of in this manner, presents a future which exists as an open possibility. Every act of the free ego, which is born in time,[43] creates a new situation and gives scope for progressive or positive development. A succession of acts unfolds new opportunities, lending to life a vigorous character and an exciting flavour. The truly free individual is he who always makes the proper choices, acts rightly, that is to say, who lives a life under God. What is the destiny of such a man? Personal immortality is his destiny.

(*d*) *Personal Immortality.* Iqbāl writes that the nature of "true infinity" consists not in extensity, but in intensity; in other words, from an extensive viewpoint, the ego is absorbed in the spatio-temporal order, but from an intensive viewpoint, the ego regards this same spatio-temporal order "as a confronting 'other' wholly alien to me." Hence, the finite ego and the Infinite Ego do not, nay, cannot, exclude each other. The finite ego bears a relation to, but is not absorbed by, the Infinite Ego. "I am distinct from and yet intimately related to that on which I depend for my life and sustenance.[44] It is the I-Thou relationship; the Thou gives meaning to the life of the I. The relationship becomes a true and full one only when the I, endowed with a divine nature (soul, ego, self), voluntarily and completely identifies its will with that of the Thou. Such harmony between the Divine and the human will implies fully developed selfhood. The man who has

attained it has done so by personal effort. He is saved ; that is to say, he has gained personal immortality. "Personal immortality, then, is not ours as of right ; it is to be achieved by personal effort. Man is only a candidate for it."[45]

Summary

Iqbāl views the "life of the ego" as a constant striving between the "self" and its environment, which is necessary in order to combat passivity, improve the quality of the ego as well as to better the life of the individual and, inasmuch as the individual is also the member of a group, of the community. He curses fatalism, which, at that time, had become synonymous with the East.

In an environment (India) where reality was regarded as an illusion (*māyā*)—a corroding influence of Hinduism—and where colonialism had bred fatalism (in the Islamic world as a whole), Iqbāl had to emphasise time and again that this world is thoroughly real. Its reality is derived from God ; hence, this world has genuine reality. He propounded constantly that Islam is a concrete religion ; that is to say, it is vitally concerned with the affairs of this world Human activity, not indolence, is taught by the Qur'ān. Activity, which challenges life itself and which is meaningful because it has its roots in the Qur'ān, is demanded of every Muslim.

If Iqbāl's philosophy has a mood of mysticism, it can be said to be a blend of the two strains of idealism and realism. The ideal (God, being) must needs invade the realm of the real (the world) in order to give it sustenance. According to Iqbāl, the development of the individual "self" does not lie solely, however, in the spiritual union into which the "self" enters with the divine ; if there is such a union, and Iqbāl does not deny that there is, then the "self" will be the richer for it, if it applies the religious experience to creative life on earth.

There is not the slightest doubt that the two currents of realism and idealism run through his works. If, on the one hand, Iqbāl emphasises dynamic energy, which is the life-force of Islam, on the other hand, he does believe in a final consummation. This is precisely the desire of every mystic and the ultimate objective of all systems of mysticism. Upon closer analysis, however, the two apparently conflicting tendencies in Iqbāl's thought do not seem as inconsistent as they would appear to be upon a cursory survey. For he did not believe in consummation beyond time (the goal of the mystic ; at the moment of consummation he enters into eternity), but in time. He does not negate life and its values, which the mystics generally do ; he affirms it and gives it positive meaning. For this reason, Iqbāl must not be called a mystic in the sense the word usually implies. Idealism, by its very nature, contains a mystical essence, but in Iqbāl's

system, it is interwoven with a most realistic approach to life.

Love versus *Intellect or Spirituality* versus *Materialism.* To be creative, man must display originality, which he cannot exhibit if he is cut off from the culture in which he grew up. Man must feed on the cultural heritage of the community to which he belongs in order to develop his individuality. This condition of contact with Muslim (and Hindu) culture was absent during the later period especially of English rule when the British tried to cover Indian education with a European veneer. Iqbāl attacks the Western form of education as it had been imported into India, because it was an imitation not of what was the best, but of what was the least good in European civilisation. It aimed at making intellectual resources dependent on foreign cultural ideas. This dependence on others (*Suwāl*, also translated as "asking") in the intellectual sphere and, as a result of it, in the political and economic domains as well, debases the individual and impoverishes the community to which he belongs. The deterioration of the Islamic community in India proves well Iqbāl's argument.

Creative genius cannot be unfolded except in an atmosphere of freedom, which is a second condition for the development of individuality. By exercising initiative in a world where change is the motto, the individual learns to become independent and to develop a capacity for dealing with new situations. Furthermore, to be creative, the individual must not be educated so as to adhere passively to a rigid ethical code, which he would outwardly accept, and inwardly reject. Such superficial acceptance can only harm, not develop, moral character of a high calibre. " 'Goodness is not a matter of compulsion ; it is the self's surrender to the moral ideas and arises out of a willing co-operation of free egos. A being whose movements are wholly determined cannot produce goodness. Freedom is, therefore, seen to be a condition of goodness.' "[46]

It is clear that the central fact in Islamic ideology is "the growth of individuality"[47] which is the right of all men and women. This growth can occur only if the individual belongs to his community, if he plays an active role in life, and if he can develop himself in an atmosphere of freedom.

Individuality is the product of the spiritual and the physical, of the real and the ideal. It repudiates "the dualism between *Alam-i-Afaq* (the world of matter) and *Alam-i-Anfus* (the world of spirit)."[48] While Islam is in constant touch with the world of matter, it does not favour a purely materialistic outlook which would push the spiritual wholly into the background. Iqbāl has this to say on the matter :

> The greatest service that modern thought has rendered to Islam, and as a matter of fact to all religion, consists in its criticism of what we call material or natural—a criticism which discloses that the merely material has

no substance until we discover it rooted in the spiritual. There is no such thing as a profane world. All this immensity of matter constitutes a scope for the self-realization of the spirit. All is holy ground. As the Prophet so beautifully puts it: "The whole of this earth is a mosque."[49]

Somewhat further Iqbāl writes that there is no such thing

as a purely physical level in the sense of possessing a materiality, elementally incapable of evolving the creative synthesis we call life and mind, and needing a transcendental Deity to impregnate it with the sentient and the mental. The Ultimate Ego that makes the emergent emerge is immanent in nature, and is described by the Quran as "the First and the Last, the visible and the invisible."[50]

Thus religion is not an afterthought that lingers on in the domain of material life; it is, itself, an invaluable element in the creative process which does not consist solely of man's "reshaping of mater,"[51] but also of his " 'capacity to build a much vaster world in the depths of his own being, wherein he discovers sources of infinite joy and inspiration.' "[52]

If man is not taught that the spirit predominates and that his material exploits must serve spiritual purposes, then his education is worthless. Iqbāl was led to this view because, as pointed out earlier, education in India under English rule had become more a matter of economics than of spiritual developement. Furthermore, during his journeys on the Continent of Europe, he had come into direct contact with a purely materialistic outlook. Though he admired the scientific attitude of the West and the spirit of endeavour it displayed, he noted the severe limitations in European life: economic competition, corroding influence of a purely materialist outlook which bred not only greed, but "soul-destroying frustration". The West revealed to him a vision of the possibilities and potentialities of human life as reflected by the exuberance and the confident restlessness of the European people. Yet he ultimately turned away from Europe, severely criticising the crude materialism, crude because it was no longer sustained by a sincere spirituality. Contrast, for example, man's victories over the physical world, with his poor knowledge of his own self, with his ignorance of how to control himself and to employ the unleashed forces of his scientific discoveries for worthy purposes. A sordid picture indeed!

Love has vanished and Intellect bites him like a snake,
Man has failed to bring Reason under the sway of Love;
He has succeeded in tracing the stars in their courses
But failed to pick his way in the labyrinth of his Ideas!
He has got so entangled in the maze of his knowledge
That he is unable to distinguish Profit from Loss!
He has ensnared the rays of the Sun
But failed to illumine the dark night of his Life![53]

In which manner can this tragic situation "which threatens to turn the

fruits of his[54] intellectual activity into veritable grapes of wrath"[55] be mended ? The answer to this question has been partly given in the preceding pages, but Iqbāl has still more to say about it.

Apprehension of Reality through the "Intellect" (*Khabar*, also translated as "head") is a slow and cold way of proceeding through hypotheses and strict evidence. Knowing Reality through mystical "Intuition" (*Naẓar*) based on Love (*'Ishq*, meaning "sight," used here in the sense of insight, and equated in Iqbāl's poetry with Love) is a heartwarming manifestation of the divine in one flash. This Love is not love between the sexes, but a much more comprehensive love grasping the symbols of Reality. It is then through Intuition, Insight or the Heart (the terms *Naẓar* and *'Ishq* taken together) that man is able to grasp metaphysical truths. "'The heart,' says Iqbāl, 'is a kind of inner intuition or insight which, in the beautiful words of Rumi, feeds on the rays of the sun and brings us into contact with aspects of Reality other than those open to sense perception.' "[56] The experience revealed by Intuition is as real as experience revealed in any other manner. Such a view tends to efface the opposition between the scientific and the intuitional modes of apprehending Reality and to bring them closer to each other. Knowledge (which term Iqbāl interprets as a capacity "based on the senses") yields Power while Intuition or Love generates Vision. Those possessing Power lack Love or Vision. " 'Vision without Power,' he observes, 'brings moral elevation but cannot give permanent culture. Power without Vision tends to become destructive and inhuman. Both must combine for the spiritual expansion of humanity."[57]

Iqbāl's philosophy reveals a "strain of revolt against the 'over intellectualism' "[58] which is predominant in a society where the issue is between Intellect and Intuition, between Reason and Love, which are the two ways of grasping Reality. In his opinion, knowledge must remain subordinate to the spiritual, if it is to serve man in this stride toward self-fulfilment ; if knowledge becomes the predominant factor, that it to say, if it is not made to serve spiritual purposes apart from the material, it becomes a Satanic force, carrying man down to annihilation. Today, in the Atomic Age, we may well ponder the truth of Iqbāl's conviction.

Principles of Human Behaviour. Prophets, educators, civic leaders and responsible men of every station in life agree that there must be some principles by which human behaviour is to be regulated and with which the minds of youth must be imbued. While the principles advanced by the various religions such as love, respect, honesty, fair play, courage, and so forth, approximate to each other, they are in each case approached from a different point of view. Iqbāl, who is not only born a Muslim, but who finds in Islam realistic, universal and moral outlook, gives new meaning to the

principles of human behaviour taught by the Qur'ān. He, furthermore, shows the manner in which they may develop either into positive or negative guiding forces of human conduct.

Courage is necessary in education to eradicate fear which Iqbāl regards as one of the most inhibitory and weakening emotions. Apart from the fear of the Lord, which engenders wisdom, any other kind of fear is destructive and, as psychology has discovered, it is frequently the hidden cause for aggressiveness. Elimination of fear is possible by applying the principle of *Tawḥīd,* which is the most dynamic concept in Islamic thought and the guiding rule in the conduct of Muslims. *Tawḥīd* as a principle in the life of the individual and the community occupies an important place in Iqbāl's thought. It implies unity. It relates to the entire domain of human life and to the I-Thou relationship. Man and God are one ; all men are one. Unity between man and God and between men creates solidarity which, in turn, gives birth to a fearless courage, giving man the strength to conquer all.[59] This aggressiveness, born from a spiritual bond, must necessarily assume a positive form If it takes on a negative attitude, it results in militarism, which defeats the original meaning and purpose of *Tawḥīd.* It is, therefore, of supreme importance that a positive attitude be assumed which will enable man to remain united with and under God. This positive attitude does not refer solely to the Islamic society, but to all societies which are all part of a bigger community : the community of mankind. Geographical and colour barriers must be let down, and all men must march together to a better future.

Tolerance results from the strength injected by *Tawḥīd.* It implies a positive attitude, and is displayed by the true believer, who does not adhere to Islam in a mechanical fashion, but orders his life on the principle of *Tawḥīd even if he is not a Muslim.* Tolerance reveals breadth of understanding, which is possible only if one is a firm believer in the principles taught by one's religion and society.[60] Intolerance, on the other hand, manifested mostly among those not firmly rooted in a society believing in positive principles, is suicidal as it arrests the developement of the individual and the community. Iqbāl was firmly convinced that men are equal between themselves (as it is taught in the Qur'ān). Such equality erases all barriers, all friction, looks upon the varying approaches to life, man and God as an enrichment of human existence, gives birth to tolerance and to unity.

Faqr has come in for great stress in the later thought developments of Iqbāl. What does it mean ? There are two kinds of *Faqr* : that of remuneration, which is a debilitating force, and that of non-attachment, which becomes a source of incorruptibility. It is the second type of *Faqr* which Iqbāl advocates.

In indulging in worldly pursuits, man must not be engulfed by worldliness. He must retain an inner attitude or, in other terms, he must practise a kind of intellectual and emotional asceticism for the pursuit of good and worthy goals. The Islamic ideal of "this-worldliness," then, must be somewhat modified so that power, riches, will not enslave the human being. For this purpose, the capacity of *Faqr* should be developed as a protective device against an excessive materialism.

The living of an active and full life in this world develops man in all directions and leads to the creation of the "whole" man rather than to a human being divided into two watertight compartments which exclude each other: the spiritual, emphasised on times set apart for mosque services, and the material, predominant in every-day affairs. This "whole" man is at the same time the "good" man for Iqbāl. As stated, the good man is he who believes sincerely in the values of his religion, whose life is regulated by *Tawḥīd*. He is not a crass materialist He is a man whose creative activity enriches and beautifies life, whose tolerance enables him to transcend geographical, religious, racial, economic and social barrriers, and whose courage and ethical conduct earn him the respect of all who come into contact with him. This then is the sketch of the *Mū'min*, the "good" man, who does his duty by the Lord.

Iqbāl's Conception of the Millat. If the individual is so much emphasised, what is to be said about his relationship to the community—of which something has been told in the previous pages—and what should be the socio-political order in the world of Islam?

In *Rumūz-i-Bekhudī*,[61] Iqbāl presents an analysis of the relationship between the individual and the community. Denouncing the life without a centre, which he believed was rapidly becoming a characteristic of the Western world, Iqbāl stated that it is necessary to have a spiritual and an ethical basis for human thinking. The individual exists in relation to a community, which widens his scope. The community as such constitutes a unit, composed as it is of a group of individuals who have merged together and who (ideally speaking) struggle for the same objectives, namely, those that would improve their particular community. This does not mean, of course, that a community represents or reflects the demands and desires of each of its individual members. It does not and, consequently, there is tension between the individual and the community to which he belongs. The tension provides, however, for the community's growth. Nevertheless, the community, for the reasons stated, presents a unity of outlook, of joint endeavours and objectives. This view of the community leads to the concept of the *Millat* ("Community"), that is to say, the idea of homogeneity of thinking of a group or a people, based on ethics rooted in religion. Inasmuch as Islam

constitutes a *Millat*, it cannot and should not be identified with one particular country.[62]

Iqbāl is able to rise above nationalism and racial and religious fanaticism, because the community he imagines—and which is mirrored in the Qur'ān—is averse to any sort of boundary.

> It seems to me that God is slowly bringing home to us the truth that Islam is neither Nationalism nor Imperialism but a League of Nations which recognizes artificial boundaries and racial distinctions for facility of reference only, and not for restricting the social horizon of its members.[63]

Clearly, the *Millat* envisaged by Iqbāl does not find its true expression in the political realm, with its "artificial boundaries and racial distinctions"; it is a spiritual homogeneity, which transcends all "artificial boundaries".

If the *Millat* cannot be identified with one particular countiy, can the emergence of "states" in Islam be justified? The answer has been given. In one sense, the modern political conception of the "state" is quite contrary and, in fact, contadictory to Islam, for Islam is the "state" and the "state" is Islam, hence, Islam does not recognise "states," but only *a* "state," the implication being that the political and the spiritual in Islam constitute an absolute unity.

> In Islam it is the same reality which appears as Church looked at from one point of view and State from another. It is not true to say that Church and State are two sides or facets of the same thing. Islam is a single unanalysable reality which is one or the other as your point of view varies.[64]

The "reality" is unity and the emergence of "states" shatters this unity, since different "states" will make different claims which frequently arouses disagreement, indifference towards each other, and rivalry and hostility. One Islamic state attacking another is inconceivable under the dictates of Islam. Hence, states do not, from the Muslim point of view, present diversity, but disunity. However, for "facility of reference," as Iqbāl terms it, or for political expediency and in the name of sovereign independence, as the practical politician sees it, or in the rhythm of history, as the historian and the philosopher interpret it, states are essential. There is no other political form in the contemporary world apart from the "state" which allows for political independence and self-expression in every domain of life. Yet, if the Islamic world is divided into states, according to Qur'ānic teachings it remains essentially a unity. States are to be regarded as instruments for carrying out the teachings of the Qur'ān; they have made possible Islamic self-expression because they have sovereign independence.

> The state according to Islam is only an effort to realize the spiritual in a human organization. But in this sense all state, not based on mere domination and aiming at the realization of ideal principles, is theocratic.[65]

In other words, the political division of Islam has been redeemed by

placing upon each state the responsibility of living in accordance with the Qur'ān. By assuming and carrying out this responsibility, the various states do not really cause a schism in Islam. The schism is only in the political realm and is artificial. Essentially, the world of Islam remains united. The *Millat*, its spiritual fortress, stands unharmed, and unshaken.

From a final reappraisal of Iqbāl's philosophy, the following questions arise :

(*a*) Is Iqbāl, in his desire to reconstruct Islam, a reactionary ?

Iqbāl was aware of the fact that life is not change, pure and simple. it has within it elements of conservation. Life moves with the weight of the past on its back. "What is history ? A tale, a story, or a fable ? No, it makes thee conscious of thyself." History implies continuity of a particular culture, of a community, and imbues a particular community with historical consciousness. The longer the continuity of a culture, the stronger its adherents emphasise the value inherent in it. The eternal values in Islam made possible the great achievements of the Islamic community in the past. If Islam could produce such a dazzling culture in the past, why could it not give birth to a creative Muslim community in the contemporary world ? Iqbāl did not live in the past, however ; he looked to the past solely to rediscover the essence of Islamic culture, to examine the dynamic forces that created it.

As a man who spent his life in the effort to regenerate the Muslim community, Iqbāl came to look upon himself as a shaker-up of society, as a superman giving it stimulus, lending to it a new shape in harmony with, and in answer to, the demands of a new era. It was his belief, which was based upon historical evidence, that from time to time a *Ṣāḥib-i-dil* ("possessor of a sensitive heart") appears on the world stage, whose aim it is to awaken the community. On this conception of *Ṣiḥāb-i-dil*, Iqbāl built up the notion of a Superman, which is different from Nietzsche's. Though Iqbāl admired great military men, he did so not because of the motives that supurred them on, but because of the energetic and purposeful activity with which they carried out their goals Neither the cult of the Superman as developed by Nietzsche nor the collectivism advocated by Marx is the ideal. For Iqbāl, the ideal remain forever Islam.

This shaker-up of society dared to challenge the secular world with the sacred Qur'ān. Yet, he was not regarded as a reactionary by the orthodox Muslims, who accepted his view to a large extent inasmuch as he based his philosophy on the fundamental principles of Islam. For the same reason, they did not regard him as a heretic ; he believed in the strictly monotheistic Islamic creed, professing "no god but God," and believing in the mission of Muḥammad. He has, however, been accused of "heterodoxy" in

the sense that he called his personal world-view—a synthesis of Muslim and non-Muslim theories—Islamic, which, by the very fact that it is such a synthesis, it no longer is. Yet, this accusation does not seem to be valid, for Iqbāl brought in these non Islamic theories to test and reveal the true nature of Islam. Whatever good these theories had, Islam also had ; only the real nature of Islam was buried under a crusty heap which went by the name of—but no longer was—Islam. The word "reconstruction," as used by Iqbāl, means essentially a reinterpretation of Islam in terms of its basic teachings, not solely for the purpose of giving this faith new depth, or greater dynamism. but of revitalising the community professing Islam. It was precisely in the social area rather than in the domain of thought where his views differed from those of the orthodox.[66] For Iqbāl stated that Islam *is* progress and, in order to make progress possible for the inert Indo-Muslims, he hammered on activity. The orthodox, however, including the religious leaders, are not a progressive group ; they represent statism rather than activity in society. But he had fired their, as well as anybody else's, imagination and, inasmuch as they did, on the whole, accep his philosophy, Iqbāl can be credited with having injected them with progressiveness.

To summarise, Iqbāl's contribution lay in capturing the essence of Islam and attuning it to the modes of a new society. The ideals of this new society were not really new; they are embodied in the Qur'ān and, thence, they are eternal. But what was new was Iqbāl's reappraisal in the light of new conditions. He had no other choice. It was the role assigned to him. No matter what or how strong the criticism—arising from an analytical study of his thought-system—against him may be, he met the challenge of his task for which he better than anyone else was equipped. For he gave the Indian Muslims, at a critical moment in their history, a sense of direction which they sorely needed.

(*b*) Does Islam give guidance in the reconstruction of a community ?

This question, which has in the main been explored in the preceding pages, can be answered in the affirmative. As Iqbāl saw it, Islam could be a vital force in the reconstruction of a community. For Islam is not solely a religion ; it transcends the religious (and theological) terms and expresses itself in intellectual, artistic and social forms. Inherent in Islam is the concern with itself as an organised society and a code of laws is provided by it for the guidance of the Muslim community.[67]

(*c*) What is the nature of the social order in Islam ?

To summarise the discussion, the social order in Islam rejects geographical, political and racial or social barriers. It is based on the unity of the Muslim community (the *Millat*). Of course, this is an ideal approach since states and nationalism have arisen in the Muslim world. Iqbāl rejects

nationalism as much as he does imperialism.[68] Nationalism is a divisive factor which splinters the Islamic world into exclusive fragments, which could not again be united. Yet, there seems to be a contradiction here because, at the same time that Iqbāl rejects nationalism, he favours (or at least appears to have advanced) the idea that Muslim majority areas be consolidated "into a single state" and given self-government. This means not only political freedom, but also the emergence of nationalism. The contradiction, however, arises from the fact that while Iqbāl the philosopher rejects nationalism as being opposed to the concept of the *Millat*, as a human being, he is identified with the Indian Muslims among whom he was born and raised. The contradiction, then, is apparent rather than real, having arisen from the fact that the nation, as an expression of social life, is the result of settlement of a particular human group in a specific area, and a consolidating process takes place whereby the group and its permanent habitat become a compact unit. This process bears two consequences: the growth of political consciousness and the emotional feeling called nationalism; that is to say, the preference for and adherence to a country or a people among whom one is born and for which or whom one feels genuine attachment. Consequently, if the philosophical approach of Iqbāl the thinker is that of an anti-nationalist, the social outlook of Iqbāl the man cannot but be that of a nationalist. His anti-nationalism, however, must be regarded in the same vein as his nationalism: they are both the expression of an idealistic spirit and emotional fervour. Actually, Iqbāl acknowledged the political fact of the existence of states but, as indicated, he interpreted it in the light of the spiritual He, like any other Muslim today, found himself to be both a member of a particular community and the Community. He was, so to say, a product of contradictory circumstances which, on the one hand, produced the Community of Islam and, on the other hand, forged smaller Islamic communities in the form of states. As a result, the contradiction could not but appear in his thought. He made an attempt to solve it by emphasising the artificial nature of states and the true nature of Islam as a "state" in the sense of a universal Community.

He was put on the stage of life at a crucial point and was assigned to play a tremendous role in exhorting his Muslim brothers in India to dynamic activity—meaningful because it was the message of the Qur'ān which, furthermore, lays down the precepts to be followed—and pointing out to them the path that would and ultimately did lead them to freedom.

> What can I do ? My nature is averse to rest ;
> My heart is impatient like the breeze in the poppy field ;
> From the spark to the star, from the star to the sun
> Is my quest ;

I have no desire for a goal,
For me, rest spells death :
With an impatient and a hopeful heart
I seek for the end of that which is endless.[69]

Chapter VII

INDIAN MUSLIM NATIONALISM, ITS PHILOSOPHY AND IDEALS

1. *Introduction*

The title of this chapter might be considered contradictory, for it raises the immediate question whether a distinction exists between "Muslim" and "Indian Muslim" nationalism. A reply thereto depends partly upon the term's interpretation and the Islamic experience.

Its roots (from the Latin verb *nascere*, "to be born") implies a people's common descent, settlement in a specified territory and development of a common civilisation. One group thus became distinguished from another. Not until the early nineteenth century, however, did the word refer specifically to a *designated country's* inhabitants.[1]

What was the Islamic experience ? It embraced a common faith, a common civilisation (with local differences, but having the same base) and (to some degree) a common language. The following statement made by Professor Margoliouth bears significantly on this issue :

> Although we are apt to think of Islam as a religion, it is probable that the Prophet thought of it rather as a nation. "Let there be in you a nation summoning unto the good" is a divine order in the Koran. The Arabic word for "sect," used of Islam, is adopted by the Turks in the sense "nation," and this seems a justifiable mistake : for in the new community all tribal differences were to be sunk. . . .[2]

Islam constituted, therefore, the binding force among its adherents, forming a "nation," which had common interests. At first narrowly confined to Arabia, it spread across the Middle East, absorbing newly converted peoples into the "Community". The consequences of this expansion were not solely religious (conversion), but also social (intermarriage), political (the Caliphate) and cultural. The last-named aspect is equally important, as it refers to the modification of ancient administrative systems according to stipulations derived from the Qur'ān and *sunnah* (first, the Prophet's and, later, the Community's) and the building up of a civilisation which, despite its absorption of ancient Arab and foreign elements, nevertheless assumed an Islamic mould. It had also a linguistic aspect inasmuch as Arabic, the Qur'ān's language, had to be learned by all Muslims. Many islamised groups, however, retained their respective languages, one of which, Persian, became (together with Sanskrit and Turkic) the basis of India's Urdu tongue. The

distinction between islamisation and arabicisation should be stressed, because many non-Arabs (e.g. Indians)[3] became islamised, while many non-Muslims were (and are) of Arab stock.[4] The linguistic issue is relevant, because it distinguished not only the Arabic-speaking peoples from those talking in other tongues, but also generally identified one sp cific language with a separate faith community.

Education is another related factor. Since Islam's advent, a training system, embodying its principles, prevailed in those areas where it had become predominant. The Muslims thus attended their own institutions of learning, adding to the sense of their uniqueness.

Consequently, three main principles tending towards unity in the Islamic world were a common faith, language and civilisation, including education. Muslim nationalism may be said to be universal, therefore, inasmuch as it applied to the entire "Community of Believers". However, this "Body's" historical political experience also was its fragmentation by settling in particular "provinces" of the Caliphate, with their respective rulers, often semi-independent from the central Government, which assisted the further development of a particularistic focus—ingrained first in the tribal and, subsequently, in the religious self-consciousness—through the process of territorial identification and thus by no means limited to recent times. In India, as elsewhere, the Muslims considered themselves subjects of their own authorities and they may be said, therefore, to have evolved a "national" outlook in the sense that they were inhabitants of a particular country and obeyed dynasties which, in due time, became "native". Thus, two forms of nationalism emerged, one being universalistic and implying loyalty to the Community at large, and the other, particularistic, as it demanded obedience to the specific community identifiable with the country of one's birth and even its Government.

During the colonialist era, a third type of nationalism became predominant. It also was particularistic, as it was based upon the religious differentiation, which now gained a political dimension, viz. freedom from British supremacy. Al-Afghānī's conception of the creation of a large Muslim, in opposition to the big Christian imperialist, *bloc* has been noted. Its underlying philosophy was the religio-political idea of the Islamic world's unity (*tawḥīd*) and the Muslim legal notion of the division between the *dār-ul-Islām* and the *dār-ul-ḥzrb*. Despite Indo-Muslim fulminations against the political characterisation of pan-Islamism, such a view seems inherent in al-Afghānī's thought, which remained "universalistic," for it appealed to all Muslims regardless of their habitat. A different picture emerges in India, where the theory developed that the two main—Hindu and Muslim—communities, each having its distinct faith, civilisation and language(s), con-

stituted two "nations". The organic idea, viz. that of a country's religious, cultural and linguistic homogeneity, does not pertain to India, but a workable synthesis irrespective of the divergence in these arenas, was repudiated.

" 'We Hindus, in spite of thousand and one differences within our fold, are bound by such religious, cultural, historical, racial, linguistic and other affinities in common as to stand out as a definitely homogeneous people as soon as we are placed in contrast with any other non-Hindu people—say, the English or Japanese *or even the Indian Moslems*. That is the reason why today we the Hindus from Kashmere to Madras and Sindh to Assam will to be a Nation by ourselves' "[5] (italics ours).

The modern political concept of nationhood, implying individuality and sovereignty, was grafted on the *ideal* of a specific people's homogeneity. Its racial and religious affinities, however, were stressed.[6] Why? Regarding race, the Hindus are of Indo-European stock. Sanskrit, their old language, contains the word *arya* or "noble," implying the ideal of the Caucasian warrior-hero, ingrained also in Western ideology.[7] Whether separatism is the result of Hindu refusal—derived from their self-image as noble—to regard Muslims as their equals[8] or whether the Muslim minority feared for obliteration by fusing totally with their Hindu neighbours is an important question ; probably, both apply, as shall be seen shortly. India's rather recent conquest by europeanised Aryans (originally of Anglo-Saxon and Norman deccent) may have reinforced the old spirit, which manifested itself sharply in the *Bande Mataram*, a Hindu nationalist anthem appearing in 1882.[9] Hindu joy at the breaking of Muslim rule also may have fortified anti-Islamic sentiments in India.

The reason for emphasising the religious tradition is given as follows by an Indian Muslim :

Religion forms the inner life of a nation ; it is the core of a nation's life. If you ignore this core, the life of a nation becomes hollow and unstable, while a nationality based on this hard inner core has a promise of stability and endurance.[10]

This is an explanation rooted in faith. The historical dimension is that two major ethnic groups followed separate faiths.[11] Islam is not only a younger religion, but it came to India from Arabia, and failed to convert a Hindu majority. The lines thus were and remained drawn. In intermarriages, however—and, here, fear for obliteration again is cited—the offspring of Hindu women and Muslim men belonged to Islam, accounting in part for its growth in India. The Muslim divines' insistence on the purification of Indian Islam from Hindu excrescences during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries can be interpreted as another way to guarantee its survival.

Action, reaction and counteraction in the political sphere resulted from the divisive pattern of Indian history, explaining the inner dissonance so

acutely externalised in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. With the rise of nationalism, the clash became unavoidable. The infusion of religion, culture, language, race with the territorial concept[12] could only aggravate the division and make inevitable the schism, to be interpreted as a total failure of the nationalist idea in the sense of keeping India intact. The roots of political separatism, resulting in the creation of Pakistan (in 1947), therefore, lie deep in India's history and psychology.

The question is whether the foundations of a nation are truly laid in the hearts of men or in a territorial habitat. The Congress affected the latter and sought to build a united Indian nation on the bases of geography, politics and economics. In fact, it presumed that the nation was already in existence. The presumption was palpably false; the bases were wrong, and the edifice of nationalism which the Congress had sought to build crashed in less than three years. . . [13]

The things that separated them [i.e. the Hindus and Muslims] were so profound and so far-reaching in their political implications that their likeness is not to be found in the history of any other people, with the sole exception of the Jews. [Although] Muslims and Hindus have lived side by side, more often than not as good neighbours, for more than seven hundred years, they maintain more pronounced marks of being separate nationalities than any two nations of Europe. . . .[14]

Now, when two peoples, which stand socially and spiritually so far asunder, attain to political consciousness, they grow up naturally into two distinct and separate nations. Any other development would just not be possible. . . .[15]

This quotation not only points out the reasons for the divisive nature of twentieth-century Indian nationalism, but it also shows that this chapter's title is not contradictory It is true that a distinction exists between "Muslim" and "Indian Muslim" nationalism in so far as the first is universalistic and the second, derived from the stress on uniqueness by faith and civilisation and the identification with a specific geographical region, is particularistic. The universalistic element is not entirely absent from the title, however, for it implies the Indo-Muslim community's desire to preserve that faith and civilisation which forged the *Millat* and to retain its membership therein.

The phrase "Indian Muslim nationalism" has, howevere, another double sense, depending upon whether the stress is put on its first or second word. If the former is emphasised, the meaning refers to the political consciousness had by India's population regardless of any racial or religious distinctions. In this respect, it is "universalist" or, better said, non communalist. If the latter is accented, the focus falls on the nationalist sentiments held by the Muslim, in contradistinction to any other group in India, and, hence, it becomes particularistic or "communalist". These two senses of the phrase

"Indian Muslim nationalism" must be kept in mind when discussing its development in Islamic India.

What was the Indo-Muslim nationalist experience? This major question embraces two principal categories: the spiritual and the secular.

2 *The Religious Content of the Movement*

It has been established that a common faith, civilisation and, to some extent, language are important factors unifying a particular group. This was true in Islamic India as much as in the Muslim world Yet, these same elements also tend to divisiveness, particularly in a region containing two or more chief groups. In this respect, the Indo-Muslim experience differed from the situation prevailing in the rest of the Islamic world, where minorities were quite small in relation to the Muslim population.[16] The linguistic issue also became more important in Islamic India for, apart from its faith, its other distinguishing mark was the Urdu tongue. In other words, a particular language became the exclusive property and identifying mark of a separate faith community and a facet of its nationalism. The territorial problem also bore upon it, for the majority of Muslims inhabited certain well-defined areas in the north and north-east of India. Education was mentioned as an important civilisational factor tending towards Muslim unification and exclusivism. In India, it became a schismatic element, too, because its Muslims had their own curriculum and schools.[17] A number of Hindus probably attended them, but they had their own learning institutions. The lines, therefore, remained pretty well drawn Sir Sayyid, himself, continued this trend, because Aligarh was founded chiefly for his coreligionists. The Hindu majority in his time either attended English or their private training centres. In other words, no "national" education was built up in India in the sense of integrating it with the ideals and aspirations of its entire population. This occurred neither in the pre nor in the British era. Muḥammad 'Alī protested that " 'public education organized and directed by a foreign government cannot become national in the broad sense of the term.' "[18] It reflects his desire for a truly national (as opposed to "communal") learning system, his accusation of the British as responsible for not developing it and, perhaps, his unwillingness to recognise that the pattern of a non-national education had been evolved in North India at least since Sulṭanate days. Sir Sayyid (and Hunter) had criticised (as noted)[19] the authorities for not attempting to draw the Muslims into the Government schools. The reason why they did not—unwillingness to include Islamic subjects—at once shows that, had they done so, education neither could have been called "national," because its focus would have shifted from "secularism" to "religion" and complicated the issue of training Hindus in the same institutions.[20]

Two other significant aspects contributing towards separatism between the Hindus and India's Muslims were the purification movement (which contains an extremist element as it is "puritanical") among the latter and, later, the reaction against Sir Sayyid's excessive Westernism. Such men as Muḥammad Shiblī and Amīr 'Alī tried to recreate the historical dimension by pointing to Islam's former greatness, attained by virtue of its progressive nature, enabling its adherents to build up a supreme civilisation. They wished to counteract too fast an absorption of a foreign culture. Abul-Kalām Āzād rejected Sir Sayyid's modernism as a betrayal of Islamic values. It did not mean that any of them repudiated rationalism, which they regarded justifiably as part of their heritage.

They stressed their identification not solely in terms of theological and cultural analyses, but also in the form of concrete political expressions, which were bi-focal. Belonging at once to Islam and to India, they saw no contradiction in pledging their loyalty to both. Muḥammad 'Alī's relevant assertion is worth quoting : " 'Where God commands, I am a Muslim first, a Muslim second and a Muslim last and nothing but a Muslim. But where India is concerned, I am an Indian first, an Indian second and an Indian last and nothing but an Indian.' "[21]

His stress on a Muslim's first duty, viz. obedience to God, was noted previously. Here, another aspect is to be considered : the juxtaposition of the words "Muslim" and "Indian", which implies religious particularism and political non-communalism. Can a Muslim maintain such a position ? If loyalty to a non-Muslim Indian Government (or even a coreligionist head) means negation of Divine decrees, a Muslim (Muḥammad 'Alī said during his trial) cannot comply. They demand submission not solely to Allah's will, but also to the authority had by Muḥammad and delegated to subsequent Muslim authorities. Moreover, they insist upon the fulfilment of the five "pillars" : repetition of the *shahādah*,[22] fasting (during Ramaḍān, celebrating the Qur'ānic Revelation), payment of *zakāt* (alms tax) and making the pilgrimage (*ḥajj*) to Mecca. These duties are particularistic, for they are in contradistinction to those imposed upon all other groups by their respective faiths. Can the assertion : "I am an Indian first," be maintained, if God's Law (which for a Muslim is revealed finally in the Qur'ān) takes precedence ? Muḥammad'Alī's statement seems to imply that essentially Indian nationalism contains nothing that opposes the Divine injunctions. The ultimate conclusion would be that Indian nationalism, itself, is God-given.[23] The juxtaposition between the two cited phrases—derived from the religio-political interplay between two different and numerically large faith groups—is not necessarily contradictory, therefore. If it had been, only the first statement could have been made, resulting in a denial of the possibility that a Muslim

could identify himself with the specific country where he was born and domiciled and another religious community formed the majority. Those Muslims and Hindus whom Muḥammad 'Alī called "communal patriots"[24] did not display this wider approach. They rejected "national universalism" in favour of "religious particularism," the first being associated with the whole body politic, embracing diverse faiths and races, the second, with a "closed community," set apart by its religion and culture (including language). This was not his attitude, as reflected in many of his statements pertaining to the Indian situation. He said, for instance, in *The Comrade's* first issue : "We are partisans of none, comrades of all. We deeply feel the many dangers of increasing controversy between races and races, creeds and creeds, and earnestly desire a better understanding of the body politic of India."[25] Elsewhere, he wrote :

But while providing for to-day, we must not forget the morrow. It is our firm belief that if the Mussalmans or the Hindus attempted to achieve success in opposition to, or even without the co-operation of each other, they will not only fail, but fail ignominiously. But every step has to be taken with caution.[26]

Abul-Kalām Āzād tried to solve the tension between "Muslim" and "Indian-Muslim" nationalism (felt by most members of Indian Islam) by postulating his doctrine of unity, which he said is reflected in the Qur'ānic statement: "Men were of one religion only : then they fell to variance."[27] He was not "communalist," because he attempted to find a common meeting ground between all religions although, as mentioned, he felt conversion to Islam—comprising the best elements of every other faith—to be the best solution. His theology was restrictive in so far as it pertained to the "reconstruction" of a single religion and advocated Islam's worldwide dominion, but also non-particularistic, as it stressed the underlying harmony between all faiths. Neither he nor Muḥammad 'Alī—whose emphasis on God's authority as motivating the same conduct (and, hence, regulatory laws) for all men displays, too, a universal dimension—felt that Islam precluded them from asserting loyalty to the country of their birth. They did not consider nationalism to be exclusive, but inclusive and, hence, non-communal and identifiable with *Indian* ideals of self-preservation, freedom, political sovereignty, cultural and economic growth. Amīr 'Alī and Sir Sayyid, however, seem to have followed the course of "religious particularism," proven by their establishment of respective political organisations and, subsequently, by the former's temporary association with the Muslim League. Both men felt that Hindu communalism forced them to their politically separatist orientation and their repudiation of "Home Rule". Sir Sayyid's prediction that Hindu radicalism would grow rather than diminish and his statement that

co-operation between both communities seemed impossible, reflect a pessimist and Muslim nationalist attitude.[28] Yet it proved to be accurate [29] Nevertheless, he as well as Amīr 'Alī tried to promote harmonious relations between the Hindu and the Indian Musalman.[30] The increasing anti-British mood and demands for freedom aggravated Muslim-Hindu tension and stimulated the growth of Indo-Muslim nationalism. Originally bred by racial and religio-cultural distinctions,[31] it also conveyed the urgent desire to preserve a particular way of life in the face of opposition, expressed by Hindu extremism, possibly influenced by the Christian missionary zeal in India. It furthermore reflected anxiety born from doubt concerning Congress interest in the Muslims' status and welfare and fear that this large minority would be suppressed by the Hindu majority if and when the British were to relinquish their control.

But the fact stands that the Congress rule was extremely unjust and oppressive to the Muslims. It has been admitted in many quarters, Hindu as well as British, that as soon as the Congress entered into power, the Hindus of the provinces in which they are in majority, felt and began to behave as if Hindu Raj had come. What is more, the Congress Ministries encouraged this feeling. District officers in the Congress-governed provinces were instructed to consult the local Congress authorities, Hindu in all cases, and associate them in the administration.[32]

Not only did it mean consolidation of Hindu ranks (*sangathan*), another Mahasabha ideal, but it also showed that "common nationhood" meant, in fact, Hindu supremacy and obliteration of Indo-Islamic culture. This is not new in the history of mankind, for Europe's Aryans tried to snuff out Judaism.[33] Whether it signifies a clash between older and newer peoples and cultures and or inbred hostility of the Caucasian for the "Oriental" is an unsolved question. The idea of holiness, associated with a majority group, its religion and culture, is as strong among the Hindus as it is among Christians and, again, in India as in Europe, it resulted in a severe anti-"Oriental" policy by the respective leadership. It is not surprising, therefore, that loyalty to faith and culture—the supreme ideal of any distinct community—was pursued with even greater intensity as a reaction to Mahasabha and Congress ideology. The adoption of a unique language, Urdu, further enlivened the Indo-Muslim community's consciousness uniqueness, or as Muḥammad Iqbāl termed it, "selfhood," and by its clustering in well-definable regions of the subcontinent, sharpening the feeling of solidarity.

The final philosophical crystallisation of the direction to be followed by the Indo-Muslim commuuity is found in Muḥammad Iqbāl's formulation.[34] He stressed the fact that it forms " 'a distinct cultural unit in India.' " Few Muslims disagreed with him. However, this conviction became the basis for a truly particularist attitude. He expressed himself as follows on the subject

of Indian Muslim nationalism :

Is it possible to retain Islam as an ethical ideal and to reject it as a polity in favour of national polities, in which religious attitude is not permitted to play any part? This question becomes of special importance in India where the Muslims happen to be in a minority. . . . The nature of the Prophet's religious experience, as disclosed in the Quran . . . is individual experience creative of a social order. Its immediate outcome is the fundamentals of a polity with implicit legal concepts whose civic significance cannot be belittled merely because their origin is revelational. The religious ideal of Islam, therefore, is organically related to the social order which it has created. The rejection of the one will eventually involve the rejection of the other. *Therefore the construction of a polity on national lines, if it means a displacement of the Islamic principle of solidarity, is simply unthinkable to a Muslim.* This is a matter which at the present moment directly concerns the Muslims of India. . ."[35] (italics ours).

The implication is a *Muslim* nationalism in its older sense of unity between those individuals embracing Islam, whose socio-legal order, based on the Qur'ān, is unique and cannot be discarded in favour of any other. If it were, then the Islamic way of life, itself, will crumble. Such a view pointed to an orientation which was particularist and, politically, anti-nationalist—in the wider meaning of loyalty to an at least partly non-Muslim Central Government. Iqbāl stood far closer on this issue to Sir Sayyid than to either Abul-Kalām Āzād or Muḥammad 'Alī. In fact, he apparently built almost directly on Sir Sayyid's notion of "nations" as applied to India's two main religio-cultural communities. It mirrors the influence of the idea expressed by the Frenchman, Ernest Renan (1823-92), namely, that " 'a great aggregation of men, sane of mind and warm of heart, creates a moral consciousness which is called a nation,' "[36] Iqbāl (as well as his famous compatriot) accepted also the Frenchman's definition that the " 'nation is . . . a spiritual principle.' " It presupposes a past, a prized heritage, and a " 'voluntary agreement to pursue its cultivation' " ; it manifests " 'solidarity, resulting from the willingness to make sacrifices, " and " 'a clearly expressed desire to continue communal life.' "[37] According to Iqbāl and believing Muslims, Islam is spiritual, creates a moral consciousness, and has an internally cooperative,[38] interpretable as a communalist, spirit. A different conception arises, however, for this word as it is used by Renan reflects the European experience of what he called the "undivided heritage,"[39] belonging to and passed on by successive generations of diverse faith groups, moulded into a unitary entity. In other words, the cultural riches are the property of a country's population as a whole and not split into parts determined by religious differentiation and, therefore, distinct from each other, in value, at least. Dissent seems clear between the conception held by Iqbāl, for instance, and Renan, who felt that " 'religion alone does not constitute a nation any more than

could geography, but, nevertheless, both agreed that religion and geography have played an important role in the formation of nations."[40] Renan's conception glosses over two significant historical facts, namely, that Europe's Christianisation (*a*) gained impetus *after* its settlement by numerous Indo-European (Aryan) groups during late Roman times and (*b*) aimed at a total unity to restore the image of the defunct Empire. Iqbāl's theory bears, however, the implication that India's Muslims by virtue of a common heritage form a "nation."[41] The important deviation between the Frenchman's and the Muslim's idea lies in the former's repudiation and the latter's emphasis on religion as the sole determining factor in a nation's make-up. Renan, discounting Europe's historical experience, presented a "mystique," inherited from the Romantic era.[42] Iqbāl's view was rooted in the actual situation confronting Islamic India. In his time, the nationalist mood attained spiritual fervour owing to the growth of a fierce resistance to the foreigner, stimulated by his division of Bengal, a political measure based on religious and territorial schismatic lines and accentuating the separatist tendencies prevailing in India. It explains the attitude, assumed and bewailed by many among its Muslims, that *Indian* nationalism could not be operative. Muḥammad Iqbāl said:

> It is, however, painful to observe that our attempts to discover such a principle of internal harmony have so far failed. Why have they failed? Perhaps we suspect each other's intentions and inwardly aim at dominating each other. Perhaps in the higher interests of mutual co-operation, we cannot afford to part with the monopolies which circumstances have placed in our hands and conceal our egoism under the cloack of a nationalism, outwardly stimulating a largehearted patriotism, but inwardly as narrow-minded as a caste or a tribe. Perhaps, we are unwilling to recognise that each group has a right to free development according to its own cultural traditions. But whatever may be the causes of our failure, I still feel hopeful. Events seem to be tending in the direction of some sort of internal harmony. And as far as I have been able to read the Muslim mind, I have no hesitation in declaring that if the principle that the Indian Muslim is entitled to full and free development on the lines of his own culture and tradition in his own Indian homelands is recognised as the basis of a permanent communal settlement, he will be ready to stake his all for the freedom of India. The principle that each group is entitled to free development on its own lines is not inspired by any feeling of narrow communalism. There are communalisms and communalisms. A community which is inspired by feelings of ill-will towards other communities is low and ignoble. I entertain the highest respect for the customs, laws, religious and social institutions of other communities. Nay, it is my duty according to the teaching of the Quran, even to defend their places of worship, if need be. Yet I love the communal group, which is the source of my life and behaviour and which has formed me what I am, by giving me its religion, its literature, its thought, its culture and thereby recreating its whole past as a living operative factor in my present consciousness. . . .[43]

A pessimistic note is heard, because the hope he entertained was coupled with the accusation that egoism had been and remained a divisive factor. This portion of his speech reflects a certain agreement with Muḥammad 'Alī in so far as it, too, is a plea for a "liberalist" spirit among Muslims and Hindus. However, he appraises communalism in positive terms, in direct opposition to his countrymen, who repugned it. Iqbāl's assertion : "I love the communal group," shows that, for him, total identification with his own community (the "self") is essential for its as well as the body politic's preservation. In its political aspects Iqbāl's theory stressed " 'national autonomy . . . to create the international state. So also without the fullest cultural autonomy, and communalism in its better aspect is culture, it will be difficult to create a harmonious nation.'" Furthermore, he asserted : " 'The principle of European democracy cannot be applied to India without recognising the fact of communal groups. The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India is, therefore, perfectly justified...[44] The political implications will be discussed later. The relevant facets here are his insistence on full autonomy for India's Muslims within their own "homelands," in order to pursue their own way of life. The word "nation," used by Iqbāl, has two senses referring respectively to the entire body politic (Renan's concept) and to the Indo-Muslim community (the implication of Renan's idea). This is the way in which Sir Sayyid also interpreted it.

The territorial issue in a restrictive sense had entered into Iqbāl's argument, but he injected a note which had been heared earlier, but not taken seriously.[45] Allusion was made previously to the identification of a particular group, sharing a common faith and civilisation. When the Muslims came to India, they established themselves and formed majorities mainly in its north and north-eastern regions, termed by Iqbāl "homelands". Religion and territory thus contributed to the formulation of the restrictive concept of Indo-Muslim nationalism. In Islamic terminology, the "nation" is co-extensive with the *Millat* ; in Iqbāl's theory, this older view was retained, but applied to a religious community settled in one country's specific areas. This is a logical attitude, as the *Millat* had become fragmented politically (a fact he deplored), but nevertheless included all Muslims regardless of their habitat, and excluded all other faith groups. The change in his attitude stressing the Muslim brotherhood idea is expressed in a *ghazal* composed in March 1907, in which he wrote :

> " 'For, the silence of Mecca has proclaimed to the expectant ear at last,
> That the compact made with the desert-dwellers shall be enforced again. . . .' "[46]

A letter dated 28 March 1909, written after his return from Europe, shows

why he had changed his Indian nationalist for an Indo-Muslim communalist orientation :

" 'I have myself been of the view that religious differences should disappear from this country, and even now, act on this principle, in my private life. But now I think that the preservation of their separate national entities is desirable for both the Hindus and the Muslims. The vision of a common nationhood for India is a beautiful ideal, and has a poetic appeal, but looking to the present conditions and the unconscious trends of the two communities, appears incapable of fulfilment.' "[47]

The transition to a newer concept has been noted, viz. a religious community is considered a "nation" in the sense of having absolute internal cultural and political autonomy, which is possible not only because of its distinct faith and civilisation (including the socio-legal system and language), but also because of its territorial identification. The concepts of "Muslim" and "Indian" are still juxtaposed, but if there were any question whether a contradiction were not inherent in Muḥammad 'Alī's statement, it no longer arises concerning Iqbāl's theory. The reason is that the first asserted the principle of Indianism, in which Islamism is considered chiefly of a religious nature and hence sub-dominant, whereas the second presented it in such a way as to reassert the integral relationship between the Islamic religion and its social structure, which therefore must remain predominant: Iqbāl did not reject Indianism in so far as it meant localisation, but (unlike Muḥammad 'Alī or Abul-Kalām Āzād) gave it a secondary significance. For him, it meant the threat of Hindu domination, which implied possible violation of the Muslim faith and culture rather than the modern principle of integration of various faith groups within a large "nation" (body politic or state), willing to work together towards the preservation of their common heritage. Renan's principle was repudiated in this wider, but applied in a more restrictive, sense to communities distinct by faith and civilisation, forming, in the case of Muslims, majorities in certain of India's regions. The transference of the politico-cultural idea of the term "nation" (formulated by the Frenchman), noticeable in Sir Sayyid's view, thus found its full philosophical crystallisation in Iqbāl's thought.

Its fundamental basis, as noted, was the unity forged by a particular faith. This theme was pounded upon by one of Iqbāl's contemporaries, Mashriqī,[48] whose theological reformulation of the Islamic spirit was equally significant. He, too, defined the Muslim religion as mainly "action," stressing the necessity of works as well as the communal willingness to make sacrifices in a holy war against the non-Muslim (including Hindu) world and perseverance and faith in the good results of the efforts spent. His call to unity, a sacrificial spirit and self-assurance seems to fit perfectly into Iqbāl's appeal. They were the three concrete principles consolidating the Indo-Islamic

community, infusing it with dynamism and confidence that it shall be successful in its quest for self-realisation (*khudī* or, also, "autonomy" in Iqbāl's terminology). Secessionism thus was encouraged by a profound philosophico-theological formulation of the real nature of the faith and the concept of nationhood as supplied to India's Muslims. Their thinkers considered it essential for pointing the future road to their salvation.

3. Its Secular Aspects

An ideological movement cannot be sustained unless it is translated into some concrete esteemable project. In the case of Indo-Muslim nationalism, such political propositions as the Indo-Muslim right to separate electorates, the formation of the Muslim League and the "Pak" plan were presented. Secular in form, they nevertheless originated from the confrontation of two major religions in India. An analysis of political developments, therefore, seems pertinent to the discussion in so far as they bear directly upon the communal situation and had religio-political implications for the Indian Musalman.

The statement was made previously that Islamic nationalism is particularistic, for it is based on a common faith and civilisation. Consequently, another implication is the devotion to one's own group. In the Muslim experience, it meant originally a transition from tribal to "community" loyalty and gained a "universal" dimension in the sense that it was pledged to the community (symbolised by the caliph) after Islam's spread through the East. Again, it was said that settlement in various lands implied obedience to different Muslim Governments. In due course, therefore, submission to the authorities appointed by God and Muḥammad became particularistic for political reasons.[49] The situation became more complex in India where the Muslims, having become the rulers, at times practised discrimination against their Hindu compatriots on religious grounds. By the time the British arrived, the soil had ripened for the stress on rights by one *versus* the other group. With the impact of newer political notions, this particularism was aggravated, as is clear from Amīr 'Alī's and Sir Sayyid's discontent with the Congress's concern for adequately safeguarding Muslim interests. Communalism had become already a strong element in national politics, proven furthermore by the fact that Sir Sayyid's Association (unlike the Congress) confined its membership to Muslims and Englishmen.[50] In other words, it rejected national identification, probably mirroring its founder's feeling that co-operation with Hindu extremists growing powerful in and outside of Congress was impossible. It must be kept in mind that (*a*) Congress was a Hindu national organisation ; (*b*) it and the Mahasabha were parallel institutions which never merged together ;[51] and (*c*) many Congressmen belonged to the

Mahasabha.

" 'It is no use saying that the Congress is not a Hindu body. A body which is Hindu in its composition is bound to reflect the Hindu mind and to support Hindu aspirations. The only difference between the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha is that the latter is crude in its utterances and brutal in its actions, while the Congress is politic and polite. But for this difference of fact there is no other difference between the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha.' "[52]

Their common aim was to rule India. The best statement on this issue was made by Dr Shankaracharya Kurtkoti: " 'India belongs to the Hindus; the Muslims are only guests and should learn to behave like guests.' "[53] This ideology was the refrain of Indian politics from at least 1923 on. Wrote a modern authority:

Congress followed the Anglo-Saxon example of a single governing political party instead of that of a governmental coalition such as was the case in France or other occidental lands.[54]

Congress leadership, for the reasons given, ignored the fact that such a political conception was inapplicable to India. The above-mentioned refrain was repeated in 1925:

" '. . . It is that the State should belong to the Hindus and the Muhammadans may live there. But the State cannot be a Muslim State, *nor can it be a jointly Hindu-Muslim administered State*. The reason is that every State is ultimately dependent on its customs, its national languages and its national history.

" '. . . *A joint Hindu-Muslim State is sheer nonsense*, which under no circumstance can exist . . .[55] (italics ours).

Sir Sayyid had noted the appearance of this political orientation in the growing antagonism during the second half of the nineteenth century. His rejection of indianisation in the sense of an integrate nation, expressed in his political speeches and actions, is the better understood in the context of the tension. His conviction that India's Muslims must remain loyal to their own traditions served not only to encourage their progress in spite of extremist pressures. It also was a poignant expression of religio-cultural communalism.

The chief relevant point is, however, that political bodies created after the Western concept of popular representation, became injected with the religious issue. And so, too, did the novel electoral idea. It meant essentially the election of candidates for office by the nation, but in India, the problem arose whether it should have this territorial or a communal electoral system, meaning that Muslims only could be chosen by and represent their coreligionists. Sir Sayyid, himself, favoured the latter to assure a sufficient number of Muslim representatives in the provincial legislatures. He feared that, otherwise, the minority might be overshadowed by the majority. It also was British governmental policy:

There had always been a weighty consensus of official opinion that in a country like India communal and class electorates were inevitable. It was a view supported strongly by Lord Dufferin and pursued later, in 1892, by Lord Lansdowne's Government. An exception to the general opinion was Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, who, speaking for the Punjab, said that he doubted "whether in a province where the antagonism of different races and sects is so intense, it would be expedient to form any scheme expressly based on the idea of choosing class representatives."[56]

The warning against a communal electoral system, sounded by Sir Fitzpatrick, was repeated by Lord Morley, India's Secretary of State (1905-10), and a supporter of Gladstonian liberalism, and reiterated in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report (1918) as follows: " 'Division by creeds and classes means the creation of political camps organized against each other, and teaches men to think as partisans and not as citizens. . . . We regard any system of communal electorates, therefore, as a very serious hindrance to the development of the self-governing principle.' "[57] It was not shared by Lord Minto or the London Foreign Office, presided over by the Conservatives. This viceroy received a Muslim deputation at Simla, on 1 October 1906. It was gathered together by Muḥsin-ul-Mulk[58] and headed by the Āghā Khān, Sr. (1875-1962).[59] Two of its members, Mian Shāh Dīn[60] (1868-1918) and Mian Muḥammad Shafī (1889-1932), both from the Punjab, urged the acceptance of separate electorates. The viceroy assured them that the political rights of all communities would be guaranteed in the proposed reforms[61] enlarging Indian representation on the advisory viceregal and provincial legislative councils. The deputation requested that the communal principle be incorporated in any representative and electoral scheme to be adopted.[62] The motivation for this demand was the anxiety that otherwise the Muslim minority's well-being would be entrusted to a disinterested organ (Congress). Even some Hindus acknowledged that the Musalman's fear was not entirely unfounded, among them, for instance, Lal Bahadur, who said:

> It is important to note that the Muslim fear of not being fairly dealt with by the Hindu majority, particularly in political sphere, cannot be dismissed as a mere figment of their imagination. The Hindus constituted a vast majority, and all their activities were looked upon with suspicion by the Musalmans of India, as the former believed in the superiority of their religion and were proud of their culture.[63]

It is interesting to note that the attitude assumed by India's Muslims towards the rulers was one of defendant *versus* protector[64] (thus following Sir Sayyid's advice). Lord Minto's assurance, given to the members of the deputation at Simla, reflects the British acceptance of such a role as well as the pursuit of a communalist policy . . . expressed by his support of the separate electoral principle—advocated by previous viceroys. It suited the authorities—particularly at a time when Hindu sentiment had risen against

them[65]—who hoped thereby to pacify the Muslims. Even the English could not solve the problem inherent in numbers ; the "one man, one vote" idea, advocated by the former Mahasabha President, Mr Savarkar, would have given the Hindus an absolute majority in any election. British policy thus was unable to cure India's "communal legacy" and develop for this land truly national representative organs.

In their official communication to the Secretary of State in October 1908, the Government of India recommended that the Muslims should be granted separate electorates. "The Indian Muhammadans," they averred, "are much more than a religious body. They form in fact an absolutely separate community, distinct by marriage, food and custom, and claiming in many cases to belong to a different race from the Hindus." Lord Morley was at first opposed to the principle of separate electorates, but ultimately gave in.

The reason for giving the Muslims reserved seats and also separate electorates was that the Muslims feared that in territorial constituencies they would not secure the representation to which their numbers entitled them. Unless seats were actually reserved, they would, whether in single or many-seated constituencies, secure very few seats against the Hindus; and without separate voting, the richer and better-organized Hindus would arrange to put up Muslim candidates who would serve their interests and not those of Muslims. Both lines of defence were therefore held to be necessary. But the Muslims advanced and obtained yet a third demand, namely, that the scale of their representation should be not their wealth or their numbers, but their "political importance," a qualification not susceptible of exact assessment.[66]

The communal electoral system henceforth remained the procedure followed in India.[67]

The fact that this issue, as also the political organisms which had sprung up in that country, became drenched with religious factionalism shows that its people were unable to treat secular matters independently of the faith question. The reasons for it have been cited.

The Muslim League. This political organisation came into existence after the Simla Conference had taken place. Muslim leaders, gathered at Dacca (on 30 December 1906) to attend the Muhammadan Educational Conference, stayed for a meeting[68] which followed it. They discussed the proposal—made by Dacca's resident, Nawāb Salīm Ullah—to create a Central Muhammadan Association for the purpose of unifying Muslim opinion. They hoped that it would also serve to check Congress influence, permit Muslim youths to participate in politics, thereby preventing them from joining the Hindu body, and support British policy.[69] In other words, the Nawāb desired to found a political organisation to succeed and imitate those set up at the time respectively by Amīr 'Alī and Sir Sayyid. His fellowmen, having examined his plan, decided to found the All-India Muslim League, and appointed a committee—headed by Muḥsin-ul-Mulk and Viqār-ul-Mulk as

Joint Secretaries—to prepare a constitution. At a general meeting (which this committee had the power to convoke), held at Karachi on 29 December 1907[70] the final draft was adopted. The Muslim League, now legally born, became the most powerful political organ in Islamic India. At its second session opened at Aligarh on 18 March 1908, it passed a resolution on the first day to create a branch in England under Amīr 'Alī's leadership, which started functiong on 6 May of that year.[71] The matter of two Provincial Punjab Leagues[72] was settled on the second day. It was decided also that the All-India Muslim League should have forty members, viz. U.P. 7, Punjab 7, Bombay Province 4, East Bengal 7, West Bengal, Bihar and Orissa 7, Madras Province 2, Frontier and Baluchistan 1, Central Province and Berar 2, the Indian States 2 and Burma, forming part of British India 1.[73] At another meeting, also held at Aligarh (9 August 1908), it requested the authorities to establish, amongst others, a separate High Court in East Bengal and Assam to render judicial aid to their Muslim inhabitants.[74]

The All-India Muslim League, as the title implies, was a national organisation whose purpose was threefold : to create a political consciousness among the Indo-Islamic population, unite them under a central leadership and act as their spokesman before the Hindus and the British.[75]

Was its formation due chiefly to the deputation's success in obtaining from Lord Minto his acknowledgment that Indian Islam constituted by virtue of its religion and culture a distinct community ? This question is a moot one in view of the stated attitudes. The desire to rally Muslim opinion in favour of its leader's platform—chiefly the communal electoral principle—may have been another contributory, but not necessarily a primary, factor in its creation. It is true that the debates had raged hitherto mostly among the leaders. The Muslim majority had neither much understanding of the political meaning implied by the phrase "communal electorates" nor of the philosophical formulation presented on the subject. Again, only the top people had gathered at Dacca and Karachi. Once they had set up their League, they needed public support to ensure its success. Nevertheless, it was shown that deeper motives had stirred them to found their own organisation. Among those mentioned, the dissatisfaction with and fear of Hindu politics must be stressed. They felt the intense need to crystallise the Indo-Muslim viewpoint and chart a course of action agreed upon by the Islamic majority and enacted by the leadership.

Briefly sketched,[76] the Muslim League had a short initial period of activity, characterised by conservatism, as it remained pro-British for the time being[77] and, during its first decades, also saw eye to eye with Congress on a number of issues. It did not have then wide mass support and remained an upper-class body.

After the death of Maulana Muhammad 'Ali in 1931, the reputation of his brother Shawkat 'Ali dwindled away. The other old leaders favouring the Caliphate, such as Zafar 'Ali Khan and Hasrat Mohani, lost the confidence of the masses because of their political vicissitudes. The Aga Khan, for whom Indian politics was a pastime, always had been a decorative silhouette. A new generation of Muslim landed proprietors, represented by Liaqat 'Ali Khan, Nawab Isma'il Khan and Sir Silkander Hayat Khan, aided by a new group of professional politicians such as Fazlul Haq in Bengal, replaced them. None among them had the calibre or the stature worthy of inspiring confidence in the ensemble of Muslim India. The Muslim League had disappeared temporarily in 1933; in 1936 she resuscitated by acknowledging again Jinnah as a leader; he, in effect, had retired from the Indo-Muslim political scene because chaos reigned and he had settled in Great Britain.[78]

Under Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ, the League once again became dynamic; he reorganised it and made it a truly popular organ of Indo-Muslim opinion.

Before discussing his career, it is necessary, however, to give at least a short exposition on certain provincial developments in order to understand the unfolding of the last acts—played out during his leadership—resulting in the birth of a sovereign state called Pakistan.

Pertinent Developments in the Provinces. The All-India Muslim League was founded in present-day East Bengal, one of the Muslim majority regions, as the whole Bengal province had 52.8% Muslim, according to the 1921 Census.[79] Its first session was held at Karachi in Sind (December 1907), its second (18-19 March 1908) at Aligarh in the western part of the United Provinces (part of India today). In other words, it met annually in a different city. Once it had been set up, branches were created in the various provinces which had at least a sizable Muslim population. Although they did their spade work from the moment they were founded, they did not become truly effective until the 1920's. Some major reasons were :

(1) the need for building up support among the Muslim leadership and population in the provinces ;

(2) the belief, strengthened by the Khilāfat movement, among an influential segment in Islamic India that Hindu-Muslim co-operation was possible ;

(3) Congress refusal to participate in the new Legislative Councils set up under the 1919 reforms ;

(4) the opposition to the elections (held under these reforms) which were fought by the Swaraj Party under Motilal Nehru's and C.R. Das's leadership;[80] it clearly showed Congress opposition to Muslim participation in government, explicable in terms of Hindu fear of Islamic dominance if and when the British would leave India ;

(5) the resultant disillusion, reassessment and change in political orien-

tation ; many Muslims left Congress and joined the League instead, constituting the former independent Muslim party, led by Jinnāḥ, in the Central Legislative Assembly ;[81]

(6) the emergence of political consciousness among the growing educated middle classes as well as, more slowly, among the Indo-Muslim villagers ; their awakening was due to intensive educational reform measures as well as political initiation.

Congress hostility again was illustrated in 1929, when discussions pertaining to the creation of a government for free India were held. An All-Party Committee, chaired by Motilal Nehru, rejected the Muslim claim to one third of the Central Legislature's seats. Islamic India's struggle for political self-expression was helped by the League which, as stated, began to draw many influential Muslims away from Congress, and built up an irresistible power as Islamic India's spokesman.

Let its position and the situation in the provinces now come into focus. The Punjab's Muslim population, again according to the 1921 Census, amounted to 54.8%.[82] Its first president was Mian Shāh Dīn ; having been appointed as Judge of Punjab's Chief Court, he was replaced in that capacity by Mian (Sir) Muḥammad Shafī'.[83] The problem of a rival League branch in the Punjab, set up by Mian Fazl-i-Ḥusain (1877-1936), Education Minister from 1921 to 1926, was dealt with at the second meeting of the national organisation. It was decided that the two men should reach a compromise. Mian Muḥammad Shafī', nevertheless, retained control until 1916, while Fazl-i-Ḥusain seems to have retired from political life. When he re-entered it in 1915, he associated himself with Congress (as did Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ at that time) without severing formally his League ties. His political activities—he founded the Rural Party, later called the National Unionist or Unionist Party—and educational career were of immense benefit to the Punjabi and, generally, India's Muslims. For instance, many more attended schools of all kinds (2.42% *versus* 6.71%[84]) *after* the spread of reforms and "the principle of communal reservation of seats" was extended to all higher government educational institutions. He also secured, under the 1916 Lucknow Pact, 40% of the seats for Punjabi students at Lahore's Medical College and Government College, which prior thereto had not admitted more than 5%-10% Muslims.[85] He was instrumental, furthermore, in granting scholarships to very poor students and in opening schools in backward areas so that parents no longer needed to send their sons to Lahore. His devotion to Islamia College in that city[86] also deserves mentioning. The result was that nearly half of the students now were Muslims and that the Muslim teaching staff as well as professional and administrative groups began to grow in numbers. A Muslim quota in the Punjab government was

established largely through his influence; other provinces and, finally, the Government of India, adopted it.[87]

Although Fazl-i-Ḥusain disagreed with Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ on the latter's programme of centralisation, as he was a provincial at heart, he, nevertheless, organised on behalf of Jinnāḥ "a successful session of the League at Lahore in 1924, when the Khilafat movement had driven the League out of public view and no annual session had been held for years."[88] Having been an influential Muslim Congress leader in the Punjab since 1915 and responsible for creating in the Legislative Council of his province the possibility of coreligionist majority rule, he was serving League interests in the 1920's. He was unpopular with the Hindus, who could not dislodge him, and with the British, who disliked "his ways and the position he had built up for himself,"[89] and did by making him a Revenue Member (in 1926). The promotion meant his removal from a position permitting him to influence other ministries. His appointment to the Vicerory's Executive Council at Delhi (in 1930) took him away from the Punjab, whither he returned five years later (on 1 April 1935), having suffered meanwhile a breakdown from which he never fully recovered. He did not follow his original intention to withdraw, perhaps due to Jinnāḥ's insistent desire to establish League leadership in that province as well. The latter invited him, in a latter dated 5 January 1936, to preside over the 1936 All-India Muslim League session. It states in part:

"'At the meeting of the Council of the All-India Muslim League, it was the unanimous wish of everyone that you should be asked to preside over the next session of the League. As soon as I suggested your name, it was cordially welcomed. I, along with many others, feel that at this moment no one can give a better lead to the Mussalmans of Indian than yourself. . . . I am afraid I have perhaps not expressed adequately how strongly I feel that your presence is necessary mainly and solely in the interests of the community, but I hope you will understand and if you can, do send me a wire "accept it". Your refusal will be the greatest misforturne and a terrible disappointment to me personally."'[90]

Fazl-i-Ḥusain refused the invitation and devoted his last year to opposing firmly any interference by the All-India Muslim League in Punjab politics. When he died on 9 July 1936, his political heirs continued the fight, his Unionist Party carrying the victory then and again, in 1937, when they won 96 out of 175 seats.[91] "But this," writes Dr Ikram, "was only a pyrrhic victory. Ten years later new forces operating under the leadership of the Quaid-i-Azam, smashed the Unionist Party to smithers!"[92] The path was paved by Sir Sikandar Ḥayāt Khān[93] (died 26 December 1942), who, despite the 1937 Unionist victory, "formed a coalition cabinet with three Muslims, two Hindus and one Sikh."[94] The national League had been opposed in that

election, but Congress refusal to accept Muslims in its cabinets drove the Unionists to a compromise with the League, which the Punjabi Muslims then were advised by Sikandar to join. This proposal, submitted by Jinnāḥ during the Muslim League session at Lahore (1940),[95] rejected the idea of Indian unity. At its core lay the principle of Indo-Muslim self-determination which was uppermost in his mind. Once the Pakistan scheme had been enunciated, the provincial leadership had a clear-cut choice. Nevertheless, in the Punjab as in other Muslim-majority provinces, the League still had to build up support for its new programme.

When Sir Sikandar Ḥayāt Khān died (on 26 December 1942), Malik Khizar Ḥayāt Khān Tiwānā became Punjab's premier and the Unionist Party's leader. Jinnāḥ went to Lahore (in April 1943) in order to win the new head over to the League's side. Khizar Ḥayāt and his father, Sir 'Umar Ḥayāt Khān Tiwānā, were interested in the Pakistan proposal in its initial stages, but were unable to reconcile their viewpoint with the conflicting League policies. Were Jinnāḥ's insistence that the Unionist Party's name be changed to the "Muslim Coalition" and the governor's dismissal of Captain Shawkat Ḥayāt Khān from the cabinet the major reasons for his failure ?[96] Rather, the Punjabi's loyalty to the original Unionist idea and the coalition ministry's endurance (until 1945) seem to explain the continuous tension between the Unionists and the League. Furthermore, Jinnāḥ maintained not only that the organisation he led was the only one entitled to speak for India's Muslims, but that it should have a major say in internal politics of those provinces where his coreligionists formed majorities. He, therefore, listed the Punjab in the six provinces for which he demanded autonomy.[97] When discussions took place concerning the proposed expansion of the Executive Council, the League's demand that it select all Muslim members to it[98] was negated by Khizar Ḥayāt Khān as he admitted having requested a seat for his province in this body.[99] The Punjabi's attitude did not reflect the real situation as was shown by the late 1945 elections—announced by Lord Wavell on 19 September 1945—to the Central Legislative Assembly. The results, announced in December, indicated that the Muslim League won "86.6 per cent of the total votes cast in Muhammadan constituencies." It received 30 of a total of 102 elected seats *versus* 25 in the previous Assembly. The Muslim Nationalists, who had held 10 seats in the former Assembly, lost them all in 1945.[100]

The elections to the provincial Legislatures, held in February 1946, gave the following results for the Punjab :

> The results of the elections in the Punjab were considered to provide the key to the Muslim problem. Out of a total of eighty-six Muslim seats, the Muslim League had been able to win seventy-five. The Congress had won

fifty-one seats, the Panthic Akali Sikhs twenty-two and the Unionists twenty, while the remaining seven had been won by independent candidates. As a result of changes in party loyalties that took place soon after the results came out, the final position became, Muslim League seventy-nine; Congress fifty-one; Panthic Akali Sikhs twenty-two; Unionists and Independents ten each. By-elections were pending in three constituencies. The Muslim League, as the largest single party, was entitlted to the first offer to form a ministry, but as it could not claim an absolute majority in the Assembly it would have had to ally itself with some other party. . . .[101]

After an alliance was made between Congress and the Akali Sikhs, they put three conditions to the League. Summarised, these were: their right to nominate "half the strength of the ministry,"[102] the member of any, and not only the Hindu, community; and, lastly, the omission of the Pakistan issue in any provincial debates as it was a national question. The League did not accept any one of these proposals. "Eventually a coalition party was formed which consisted of the Congress, the Unionists and the Akali Sikhs, under the leadership of Khizr Hyat Khan, who was invited by the Governor to form a ministry."[103]

Obviously, the League was dissatisfied with the situation in the Punjab, which meant repudiation of its supreme leadership in that province. The elections showed, nevertheless, the increasing support given it by the middle class as well as "the failure of Congress to attract, or to keep attracted, the discontented. . . ." It must be remembered, also, that the League, itself, had partly a middle-class membership, which increasingly grew aware that they could not be successful "in the present order" or "even in a free capitalist India" and that their opportunities "could be immensely increased if they would stand together as a corporate Muslim" group.[104]

Conditions in the Punjab were precarious. As no compromise between the League and the Unionists could be reached, Khizar Ḥayāt Khān resigned (on 2 March 1947) and his coalition ministry, mainly supported by Sikhs and Hindus, fell. Sir Evan Jenkins, the Punjab's governor, "adopted the constitutional procedure of calling upon the Khān of Mamdot, leader of the provincial Muslim League, to form a Ministry. As expected, both the Hindus and the Sikhs refused to co-operate and the Governor was obliged, on 5 March, to take over the administration under Section 93."[105] Their refusal was grounded in their repudiation of Pakistan.[106] Communal rioting, which not only beset the Punjab—"particularly in the Rawalpindi section"[107]—became so serious in that province that Jenkins saw no way of having an elected ministry take over. The Punjab consequently continued to be governed under Section 93 of the 1935 Government of India Act until power was transferred to Pakistan (on 15 August 1947).

Another matter, too, had been prominent in the high-level discussions, namely, the division of certain provinces, such as the Punjab. It became

the more serious and imminent after the British Government decided (on 20 February 1947) to transfer power by June 1948. The final events occurred under Lord Mountbatten, the last of thirty-four Governor-Generals, who reached India on 22 March.[108] Independence, secession and provincial division, including all administrative aspects related thereto were the three major themes echoeing throughout the land. The first had been agreed upon. Regarding the second, suffice it to repeat here Jinnāḥ's statement that a grouping of Muslim-majority provinces necessarily had to include the Punjab.[109] Concerning the third, two statements, one by the late Premier Nehru, the other by Dr Rajendra Prasad, then Constituent Assembly President and later India's President, gave the final orientation. Nehru was willing to give Pakistan to the League, provided "'they do not take away other parts of India which do not wish to join Pakistan.'"[110] Dr Rajendra Prasad said a little later that compulsion is not the wisest of politics. "'This,'" he added, "'may mean not only the division of India, but a division of some provinces. . . .'"[111] The issue was discussed at a conference called by Lord Mountbatten at Simla (10 May 1947) and, again, during a meeting convened by him at his Delhi residence (2 and 3 June), when Jinnāḥ finally accepted it as the only and best way to guarantee Indo-Muslim sovereignty.

How did the Punjabis feel about it ? Khizar Ḥayāt Khān—as did the Hindus and the Sikhs—opposed it, a logical position in view of his nationalist attitude. He apparently changed his view subsequently. Was it due to insufficient "official encouragement"[112] to League pressures or did he finally realise that the Punjabi Muslims had no alternative but to accept that choice which ultimately would be of the greatest advantage to them ? The Indian people having been granted by their leaders the right to express their preference by referendum, the Punjabis voted as follows :

> The Punjab Legislative Assembly . . . decided by ninety-one votes to seventy-seven to join a new Constituent Assembly. The members from the Muslim majority areas of West Punjab then decided, by sixty-nine votes to twenty-seven, against the partition of the province ; while the members from the non-Muslim majority areas of East Punjab decided, by fifty votes to twenty-two, that the province should be partitioned and that East Punjab should join the existing Indian Constituent Assembly.[113]

The referendum results need not surprise anyone. They showed that the Muslim majority preferred to join Pakistan, but, following League policy, were averse to splitting their province.[114]

When Lord Mountbatten promulgated India's independence as well as the creation of a new sovereign country : Pakistan, his formal announcement implied at once the creation of some provinces, including that of the West Punjab,[115] which joined the new-born land. The Unionist ideal had

lost out ; the Muslim League had been vindicated.

Irrespective of Mian Fazl-i-Ḥusain's disagreement with League policy, he was the one man, spanning momentous decades in the nineteenth-twentieth centuries,[116] who led the Muslim Punjabis out of darkness. It was he more than any other who created a political consciousness among them and thereby was responsible for the emergence of an Islamic majority in his province. Their numbers alone would have been meaningless without the educational and political encouragement given them by their benefactor. Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ reportedly said "that in his opinion only two leaders of Indian Muslims had rendered solid, lasting service to the community and they were Sir Syed and Mian Fazl-i-Husain."[117]

At the time that the latter was active in the Punjab, Maulvī Abul-Qāsim Fazl-ul-Ḥaq (1873-1962) was Bengal's recognised Muslim leader. He, however, lived long enough to witness Pakistan's birth and continue his political activities in that country. He was Education Minister for only six months (in 1924), as the Ministry in which he served was overthrown. This was due to opposition by the Swaraj Party led by C.R. Das, who had Muslim Khilāfatist support and Motilal Nehru. He presided over the Bengal Muslim Conferencc, held at Faridpur (on 2 may 1925), "when he urged the Muslims to organise themselves to start an association along the lines of Hindu Mahasabha and to cover the whole of Bengal with a network of branches."[118] Although he did not have any post in the provincial government between 1925 and 1936, he played an active part in his province's political life. He was Calcutta's mayor (1935-6) and a member of the Provincial Committee, created (in 1927) to help the Simon Commission.[119] In the same year (1927), Bengal's first stable Ministry,[120] to which belonged also Khwāja Nāẓim-ud-Dīn (1894-1964), was formed. Fazl-ul-Ḥaq often joined Congress in municipal and provincial politics, but fearlessly pushed his people's rights. His "strong speeches in support of the demands of Bengal Muslims"[121] and his blocking the reopening of the Communal Award,[122] issued after the London sessions had failed, are solid proofs. He also founded the Krishak-Proja (Peasant-Tenant) Party, while elections under the Government of India Act took place (in 1935). His Party stood for land reform, the abolition of the zamīndārīs, and, generally, for economic reconstruction. It opposed and defeated (in 1936) the Bengal League branch, led by Khwāja Nāẓim-ud-Dīn.

The result of the electicns displayed an old trend of Bengal politics noticed even by the Simon Commission—the emergence of several small discordant parties and groups instead of the overwhelming success of one party. In the Bengal Assembly of 1937, the Congress had gained 60 seats, including 17 for the scheduled castes, the Muslim League gained 40, the Krishak-Proja Party obtained 35. There were 25 Europeans, 41 indepen-

dent Muslims, 23 independent scheduled caste members and 14 independent caste Hindus. With this composition of the Assembly, only a coalition cabinet could provide a stable government. Fazl-ul-Haq became the Chief Minister on April 1, 1937, and continued to hold this position for almost full six years On the formation of the Coalition, the relationship between the Krishak-Proja party and the Muslim League improved, and Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din, who was elected by mutual agreement in a by-election, became the Home Minister.[123]

Again, as in the Punjab, Congress refused to accept elected Muslim representatives and the result was the same, viz. Fazl-ul-Ḥaq insisted that his Party join the League. The reconciliation and his hearty support of this Indo-Muslim organisation revived it in his province. He resigned, however, from its Working Committee in protest against Jinnāḥ's request that he (as also Assam's and Punjab's premiers) leave the Defence Council, set up in 1941 by the Government of India because the invitation to join it had not been chanelled through the League.[124] Jinnāḥ also felt that national co-operation with it in the Second World War should be on condition that certain League demands would be met. Apparently, Fazl-ul-Ḥaq's was a minority voice, interpretable perhaps as a rejection of total League interference in Bengal. When the news of a novel organ, the Progressive Coalition Party, circulated and his colleagues heard about it, they resigned. The short truce was broken. His opponents set up a new Muslim League Party, while Fazl headed the Progressives.

On 16 December, 1941, Fazl-ul-Ḥaq formed a new Ministry in coalition with non-Muslim members. His Cabinet included nine members, of whom five, including the Premier, were Muslims and four Hindus. Two Hindu members were from the Forward Block, one represented the scheduled castes and the fourth was Dr. Shyama Prashad Mukerjee, a militant leader of Hindu Mahasabha, who later founded Jana Sangh. Fazl-ul-Haq's new Ministary was able to command a majority in the Assembly, but the by-elections showed its total loss of support so far as the Bengal Muslims were concerned. Soon Dr. Mukerjee got into difficulties with the Governor and resigned in November, 1942. This was a period of great anxiety as Japanese troops had reached very near the borders of Bengal and Fazl-ul-Haq had differences with the Governor over administrative measures necessary for war work. On 28 March, 1943, he resigned.[125]

His successor was Khwāja Nāẓim-ud-Dīn, the second powerful Muslim Bengali. Unlike Fazl-ul-Ḥaq, he was a Leaguer. As a member of the Bengal Cabinet (1929-34) and the Executive Councillor, he strongly influenced the course of his province. The dyarchy, characterising its political life and interrupted four times due to a vote of lack of confidence in various ministers, was re-established more firmly in 1929.[126] From the moment he entered Bengali politics, he was in collision with Fazl-ul Ḥaq, whose party, it just was noted, triumphed in the 1956 elections, It signified a "defeat" not only for the Bengal Muslim League, but also for its head,

Khwāja Nāẓim-ud-Dīn. Dr Ikram's statement that the 1937 Unionist Party's success in the Punjab "was only a pyrrhic victory"[127] applies equally to the 1936 elections in Bengal. Despite Jinnāḥ's losing Fazl-ul-Ḥaq's allegiance in 1941, he won out by Nāẓim-ud-Dīn's loyalty to and support of the League. It signified, furthermore, that they together carried Bengal's Muslim electorate Nāẓim-ud-Dīn strongly opposed Fazl-ul-Ḥaq's view that the decision to sit in the Defence Council was an individual or, more so, a provincial matter ; that is, the argument for autonomy. The latter's Ministry, formed in December 1941, lasted only a year and three months. Its failure showed that he as a non-Leaguer had lost the support of Muslim Bengal, which now stood firmly behind Khwāja Nāẓim-ud-Dīn. His Ministry, set up on 24 April 1942, lasted until the 1945 elections had taken place. The two-year period in itself might not be interpreted as stability, but it did indicate a solid League front in Bengal.

Other prominent Muslim members of the Cabinet were Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan, the Education Minister, and Khwaja Shahab-ud-Din. The parliamentary secretaries who gained prominence later included Muhammad Ali of Bogra (later Prime Minister of Pakistan), Fazl-ur-Rahman (later Education Minister, Government of Pakistan) and Tafazzal Ali Chowdhury [128]

It indicated a solid League front in Bengal, which crumbled as a result of squabbling among its members, weakening Khwāja Nāẓim-ud-Dīn's position. "Kiran Shankar Roy, leader of the Congress Party in the Bengal Legislature, approached Nazimuddin with a view to the formation of a League-Congress coalition ministry."[129] Meanwhile, a number of the premier's party members defected (on 28 March 1945), leading to his ministry's defeat. The consequence was the same as in the Punjab : the governor took over under the 1935 Act.

The Muslim League's victory in the elections to the Central Assembly was mentioned.[130] In those to the provincial legislatures, the following data are pertinent :

In the Bengal Assembly of 250 members, the Muslim League won 113 out of the total of 119 Muslim seats, and the Congress obtained eighty-seven. H.S Suhrawardy, leader of the Mu lim League, was invited to form a ministry. He held negotiations with the local Congress leaders with a view to forming a coalition ministry, but this proved fruitless and a ministry was formed by the Muslim League Party with the support of independent elements.

Its victory in Bengal offset its defeat in these elections in the Punjab.[131]

Jinnāḥ's opposition to the territorial division of provinces with a Muslim majority—particularly to that of the Punjab and Bengal—has been indicated.[132] Bengali Hindus increasingly favoured the creation of West

Bengal, however, as did the provincial Congress and the Mahasabha.

At this stage, Suhrawardy (the Premier) came out with a proposal for "a sovereign, independent and undivided Bengal in a divided India". Sarat Chandra Bose, the Congress left wing-leader, supported the proposal, but it received little support from either the Muslim League or the Congress.[133]

When Bengal's Provincial Legislative Assembly met (on 20 June 1947) it "decided by 126 votes to ninety in favour of joining a new Constituent Assembly."[134] This is not surprisiug as Muslim Leaguers were dominant. Regarding territorial division of their province, the following statistics tell the story :

The members from the non-Muslim majority areas of West Bengal then met and decided by fifty-eight votes to twenty-one that the province should be partitioned and that West Bengal should join the existing Indian Constituent Assembly ; while the members from the Muslim majority areas of East Bengal met and decided by 106 votes to thirty-five that the province should not be partitioned and, by almost the same majority of votes, that East Bengal should join a new Constituent Assembly and that Sylhet should be amalgamated with that province.[135]

As in the Punjab, Bengal's Hindus preferred, its Muslims rejected, partition. Nevertheless, the realities of the situation could not be ignored. The League scored another victory in so far as a new Muslim province of East Bengal joined Pakistan (in August 1947) and named Khwāja Nāẓim-ud-Dīn its first Prime Minister. A year later, the Cabinet chose him to be Pakistan's Governor-General, succeeding directly Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ (died September 1948).

In Ḥusain Shaheed Suhrawardy (1893-1963), the Muslim League had another firm Bengali supporter. "When C.R. Das was disowned by the Hindus and Hindu-Muslim relations deteriorated, Shaheed drifted towards the Muslim League, and became the Secretary of the Bengal Provincial Muslim League"[136] He, like Nāẓim-ud-Dīn, rejected the more fluid position of a man like Fazl-ul-Ḥaq.

When at the meeting of the Khilafat Committee held at Calcutta in December 1928, the "Bengal group led by Maulana Akram Khan, Ashraf-uddin Choudhri and Fazl-ul-Haq, were in favour of compromise with the Congress, the new Khilafat Committee of Calcutta, with Shaheed Suhrawardy leading it, was against any compromise with the Congress on the reservation for the majority in respect of Punjab Muslims."[137]

It was not until April 1943 that he entered his province's government as Minister of Civil Supplies.

The Muslims had a slight majority in the population of undivided Bengal which was reflected in the Legislative Assembly, and between 1937

and 1947 the ministry was always led by a Muslim ; but this was the shadow rather than the substance of power. With the exception of Nazimuddin, who was universally trusted, and the brilliant Suhrawardy (and these two were openly opposed), their political leadership was generally dull. . . .[138]

In the late 1945 elections, the League branch in Bengal won 116 out of 119 seats. Suhrawardy's organising talents, apart from League popularity in that province, constituted an important reason for its success. In 1946, he became Bengal's premier. Khwāja Nāẓim-ud-Dīn went to Delhi. When in April 1946 newly elected Muslim legislators held an All-India Convention, which finalised the Muslim demand, the main resolution was moved by Ḥusain Shaheed Suhrawardy. He subsequently stayed at Calcutta, joining hands with Gandhi to prevent bloodshed and thereby saving many Muslims in that city and its province.

The three men mentioned, Fazl-ul-Haq, Khwāja Nāẓim-ud-Din and Ḥusain Shaheed Suhrawardy, were the spokesmen for Islamic Bengal. Fazl-ul-Ḥaq, like Fazl-Ḥusain in the Punjab, had a genuine interest in the people and tried to improve their status by various educational and economic programmes. The eldest among them—he was born four years before his Punjabi colleague and twenty-one years before Nāẓim-ud-Dīn—he began the process of stirring political awareness among Bengal's Muslims, continued by his successors.

The question of Sind[139] (capital, Karachi[140]), was reviewed also at the League's first national meeting. The reason was its large Muslim majority, comprising 70.7% of its population, totalling then about 4,400,000.[141] The suggestion that it be separated from Bombay Province, made by the Reception Committee's Chairman during an All-Indian Congress session at Karachi (in 1913) originally was favoured by the Hindus. This question again was raised by the Sind branch of the National Muhammadan Association during Edwin Montagu's visit to Karachi (in 1917).[142] The resolution for Sind's separation, moved by Shaykh 'Abdul Majīd Sindhī at the All-India Muslim League meeting (1925), was adopted formally. In spite of subsequent Hindu opposition, the autonomy of this province was incorporated in the 1935 Government of India Act, which it attained on 1 April 1936, four years after the Communal Award had reserved thirty-four of a total of sixty seats to Muslim Sindhīs.[143] "Its Moslems had been lifted from a minority status to that of a majority."[144]

Sind politics between 1937 and 1946 were dominated by selfish men mainly interested in obtaining a ministry. A pro-Congress Government led by Khān Bahādur Allah Bakhsh was followed by a Coalition Cabinet formed by Sir Ghulām Ḥusain Hidāyatullah, an old Leaguer, who was instrumental in persuading the British to grant autonomy to Sind. It consisted "of the

two members of the Muslim League, one independent Muslim and two Hindus. . . . All the Muslim Ministers joined the League, and on 3 March, 1943, the Sind Assembly passed a resolution on the lines of the Lahore Resolution of 1940."[145] Differences among them and the demand by the Working Committee of the Sind Provincial Muslim League that they resign, because they gave inadequate aid to the Haris and formed syndicates for the handling of food purchases, undermined their authority. This Ministry fell when Sir Ghulām resigned (in February 1946); a month earlier, a Muslim-Congress coalition had been formed by dissatisfied Muslims, many of them supporters of the ex-Premier Allah Bakhsh (assassinated on 14 May 1943). Sind's Governor then ordered new elections, which were held in December 1946. "These elections which were fought on party tickets resulted in the election of twenty Congressmen, thirty-five Muslim Leaguers, and three Europeans and two members of Jamiat. The Muslim League ministry was reformed on 3 January, 1947, with Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah as Premier."[146] The Sind Legislative Assembly decided at a special session convened on 20 June of that year to "join the new Pakistan Constituent Assembly and thus Sind became the first province to opt for Pakistan under the scheme of 3 June 1947."[147] Sir Ghulām was its first Governor after Partition became a reality on 15 August.[148]

The North-West Frontier Province (N.-W.F.P.) was created by Lord Curzon, who separated certain districts from the Punjab (1901). Inhabited by Pushtu-speaking Pathān tribes of the Muslim faith, it had been divided by Colonel Mortimer Durand, England's Foreign Secretary at the time, into two areas: one under British India's, the other under Afghanistan's, control.[149] The seeds for the eventual merger of the N.-W.F.P. with Pakistan resulted from the following causes: (*a*) its establishment as a separate province; (*b*) its predominant faith being Islam; and (*c*) its creation as a Muslim majority province (1935).

The story unfolds as follows. In spite of earlier League demands, no reforms were introduced in the N.-W.F.P. prior to 1929, partly due to Hindu opposition, partly to League weakness in that province, and partly also to its own leadership. Khān 'Abdul Ghaffār Khān (born 1891), a dominant figure in N.-W F.P. politics, and known as the "Frontier Gandhi" for the tactics he used, was anti League. He formed (in the 1920's) the "Servants of God" (Khudā'ī Khidmatgār), also called "Red Shirts," numbering "between 100,000 and 200,000."[150] They constituted at once a religious and a Pathān nationalist movement.

Through the movement the Pathāns have been learning to help each other, to see their problems and difficulties as common. They have been learning to organize, to discipline their irascible discontent and to direct

it into . . . effective channels. During the Congress' "no-rent" campaign of 1930, the Khudā'ī Khidmatgars staged a successful well-organized stoppage of revenue collecting. . . ."[151]

They were mainly village-based and weak in the towns. Pro-Congress, they took over their province's government at a time the League was nearly defunct. Twice they formed ministries : in 1932 and in 1937, to which further reference shall be made.

Jinnāḥ's "fourteen points," formulated toward the end of 1928,[152] when the Simon Commission was touring India (1927-9), included certain demands specifically pertaining to the N.-W.F.P. They were, apart from his insistence on provincial autonomy (point 2), which applied "to all provinces" and the one-third Muslim ratio in the provincial cabinets and at the centre (point 13):

6. Any territorial redistribution that might at any time be necessary shall not in any way affect the Muslim majority in the Punjab, Bengal and the *N.W.F Province* .

10. Reforms should be introduced in the *North-West Frontier Province* and Baluchistan as in other provinces [italic ours].

By popular Muslim demand, the N.-W.F.P. became a governor's province, meaning that it fell under direct control of the central government as well as in the category of "exclusive areas" (Section 93 of the 1935 Act).

The League, reviving under Jinnāḥ's leadership, now sharpened its focus also on the N.-W.F P., but its first attempts to dislodge non-League leadership there failed. The Red Shirts had one aim : Indian independence and, in spite of their Pathān nationalist sentiments, they at first preferred unity. "After 1931 the organization was put at the disposal of Congress."[153] Their leader and his colleagues were arrested under the Ordinances issued by the Viceroy, Lord Willingdon (1931-6, Lord Irwin's successor) during the Second Round Table Conference (7 September-1 December 1931).[154] The Communal Award, published by Prime Minister Ramsay Macdonald on 16 April 1932, assigned 36 out of 50 seats to the N.-W.F.P.'s Muslim inhabitants, constituting 91.8% of its population which then numbered a little less than three million.[155] On 30 April the Viceroy inaugurated its Legislative Council.[156] Sir 'Abdul Qayyūm Khān formed its first pro-Congress ministry (1932-7).

The 1935 Government of India Act decreed yet another of the 1919 Proposals, viz. the creation of the N.-W.F.P. as one of the two Muslim-majority provinces (apart from Sind). It satisfied thereby a League demand. Elections being held under the Act had the following result :

In the North-West Frontier Province, independents, largely supported by the Khudā'ī Khidmatgārs, won practically every seat in 1937 ; and the brother of 'Abd al-Ghaffār became premier. The group then joined the Congress.[157]

This Congress ministry, the second formed in the N.-W.F.P., lasted until 1939.

By now, cohesion between Red Shirt leaders and the Congress was practically complete. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, when he was out of jail, was an important member of the All-India Congress Working Committee.[158] He was, in effect, "the Deputy Leader of the Congress Party in the Central Assembly!"[159] Gandhi repeatedly visited "the province to bring it fully in line with the Congress-dominated areas."[160] On the Congress Working Committee's demand, Dr Khān Ṣāḥib (d. 1956), as Sir 'Abdul Qayyūm, who—unlike his brother, had studied in Eugland—was called, resigned, as did the Congress ministries in the other provinces. Theirs was a formal rejection of co-operation with England in the Second World War.[161] Meanwhile, Lord Willingdon had been supplanted by Lord Linlithgow (1936-43) as India's Viceroy. During an interview with him (in February 1940),[162] Jinnāḥ mentioned the League's efforts to set up a ministry in the N.-W.F.P. "He was convinced that there could be no more salutary lesson for the Congress and no better advertisement of the real position in India, whether before the country or throughout the world, than that a non-Congress ministry should be set up in the North-West Frontier Province."[163] In spite of the Viceroy's assurance that he would like to see the Constitution again in effect there by the appointment of an accepted ministry and would communicate Jinnāḥ's views to the Governor, Sir George Cunningham, no League ministry was formed.[164] For some years (1939-43), therefore, the N.-W.F.P. lacked a popular government. The question again was discussed by Sir Feroz Khan Noon, a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council at the time, with the Governor (October 1942). His argument followed Jinnāḥ's.

But the Muslim League had an insecure majority in the Assembly and the time was not ripe for action—though the position was to change some months later. Aurangzeb Khan, the local Muslim League leader, obtained a promise of support from 20 Muslim members. There were 50 seats in all in the Assembly, of which 22 belonged to the Congress Party; but ten of the Congress members were in prison, while seven seats were vacant. Aurangzeb Khan formed a cabinet, and by so doing was able to obtain an additional following.[165]

On 25 May 1943, the N.-W.F.P. had its first Muslim League Ministry, which triumphed in the subsequent by-elections.[166] It lasted nearly two years. Meanwhile Lord Linlithgow left India (20 October 1943); his successor, Lord Wavell (1943-7), released a number of Congressmen, resulting in their increase in the provincial ministries.

On 12 March 1945, the Muslim League ministry in the North-West Frontier Province was defeated by twenty-four votes to eighteen, and Dr. Khan Sahib, leader of the Congress Party, was invited by the Governor to form a

new ministry. The Governor asked for an assurance of whole-hearted co-operation in the prosecution of the war. Dr. Khan Sahib gave the necessary assurance and once more a Congress ministry was formed in the North-West Frontier Province.[167]

The explanations for this phenomenon in a Muslim-majority province have been given.[168] Its leadership happened to favour integration in a united India and thereby stood with Abul-Kalām Āzād and others; they considered themselves *Indian* Muslims rather than *Muslim* Indians. Cantwell Smith may be right in saying that the "Red Shirts" had greater strength in the rural areas. It would mean that it was not counteracted in the cities, implying that the urban middle class in the N.-W F.P. as yet had not become sufficiently outspoken or had not expanded enough to make its voice heard. The Muslim League being dependent on upper- as well as middle class support, this thesis seems to be a valid one, as the following quotation shows: "The conflict between the Muslim League, which was gradually gaining strength, and the Congress Party, continued to increase".[169] The decision made by Khān 'Abdul Qayyūm Khān, once very active on Congress's behalf, to join the League (in 1945)[170] did not help. Henceforth, he became the Frontier Assembly's Opposition leader. Neither was the situation improved by the 1946 elections to the provincial Legislature.

In the North-West Frontier Province, the Congress won thirty seats (of which nineteen were Muslim), as against seventeen captured by the Muslim League. Other Muslims got two seats and the Akali Sikhs one. The Congress formed a ministry with Dr. Khan Sahib as premier.[171]

A Congress ministry once again was elected in a province, of whose population over 90% were Muslims.[172] Gandhi toured the province after Congress entered the Interim Government (in October 1946),[173] certain it would remain part of India. The Provincial League, headed by Pīr Ṣāḥib of Mānkī Sharīf, organised demonstrations against the ministry, which replied by arresting many, including Khān 'Abdul Qayyūm Khān (on 20 February 1947),

at Mardan, where the Muslim League started the civil disobedience movement against the Frontier Government, which took drastic measures to deal with the challenge. This led to worsening of the situation, and on March 10 serious communal rioting broke out in Peshawar.[174]

Jinnāḥ urgently requested the Frontier League that it " 'refrain from provocative action," and Pīr Ṣāḥib then " 'ordered his followers to limit themselves to peaceful resistance."[175] The situation remained tense, however. The provincial government's arrest of the Pīr of Mānkī Sharīf "was strongly resented by his followers, who included a section of the tribal people."[176] Lord Mountbatten visited the N.-W F.P. in late April. "This had a calming effect on the League demonstrators as well as on the tribes,"[177] but did not

reduce the inner conflict causing the serious tension.

On 6th of May, 1947, an emergency meeting of the Congress Working Committee was held at Delhi, at which the Frontier situation was discussed. After this, for the first time, a proposal for an independent state for Pathans was mooted by certain leaders associated with Dr. Khan Sahib's cabinet.[178]

The British Government's Statement of 3 June 1947 contained the following section pertaining to the province under discussion:

" '11. The position of the North-West Frontier Province is exceptional. Two of the there representatives of this Province are already participating in the existing Constituent Assembly. But it is clear, in view of its geographical situation, and other considerations, that if the whole or any part of the Punjab decides not to join the existing Constituent Assembly, it will be necessary to give the North West Frontier Province an opportunity to reconsider its position. Accordingly, in such an event, a referendum will be made to the electors of the present Legislative Assembly in the North-West Frontier Province to choose which of the alternatives mentioned in paragraph 4 above they wish to adopt. The referendum will be held under the aegis of the Governor-General and in consultation with the Provincial Government.' "[179]

Two differing viewpoints now were expressed in the N.-W.F.P. : one, supporting the League, the other, advanced by Khān 'Abdul Ghaffār Khān, a pro-Congress leader advocating nationalism, and like-minded men, desiring the creation of an independent Pathān state. As referendum day was nearing, 'Abdul Ghaffār Khān insisted that the inhabitants of the N.-W.F.P. had the right to vote for a sovereign Pathanistan. Jinnāḥ rejected his demand, but promised autonomy once the Province had joined Pakistan. 'Abdul Ghaffār Khān then suggested to his followers that they boycott the referendum. The British had appointed meanwhile Brigadier J. B. Booth as the N.-W.F.P.'s Referendum Commissioner, to be aided by British officers in the Indian Army with frontier experience.

The referendum in the North-West Frontier Province was held from 6 to 17 July. Of the total electorate of 572,798, slightly over 50 per cent took part —289,244 voting for, and 2,874 voting against joining a new Constituent Assembly.[180]

The Red Shirts, following Ghaffār Khān's advice, "had boycotted the referendum but, as stated by Brecher, the biographer of Nehru, 'the consensus of opinion was that a majority would have favoured Pakistan even if Redshirts had contested the issue.' "[181] Dr Khān's Congress ministry, still in office at the time of the referendum, subsequently was dismissed by the governor "under instructions from Jinnah. A Muslim League ministry was then formed by Abdul Quayum Khan, and seven members of the Congress crossed the floor of the Assembly to support it."[182] No new elections were scheduled for the N.-W.F.P.—as they were in the Punjab and Bengal—to determine its representatives in the respective Constituent Assemblies as it was not

partitioned. It had elected them to the previously existing Indian body and all that was necessary was to transfer them to the new Constituent Assembly of Pakistan.

The N.-W.F.P. by majority vote joined the West Punjab, East Bengal and Sind as partner in their new State.

In retrospect, it differed from the provinces discussed so far, because of its specific geographic location and ethnic composition. Khān 'Abdul Ghaffār Khān was instrumental in creating a political consciousness among his people. Like some leaders in other provinces andm any in his own, he was an Indian rather than a Muslim nationalist. In spite of their stand, the Pakistan movement gained ground since 1942. Was it because of the sheer weight of a Muslim majority which exceeded the percentage in any other province (except Baluchistan) ?[183] The events show that the change in attitude of Khān 'Abdul Qayyūm Khān and some of his colleagues, the insistent League campaigns and urban middle-class growth were most significant as they stimulated an awareness slowly growing during 1920-45 amongst the people of the N.-W.F.P., that they had a say in their future and that, as Muslims, Pakistan was the best guarantee for the preservation of their culture.

Baluchistan (capital: Quetta)—comprising the states of Kalat,[184] Kharan, Las Bela and Mekran as well as agencies which Kalat's Khān leased to the British—has nearly as large a Muslim majority as the N.-W.F. Province, viz. 90% of a population of 857,000 (according to the 1941 Census).[185] Its inhabitants are mainly pastoral nomads speaking Iranian languages related to Pushtu. Among them live about 250,000 Brahuis, whose tongue: Dravidian, still spoken in South India, betrays ancient Indian origin. Otherwise, they have adopted Baluchi ways.

Disturbances occurring in Kalat after the first Afghan War (1838-42)[186] occasioned British India's intervention in and (since 1875) control of the province, henceforth known as British Baluchistan.

A situation similar to that existing at the time in the N.-W.F.P. prevailed here : it was a Chief Commissioner's Province, no reforms were instituted prior to 1929 and its League branch was weak. Jinnāḥ's tenth point refers to this province ; to repeat :

10. Reforms should be introduced in the North-West Frontier Province and *Baluchistan* as in other provinces.[187]

In spite of his demand, none were effected. Unlike in the N.-W.F.P. no elections were held in 1937 (under the 1935 Act) and, hence, no representative legislative assembly was set up. The reason : "British Baluchistan was the responsibility of the Governor-General in his discretion."[188] His Agent, aided by appointed advisers, was in direct charge.[189] Here, too, a "Muslim

Indian-nationalist" group, calling itself the *Waṭan* ("Fatherland") Party, was organised. The province's landowners, on the other hand, supported the Muslim League.[190]

With Dominion Status in the air, Baluchistan faced the same problem as all other Muslim-majority provinces. A resolution passed by the Muslim League's Working Committee (New Delhi, 28 September 1940), and confirmed by the All-India Muslim League the next day, also referred to Baluchistan. Its third point is most pertinent here :

> (3) So far, the Government do not propose to appoint non-official advisers in those provinces which are being administered by the Governors under Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935. The Committee feel that without the association of the Muslim League representatives in the administration of those provinces it will not be possible to secure real and effective co-operation of the Musalmans ; . . .[191]

This statement was made about the time Britain requested India's assistance in the Second World War ; its relevant point is that the League began to assert the right to be associated with provincial government. To an offer made by Gandhi (on 24 September 1944), Jinnāḥ replied (the next day), insisting that Baluchistan belonged to the six states envisioned as part of Pakistan. This view, asserted in 1930 by Muḥammad Iqbāl,[192] again was repeated in the Muslim League's memorandum—point 1[193]—submitted during the Simla conference (May-June 1946).

During the discussions relating to the election of representatives to the Constituent Assembly, Congressmen "pointed out that in Baluchistan it would be improper for any nominated individual to speak for the whole of a province which he did not represent."[194] The formal statement, issued jointly by the viceroy and the Cabinet Mission,[195] contained this reference :

> 6. The representative of Baluchistan will be elected in a joint meeting of the Shahi Jirga and the non-official members of the Quetta municipality.[196]

Accordingly, the *Shāhī Jirga* elected a representative to the Constituent Assembly (late 1945 elections),[197] but he did not become an actual member of it.

While high-level talks went on between the League, Congress and the British, Baluchistan's internal political condition remained static. No representative institutions were developed. Three major reasons may have accounted for it : (1) its geographical location as a frontier province, frequently referred to in official discussions and correspondence ; (2) its tribal composition ; (3) its unchanged political status as the Governor-General's direct responsibility. The League's inability to effect a change must be projected against the stated background. It never relinquished, however, its

concern with Baluchistan's future and continued efforts to make the inhabitants aware that they as Muslims had but two alternatives : self-determination in a proposed Indian Union or association with Pakistan in case of secession. Baluchi upper-class support has been noted.

During the discussions held (in May 1947) about possible partition, the mode of procedure, and other technically related aspects, Baluchistan was mentioned as well.

Nehru "described the so-called self-determination in the case of Baluchistan as 'preposterous'. It left the future of that province to a single individual who would be chosen by a group of sardars and nominated persons who obviously represented a vested semi-fendal element. Baluchistan had an importance as a strategic frontier of India and its future could not be dealt with in so partial and casual a manner."[198]

The 3 June statement of His Majesty's Government said :

12. British Baluchistan has elected a member, but he has not taken his seat in the existing Constituent Assembly. In view of its geographical situation, this province will also be given an opportunity to reconsider its position and to choose which of the alternatives in paragraph 4 above to adopt. His Excellency the Governor-General is examining how this can most appropriately be done.[199]

This statement shows that no definite method had been conceived about how to guarantee the Baluchis the right to express their preference. When the double plan of voting for or against joining Pakistan and partition had been decided upon, the manner of administering the referendum in Baluchistan had to be clarified.

There was some difficulty in settling the procedure for ascertaining the wishes of the people of Baluchistan. Nehru had suggested the possibility of sending a commission to meet the tribal *jirgas* and of holding a referendum in Quetta town. But the Chief Commissioner, Sir Geoffrey Prior, advised that such a course was not feasible. The Viceroy finally decided that the Shahi *jirga* and the non-official members of the Quetta Municipality should be summoned in order to decide the future of the province. The members of these bodies met and unanimously decided to join a new Constituent Assembly. The seven Hindu and Parsi members of the Quetta Municipality did not attend the meeting.[200]

British Baluchistan voted (on 29 June 1947)[201] as had Sind, East Bengal, West Punjab and the N.-W.F.P., to join Pakistan. Not being partitioned, (like Sind) no elections to the respective Constituent Assemblies were necessary.

As an addendum, it may be noted that a similar set-up has continued to prevail immediately after Independence Day ; viz. an Agent, this time, of Pakistan's Governor-General, administered Baluchistan, "with the aid of local nominated advisers. Representative institutions are at present being planned."[202]

In summarising this portion of the discussion, the above data show that provincial leadership was instrumental in arousing an awareness among their coreligionists that they, as Muslims, had a stake in their future. By fostering education among them in the cities and the villages, they reached many talented youths who then entered the professions or became business men and thereby augmented the middle-class urbanites. Members of this group, whether or not they engaged actively in politics, had become more sophisticated and lent their moral and/or financial support to their preferred leadership Furthermore, they not only had become acquainted with modern political theses and techniques, but appropriated them. The data also reveal their growing dissatisfaction with the state of affairs, the longing for independence and, as a result of the ever-present communalist problem, the agonising uncertainty—intensified possibly by fear of reprisal against a former ruling minority—about the Muslims' survival as a distinct religio-cultural group in a Hindu-dominated environment.

The national League did not engage in all phases of life, as it was primarily a political organisation. Its direct concern lay with giving Muslim India a direction that it felt would be the only path leading to salvation. The dim outlines become sharper throughout the first three decades of the twentieth century, crystallise themselves in policies laid down under the 1935 Act, are delineated specifically for Indian Islam in 1906, 1916, 1929, and again in 1930 and 1940 when Muḥammad Iqbāl and Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ made their respective historic statements. The increasing League strength after 1933-6, in Bengal and other Muslim-majority provinces, was due partly to the stated factors, but also to the imprisonment of a host of Hindu leaders (1941-5) including Patel, Nehru, Gandhi (August 1942-May 1944), a number of ex-Congress provincial ministers, and even the Congress Working Committee (August 1942-June 1945).[203]

By 1942, the entire situation had been distilled into an "Either/Or": either a confederation or secession. The innumerable conferences between 1942 and 1947 revealed the brittleness of the confederation scheme. They may be seen as the prelude to a dominant theme in Indian history: the desire to be free. Pakistan's birth gave expression to this desire nourished particularly by India's Muslims.

In retrospect, its creation might have remained but a dream, had it not been for the ardent stimulation of a political self-awareness among them by both non-Leaguers and Leaguers, who shared one ideal: Muslim India's full participation in their country's administration.

Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ (1876-1948): His Political Ideas and Career. Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ was among the leaders[204] who emerged in Islamic India during the first decade of the twentieth century. Born nineteen years

after the Mutiny, he was twenty-two when Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān passed away. Aligarh was only one year older than he and the period in which he grew up was one in which its tradition was strong. In the ferment of the time, Indo-Muslim leadership developed two divergent approaches: one, co-operation with the British, the other, independence.[205] To safeguard his community's well-being, Sir Sayyid had shifted from a one- to a two-nation theory,[206] which would have repercussions in the theme developing in Jinnāḥ's mind.

The First Stage of His Life: 1876-1920. Born[207] in Karachi from a middle-class family—his father was a merchant—he attended primary school in Bombay, entering first the Mission High School of Sind and then Bombay University. He went to London at the age of sixteen to study law. Having attained his Barrister's degree he returned to India in 1896, and set up his practice in his birthplace. After a three-year struggle, he became Magistrate of the Bombay Presidency in Bombay City, which post relieved him from his hardship. His practice meanwhile grew and he then decided to enter politics. He made his debut by attending—as secretary of the Parsi President, Dadabhai Naoroji (1825-1917)[208]—the All-India National Congress session at Calcutta, held in the same year (1906) that, but before, the All-India Muslim League was founded (October). He thus acquired the necessary experience for his later career. In the earlier period (1906-20), he was a Muslim Indian nationalist.[209]

Elected by the Bombay Muslim constituency to the Imperial Legislative Council (1909), Jinnāḥ met and became a friend of the nationalist leader, Gopal Krishna Gokhale (1866-1915).[210] While he was a Congress member, the Muslim League had approved[211] the separate electoral system, including reservation of seats and weightage. The last-mentioned principle meant the increase or decrease of Muslims in the legislatures of those provinces which had respectively more or less Hindus in proportion to the other group.[212] Jinnāḥ then opposed it, as proven by the resolution he introduced in Congress at its 1910 session:

> While recognising the necessity of providing for a fair and adequate representation in the Legislative Councils for the Mahomedan and other communities where they are in a minority, this Congress disapproves the regulations promulgated last year to carry out this object by means of separate electorates and, in particular, urges upon the Government the justice and expediency of modifying the regulations framed under the Indian Councils Act of 1909, before another election comes on. . . .[213]

He seems to have expressed majority Muslim and Hindu opinion,[214] which at that time remained concentrated rather on the desire for greater national representation.

Jinnāḥ acted (in 1910 and 1911) as invited counsel to the League, aiding it in its desired constitutional reforms. He would not join this organisation, however, for another three years, "and as he said in reply to an article by *The Times*, London, was 'proud to belong to the Congress party.' "[215] He subsequently joined Gokhale on a journey to England (1913). While he was absent from India, the national League members voted to amend their constitution by confirming their aim to be " 'a suitable form of self-government' " (March 1913).[216] During a meeting (later that year) with Muḥammad 'Alī (the *Comrade's* founder) and Sir Sayyid Wazīr Ḥasan (then the national League's secretary), they suggested that he join this Indo-Muslim organisation. Told that its aims harmonised with those held by Congress, he became convinced that his League membership would not undermine his loyalty to India's national cause. Upon signing the League pledge (fall 1913), " 'his two sponsors were required to make solemn preliminary covenant that loyalty to the Muslim League and the Muslim interest would in no way and at no time imply even the shadow of disloyalty to the larger national cause to which his life was dedicated.'"[217] Jinnāḥ thereby followed the tradition of such leaders as Naoroji, the Hindus Gokhale and Surendranath Banerjee (1848-1926) and, among the Muslims, Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, Amīr 'Alī and Abul-Kalām Āzād. The exception was that, unlike most of them, he at once belonged to what would become the chief Muslim and the foremost Hindu political organisation. He wished, and Gokhale considered him, to be, ' "the best Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity' "[218] and he was, indeed, in an eminent position to carry out this responsible task. Clearly, "separatism," as he called it, formed no part as yet of his political ideology; he continued to think in terms of a United India at least until 1930.[219]

Returned home (end of 1913), he headed a delegation to England (some months later) to acquaint the Secretary of State Lord Crewe, with Congress views concerning the 1909 Council of India Act, which granted "separate representation" to the Muslims "in Madras, Bombay, Bengal, the United Provinces and in East Bengal and Assam."[220] Back in his country, Jinnāḥ was instrumental in persuading Congress and the League to hold their respective annual sessions at Bombay (December 1915); a pro-Congress man, Maẓhar-ul-Ḥaq, acted as League president.[221] At the latter's meeting, the appointment of a committee—empowered to confer with a similar Congress committee on proposed changes—moved by Jinnāḥ and supported by Fazl-ul-Ḥaq, then a League member, and Abul-Kalām Āzād, was adopted unanimously. These two committees met during 1916 when a " 'Joint Scheme' of reforms," known as the Lucknow Pact, was reached "after months of difficult negotiations.' "[222] Signed during the second simultaneous gathering of Congress and League at Lucknow (last week of December 1916), the latter

chaired by Jinnāḥ, Congress thereby officially accepted separate electorates for the Muslim community.

The Muslims were to have one-third of the Indian elective seats in the All India Legislature. In the Provinces they were to have 50 per cent of the Indian elective seats in the Punjab ; 30 per cent in the United Provinces ; 40 per cent in Bengal ; 25 per cent in Bihar ; 15 per cent in the Central Provinces ; 15 per cent in Madras and 33.3 per cent in Bombay. Both in the Provinces and at the Centre the Muslims were to have their own separate electorates. No bill affecting a particular community should be proceeded with in any council if three-fourths of the representatives of tha community opposed it.[223]

The Lucknow Pact was a historic event and the culmination of Jinnāḥ's efforts to find a common solution to a problem that grew ever larger in the context of nineteenth- and twentieth-century political thinking. Why did he accept the Muslim right to equal representation by separate electorates[224] which a segment of Hindu leadership regarded as *the* expression of communalism? Probably for a number of reasons: first, he had been a League member for three years, which meant necessarily his support of its programme, second, having retained his association with Congress, he was in an excellent position to inform it of the reasons for the Muslims' insistence on this issue without assuming an antagonistic position—thus, he could and did persuade it to give in to their demand; and, third, he must have regarded the Pact as a triumphant realisation of his desire for Hindu-Muslim unity. Both groups certainly regarded it as a good-will gesture on the majority's part towards the large minority to assure such safeguards as the latter felt were necessary. Jinnāḥ's dream soon ended.

The Pact had been signed at the height of the War, when the land was governed by Great Britain under the Defence of India Act.[225] For another three years, the young man, now recognised as a brilliant leader, would pursue the programme he had nurtured from the beginning of his political career. However, history's tide turned against him. India was ravaged by the bubonic plague (1917), suffered in many parts famine resulting from the monsoon's failure (1918), an influenza epidemic (1918-9), causing thirteen million people's death—more than the number who had died on the battlefields of the late war. The cost of living soared. "Widespread dissatisfaction grew into active discontent and resentment."[226] The Rowlatt Act,[227] passed in the same year as the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms (1919), but unlike them, in the face of the nays voted by the Imperial Legislative Council's Indian members, raised a tremendous storm. It forced Jinnāḥ's resignation from this body.[228] Edwin Samuel Montagu's earnest declaration in the House of Commons (August 1917) favouring "'the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization

of responsible government in India' "[229] and the actual reforms instituted, leaving Finance, Law and Order as " 'reserved subjects,' " to the provincial governors and "their nominated councillors "[230] did not improve India's morose mood.

The Khilāfat and Non-Co-operation Movements[231] under Gandhi's leadership swept the land (1919-24). A new Hindu leader's star was rising to fill the void left by the older liberals' passing from the scene (Gokhale had died in July 1915, Naoroji in 1917), as did Bal Gangadhar Tilak (d. July 1920), whose platform throughout had been that of self-rule (*swarāj*). Banerjee was still alive (d. 1926), but the moderate tradition he represented had lost its appeal. Tilak's ideal, symbolised by the Home Rule League, founded conjointly (in 1916) with Mrs Annie Besant (1847-1933),[232] was nourished by C. R. Das, founder of the Swarajya Party (late 1922) in Congress. This Party's aim was to attain self-government within the shortest period. In the 1923 elections, it "practically wiped out the Liberals."[233]

Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ belonged to the Home Rule League. He first disagreed with Gandhi, who had succeeded Mrs Besant as its president, on changing its constitution, creed and name—to *Swarāj Sabhā* forced through by a thin majority instead of a three-fourth vote. He then left this orgnisation (October 1920), which, having lost a fine administrator, went into eclipse,[234] but its ideal became a burning flame.

By remaining aloof from the *Khilāfat* movement which meanwhile had gathered momentum, Jinnāḥ took a stand quite contrary to that assumed by most Indians. His position (similar to Sir Sayyid's) was motivated by his pro-British sentiments and by his belief, not shared by the majority, that India's problems would not be solved automatically once the foreigners would have left the country. He was the only person to reject Gandhi's non-violent Non-Co-operation programme, presented before Congress at its Nagpur session (26 December 1920).

> Everything British was to be avoided; taxes were to be unpaid; workers to strike; shopkeepers to refuse to sell British goods; students to leave British colleges; until the two very different objects were attained—the restoration of the Caliph's authority and the granting of Home Rule.[235]

He, unlike Muḥammad 'Alī, who had joined with Gandhi in this movement, clashed with the Hindu leader, whose programme he regarded as defective. "Jinnah was a realist who never permitted his vision to be obscured by emotionalism.[236] His inability to agree with Gandhi on the course India should pursue, his utter repudiation of the emotionalism, expressed in the wearing of home-spun cottons (*khadi*) and in speeches delivered in Hindustani on the Congress floor, caused his resignation from the Indian National Congress (December 1920). This date marks a turning point in his

life. For fourteen years, he had been associated with Congress, had repudiated "separatism" and thought that Hindu co-operation, symbolised by the Lucknow Pact, proved that unity was possible, given Hindu guarantees to Muslim self-expression and direct participation in India's affairs.

The *second* phase in Jinnāḥ's career : 1921-35, comprising the period between the end of his Congress membership and his reorganisation of the All-India Muslim League, now opened.

His turning away from Congress is not to be interpreted as his taking a separatist orientation. He made this clear in his speeches and by his efforts made during this period to reach a compromise. He said, for instance, at an annual League session (Lahore, 1924) that it must "bring about in due course . . . once more an amicable settlement between the Hindus and the Muslims, as was done at Lucknow in 1916.' "[237] When discussing the Indian Finance Bill (1925), he stated on the Legislative Assembly floor :

> " '. . . I, Sir, stand here with a clear conscience and I say that I am a nationalist first, a nationalist second and a nationalist last. . . . I once more appeal to this House, whether you are a Mussalman or a Hindu, for God's sake do not import the discussion of communal matters into this House, and degrade this Assembly, which we desire should become a real National Parliament. Set an example to the outside world and our people !' "[238]

Persisting in his task to find unity, he presided over a Muslim leaders' conference at Delhi (late 1926), whose proposals included their willingness to give up the separate electoral system, won so hard at Lucknow. The reason was Hindu criticism that it aggravated schismatic tendencies.[239] The "Delhi Proposals," rejected by the Punjabi Muslims, were endorsed by the All-India Muslim League, the Khilāfat Conference, and unanimously by the All-India Congress Committee (Bombay, 1927). The Indian National Congress "welcomed" them at their annual meeting (Madras), but they were opposed by the Mahasabha and other leaders with the result that they were referred to an All-Parties Conference, falling in the lap of the Nehru Committee.[240] The failure of Jinnāḥ's attempt was the more crucifying in view of two other occurrences at this time. When Gandhi called off his Non-Co-operation Movement (1924), the Communal riots plaguing India stunted Hindu-Muslim amicality, vindicating Jinnāḥ's conviction that emotionalism would stir up the masses without laying a solid base for a strong Congress policy. Upon the collapse of the *Khilāfat* Movement followed the first League-Congress split (1927). The All-India Muslim League divided itself into a pro- and an anti-British camp, respectively led by Muḥammad Shafī' and Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ, the former rejecting, the latter supporting, Congress in its boycott of the Simon Commission.[241] It was not serious as yet, but it might be regarded as the first formal indication that Congress and League would not be able to

conciliate their differences.

This Statutory Commission, headed by Sir John (later Viscount) Simon, had as its main duty to draw up a constitution for India, as provided for under the 1919 Act. Indian repudiation of it led to an All-Parties' Conference, convened by the Congress Working Committee in 1928.[242] The "liberal" League wing's executive was authorised by Jinnāḥ to participate in this Conference, It was presided over by Dr M. A. Anṣārī, who reported that no solution to the communal representation problem had been reached. A Committee was appointed under Pandit Motilal Nehru's [243] leadership to examine what principles to embody in a constitution. The Nehru Report, as the result was called, did not meet with Jinnāḥ's full approval. During another session held by the All-Parties Conference at Calcutta, in December 1928, he submitted "fourteen points" to safeguard Muslim rights in any envisaged constitution. Summarised, they demanded Federalism, with power vested in the provinces, which should be autonomous ; effective minority representation without reduction of any majority into a minority "or even equality" ; that Muslims form no less than one-third of the total in the central legislature ; separate electorates (although a minority might choose the joint system at any time it wished) ; religious liberty (including that of education and "propaganda") for all ; efficiency, not faith, to be the determining factor in filling State and local governmental posts ; a quorum of three-fourths " of the members of any community" necessary to pass any resolution or bill in the legislatures "or other elected" bodies ; the separation of Sind (a Muslim majority province) from the Hindu Bombay Presidency ; one-third of the provincial or central Cabinets to comprise Muslims ; that no changes in the Constitution be made by the central legislature unless the States, forming part of the "Indian Federation," also concur ; "adequate safeguards for the protection of Muslim culture . . . and promotion of Muslim education, language, religion, personal laws, and Muslim charitable institutions and for their due share in grant-in-aid."[244]

The Nehru Report did not take effect, because Congress rejected[245]

> the three main items of the amendments . . . : firstly, that Muslims should be given one-third representation on the Central Legislature ; secondly, that the Punjab and Bengal should have Musiim representation on the population basis for ten years, subject to revision of this principle after that period ; and thirdly, that residuary powers should be vested in the provincial legislatures and not at the Centre.[246]

The only issue on which Congress-League agreement existed was independence. The British then decided to call a series of "Round Table" Conferences, which League members attended,[247] but Congress at first opposed.[248]

Jinnāḥ meanwhile had gone to England where he spent some years

(1930-4) practising before the Privy Council. Was his departure from India a sign that he had become fed up with its situation ? It did not mean his withdrawal from political life, even though he was absent from the scene and only participated in the first Conference[249] (12 November 1930-19 January 1931). This is what he said then :

> I maintain that the Hindu-Muhammadan settlement is a condition precedent . . . before any constitution can be completed for the Government of India, and I maintain that unless you provide safeguards for the Musalmans that will give them a complete sense of security and a feeling of confidence in the future constitution of the Government of India, and unless you secure their cooperation and willing consent, no constitution that you frame for India will work for twenty-four hours.[250]

The Muslim demand for "adequate safeguards" was incorporated in a resolution adopted during the last, plenary, session on 19 January.

Little progress was made during the second conference (7 September-1 December 1931). At its conclusion, Ramsay MacDonald (then England's Prime Minister) urged the Indian representatives to discuss and settle among themselves " 'what checks and balances the Constitution is to contain to protect the minorities from unrestricted and tyrannical use of the democratic principle expressing itself solely through the majority power.' "[251] Great Britain thus refused its assistance in solving the problem, thereby applying the tenet of non-interference in Indian "religious" affairs affirmed by the Royal Proclamation of 1858.

Those who had been present at the second Round Table Conference reconvened at Simla after their return from England to continue their discussions and, particularly, to solve the communal representation issue. They could not come to an agreement. England's Prime Minister then decided to introduce the Communal Award (on 16 April 1932), granting separate electorates to all minorities (Muslims, Anglo-Indians, Hindu Depressed Classes[252]). The authorities thereby clearly did not alleviate, but contributed to separatism, for now they also divided the Hindu groups according to whether these constituted a majority or a minority. The attitude of the British government might be characterised as abstention on an advisory, but intervention on a concrete, level. It is doubtful that they were seriously concerned with solving the communal problem; rather it seems that they hoped to prolong their rule by sowing greater discord. They succeeded in the long run to their disadvantage.[253]

Some months later, the third (and last) Round Table Conference convened (17 November-24 December 1932). It had to consider another chief issue, namely, should the "residuary powers" be vested in the Centre or in the Provinces ? Of course, this question was related to the structure of the future Indian Government. The unitary principle had been rejected by

Jinnāḥ in the first of his "fourteen points". It was repudiated also at the first Round Table Conference.

Up to this time, an all-India federation had been regarded as a remote possibility. But at the very outset of the Conference Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru boldly declared himself for a federal system of government for India and invited the rulers to support his suggestion. The Maharajah of Bikaner and the Nawab of Bhopal stated on behalf of the rulers that they were prepared to come into the proposed federation provided their internal sovereignty was guaranteed. Sir Muhammad Shafi for one wing of the Muslim League and Jinnah for the other also welcomed the proposal.[254]

In other words, concord seemed to prevail between the Hindus and the Muslims, which was not too surprising, because Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru[255] and Jinnāḥ had been among the signatories of the Minority Report (prepared by the Reforms Enquiry or Muddiman Committee, of which they were members, and completed on 3 December 1924). It had recommended that a Royal Commission or another agency be created to investigate, and advise, concerning the solid foundations to be laid for a permanent Constitution. It felt that this alone would assure the Indian people's voluntary co-operation and governmental stability.[256] It reflected a liberalist attitude which was present, in effect, in the Congress resolution of 1924, wishing to revise the 1919 Act "'so as to secure for India full self-governing Dominion Status within the empire *and provincial autonomy in the provinces*'"[257] (italics ours). This resolution, in effect, had prompted Pandit Motilal Nehru to move "an amendment calling for a representative Round Table Conference to recommend a scheme of constitution for the establishment of full responsible government in India."[258]

The "secular" developments occurring between 1924 and 1930, historically speaking, seem to have followed one another in a most logical order. The demand for freedom necessitated a working instrument (Constitution) for carrying on government as well as the assurance that all minorities would have the same treatment, opportunities, and equal representation in all political bodies. The concept of an Indian Federation, in which all provinces would have full autonomy, but remain united by the device of a central government (after the United States pattern) seemed ideally suited to the communal problem's solution. The Muslim League and, at least the Liberal Congress wing, which, indeed, had proposed it, agreed thereto. When it came to discussing the distribution of power, however, discord between them arose. The Muslims insisted at the last London session that all power be vested in the provinces; the Hindus, that it be retained by the Centre. The reason for the Muslim demand clearly was the absolute certainty that provincial autonomy would be respected by the central government (i.e. the Hindu majority) Consequently, the resulting dissention made a solution impossible

and the Round Table Conference a failure. It showed that the disunity, founded undoubtedly on mutual distrust sown by Indian extremists and by British policies, had too deep roots to be eradicated. All attempts by Muslims and Hindus in the direction of unity remained barren.

The implication of Jinnāḥ's demand for " absolute " provincial autonomy, of course, relates to the settlement of a particular faith group in a certain specified territorial region. The concept of the "nation," whose three essential ingredients (in Renan's and Iqbāl's philosophical analysis) were religion, culture and geography, became more clarified in Jinnāḥ's political theory. His insistence on self-rule involved " distinct nationhood " in a political sense and pointed to separatism. And yet, he did not repudiate altogether Indian nationalism, for he still stressed the federal principle. It seems somewhat contradictory, because insistence on absolute self-rule excludes federalism, while the latter's preservation demands voluntary delegation by the provinces of some of their power to the Centre. Either he did not carefully think through the mode of relationship between it and the provincial Governments or he still hoped to save India's territorial unity by keeping its Islamic-majority areas as a politically "loose" part within what might be termed the "Union". It would have harmonised with his earlier hopes for a Muslim-Hindu settlement and with the fact that, at first, he was not influenced by certain implications of Muḥammad Iqbāl's presidential speech delivered before the Muslim League session at Allahabad on 29 December 1930, that is, at the time the first Round Table Conference was in session (12 November 1930-19 January 1931). Iqbāl demanded therein "self-government" and "the formation of a consolidated North-Western Indian Muslim State."[259] He asserted also the following :

> I am glad to be able to say that your Muslim delegates fully realise the importance of a proper solution of what I call Indian international problem. They are perfectly justified in pressing for a solution of the communal question before the question of responsibility in the Central Government is finally settled. . . . Indeed the Muslims of India are the only Indian people who can fitly be described as a nation in the modern sense of the word. . . .[260]

The underlying reason for using the phrase "international problem" was, he said in the same speech, " 'the essential disparity between the great cultural units of India. Yet the Prime Minister of England apparently refuses to see that the problem of India is international and not national.' "[261]

It could be said by way of comment that, if the problem had been "international," then neither federalism nor confederalism would have seemed possible, and the only logical solution would have appeared to be a complete territorial and political separation between the Hindu and the Muslim regions of India ; in effect, the creation of a sovereign independent State. Nevertheless, Iqbāl did not mean this, because he also said in the

same speech : " 'The Muslims demand federation because it is pre-eminently a solution of India's most difficult problem, i e. the communal problem.' "[262] He repudiated Indian nationalism in so far as it implied "hinduisation," but accepted it with reservation in the sense of retaining territorial unity, if autonomy and separate electorates as well as the preservation of the Islamic faith and way of life would be guaranteed by the Central Government. Jinnāḥ fully agreed with his countryman, but rejected in the 1930's any evocation in the latter's speeches of a geographical and political schism. Not until 1939/1940 did he advocate the establishment of a Muslim State fully separated from Hindu India.[263]

A year after Iqbāl's 1932 address, a pamphlet, entitled *Now or Never*, appeared in Cambridge.[264] It was issued by Choudhary Raḥmat 'Alī (on 28 January 1933) as a "Declaration" of the Indo-Muslim community's "distinct nationhood." The pamphlet's title was based on the following statement found in Sūrah xiii. 12: "Verily, God will not change his gifts to men, till they change what is in themselves." It is a direct challenge to the Muslims to improve or purify themselves. This, indeed, is the meaning of the term "Pak" which forms the basis of the word "Pakistan,"[265] used for the first time in *Now or Never*. Essentialy, it was an appeal to India's Muslim leaders to reject Federation, which Raḥmat 'Alī condemned, and work towards the ideal of creating an indepenpent Indo-Muslim nation. He, himself, wrote :

> This Declaration . . . symbolized the proclamation of our freedom from the British-Bania domination ; the release of our nation from the bonds of "Minorityism," and the resumption by our Millat of her march towards her goal. . . .[2'6]

It was urgent to act "now"; to retard the process by endless and fruitless negotiations and risk the well-being of the Indian Musalman in any compromise with Congress meant (according to the pamphlet's author) unfaithfulness to the ideal : preservation of the Islamic faith, of its purity and its civilisation. Indo-Muslim cultural reassertion ("renaissance") could not be achieved, he felt, unless his community gained full independence from Hindu India.

Raḥmat 'Alī reiterated the principles of exclusivism, *tawḥīd* and "communal patriotism" of the kind approved by Iqbāl, who had said :

> Politics have their roots in the spiritual life of man. . . . I am opposed to nationalism as it is understood in Europe . . . because I see in it the germs of atheistic materialism which I look upon as the greatest danger to modern humanity. Patriotism is à perfectly natural virtue and has a place in the moral life of man. Yet that which really matters is a man's faith, his culture, his historical tradition. These are the things which, in my eyes, are worth living for and dying for, and not the piece of earth with which the spirit of man happens to be temporarily associated.[267]

Religion being regarded as the basic fibre of nationalism, Raḥmat 'Alī's political proposition had greater validity than any other, because it was directly related to that historical experience where faith brought a nation into being.[268] By stressing particularism, he necessarily had to repudiate universalism, thereby solving the tension between Indianism (taken in a spiritual sense) and Islamism, felt by Iqbāl and, to some extent, also by Muḥammad 'Alī and many Indian Muslims.

He backed up his political philosophy by concrete action : the creation of the Pakistan National Movement, aimed at summoning "our people to meet a crisis no less fateful than that of 1857".[269] Its *spiritual* goal was "the completion of our mission in Pakistan and in the rest of Pakasia.",[270] This ideal had a *national* dimension :

> The fulfilment of the duty and determination of us all to live within this Pakistan under a Pak government, conducted according to Pak laws ; and, on the achievement of our independence, to re-integrate this Pakistan with Iran, Afghanistan, and Tukharistan in order to re-create the original Pakistan. . . .[271]

It reflects Iqbāl's statement that Islam cannot be retained "as an ethical ideal," if it is rejected "as a polity in favour of national polities."[272] It also has the same emotional stress as the poet's confession : "I love the communal groups, which is the source of my life, by giving me its religion [and] its culture."[273] Both men rejected entirely the universalist attitude in so far as it meant political cohabitation with a non-Muslim majority. The "two-nation" theory, expressed in the 1880's by Sir Sayyid, and formulated by Muḥammad Iqbāl in the early twentieth century. had found its final form in Raḥmat 'Alī's statement. It could no longer be denied if religion remained (as it did) the overriding factor in Indian politics.

The "Pakistan" plan, integrally linked with the territorial factor, was regarded by most Muslim leaders as impractical. As late as 1935, Jinnāḥ denounced it " 'as a crazy scheme.' "[274] He still hoped for a Hindu-Muslim settlement of a federal nature.

Four years earlier, Muḥammad 'Alī had died (January 1931), leaving the Indo-Muslim community without an energetic and able leader. The Muslim League, itself, had begun to lapse into oblivion.

> Between 1930 and 1936 the political direction of Muslim India changed. Certain professional politicians died, others lost control of [general] opinion. After Maulana Muhammad Ali's death in 1931, the reputation of his brother Shaukat Ali dimmed. Other old leaders of the movement in favour of the Caliphate, such as Zafar Ali Khan and Hasrat Mohani, lost the confidence of the masses because of their political vicissitudes. . . . None among the newer group, including Liaquat Ali Khan and Fazlul Haq could "inspire the confidence of all of Muslim India. The Muslim League had

disappeared temporarily in 1933 ; in 1936 he revived by again acknowledging Jinnah as a leader". . . .[275]

This was the situation when Jinnāḥ returned to India (in 1934). While in England, in spite of the fact that he had not been a delegate to the second and third Conferences,[276] he met with many of his countrymen who had come there for the occasion. Furthermore, he had expressed his views during the first Round Table session and in private conversations. Unable to reach an agreement on the communal problem with Gandhi, he and other Muslim leaders came to terms with representatives of the Anglo-Indians, Christian Indians, Depressed Classes, Muslims and British interests (the so-called "Minorities Pact") just prior to the formal opening of the second Conference.[277] He was becoming interested in Iqbāl's conception, but his private talks with the poet-philosopher during the latter's journey to England (1932) did not fully convince him that unity was ephemeral. Dr Ikram reports Jinnāḥ saying to him during "a brief visit to Oxford in 1932 . . . with great anguish of soul, 'But what is to be done? The Hindus are short-sighted and, I think, incorrigible. The Muslim camp is full of those spineless people who, whatever they may say to me, will consult the Deputy Commissioner about what they should do ! Where is, between these two groups, any place for a man like me ?' "[278] Receiving reports on the home situation and appeals from some Muslims, including Iqbāl, to come back, he sojourned in India for a few months. "In 1934, however, he was elected the permanent president of the All-India Muslim League, and finally returned to India in October 1935 "[279]

The *third* phase of his career : 1936-47, began with his assumption of League leadership.

Its annual session was held at Bombay in April 1936, under the presidentship of Sir Wazir Hasan, and its constitution was revised to make it a more democratic and living organization. Steps were also taken, for the first time, to set up a machinery for contesting elections on behalf of the Muslim League. A central election board with provincial branches was set up to take in hand arrangements for fighting the provincial elections under the Government of India Act of 1935 Jinnah toured the country to canvass support for the League candidates, but his efforts were only partially successful. . . .[280]

The establishment of local branches had the purpose of making the League into a popular organ of and propagating its policy throughout Islamic India. A year later, Muḥammad Iqbāl, having given Jinnāḥ his support in the Punjab, acknowledged him to be the Indo-Muslim community's sole leader. He wrote to him, for example :

I know you are a busy man ; but I do hope you won't mind my writing to you so often, as you are the only Muslim in India today to whom the community had a right to look up for safe guidance through the storm which

is coming to N. W. India and perhaps the whole of India.[281]

Jinnāḥ's subsequent activities were communally oriented, although he never wholly gave up his ideal of unity.[282] The chief reason for this change may have been Congress opposition to certain parts of the Government of India Act, promulgated in that year on 4 August.[283] It provided for a Federation, in which the accession of the provinces—fully autonomous and having their own elected legislative assemblies—would be automatic and of the States voluntary. The Central Government would administer the subjects considered "federal" (e.g. army, navy) in contrast to the "provincial" items, which fell under the local legislatures' aegis; it would establish generally applicable principles for a third, "concurrent list," comprising labour, criminal and civil law amongst others, to be adapted to local circumstances. Each province was to have a Governor appointed by the Crown and assisted by a ministerial Council subordinate to the Governor-General. The Act incorporated the reservation of seats, separate electorates and weightage. It stated specifically:

> No person shall be included in the electoral roll for a Sikh Constituency, a Muhammadan Constituency, an Anglo-Indian Constituency, a European Constituency or an Indian Christian Constituency unless he is a Sikh, a Muhammadan, an Anglo-Indian, a European or an Indian Christian, as the case may be.[284]

The League took the same position as Congress by repudiating particularly the Act's federal part. The experience under the British was that the provinces had no autonomy and the Central Government exercised full control, i.e. it interfered in their "internal affairs" with the implication that it rather than they had exclusive jurisdiction. The Provincial Governments thus entirely remained subordinated to the Centre, which thereby imposed a limitation on their constitutional right to be autonomous. Consequently, the "safeguards" lost their force, despite the Act's provision for them.[285] Therefore, they were rejected by both Congress and the League.[286] However, their repudiation had a substantially different ground, because Congress "wanted complete responsibility at the Centre."[287] It meant independence from British control. Apart from the League's criticism that the Act's safeguards were worthless, it necessarily contested the Hindus' demand, not because it implied self-rule, but might lead to the replacement of a potent foreign by a strong Hindu-majority Central Government. Thus, again, the autonomy of the Muslim province would be endangered by Congress interference and their civilisation threatened. The secular issue derived from practical experience of the governmental structure in India was superimposed upon the root problem of religion.

The year after the Act had been passed, Jinnāḥ decided to give the Muslim masses the kind of leadership given by Congress to the Hindus. His

purposes were to explain to the former, and acquaint them with the League position on, the various issues and to obtain wider support for it than it hitherto had had. He strengthened the organisation by establishing a Central Board and local committees. Furthermore, he insisted that the League henceforth be regarded as Islamic India's sole spokesman and that Congress do not appoint one of its own Muslim members as its representative in negotiations with this non-Hindu body. He repudiated thereby the Congress view that it spoke for Hindus and Muslims alike and the theory of those Indian Muslim nationalists that association with it was not contrary to Islamic ideals and he irked many, if not the majority, of Hindu leaders. The antagonism aggravated by the communal riots grew on the upper level after Congress failed to obtain seats during the 1937 elections[288] in Sind, Bengal and the Punjab. It caused President J. Nehru to observe that he " 'attributed the failure of the Congress to capture Muslim seats to neglect of work among the Muslim masses and . . . that it was now for us to go ahead and welcome the Muslim masses and intelligentsia to our great organisation.' "[289] League and Congress ever more became locked in the contest to win over the majority of India's Muslims. The growing communalist orientation of Congress is shown by Nehru's confession that it had not made a sufficiently strong attempt to gain Muslim seats.[290] This may or may not have influenced to some degree the increasing separatist League stand. In any case, its claim that it represented "all Muslims" was rejected by the Hindus, but accepted by the British.[291] "In the absence of any exact figures . . . we shall proffer an estimate: that the League in 1940 was supported by virtually all the Muslim upper class, most of the Muslim upper middle class, and at least emotionally by a very sizable portion of the rest of the middle classes of the Muslims, including probably most of their youth."[292] It would show that between 1937 and 1940, it gained a sizable number of adherents in Islamic India. In part, it was due to the success of League propaganda, but part, also, by the increasingly communalist orientation of Congress.[293] This may have prompted Jinnāḥ to state in 1937, after the elections had taken place: " 'I want the Mussalmans to ponder over the situation and decide their own fate by having one single, definite, uniform policy which should be loyally followed throughout India'."[294] He asserted in the same speech: " 'No settlement with the majority is possible'."[295] He may have been influenced by Iqbāl's insistence that the Indian Muslims are "a distinct political unity in the country."[296] Nevertheless, Jinnāḥ did not as yet openly advocate a full schism. It was not until 1939 that he publicly asserted his doubt whether Federation would be the solution to the communal problem.[297] In talking to a pro-Pakistan-minded Muslim student delegation from Cambridge, he said: " 'I am getting more

and more convinced that you are right in spite of myself.' "[298]

He made his position clear in his famous presidential address delivered before the Muslim League during its session at Lahore (on 22 March 1940), when he reiterated Iqbāl's argument as follows : " 'The problem in India is not of an intercommunal character but manifestly of an international one, and it must be treated as such. So long as this basic and fundamental truth is not realized, any constitution that may be built will result in disaster. . . .' "[299] He also asserted that " 'Muslim India cannot accept any constitution which must necessarily result in a Hindu majority government.' "[300] He did not explicitly reject in this sentence the possibility that, *theoretically at least*, a constitution applicable to the entire country could not be successfully operative. Implicitly he did, for three chief political reasons : namely, in any elected government, a Hindu majority (derived from the numerical factor) would prevail ; the power it would have in the Centre ; the threat it would constitute to Muslim provincial autonomy. Two major "religious" motifs (unstated here, but expressed in many previous speeches) were : the preservation of the Islamic faith and civilisation and the impossibility of incorporating even portions of the *Sharī'ah* in a legislative document to be applied to non-Muslim groups as well. He, therefore, continued his speech by saying :

> Mussalmans are not a minority as it is commonly known and understood. . . . Mussalmans are a nation according to any definition of a nation, and they must have their homelands, their territory and their state. . . . We wish our people to develop to the fullest our spiritual, cultural, economic, social, and political life . . . in consonance with our own ideals and according to the genius of our people. . . .[301]

He then introduced what came to be known as the "Pakistan Resolution," which reads as follows :

> Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute "Independent States" in which the constituent Units shall be autonomous and sovereign. . . .
>
> This session further authorises the Working Committee to frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption finally for the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters as may be necessary.[302]

The resolution—which echoed Sir Sayyid's and Iqbāl's political ideas[303]

—was adopted on 23 March 1940.[304] Henceforth, it became the formal platform of the All-India Muslim League, which bent every effort towards fulfilment of its ideal. Not all members of the Indo-Muslim community accepted it ; among them were, as mentioned earlier, Abul-Kalām Āzād, who had retained his membership in Congress throughout 1920-40, the Jam'iyat-ul-'Ulamā, the Aḥrār Party and the Shī'ah Political Conference. These three groups met at Delhi (April 1940) to discuss League policy. The "Azad Muslim Conference," as it came to be called, rejected partition as well as the League's claim to be the only political organisation representing Islamic India's interest. Nevertheless, the majority supported it.[305]

What was the Hindu reaction ?

Babu Rājindra Prashād issued a statement at Patna, on April 16, to the effect that the Congress would discuss the Muslim League proposition for the division of India if the League would present the proposition in specific terms. Jinnāḥ . . . rejected this offer, saying that the "principle" of partitioning India must first be accepted by the Congress, and that then the details could be worked out ; provided always . . . that no Muslims outside the Muslim League be consulted.[306]

The evidence seems to support the thesis that the Hindu leadership at first rejected and the British accepted divisionism[307] as implied in the Pakistan plan. The former had not accepted the earlier Muslim offer[308] to relinquish the separate electoral system and substitute an equally valid proposal for it. The latter did nothing either to find another way out of the dilemma Three prospects loomed ever larger from 1940 on : Indian independence rather than Dominion status,[309] hearkening back at least to the *swarāj* movement ; secession inherent in the Pakistan scheme, outlined by Iqbāl in 1930, but deeply rooted in India's make-up ; and, associated with it, but not dominant before 1945-6, the (discussed) partition of certain provinces with a Muslim majority in specific sectors. While the League and Congress—whose chief spokesmen then were respectively Jinnāḥ and Gandhi[310]—agreed on the first, they were unable to reach a compromise preventing secession.

" 'Deliverance Day,' 22 December 1939, was observed by the followers of the Muslim League throughout India with varying degrees of enthusiasm. The outlook at the end of the year was indeed gloomy. There seemed to be little prospect of finding a way out of the impasse. The Congress insisted on a Constituent Assembly at the end of the war ; the League was opposed to the idea. The breach between the two could not have been more complete."[311]

During a meeting between Jinnāḥ and Lord Linlithgow the Viceroy (January 1940), the Muslim leader told him :

that, during the discussions in November, he had tried to prevail upon the Congress leaders to accept the Viceroy's offer to expand his Executive Council subject to agreement in the provinces, but that the Congress leaders

would not look at the proposal. Jinnah remained pessimistic as to the prospect of democratic institutions in the western sense working well in India; collective Cabinet responsibility, he felt, must be abandoned.[312]

Nevertheless, even during the 1940's, he was willing to accept a plan, proposed by the Cabinet Mission,[313] saving the Indian Union. Contrary political events forced him to continue the pursuit to which he dedicated himself since his return to India.

Reference was made to the growing non-liberalism in Congress many of whose members belonged to the Mahasabha as well.[314] Dr Prashad may have been right in holding that the separate electoral system aggravated this distinction. It undermined the one-nation thesis to which Congress stubbornly adhered, but also reflected at once the numerical increase in, and the right of self-expression to, India's Muslims. Besides, the Congress view had been negated by Mr Savarkar, who stated at the Mahasabha's Ahmedabad session (1937):

" 'Several infantile politicians commit the serious mistake in supposing that India is already welded into a harmonious nation, or that it could be welded thus for the mere wish to do so. These our well-meaning but unthinking friends take their dreams for realities. That is why they are impatient of communal tangles and attribute them to communal organisation. But the solid fact is that the so-called communal questions are but a legacy handed down to us by centuries of a cultural, religious and national antagonism between the Hindus and the Muslims. . . . India cannot be assumed today to be an unitarian and homogeneous nation; but on the contrary, there are two nations in the main, the Hindus and the Muslims in India.' "[315]

These words were spoken three years before Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ acknowledged formally and publicly that " 'Mussalmans are a nation according to any definition'. "[316] The idea contained in Savarkar's speech was repeated in his address before the Mahasabha at its (December 1939) Calcutta session, when he said, for example: " 'National homogeneity connotes oneness of a people in relation to the contrast they present to any other people as a whole.' "[317] Yet, he expressed disagreement with " 'the conception of Territorial Nationality not cemented by any Cultural, Racial or Historical affinities and consequently having no common will to incorporate themselves into a Nation.' "[318] Did he reject India's division outright or did he thrust the glove to its Muslim leadership to sharpen its thesis and be bold enough to publicise it? In 1940, Jinnāḥ did so.

The events occurring in the 1940's quickly reached their climax. One British mission followed upon another to determine the conditions under which independence could be achieved. Among the most pertinent problems were the framing of a Constitution, the setting up of a Constituent Assembly to draft it, the role of the enlarged Executive Council and the balance

of power between Hindus and Muslims at the Centre. Sir Stafford Cripps, heading the first missson (1942),[319] suggested not only independence, "within the Empire or not,"[320] as soon as the war had ended, an elected government, and the right of any State freely to accept or reject the Constitution, i.e. enter or remain outside the Union. He also included the following clause in his draft declaration released to the press (29 March 1942):

(*i*) The right of any province of British India that is not prepared to accept the new constitution to retain its present constitutional position, provision being made for its subsequent accession, if it so decides. *With such non-acceding provinces, should they so desire, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to agree upon a new constitution giving them the same full status as the Indian Union* and arrived at by a procedure analogous to that here laid down[321] (italics ours).

The "provincial option" plan, the inclusion of States delegates who did not necessarily represented their peoples' choice, proposals relating to Defence, *et al.*, were rejected by Congress as also the League, with which the Mission barely negotiated. One major reason for Hindu repudiation of the Cripps proposals was that it meant, in fact, partition of India.[322] When the Congress view had become known (on 11 April 1942) Jinnāḥ published the League Working Committee's resolution (passed that same day), which partly stated:

In the draft declaration a constitution-making body has been proposed with the primary object of creating one Indian Union. So far as the Muslim League is concerned, it has finally decided that the only solution of India's constitutional problem is the partition of India into independent zones; and it will therefore be unfair to the Muslims to compel them to enter such a constitution-making body whose main object is the creation of a new Indian Union. . . .[323]

Jinnāḥ had made his and the League stand clear; the lines were drawn sharply, although discussions on co-operation in a proposed Constituent Assembly and the problem relating to delegation of power at the Centre continued between 1940 and 1946.

Among the many plans put forward since 1939 was, first, that envisaged by Dr 'Abdul Laṭīf, then associated with 'Uthmāniyah University (Hyderabad, Deccan). He proposed the division of Muslim India into

three big blocks, in the North-West, in East Bengal, and in the Daccan, and a number of small islands scattered all over in the ocean of Hinduism. . . . The so-called residuary powers would vest in the federating units, the Central list of subjects would be limited to the barest minimum, as foreign relations, commerce and defence. Each federating unit would have an army of its own "under the Central suppervision," but the navy would be entirely under the control of the Centre. There would be a general exchange of populations, the Muslims to retire to their cultural zones and the Hindus to theirs. But as some Muslims might desire to live in Hindu

zones and some Hindus in Muslim zones for commercial, industrial or other purposes, special laws would be enacted and special officers appointed to protect Hindus in Muslim zones and Muslims in Hindu zones.[324]

The idea of special protection, commented F.K. Khān Durrānī, nullifies the population's exchange idea.

Soon after Dr Laṭīf had made his views known, Sir Sikandar Ḥayāt Khān published his scheme. Accepting both Dominion Status and Federalism, he suggested India's division into seven "Zones" and insisted that the power at the centre be held to a bare minimum so as to prevent interference in the provinces. "The provison : ' In the event of a doubt or difference of opinion as to whether a subject is Federal, Concurrent, Regional or Provincial (or State), the decision of H. E. the Viceroy and Governor-General in his discretion shall be final,' puts the federating units effectively under the thumb of the Centre."[325]

Then there was the so-called " Aligarh" plan, advanced by Dr M. A. H. Qādri and Professor Dr Sayyid Ẓafar-ul-Ḥasan (about the same period). It proposed British India's division into three fully sovereign States, viz. (1) North-West India, including the N.-W. F. P., Punjab, Baluchistan and Sind, as also Kashmir; (2) Bengal, comprising also " the adjacent districts of Purnea (Bihar) and the Sylhet Division (Assam)" ; and (3) the rest of British India, that is Hindustan. Within the third group "two new autonomous provinces " were to be formed, " namely :

"(*a*) Delhi Province, including Delhi, Meerut Division, Rohilkhand Division and the district of Aligarh (Agra Division), and

"(*b*) Malabar Province, consisting of Malabar and adjoining areas on the Malabar coast.

"So constituted, Pakistan will have a Muslim population of over 60% and Bengal of 57%, and both will be Muslim States.

"The Malabar area has 1.4 millions of virile Muslim population constituting 27% of the total, which can very well look after itself. The newly constituted autonomous province of Delhi will have a Muslim population of 3.5 millions, forming about 28% of the total.

"The Indian States situated within the boundaries of any of the three proposed States or exclusively on the frontier of one of them would be attached to that State. Those bordering or more than one of the three States should have the option of joining any of the adjoining States, whereas Hyderabad . . . would be a Sovereign State, as historically and legally it at present is.

"These three independent States, Pakistan, Bengal and Hindustan, should enter into a defensive and offensive alliance among themselves on the basis of mutual recognition and reciprocity. . . . They would have a joint Court of Arbitration to settle any dispute that might arise between themselves or between them and the Crown."

The framers of the Aligarh plan, recognising that Hindustan's 23-million Muslim population would constitute a 10% minority, suggested, furthermore, that "'an accredited Muslim political organisation will be the sole official representative body of the Muslims in Hindustan.'" They also proposed that centres with 50,000 or more inhabitants be given "the status of a Free City," in recognition of the fact that Muslims congregate in urban areas. Again, Hindustan's Muslim villagers should be persuaded "to aggregate in larger units" for protection of their economic and cultural interests. "Lastly, they propose :

"'The Muslim minority in Hindustan and the non-Muslim minority in Pakistan and Bengal will have (*i*) representation according to population and (*ii*) separate electorates and representation at every stage, together with effective religious, cultural and political safeguards guaranteed by all the three States.'"[326]

A contemporary's comment on this issue was that protection of Hindustan's Muslim minority "is a very serious problem, and when the details of the final adjustment between Hindu India and Muslim India come to be thrashed, the suggestions made by the authors of the Aligarh scheme will demand very serious consideration."[327]

Dr B. R. Ambedkar, in his *Pakistan or The Partition of India* (1940), wrote :

"'A nation has to be accorded the right of disruption because it will not be satisfied with mere change in the form of government. Its quarrel is over the question of ultimate destiny.' . . .

"'A nation . . . is not only different from other components of the State, but it believes in and cherishes a different destiny totally antagonistic to the destiny entertained by other component elements in the State. The difference appears to me so profound that speaking for myself I would not hesitate to adopt it as a test to distinguish a community from a nation. A people who notwithstanding their differences, accept a common destiny for themselves as well as for their opponents are a community. A people who are not only different from the rest, but who refuse to accept for themselves the same destiny which others do, are a nation. . . .'"[328]

The implication is, of course, separation, which, he himself proposed. "His conception of Pakistan, for which he argues scientifically and at great length, is, therefore, exile for the Muslims from India."[329] His thinking contradicted the Congress stand (until 1946), and followed a point of view inherent in the political situation. "Ambedkar," commented Khān Durrānī, "bases his whole scheme of partition on the distinction of Muslim and non-Muslim. . . ."[330]

The plan advanced by Sir Feroz Khān Nūn (August 1942)

Proposed the division of India into five 'Dominions', (1) Bengal and Assam ; (2) C. P., U. P. and Bihar ; (3) Madras ; (4) Bombay and (5) Punjab,

Sind, Baluchistan and the N.-W. F.P. These 'Dominions' should have a federal central authority for the administration of certain matters, such as defence, customs, foreign relations and currency. The central authority would consist of delegates nominated by the five Dominion Governments. 'If at any time any Dominion is dissatisfied with the working of the central authoriy, that Dominion shall have the power to secede'."[331]

Pertinent to it, Khān Durrānī asked; "But where will the 'power to secede' come from if the central authority does not permit it to secede?" In the absence of a tribunal before which "an oppressed province" could plead its case or "sue the central authority for the right of secession," what will happen? "Will there be a civil war then, or shall we wait for a 'friendly invasion from abroad'?"[332] He died before the arrival of the Cabinet Mission and saw neither its failure nor the realisation of Pakistan. Like Iqbāl, he was pessimistic about the outcome, expressing himself as follows:

A Federal Centre, unless the Hindus of their own accord waive their right of majority, of which there is little hope, will necessarily mean Hindu Raj, leading sooner or later to the political extinction of the Muslims. We do not have to imagine it. The Hindu Mahasabha proclaims it from the housetops, and the twenty-seven months of Congress rule in six provinces have proved it and demonstrated the methods they are going to employ for the consummation of their dream. *In any case, the Muslims feel that a Federal Centre, dominated as it will be by the Hindus, will be their undoing*. . .[333] (italics ours).

These words were written (in 1943) by a contemporary of the events a year after the Cripps Mission and when it had become clear, "since the beginning of 1942" that "the Indian Muslims were nearing their goal of a separate state."[334] The "Quit India" movement, launched by Congress by a resolution of its Working Committee (passed on 14 July 1942) upon Gandhi's insistence, intensified the situation.[335]

It is interesting to note that two different viewpoints prevailed among the Hindus and India's Muslims; for example, the Madras premier, C. Rajagopalachari, and some of his associates, following the line of argument followed by Dr Ambedkar and Mr Jinnāḥ, attempted "to convert the Congress" to acceptance of partition. Their failure in doing so led to their resignation (15 July). In the Islamic community, such men as Abul-Kalām Āzād and many other individuals and groups, opposed it and, therefore, rejected League policy. Yet, they succeeded neither in persuading their coreligionist opponents to modify their stand. The hardening of the arteries on both sides made a change impossible. All efforts to come to a mutual agreement, including the Gandhi-Jinnāḥ talks (September 1944) and the Simla Conference (June 1944), failed.

The most significant thing about these talks was, of course, their failure to produce any agreement. But almost equally significant were the prior enthusiastic and vibrant hopes for their success, throughout the country and

especially throughout the Muslim League. The rank-and-file Muslims in the League, and its many progressive leaders, office-holders and editors, were extremely keen that the negotiations should lead to a Congress-League settlement. A majority, probably, of Congressmen also hoped for their success, though the conservatives were opposed, and put pressure on Gandhi not to make concessions. The real leaders of the Congress being in prison, the field was open for the reactionary Mahasabha spokesmen to make their opposition clamorous. *The League as a whole was more wholeheartedly in favour of a settlement than the Congress; and it was Leaguers who were most bitterly dejected when the conversations failed.* Desperate frustration followed on the breakdown, with uncalculated consequences in increased alienation and irrationality. Both sides, of course, placed the blame for the failure on the hated communal enemy, the leader of the other side[336] (italics ours).

What were these talks unsuccessful? The answer seems inherent in the passage quoted above. If this is a correct appraisal, the failure of all subsequent attempts to reach a compromise was due chiefly to strong Mahasabha influence also on Nehru and other Congressmen once they were free again to resume command. Cantwell Smith's answer to this question was: "The talks failed partly because neither Gandhi nor Jinnāḥ was able to understand the other's point of view; and partly because Jinnāḥ did not want a settlement."[337] This conclusion seems to contradict not only what he, himself, said in the previously cited passage, but also Jinnāḥ's subsequent activities. The Muslim leader never withdrew from the immediate political scene as he had done at an earlier moment in his career and constantly participated in all conferences held both with the British and/or Hindu leaders. His abundant correspondence dating from 1942-7 is further proof of his desire to settle the problem. The Pakistan scheme may be said to have been put forward only as a solution in case no agreement would be forthcoming. Why did he and his League associates engage otherwise in the many scheduled talks and private meetings? Cantwell Smith observed, because they hoped even by the end of 1944 to reach a settlement. They could have kept aloof altogether!

The League, meanwhile, was becoming the most powerful Indo-Muslim organisation and some of its branches began to gain in the provincial elections.

After the elections, the newly-elected Muslim legislators met at a Convention on 8, 9, 10 April 1946 at Delhi. The main resolution which was moved by Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy marked the final crystallization of the Muslim demand, and indicated the lines on which Pakistan actually came into existence in 1947. The Lahore Resolution of 1940 urged that contiguous Muslim majority area in the North-West and East "should be grouped to constitute independent states." It spoke of states and not a state. . . . Apparently, it was taken for granted that the independent states "will form units for Pakistan," as stated by the Quaid in reply to Mahatma Gandhi in September 1944. By 1946 either the need to remove this confusion or printing error was felt, or public opinion had got ready for the idea of a single sove-

reign state comprising the zones in the north-east and the north-west. Steps to formalize the position were taken at the Convention, which resolved that "the zones comprising Bengal and Assam in the north-east and the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan in the north-west of India, namely, Pakistan zones, where the Muslims are in a dominant majority, be constituted into a sovereign independent State.[338]

The last and most inportant of the British proposals aimed at retaining the Union was the Cabinet Mission Plant.[339] It envisaged an Indian Union, comprising three sections, of which A included Hindu India ; B, Sind, the Punjab and North-West Frontier Province—heavy Muslim-majority areas ; and C, Assam and Bengal, having a smaller Muslim majority. The reason for this division was to put the minorities at ease concerning any infraction of their power by the Central Government. It also suggested the creation of an Executive and a Legislature formed of elected members from all sectional parts and the States. It stressed, furthermore, that the provinces would have full autonomy and most subjects be under their sceptre. The exceptions were : defence, communications and foreign affairs, which would be in the Federal domain. Jinnāḥ at first opposed the Plan and submitted his ten-point memorandum. Its most relevant demands were : the provision of " 'safeguards concerning religion, culture and other matters affecting the different communities' " ; a three-fourth majority vote " 'by the Union' " in controversial matters ; the right of provinces " 'to opt out' " *after* the Federal and provincial Constitutions were framed ; and " 'parity of representation between the two groups of provinces in the Union executive and the legislature, if any.' "[340] Congress felt, however, that provinces should have the right "to opt out" even prior to the passing of a Constitution. It also rejected the principle of parity, offering instead " 'the provision to the effect that no major communal issue in the Union constitution shall be deemed to be passed by the Constituent Assembly unless a majority of the members of the community or communities concerned present and voting in the Constituent Assembly are separately in its favour' " which it regarded as " 'a sufficient and ample safeguard for all minorities.' "[341] It suggested arbitration by the Federal Court, if a serious disagreement arose and could not be settled. Nevertheless, it did not define what it meant by a "major communal issue". Also, It expanded the list of subjects over which the Centre would have control from three to seven by adding " 'fundamental rights, currency, customs and planning.' "[342] The inclusion of the first-named topic expressed willingness to comply with Jinnāḥ's demand. Congress opposed grouping,[343] however, which the Viceroy then asserted was not obligatory, although he insisted on the parity principle.[344] The Plan's suggestion to give the Centre control over finance prompted Jinnāḥ to demand from the Hindu body that " 'in no event shall it be by means of taxations.' "[345] While the latter did not con-

sider it as a point for difference, it said that " 'the Federal Union will have . . . the power to raise revenues in its own right.' "[346] It did not indicate the process to be adopted, probably considering it a matter for further discussion. The League Council accepted the Plan on 6 June 1946 with reservations ; Congress ratified it a month later. The former continued to insist on the creation of a sovereign Pakistan, comprising sections B and C, to which the latter took strong exception. Furthermore, the League Council authorised Jinnāḥ to begin negotiations with the Viceroy regarding the proposed Central Interim Government arrangements and to take whatever action and decisions he felt necessary. The 5 : 5 : 2 ratio of portfolios—5 to League, 5 to Congress representatives, 1 to a Sikh and one to an Anglo-Indian—suggested by the Viceroy, had to be abandoned because of strong Congress opposition. The Viceroy then published a Statement (16 June 1946) announcing the creation of a fourteen- instead of a twelve-member ExecutiveC ouncil, the addition covering a Scheduled Caste representative as an extra Congress member (six *versus* five League men), a Parsi and a Christian Indian. "The Statement stressed that the proposed distribution of seats should not be treated as a precedent for the solution of any other communal question; that it was an expedient put forward to solve the present difficulty only and to obtain the best available coalition government."[347] Jinnāḥ's and Nehru's names were included in the proposed list of Executive Council members. Jinnāḥ asked the Viceroy in writing for a clarification, viz. whether his proposals for the Interim Government were final or open to change (19 June), the Viceroy would fill any vacancy resulting from refusal of acceptance and, in such a case, the League's president would be approached for his consent. Lord Wavell replied that neither a final decision nor any changes could be made pending acceptance of League and Congress and that he would fill any vacancies after consultation with these two major bodies. He also assured Jinnāḥ (in a letter dated 22 June) that the Congress hope for a non-League member in the proposed Executive Council was unacceptable to him personally and to the Cabinet Mission. The result was that the Congress Working Committee during its Delhi session (25 June) rejected the Interim Government proposals. Its resolution stated :

> In the formation of a provisional or interim Government, Congressmen can never give up the national character of the Congress or accept an artificial and unjust parity, or agree to the vote of a communal group. . . .[348]

This resolution was passed during the last moments of Āzād's presidency of Congress. It affirmed, however, that Congress would enter the proposed Constituent Assembly " 'with a view to framing the constitution of a free, united and democratic India.' The Committee concluded that it was essential that a representative and responsible provisional government should be

formed at the earliest possible date."[349] Neither it nor the League had accepted the 16 June statement. One of the Hindu leaders' objections remained the exclusion of a non-Muslim from the Executive Council ; the League wanted to be assured that its members would sit in that body. Jinnāḥ furthermore argued that the elections to the Constituent Assembly and the formation of an interim Government formed one integrate whole ; to proceed with one part first was unacceptable.

Although Congress entered the Constituent Assembly after ratification of its Working Committee Resolution—at its Bombay session (6 July 1946), when Nehrn took over its presidency from Āzād, the League abstained from joining the legislative body. Matters were not facilitated by Nehru's rejection of grouping. Sure that

" 'section A will decide against grouping . . . whether there is a four to one chance of the North-West Frontier Province against grouping. Then group B collapses. It is highly likely that Bengal and Assam will decide against grouping. . . . Thus you see this grouping business, approached from any point of view, does not get us on at all.' "[350]

He also said that the Centre would control credit, currency, taxation, foreign trade is included in foreign affairs and that a central authority must have the power to deal with economic or administrative collapses and inter-provincial disputes. Lastly, he indicated that Congress could modify the Cabinet Mission Plan. Such statements and the non-settlement of the option issue did not help in reassuring the League, which moved at its Bombay session (27 July) that Pakistan was its ultimade goal within or without the Indian Union. "After three days' discussion, the Council passed a resolution rejecting the Cabinet Mission Plan."[351] It also proclaimed 16 August as "direct action" day to attain its goal, Pakistan.

Meanwhile, elections for the 296 assigned seats in the Constituent Assembly had been completed (end of July). The step was to create an Interim Coalition Government. Lord Wavell's 6 : 5 : 3 ratio—three for the minorities—originally advanced in the 16 June Statement, was confirmed in a letter addressed to the Muslim League and Congress presidents (on 22 July). It also asserted :

(*c*) Distributlon of portfolios will be decided after the parties have agreed to enter the Government and have submitted their names. The Congress and the Muslim League will each have an equitable share of the most important portfolious ; . . .

I would welcome a convention, if freely offered by the Congress, that major communal issues can only be decided by the assent of both the major parties, but I have never thought that it was essential to make this a formal condition since in fact a coalition Government could work on no other basis. . . ."[352]

Not only did the League abstain from the Constituent Assembly, whose opening session occurred on 9 December 1946, but it also hesitated in joining the Interim Government. Nehru insisted on settling the matter of sovereignty before Congress could enter it (letter of 23 July). Jinnāḥ rejected the invitation (letter dated 31 July) for various reasons : the Scheduled caste representative would be nominated by Congress rather than by his own people ; consequently, the way was paved for it to appoint a "Quisling Muslim," that is a non-Leaguer ; the portfolio distribution was not "equal," but "equitable"; the Viceroy apparently attached little significance to the assurance of minority safeguards. Hence, the League Working Committee found it impossible to participate in the new Government.[353] Lord Wavell, replying to Jinnāḥ (on 2 August), said that he would ask Congress to make proposals for it and that, should it submit an acceptable coalition offer, he was certain the League leader would respond readily. The implication of the Viceroy's decision was that plans to set up the Interim Government would be made without League co-operation.

Āzād, alone or in consultation with like-minded Hindus, censuring particularly Nehru's statement that the Cabinet Mission Plan could be changed if Congress saw it fit to do so, convened its Working Committee (on 8 August) at Wardha. He argued before it that the earlier All-India Congress Committee's resolution (26 June) was binding " and that no individual, not even the Congress President, could change it."[354] The dilemma now facing the Hindu organisation was that repudiation of its president's statement might undermine its position, while rejection of the Cabinet Mission Plan meant India's partition. The Working Committee reaffirmed co-operation, the acceptance of its 26 June resolution and, furthermore, asserted :

> The Committee have emphasised the sovereign character of the Constituent Assembly, that is its right to function and draw up a constitution for India without the interference of any external limitations which are inherent in its task, and will therefore seek the largest measure of co-operation in drawing up a constitution of free India allowing the greatest measure of freedom and protection for all just claims and interests. . . .
>
> The Committee hope that the Muslim League and all others concerned, in the wider interests of the nation as well as of their own, will join in this great task.[355]

Despite this comforting resolution, Jinnāḥ feared that Nehru's statement represented the true Congress view. He asked himself, therefore, what assurance the minorities and, particularly India's Muslims, would have once the British had departed. The antagonists stumbled constantly on the major problem of " minority " protection in a constitutional settlement for a free India. "Direct Action " day was celebrated (on 16 August) with the usual corollary of fighting and killing. The massacres grew worse when Congress,

having decided to enter the Interim Government, nominated all members of the new Executive Council (on 24 August) with Nehru as its Vice-President. "The result was unprecedented communal rioting. In Calcutta four thousand were killed, in Bihar five thousand, and in East Bengal there were fifty thousand homeless refugees."[356] In view of the League refusal to enter the Government, Nehru had suggested to Lord Wavell (17 August) that non-Leaguers fill the Council's five Muslim-assigned seats. The Viceroy felt averse to such an idea and replied that, at most, he could recommend to H.M.'s Government one non-Leaguer. Jinnāḥ made it clear in a press communique (of 19 August) that he was unapproachable. Subsequent conversations, nevertheless, were held with him, during which he was assured by the Viceroy of all possible attempts to settle any dispute with Nehru if the League head and Hindu leader personally were unable to do so.[357] The Interim Government was sworn in on 2 September. Congress now ruled the land; the League remained aloof. The Viceroy, meanwhile, exerted his efforts to get the League into the Government. Unable to settle the issue pertaining to the nomination of a non-Leaguer in the Interim Government, he informed Jinnāḥ accordingly (on 2 October). He stressed at the same time how important it was for the League to enter it unconditionally and persuaded its president to convoke soon a session of its Working Committee. The result of these discussions were Jinnāḥ's submission of nine points to Lord Wavell for clarification. They were, summarised: a membership of 14 in the Executive Council; non-League responsibility for and approval of the Scheduled Caste representative included in the six Congress nominees; no Muslim of Congress choice to be appointed; no decision on important communal matters to be taken if the majority of the Executive Council's Muslim or Hindu members stand opposed; the appointment of "alternative or rotational Vice-Presidents . . . in fairness to both the major communities"; in the absence of consultation, it cannot be regarded as approving the selection of the Parsi, Sikh and Indian Christian, but when future vacancies occur, these minorities' representatives must be nominated after deliberation with League and Congress; these two organisations must have an equal and fair share of the most important portfolios; no changes of these principles are to be effected without their agreement; the "long-term plan" cannot be achieved "until a better and more conducive atmosphere is created and an agreement has been reached on the points stated above and after the interim Government has been reformed and finally set up."[358] The Viceroy's reply, after having talked to Nehru (on 4 October), rejected the third point, as he felt that both parties should be free to appoint its respective representatives; alluded to "a process of mutual adjustment" for a coalition government to work (4th point); thought the rotational question

difficult, but promised he would see to the nomination of a Leaguer as Cabinet president during the absence of India's Governor-General and Vice-President and another as the Cabinet's Co ordination Committee, of which Lord Wavell, himself, was Chairman (5th); pledged consultation with League and Congress prior to filling any vacancy of the other three communal seats (6th); no minority can be excluded from having a share in the portfolios' distribution, but this does not exclude "equal distribution of the most important portfolios between the Congress and the Muslim League. Details would be a matter for negotiation" (7th). In agreement on the eighth point, he hoped that the League Council would convene shortly "to reconsider its Bombay resolution" (9th).[359] While this correspondance was exchanged between Jinnāḥ and the Viceroy, Congress-Muslim talks were conducted and (by the Nawāb of Bhopal's good offices), another Jinnāḥ-Gandhi meeting was arranged. They agreed on Congress acceptance of the League as Muslim India's only political organ and spokesman, but disagreed on its insistence that Congress be limited in choosing "such representatives as they think proper from amongst the members of the Congress as their representatives."[360] When Nehru was informed of this formula, he did not object, but added that if the Muslims insist on the League as their sole representative, they must accord Congress that same privilege, accepting it as the only organisation representing all non-Muslims *as well as Muslim non-Leaguers.* Nehru also insisted that Gandhi, when drafting the formula, had included a clause pertaining to the co-operation of all members of the Interim Government for all of India's good and that they " will never invoke the inervention of the Governor-General in any case."[361] Nehru had not relinquished the idea of sovereignty. Jinnāḥ asserted that such a paragraph had not been included in Gandhi's statement. Furthermore, Nehru rejected the League's demand that it be consulted on filling any of the possibly vacant minority seats, the principle of rotation of the Vice-Presidency, offering instead the chairmanship of the Cabinet Co-ordination Committee to a Leaguer or, alternatively, that of House leader in the central Assembly. Concerning the communal issue (4th point), Nehru felt that dissension should not be brought before a Court, because mutual agreement should be possible and, if not, arbitration should be the last resort. "The result of the discussions," ending in failure, comments Menon, " was to accentuate the bitterness between the two parties and to cause further confusion in the public mind."[362]

In spite of the complete disagreement between League and Congress, a compromise was in the air. Jinnāḥ did not disappoint the Viceroy by convening the All-India Muslim League Working Committee and informing him (by his letter of 13 October) of its decision to enter the Interim Govern-

ment. Pointing out the rejection "of the basis and scheme of setting up the Interim Government" and the Viceroy's decision and arrangements, he acknowledged the granted right of appointing five Muslims to the Executive Council. Referring to the "serious consequences" of including "Muslims who do not command the respect and confidence of Muslim India," he ended by saying that for these "and, lastly, for other very weighty grounds and reasons which are obvious and need not be mentioned, we have decided to nominate five on behalf of the Muslim League. . . ."[363] An interview with Lord Wavell, at which Liāquat 'Alī Khān, who had become Jinnāḥ's right hand, was present, followed. The question of the League's right to nominate a Scheduled Caste member again was brought up—it had been discussed in the beginning of October—but the Viceroy counselled not to challenge Congress now. He also warned Jinnāḥ that the League's co-operation in the Interim Government was contingent upon the nullification of its Bombay statement. When the Muslim leader answered that this could be done by the All-India Muslim League, Lord Wavell suggested it be convened quickly. The latter then informed Nehru of the discussion, of the League's decision to join the new Government and appoint a non-Muslim in its list of nominees, and that it signified at once its acceptance of "the long-term plan". The League's list named as its representatives : Liāquat 'Alī Khān, Ghazanfar 'Alī Khān, 'Abdur Rab Nishtar, I. I. Chundrigar, and the Scheduled Caste member, Jogendra Nath Mandal, then member of Bengal's Muslim League ministry.[364] "The Muslim League's decision to enter the Interim Government was received with relief, although it was regretted that no agreement had been reached between the two parties. . . ."[365]

As a result, the Interim Government was reconstituted (on 15 October). Now, a new problem confronted it, viz. the distribution of portfolios. Lord Wavell suggested "that one of the three senior portfolios—External Affairs, Defence and Home Affairs—may be transferred to the League." Nehru was so adamant on retaining the External Affairs portfolio that he threatened resignation if it were given out of Hindu hands.[366] Vallabhbhai Patel, for many years associated with Nehru, opposed the transfer of Home Affairs and felt that such subjects as "currency and finance" as well as "trade and industry could be developed only on an all-India basis and the same thing applied to commercial policy." Gandhi replied to Patel's objections by saying that he did not see any reason why "provincial governments would differ from the Centre on questions like currency or customs." Hence, there was no reason why such subjects should be included in a compulsory listing.[367] Anyway, the Finance portfolio was offered to the League, which, Congress thought, "would not be able to manage Finance and would have to decline the offer."[368] When Chaudhary Muḥammad 'Alī heard the news, he

was jubilant as it meant League control of every Department. He immediately contacted Jinnāḥ and, assuaging the latter's fears, assured the Muslim leader of his (Chaudhary's) full co operation. The proposal then was accepted by Jinnāḥ and Liāquat 'Alī Khān became the first Muslim Finance Minister in the newly constituted Interim Government. The other portfolios distributed among the League nominees were those of Law (Mandal), Communications (Nishtar), Commerce (Chundrigar) and Health (G. 'Alī Khān).[369] They and the Congress representatives entered office formally on 26 October 1946.

However, Jinnāḥ did not accept Lord Wavell's suggestion that the League representatives join the Constituent Assembly, which created the problem of "bi-partisan" co-operation in framing the Federal Constitution and, once it had been formulated, of obtaining minority acceptance for it. Meanwhile, the League "refused to accept Nehru's leadership" ;[370] consequently, two separate *blocs* under their respective heads existed within the Coalition Government. The sectional issue continued to be another chief cause for disagreement[371] between the Muslim and Hindu representatives. Gandhi had said (on 23 October) :

> The Constituent Assembly is based on the State paper. That paper has put in the cold storage the idea of Pakistan. It has recommended the device of "grouping" which the Congress interprets in one way, the League in another and the Cabinet Mission in a third way. No law-giver can give an authoritative interpretation of his own law. If, then, there is a dispute as to its interpretation, a duly constituted court of law must decide it.[372]

Jinnāḥ saw no reason why he should convoke, therefore, the League Council and suggested the postponement of the Constituent Assembly's opening meeting (scheduled for 9 December), which, however, was not delayed.

The British stated that the sections would have the right to determine which procedure to follow in setting those affairs allotted to them for decision and that "provinces would meet in sections."[373] They did not guarantee, however, that this mode would be followed, as they said that they could not control the happenings in the Constituent Assembly. They suggested, instead, that those matters on which the major communities dissented should be decided by majority vote.[374] The League remained dissatisfied. A London meeting then was called by Prime Minister Attlee from 2 to 5 December. It was attended by Messrs Jinnāḥ and his co-worker, Liāquat 'Alī Khān,[375] as League representatives and Messrs Nehru and Baldev Singh[376] as Congress delegates. No agreement was reached, however. The British Government issued a statement, on 6 December,[377] saying that the chief problem pertained to the sectional issue, viz. the right of each section (A, B, and C) to frame a charter for the provinces falling respectively within it, decide on a

"Group Constitution," and of the provinces to opt out of the section to which they were assigned after the Federal Charter had become effective, elections under it had taken place and a referendum held in that particular province to determine its inhabitants' wishes.[378] The British urged Congress to accept the Cabinet Mission's view and submit any differences of interpretation on the latter's 16 May Statement to the Federal Court for a final decision.

When the London session broke up, the Muslim delegates remained in London, where Jinnāḥ made some speeches, asserting that the sole solution was the creation of a sovereign independent Muslim State in India. Consequently, the League did not join the Constituent Assembly.[379] At a Congress meeting held on 5 January 1947, President Nehru moved a resolution which partly stated : " 'In the event of any attempt at . . . compulsion, a province or part of a province has the right to take such action as may be deemed necessary in order to give effect to the wishes of the people concerned.' "[380] It dissatisfied the League, whose Working Committee (convened at Karachi on 29 January), replied by passing the following resolution :

These qualifying clauses, in the considered opinion of the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, confer the right of veto within the section on "a province," and what is more absurd, on "a part of a province" as well as on the Sikhs in the Punjab, and therefore they completely nullify the so-called "acceptance" by the Congress of the 6 December Statement."[381]

Inasmuch as "the Congress, the Sikhs and the Scheduled Castes had not accepted the Statement, the Muslim League Working Committee called upon the British to declare that the Constituent Assembly, the elections to and the summoning of which had been *ab initio* illegal, should be dissolved forthwith. In these circumstances, the Working Committee declined to call the Council of the League to reconsider its decision of July 1946.'"[382]

During an interview with President Nehru, Lord Wavell stated his regret at the League decision, that it was impossible to dissolve the Constituent Assembly (which the Muslim body had never joined because of its opposition), without the latter's support a Constitution could not very well be framed, and the resignation of its delegates from the Interim Government could be demanded by Congress. Accordingly, Congress sent a formal letter to the Viceroy (received by him on 5 February), requesting that the League representatives withdraw from the Coalition Government. It cited as reason for its demand its interpretation of the Muslim League's January resolution, viz. that it implied repudiation of the Cabinet Mission Plan. Congress reiterated its demand on 13 February and, two days later, President Nehru indicated during a press interview that it would withdraw, itself, if the League refused to do so.[383] The problem was rendered more acute by the communal riots which had been particularly grave during the last few years, the open

question of the military's and the administration's loyalty at a time when constant Congress-League clashes prevented reconciliation, and, finally, by the British announcement on 20 February,[384] that is, five days after the Hindu leader's demand, that power would be transferred to India at the latest by June 1948.

At another conference between Lord Wavell and President Nehru on 21 February the latter argued that the phrase " 'parts of the country,' " found in the last paragragh of the 6 December 1946 Statement issued by the British could be interpreted as " 'parts of a province.' " The Viceroy disagreed, saying that it meant solely the framing of a Constitution (Federal, provincial or "group") with the consent of the Union population's majority. The tension in India grew, particularly in Bengal (home of the Mahasabha, which began to investigate ways of partitioning it), from whose eastern region Muslims emigrated *en masse* to Assam to occupy grazing areas. The Assamese, mostly of the Hindu faith, felt strongly against having been grouped with a predominantly Muslim province. A difficult situation existed in the Punjab; here the Sikhs opposed the Muslims who had been unable to form a ministry, as they did in Bengal and Sind, after the 1945 elections. Agitation spread throughout India. Congress meanwhile repeated on 5 March 1946 its acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan[385] and invited the Muslim League to send delegates for a conference with it. Furthermore, it suggested the Punjab's partition which the League and some Congress factions disliked, as the Muslims had hoped to retain control over that whole province.

The impossibility of a Congress-League settlement was clear by the time Lord Wavell left India in March 1947. His successor, Lord Mountbatten, was unable to heal the rift and preserve the Union.

The Hindu leadership, increasingly aware that a compromise was impossible, was changing its mind. Nehru by now was willing to give Pakistan to the League as long as no province was pressured to join the new country.[386] Dr Rajendra Prashad subsequently said: " 'This may mean not only the division of India, but a division of some provinces. . . .' "[387] The issue was discussed at the Simla Conference (10 May 1947) and, again, during a meeting Lord Mountbatten convened at his Delhi residence (on 2 and 3 June). Jinnāḥ ultimately accepted the partition of certain provinces as he saw no other path that would assure Indo-Muslim independence.[388]

The final British Statement promulgated on 3 June provided for " 'the transfer of power this year on a Dominion Status basis to one or two successor authorities according to the decisions taken as a result of this announcement.' "[389] It was a confession of their failure in obtaining Hindu-Muslim agreement, preserving India's unity and that partition was the sole practical solution to the communal problem, thereby retracting their earlier position,

stated by Lord Wavell, that it would not be a satisfactory measure. In a broadcast made by England's Prime Minister on 3 June 1947, he asserted: " 'As the Indian leaders have finally failed to agree on the Cabinet Mission's plan for a united India, partition becomes the inevitable alternative.' "[390] The 1947 statement provided for the division of British India (excluding the States, which had retained their autonomy) into Muslim and Hindu majority areas, to be determined—in the case of the Punjab and Bengal—by the 1941 Census figures and by vote of the communities, sitting separately in the Legislative Assembly, as to whether or not they wished their respective provinces to be partitioned, the majority decision to prevail. The Legislative Assemblies of Sind, the North-West Frontier Province, "British Baluchistan" and Assam—all of which (except the last-named) had Muslim-majority populations, also had the right to choose whether or not to participate in the existing Federal Constituent Assembly. Those provinces preferring to abstain from it then had to indicate the supreme authority to whom they felt power must be transferred.

The Statement's reference to "this year" implied an earlier date than originally intended.[391] In effect, Lord Mountbatten said then: " 'I think the transfer could be about the 15th of August.' "[392]

The All-India Muslim League Council, meeting in New Delhi on 10 June 1947, resolved to accept the 3 June Statement as did Congress on 14 June at its Delhi session. "Nationalist" Muslims, Hindu groups about to become minorities in the proposed Pakistan State, and extremists did not support it. Nevertheless, the work towards effecting partition was begun by holding referenda during June and July and delineating the boundaries for which task special commissions were appointed.

When the decision to divide India was taken, the Government at London set about drafting the "Indian Independence Bill,"[393] which the House of Commons and the House of Lords passed respectively on 15 and 16 July. The Crown gave its consent two days later. To assure effective operation of the "transfer of power," a Partition Council—of which Jinnāḥ and Nehru, amongst others, were members—and an Arbitral Tribunal were set up to iron out any problems and differences relating to division. "The Government of India Act, 1935, as modified and adapted, was brought into operation by the India (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, made by the Governor-General on 14 August 1947."[394]

The question of who would become Governor-General now arose. Clause (*e*) of the 16 May Statement read: "That the Governor-General should be common to both the Dominions and that the present Governor-General should be reappointed."[395] As neither party had said anything about it, their acceptance seemed implied. The Indian Independence Bill provided, therefore,

that unless either Dominion's legislature decreed contrariwise, one person would act as Governor-General for both. Lord Mountbatten had been requested by Nehru to continue in that office for India and Jinnāḥ, the Viceroy thought, would extend a similar invitation. The Muslim leader had suggested the appointment of a "Super-Governor-General" standing above the other two. The presumption was erroneous as Jinnāḥ hinted during a get-together with Mountbatten (on 2 July) that he, as League leader, would like to become Pakistan's Governor-General. His preference was confirmed in writing by Liāquat 'Alī Khān (5 July). The Viceroy "felt hurt at the League decision."[396] The Viceroy's press attache, Alan Campbell-Johnson, had written in his diary (entry dated 22 April 1947):

He [Lord Mountbatten] has come round to the view to-day that the Cabinet Mission Plan can somehow be resurrected in a new form and name. As originally presented, it was psychologically wrong. If the principle of two sovereign States could be accepted, union might be achieved through sovereignty. We had to recognise that the Moslem League were prepared to give up the B and C Groups (full Pakistan area) and to accept a truncated Pakistan if a real free centre went with it.[397]

Jinnāḥ's stand dashed the Viceroy's hope.

The British Government, headed by Attlee, was fearful of civil war in India and, dissatisfied with Lord Wavell's military viewpoint, had nominated Mountbatten as his successor.[398] Dr Ikram refers[399] to the view expressed by the Governor-General's Chief of Staff, Lord Ismay, as noted by Campbell-Johnson while still in London (entry dated 21 February 1947): "Ismay . . . felt there was a danger of an issue being made of Mountbatten's selection as a pro-Hindu and anti-Moslem League appointment."[400] The Governor-General has been accused of having been influenced by the Nehru-Patel axis. The diarist notes (31 May 1947):

" 'Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel, the two big Congressmen in the Interim Government, accept Partition on the understanding that by conceding Pakistan to Jinnah they will hear no more of him and eliminate his nuisance value, or, as Nehru put it privately, that by 'cutting off the head we will get rid of the headache'. . . ."

He added, however: " 'Partition is undoubtedly a tragedy, but a worse tragedy would be to try to impose a unity unacceptable to the great majority of the hundred million Moslems.' "[401] Earlier (8 April), he had characterised Jinnāḥ's attitude toward the British as "liquidators" and the Muslim's fear that he would get only a " 'moth-eaten Pakistan'."[402] Under these circumstances, is it any wonder that Jinnāḥ preferred his supreme leadership over Pakistan to assure complete sovereignty? Alan Campbell-Johnson's comment was that Mountbatten suffered from illusion and "Jinnah's verdict goes in favour of Jinnah."[403] This statement could be considered either as a cynicism

or as an emotional expression supporting the League stand. It might serve, however, as a final epitaph on a man who dedicated his life to Muslim India.

Partition became official on 15 August 1947. A new sovereign country—called Pakistan—was born on that day. Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ became its first Governor-General. The 15th of August marks the end of the third and the beginning of the fourth and final phase in his political career.[404]

The loyalty and support which he had received from Muslim India's majority was unique. They honoured him with the title of *Quā'id-i-A'ẓam* or "supreme leader" which, amazingly, first was bestowed upon him by Gandhi.[405] As "father" of Pakistan, Jinnāḥ remains enshrined in his country's and the world's annals of history.

4. Conclusions

The creation of Pakistan, the "land of the pure," vindicates the view expressed by Muḥammad the Prophet that Muslims are pre-eminent by their faith and that they may not mingle with other groups unless these have become converted.[406] Raḥmat 'Alī injected in his theory the issues of faith, civilisation, territory, the three ingredients noted earlier as being essential to the political composite called a "nation". His concepts of purity, which has ethnological implications, and the "fatherland," a territorial and political theme invoking an excessive emotional sense of patriotism, undoubtedly were influenced also by the Hitlerian theories which were being circulated in Germany at the time he was in England. While Muḥammad Iqbāl had rejected the second notion, nevertheless it could be implied from his theory that his community must live its own life and hence apart from any other. As it was localised in the sense of having settled and continued to live in a particular territory in Northern India, geography very much entered into the picture.

To Islam, unity could only mean a Muslim brotherhood cemented by singular loyalty to the religion revealed by Muḥammad. Indianism had to be repudiated, for it would have meant the inclusion of the "uninitiated" into the fraternity. Ultimately, the assertion made by Muḥammad 'Alī was untenable from a fundamentalist viewpoint, because it meant a divided dedication and submission to something other than the Qur'ānic decrees. The Law of a united India could not be exclusively Islamic, as non-Muslims, having their own Codes, could and would not adhere to it. Consequently, "I am an Indian first" has meaning for a Muslim only with reference to the local place of his birth and residence. Theologically, the League's non-recognition of Muslims not associated with it can be interpreted as a repudiation of Muḥammad 'Alī's (and more so, Āzād's) subscription to a universalism which minimises external differences and stresses the internal unity

between all faiths. The *jamā'at* cannot be extended, according to Muḥammad 'Alī and Muḥammad Iqbāl, as the latter's profession of absolute dedication to "my community" testifies, explaining thus his insistence that the situation in India is international rather than "national". It is an affirmation of exclusivism, theologically speaking, and politically, of the Indo-Muslim community's duty to create its own polity, resting on the "pillars" of its faith. A nationalism which does not have this spiritual foundation is alien to Islam's spirit.

The insistence on the formation of a sovereign Indo-Muslim State meant, in any case, the reassertion of a particularist *versus* a universal nationalist orientation. The two are mutually exclusive from a Muslim and Hindu fundamentalist viewpoint by the stress on the greatness of a way of life solidly built upon a specific faith. Pakistan, then, means the reconstitution of a people, "lost in the wilderness," into a firmly united congregation (brotherhood). The Divine oneness is mirrored in the religio-socio-political unity symbolised by the *Millat*. This is God's Kingdom on earth: the association of unique individuals (for Iqbāl and ultimately also for Jinnāḥ), presided over by the most Unique Self: God. This uniqueness is bestowed by their faith. If it is not preserved, deterioration sets in. Man, himself, being its keeper, he must come to its defence when it is threatened. Mashriqī and Iqbāl both had insisted that Muslims become energetic and the former that Islam means a *jihād*, a voluntary sacrifice, united effort and belief in oneself and one's efforts. The stress on dynamism, the future's importance and the reassertion of the worth of Islam's own culture repudiated at once Sir Sayyid's over-emphasis on the excellence of European civilisation and Shiblī's and Amīr 'Alī's turn to the past.

Amidst adverse political circumstances, when preservation and self-determination became the Muslims' uppermost concern, the message of "Now or Never" had added urgency. Failure to act on behalf of Islam at a time of danger meant (according to Raḥmat 'Alī) betrayal of its true ideals. The implication of Iqbāl's philosophical formulation coupled with Raḥmat 'Alī's insistent motifs of "homelands," "purity," and "loyalty" and Mashriqī's themes of self-sacrifice and unitedness could not but influence those Muslims seriously concerned with the "salvation" of their faith and culture.

Such a man was Jinnāḥ and his political theory is the final embodiment of the Islamic ideal as postulated by these Indo-Muslim thinkers.

The developments were not solely formulated by philosophical analysis. They assumed (as noted) a secular nature in so far as they expressed themselves in such forms as political organs, an electoral and administrative system, a Constitution. The concept of "nations" did not arise in Islamic

India until the late nineteenth century, due to the European ideational impact. It was built, nevertheless, on the distinctness of faith. The electoral system reflected the communal differences ; the failure of the "confederacy" principle is attributable to the inability on the part of Muslims and Hindus to conceive of the provinces in terms of secular States united by a Central Government. It explains why the Cabinet Plan, whose proposed governmental structure may have been patterned after the United States model, could not be executed. The political developments, secular in nature, clearly were shaped by the communal dissension which, as pointed out, had its roots in India's religious history.

Finally, the historian is faced with the interpretation to be given to Jinnāḥ's activities. If he had subscribed to communalism, why would he have had so many discussions with the Hindus and the British to come to some sort of understanding ? Would they not have to be regarded as a contradiction if his communalist position is stressed ? All he would have had to do is to remain aloof, insist on complete secession, but even after 1940, when the Pakistan idea had begun to take shape in his mind, he did not do so. The word "communalism," itself, perhaps needs further analysis. Belonging to a specific faith group does not necessarily imply communalism. This word undoubtedly was used specifically in application to the political aspect. Jinnāḥ's desire to have safeguards for his coreligionists is not to be regarded as a communalist orientation.[407] This is clear from the previous discussion on his earlier career, but particularly proven by his presidential speech given before the Muslim League (1916), when he also said :

" 'I have been a staunch Congressman throughout my public life and have been no lover of sectarian cries, but it appears to me that the reproach of 'separatism' sometimes levelled at Musalmans is singularly inept and wide of the mark, when I see this great communal organization rapidly growing into a powerful factor for the birth of a United India. A minority must, above everything else, have a complete sense of security before its broader political sense can be evoked for co-operation and united endeavour in the national tasks. To the Mussalmans of India that security can only come through adequate and effective safeguards as regards their political existence as a community.' "[408]

This is what he asked for in the 1920's, 1930's and 1940's and what he never received. Hence, his entirely different approach as reflected in his Cairo speech (29 December 1946) : " 'We have resolved to establish two Muslim states in India. In the Pakistan Zone we will be able to safeguard the heritage of Islam and all the glory of our culture and civilization.' "[409] It was, indeed, a severe indictment of Hindu and British policy and as such answers in part, at least, the question : What made Jinnāḥ change his mind ? The more specific and immediate among the multiple replies that can be given are :

(1) the Hindu leaders' recalcitrance in acknowledging the strong need for guaranteeing "security" to India's Muslims—their refusal to do so points up, of course, their own inability to overcome communalist thinking in so far as it had seeped into their political conceptions ; (2) personal antagonism ; (3) Mahasabha ideology, referred to more than once, which exerted the greater force when Congress sat in prison ; (4) nationalism, with its ideal of sovereignty, so dominant in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries ; (5) the actions of the British—they should have been more acutely aware of the void at a time Hindu leadership was needed most critically ; they were unable to provide for India an electoral system based on equal representation, yet not founded on separate electorates which may add a valid ground to the accusation that they preferred division ;[410] and they nourished pro-Hindu sentiments. This very last fact reverts to the thesis that the Aryan could not but be in sympathy with the Aryan. The Muslim, condemned in the nineteenth century, continued to be regarded in the twentieth with suspicion and as a strange breed difficult to understand.[411] The latter's monotheism, on the other hand, bred a monolithic political conception : one God, one religion, one brotherhood, one country. Hence, the impasse, which neither member of the triangle could break.

Pakistan, in the last analysis, implies a rededication to Allah and Muḥammad similar to Moses's reaffirmation at Mount Sinai. It has a messianic motif : the elect point the road for the world to follow : submission to His Will, Law, appointed authorities, and sacrifice to preserve Holy Writ and the civilisation it has forged. The Indo-Muslim *millat*—sanctified—has become transformed into the "City of God".

Chapter VIII

THE FORCE OF THE CONSERVATIVE CURRENT

The ideal of self-realisation, embodied in Muḥammad Iqbāl's philosophy and poetry as well as in Raḥmat 'Alī's and Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ's political concepts, could be achieved only in a "pure" Islamic State. Hence, the prior concrete aim was the political reconstruction of the Indo-Muslim society, to be ruled by Qur'ān and *Sharī'ah*. To this end, Pakistan was created. " 'The idea was,' " said the *Qūā'id-e-A'ẓam*, " 'that we should have a State in which we could live and breathe as free men and which we could develop according to our own lights and culture and where principles of Islamic social justice could find free play.' "[1] Once it had come into being, many problems loomed. They were, briefly summarised: legislative, because a Constitution had to be drafted; political, as a new government had to be set up and the relationship between East and West Pakistan, the provinces and the Centre, had to be defined; administrative, for a civil servant body was needed; economic, due to the departure to India of many Hindu business men and peasants from areas falling within the Muslim State—resulting in rudderless stores, factories, farms and the necessity of restoring them and building up national and foreign commerce and trade; educational, derived from the need for training larger numbers of Muslims for all kinds of jobs; and, lastly, diplomatic, implying the opening of embassies and consulates throughout the world, the participation in the United Nations and other political and economic international agencies, which required additional skilled personnel and funds. The first attempts to grapple with these problems were made during the fourth and final phase of Jinnāḥ's career. In his last year, he had barely sufficient time to enunciate some guiding principles for the infant body politic.[2] Before stating their substance, some other aspects call for attention.

The most significant questions for this inquiry arising at the time were religio-juridical ones; viz. what kind of State Pakistan should be, what type of Constitution and government should it have? When it was born, its first functioning body was the seventy-member Constituent Assembly, which met on 11 August 1947. Its main task was, of course, to draft a legislative document for the young country, which was governed meanwhile under the Indian Independence Act.[3] Its history, briefly sketched, was as follows: Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ, whom it elected its president on 11 August 1947,[4] enunciated certain principles which were incorporated by its next leader,

Prime Minister Liāquat 'Alī Khān (August 1947-October 1951)[5] in the "Objectives Resolution" (passed in 1949), which he, himself, had moved and which was incorporated in the 1956 Constitution. The Assembly then had the task of proceeding with the examination of those fundamental principles (electorates, form of the State, rights of Muslims and minorities, etc.) to be laid down in the future Charter. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Khwājah Nāẓimuddīn (1951-3),[6] it drew up a draft, which orthodoxy did not accept. In effect, the theologians, convening at Karachi (11-18 January 1953), approved a series of amendments, written by Sayyid Abul-A'lā Maudūdī, during August 1952,[7] which they sent to the Assembly. These met with the liberalists' disapproval. At its session on 7 October 1953, Prime Minister Muḥammad 'Alī (1953-5)[8] moved for the consideration of the Basic Principles Committee Report. On 27 October, it adopted the proposals that Pakistan be an "Islamic Republic," would have a two-House Parliament elected by adult franchise, a Cabinet directly responsible to the Legislature and a Muslim Chief of State, chosen by a joint session of both Houses. In the same year, the Government had to contend with widespread anti-Aḥmadīyyah disturbances in the Punjab,[9] which also pertained to the issue of constitution making, as they involved a sect born within Islam and had implications for the minorities' position in a Muslim State. Despite attempts made by the Prime Minister, who had the "Nazimuddin Report" reframed, little headway was made. The liberalists repudiated the conservatives' view that the drafts presented were too Westernist and the minorities' accusation that they were too Islamic. An impasse was reached; after seven years (between 11 August 1947 and 14 August 1954), covering fourteen sessions with numerous public meetings and debates, Pakistan's Constituent Assembly had been unable to frame a Charter. It furthermore was no longer representative because then a newly organised party, the United Front[10] (which in the 1954 elections to East Bengal's Legislative Assembly had secured 223 *versus* the Provincial Muslim League's 10 seats) was not included in it, and its East Pakistan League members did not truly speak for their constituents.[11] Two other reasons were the Assembly's conception of itself as a permanent legislative organ and its insistence that the Governor-General did not have the right of assent (i.e. had no part in the law-making process).[12] Therefore, Mr Ghulām Muḥammad dissolved this body by a proclamation, dated 24 October 1954, declaring "'a State of Emergency throughout Pakistan. The Constituent Assembly as at present constituted has lost the confidence of the people and can no longer function.'"[13] His action was upheld by the Federal Court's ruling (publicised on 26 March 1955) thereby reversing the Sind Court's decision that it was unwarranted, prompting the Federal Government to appeal to the supreme judiciary

organ.[14] The result was that all Acts and orders passed by the old Assembly and the provincial governments were null and void. Also, parliamentary rule had ended, as all authority now was vested in the executive, represented by the Emergency Power Ordinance, which had the sole constitution-making right. The Court declared the need for fresh elections in order to set up a new legislative body. The Governor-General accepted its decision and thus expressed his desire not to infringe upon the people's rights, and exceed the limits of Muslim political thought. Accordingly, elections were held in the summer of 1955 for a new eighty-member Constituent Assembly, chosen on a parity basis (forty from East and forty from West Pakistan). The results, announced on 23 June, were as follows: of the seventy-two seats then contested (eight more were to be filled), the Muslim League won twenty-five; the United Front Party (not represented in the first Assembly) sixteen; the Awami League, twelve;[15] the minorities, eleven; and the independents, eight.[16] The new Constituent Assembly was convened by the Governor-General's order at Murree (a Kashmir hill station above Rawalpindi) on 7 July, remaining in session until 14 July, when it adjourned. It validated thirty-six Acts[17] passed by the former body and sent the respective bill to a select committee, which had to report back prior to 15 August.[18] Parliamentary rule thereby was restored. On 9 January 1956, it presented a Draft Constitution. The theologians, led by Sayyid Maudūdī, again submitted a series of detailed "Comments."[19] The "Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan" was passed finally by the Second Constituent Assembly on 29 February 1956, and received the Governor-General's consent on 2 March. The *'ulamā'* adopted a resolution during a meeting held by the Central Executive Council of the *Jamā'at-i-Islāmī* at Lahore on 18 March, approving the new Constitution. It meant that agreement had been reached between the principal antagonists on what kind of a Charter and Government Pakistan was to have. It took approximately eight and a half years to frame its Constitution, and it was abolished a year and a half later on 7 October 1958 by Major-General Iskandar Mirza, who had been elected the first President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, inaugurated on 23 March 1956.[20] Martial law was instituted; parliamentary rule had ended.[21] The old Muslim League as well as all other parties were abolished.

It is impossible within the space available to compare the various constitutional drafts which saw the light. All that is attempted here is a somewhat detailed investigation of the problems relating to the liberalist and conservative interpretations of the nature of the Islamic State, its Constitution and, pertinent thereto also, the position of the minorities in such a State. A fierce debate on this large issue, referring in crystallised form to the question whether the new nation constituted a

"secular" or a Muslim society, raged between the conservatives and the modernists on the one hand, and, on the other hand, between the modernists and the minorities. In order to understand the true depth of the argumentation, a brief analysis of the Islamic concept of the rule of law seems essential.

According to Muslim legal theory, God is not only the Creator of heaven and earth, man and beast, the Sovereign of the Universe, but also the Law-giver, Who alone has perfect knowledge. He is regarded, therefore, as the Head of the Islamic State as well as the Author of its Law which, consequently, is regarded as eternal, immutable, existing prior to society and State, and independent of man, who is not above, but subject to, it. The Qur'ān, completed when Muḥammad died,[22] is the final expression of Divine Law, the implication being that, as a revealed book, it is immutable and valid at all times throughout the Muslim world. It exists as an expression of God's will and its aim is to lay down to the believer the standard form of life (*sharī'ah* or "waterway," i.e. the "right path"). It is essential as a regulatory force in society. In effect, the State was created for the purpose of enforcing the Law and, as Allah's chosen instrument, its authority is supreme on earth.

The Muslim theologian-jurists[23] recognised the importance of investing the proper persons with the power of its execution. Held upon the Prophet's death by the caliphs, they became recognised officially as the earthly executors of the Divine Will. The statement that obedience is due to God, Muḥammad and the designated deputies (in that order) reveals the obligation due by all Muslims as well as the derivative triadic form of authority envisioned by Islam.[24] To repeat: God is the Chief of State, His Law and Will are decreed in the Qur'ān and the *Sharī'ah*; Muḥammad is His Prophet and the first Muslim; and the caliphs are their subsequent delegates.

The Code, itself, rests on three chief sources: the Qur'ān, the *Sunnah* of the Prophet and, subsequently also, of the Muslim community, and his "Sayings" (*Ḥadīth*).[25] A fourth important foundation is the body of legal decrees (called *Fiqh*), built, too, upon the above-mentioned bases, and developed since early Islamic times. It arose in reply to the need for governing the newly conquered lands according to Muslim principles.[26] Inasmuch as the legislative function in the sense of *making* laws had ended with Muḥammad's death, the theologians applied three principles: *ijmā'* or "consensus of opinion,"[27] *qiyās* or "analogical legislation" and *istiḥsān* or "juridical preference," taking into account the public welfare.[28] The application of *istiḥsān* meant bare use of the purely legal traditions and, hence, a more liberal interepretation of the Qur'ānic injunctions. By the end of the eighth century C.E. (fourth A.H.), the theologians by "consensus" repudiated all

legal formulation in so far as it meant the use of independent reasoning (*ijtihād*), involved particularly in the use of the last-named principle. The reversion to orthodox thinking[29] stunted the "creative" effort and accounted for a rigid stratification symbolised by the innumerable religio-legal commentaries piling one upon another, a derivative process using the known categories and shying away from original analysis. All the above-mentioned sources as well as the rules derived from them coagulated into the Code, which therefore came to be regarded as sacrosanct and, hence, revealed and immutable. Inasmuch as orthodoxy considers the *Sharī'ah* to be the manifest form of Allah's decrees and acknowledges sovereignty only in terms of His rule, they insist that it alone in unchanged form must be the Law of Muslim society in the present as in the past.

In modern times, when legislative documents called "constitutions" were introduced into the Middle Eastern world, it had generally two choices, viz. either to abandon the Code and formulate a Charter after the Western "secular" pattern (as did Turkey, for instance) or to retain it by including its essential principles in such a modern legal instrument (following Afghanistan's example). The judgment passed on the issue concerning the nature of a Mnslim-majority State took into primary consideration whether or not the *Sharī'ah* prevailed in it.[30] It is said, therefore, that " 'Islam is religion.' " and " 'religion is politics'. Religion and politics cannot be separated in Islam.' "[31] It leads directly to the polical problem, which, because of this close interrelationship, has a religious and, as shown, a juridical dimension.

Pakistan had come into being in order that it should be an Islamic State. The reasons were clear : the Muslims, themselves, would be the ruling power rather than remain a large minority fearful of encroachments upon their rights by a Hindu majority ; could pursue their own religious and cultural life ; would truly form part of the *Millat* and be able to become members of any modern "trans-national" Muslim and internationally mixed political and economic organisations. What, however, is meant by an Islamic State ? This question, also directly connected with the constitutional issue, has defied a precise answer.

Does it mean a liberal state ? Is it equivalent to a Christian state ? The many answers given to these questions by Muslim Pakistanis can be reduced to a meaningful concept, which implies that it is not dissimilar from any form of state mentioned, but rather an Islamic state is conceived of in such terms as Islamic mysticism, Islamic art, Islamic theology. Art, theology, mysticism are creations of Islam ; in this sense, Pakistan also as an Islamic state is the creation of Islam. The latter faith brought forth the dedication and the energy to create Pakistan; therefore, Islam is the basis for Pakistan and Pakistan is an Islamic state.[32]

Historically, justification for this view exists, because Muslims have regarded the Caliphate as a politico-religious organism, which was Islamic in so far as the *Sharī'ah* governed it.

When Pakistan was founded, two questions immediately were raised, namely, (1) could it be called an *Islamic* State, because it had boundaries; (2) must the unrevised Code prevail and, if not, would the Muslim designation still apply? The first one had been solved as well as possible by Iqbāl's argument that frontiers are artificial lines drawn for practical political reasons; in reality, Islam transcends them so that the *Ummah* remains unbroken. Consequently, Pakistan from that viewpoint is a Muslim State. This seems to be the general form of reasoning accepted by its orthodox and modernist residents today. The second one, however, created many disagreements between these two groups. It was the more serious, as it related to the character of a modern State, to be defined precisely by its Constitution.

Jinnāḥ, a modernist by outlook, set the tone by stipulating certain guiding principles which he regarded as essential for the sound development of the fledgling nation. In his acceptance speech of the first Constituent Assembly's presidency, he stated:

> The Constituent Assembly has got two main functions to perform. The first is the very onerous and responsible task of framing our future constitution of Pakistan and the second of functioning as a full and complete Sovereign body as the Federal Legislature of Pakistan. . . .
>
> Dealing with our first function in this Assembly, . . . I would like to emphasize . . . that the first duty of a government is to maintain law and order, so that the life, property and religious beliefs of its subjects are fully protected by the State. . . .[33]

He urged freedom of worship for all "minority communities" and full co-operation between individuals as citizens " 'of this State with equal rights, privileges and obligations.' "[34]

State protection of all subjects, regardless of creed, generally had been practised by the Islamic world[35] so that Jinnāḥ's insistence thereupon accorded with Muslim experience. The new note struck by him pertains specifically to the principle of citizenship with its stated corollaries. It raised a tremendous problem relating to the two issues of joint *versus* separate electorates and the minorities' allegiance to the *Sharī'ah*, which obviously could not be expected from them. It was the more significant, for equal rights included the giving of seats to non-Muslim representatives in Parliament and, hence, their participation in the legal process. Could the new State become and remain "truly" Islamic under such circumstances? The orthodox necessarily replied negatively to this question. They regarded such a modern democratic procedure (involving joint electorates) as weakening "the Islamic consciousness of the *Millat*" for it would "inject alien ideas into the minds of the

coming generations."[36]

The liberalists[37] dissented from the beginning, as is clear from Jinnāḥ's and Liāquat 'Alī Khān's statements. The Preamble to the Objectives Resolution (moved by the latter on 1 March 1949)[38] read : ". . . sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limit prescribed by Him is a sacred trust."[39] The principles of Divine sovereignty and delegation of power are reiterated in this paragraph. Hence, it would seem to be an orthodox conception of the rule of Law. The same Resolution also decreed that "the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accord with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the *Sunna*." Again, no ground for disagreement seemed to exist. It stated, moreover, that "the State shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people," insisted on equal treatment and rights of all minorities living in Pakistan, and guaranteed "the independence of the judiciary" and "the integrity of the territories of the Federation, its independence and all its rights."[40]

Two chief concepts are involved in this Resolution, namely, those, of a modern representative democratic type of government and citizenship. Both seem to be contrary to the Muslim experience, as will be shown.

The first-mentioned institution implies that the people elect candidates of their own choice, acting as accredited deputies for them in the local and central administration. During the Republican Era, the political process was less a matter of election than selection by the man in charge or a group consulting together on the best avaiable leader to succeed the previous one.[41] Later on, succession was guaranteed by the father's appointment of one of his sons (usually the elder one).[42] The *bay'at* or pledge of obedience given in the form of a handshake by indiviual tribal members during the first century A.H., in time assumed the presumptive character of a tacit approval. The Chief of State then acted not solely on behalf, but with the implicit consent, of the people. The *vox populi* was not practised individually, but corporately ; it was vested in a single person (caliph) who, despite consultations with his advisers, represented his people before God as a judge his client before the Court. In other words, individual representational right was not given to Muslims. Rather, it was included in the powers granted to the *khalīfah* by God's Will and, consequently also by that of His obedient people.[43] It is entirely dissimilar from the Western institution of representative government, permitting every citizen to choose on the joint electoral principle a candidate to public office. The former takes into account the religious nature of rulership, which remains subject to God and *Sharī'ah*

as the State's sovereigns. The latter does not advocate any particular religious Code as the law of the land and acquired, therefore, a "secular" designation.[44]

The issue of democracy also enters into the discussion. All Muslim segments insist that Islam instituted a democratic system. No contention with this view would arise if a politico-linguistic transference had not occurred. The Qur'ānic statement, "I am only a man like you" (xli. 5) does not necessarily mean that men are equal, because those set above others in a managerial capacity hold a different position from those they govern, and Muslims as the elect group in the lands they conquered and ruled have had all prerogatives. It implies rather that the highest in the State must acknowledge Allah as the Supreme Ruler; in this respect, the caliph and the common man have equal obligations.[45] Democracy in the sense of "rule by the people" is an interpretation transposed from Western onto Muslim political terminology. The Islamic experience has been to rule *for* the people in their own interests. It is a paternalistic attitude probably derived from the structure of Semitic religious thought, which looks upon the leader—be he the family, tribal, or Divine Chief—as the source of all power. The submission doctrine is quite revealing within this sphere, as it involves a transmission on the one hand of power from God to certain men and, on the other, of obedience by the population to their Creator and his deputies. An authoritarian attitude thus was fostered. It confers upon a small group the function of representative government, considered the right of Muslims collectively. Such a system, called by Sayyid Maudūdī a "democratic Khilafat,"[46] is completely alien to Western political theory and experience, which, in turn, was unknown in Muslim times. Nevertheless, a linguistic transference was possible by using the word "representation" as the key term, by pointing to the village and tribal councils deliberating upon the issues of the day and their solution, and to the rulers' willingness to hear the complaints of individual subjects in person.[47] Such practices derive from the people's right to be governed in such a way that their welfare is taken into account. It is wholly different in content, however, from the Western democratic parliamentary procedures.

The last two relevant aspects of the problem, embedded in the Objectives Resolution and in the notion of equality, are those referring to citizenship and the position of the minorities. The Western idea of citizenship has a history going back to ancient Greece, which nurtured the doctrine that free adult citizens actively participate in their city-state's affairs.[48] Although changes occurred in Roman times and the Greek city-states coalesced, without losing their individuality fully, into the Roman State or *civitas*—whence comes the word "citizen"—and then into the Empire, the older idea was

not lost. The settlement of fresh Indo European invaders,[49] who engulfed the Empire (fifth century C.E.), may have given impetus to the transformation of the tribal council,[50] through various stages of transition, into the parlia-ment which, in thirteenth-century France, was a judicial body under royal supervision. Another institution, that of the States-General, probably found-ed by King Philip IV (r. 1285-1314), although at first no more than an em-bryo organ, signified the participation of French citizenry as a "third estate," apart from the barons and prelates, although, unlike the latter two groups, the first were represented by proctors. Representation and citizen-ship actually meant membership in a specific nation (English, French, Ger-man), and, prior to the rise of Protestantism in the fifteenth century, in one religion, viz. Catholicism. No more than a brief reference can be made here to the House of Commons –developed from the popular assembly—which English institution obtained a fair share in legislation first under King Henry VI (r. 1422-61, 1470-1). By the Renaissance period, a people's right of repre-sentation in Parliament had been secured.

The theories of popular sovereignty and free citizenship, set forth by Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-78), joined to the "rights of men" doctrine, proclaimed in his century, resuscitated the Greek concept, restated in poli-tical theory as government by consent. Thus, the coercive and arbitrary elements were discredited. The thesis that the power of the State rested with its citizenry, which forms its cement and has certain "inalienable rights,"[51] was applied practically by instituting the public voting system extended to its free adult sector. This is the essence of the doctrine of liberal govern-ment, with its concepts of majority will and mutual recognition of obliga-tions and rights. It ultimately goes back to some notion of natural rights which thus remains the underlying theme in Western political liberalism.

The original Muslim view that citizenship means membership in the Islamic society is different from the earlier Greek idea, because it defines the religious affiliation as the primary principle on which citizenship rests. Greece, on the contrary, stressed first birth in the tribe, then in the city-state, as the one condition for citizenship.[52] From this angle, furthermore, the Muslim's approach is more universal, as it ignores both the tribal and the geographical factors. It is, however, similar to the Catholic thesis, which postulates admission to its Church—by baptism—as the only principle defin-ing a man's legal status. Catholicism as well as Islam rejected separation between Church and State so that both retained a collective form. The Mus-lim, unlike the Christian, world did not experience this movement until it felt the European impact. Consequently, the modern concept of citizenship as the primary tenet was imposed upon it, thereby negating the political signficance of religious affiliation and broadening the foundations so that

minorities legally could claim the right to occupy any government post.[53]

Regarding representation, it may be repeated that the Prophet Muḥammad originally and the successive caliphs, holding supreme authority in the State, represented the Muslim body before Allah. During the Umayyad and following eras, a royal council acted as an advisory organ,[54] but it often was subject to a caliph's will and whims. No representative organs similar to those developed in the West appeared in the Islamic world until the Europeans introduced them.

The imposition of European political and legal ideas and organs resulted in the corrosion of the *Sharī'ah's* authority, at least on the national level, as well as to its re-examination and question by Muslim modernists, in India and other Islamic countries, whether their entire Code is revealed and immutable. Voices demanding changes were heard from the nineteenth century on.[55] Having accepted modern ideas, they stood then as they do now in opposition to fundamentalist thinking, which insists on the absolute validity of the older Islamic concepts so as to prevent secularisation. The nature of citizenship and representation became foci of discussion in Pakistan once the Indo-Muslim theologians[56] acknowledged its valid existence.

Finally, the minority issue needs some attention. Citizenship in an Islamic State legally includes solely Muslims. Inhabitants belonging to other faiths remained outside of the *corpus civilis*, because they did not acknowledge Muḥammad's and the *Sharī'ah's* authority. They had to pay a poll-tax (*jizyah*) in exchange for the protection afforded them.[57] They were, in effect, foreign nuclei settled for one or another reason in the Caliphate and given the right to carry on their social and mercantile or professional existence and to be under the jurisdiction of their own religious law courts as long as they did not endanger the Muslim polity. It reveals Islam's tolerance, which must not be mistaken for a democratic spirit. It was rather an equitable policy executed in accordance with general principles of justice decreed by God.[58] In a democracy where religion does not play a political role, minorities have the right to vote for candidates irrespective of their religion and to participate in the law-making process. In a Muslim polity, such a procedure creates a problem, because it would mean either that the minorities are willing to uphold the *Sharī'ah* in their representatives' deliberations on State affairs, which is absurd, because they subscribe to other faiths or refuse to do so, far more logical a position. In the latter case, two principles must be asserted according to Muslim orthodoxy, viz. that of separate electorates and abstention of the juridical (derivative, not "law-making") process. Citizenship then retains the older flavour of peaceful existence within the bosom of the Muslim State in contrast to the newer sense of equal rights in so far as these pertain to direct participation in all aspects of political and

legal life. If some *modus vivendi* must be reached whereby the religious issue does not remain fundamentally predominant, can the State still be called Islamic? Yes, said Liāquat 'Alī Khān; no, the '*ulamā*'. The former's reply seems to be an anomaly, of which he, himself, exposed to modernist thinking (as he was educated at Aligarh and Oxford, where he received a Law Degree), was apparently unaware. Serving as Muslim League Secretary (1936-47) and Jinnāḥ's right-hand assistant, he supported the movement for the establishment of an Indo-Muslim State. As its Prime Minister (1947-51), he shared the responsibility of steering it through its first years and laying its foundations. Influenced by Jinnāḥ and Iqbāl, he desired to retain an Islamic structure and, at the same time, avoid excessive reliance on the *Sharī'ah* as the new polity's Law. In addressing the Constituent Assembly on 7 March 1949, when he moved the Objectives Resolution, he said furthermore:

> Sir, I just now said that the people are the real recipients of power. This naturally eliminates any danger of the establishment of a theocracy. It is true that in its literal sense, theocracy means the Government of God; in this sense, however, it is patent that the entire universe is a theocracy, for is there any corner in the entire creation where His authority does not exist? But in the technical sense, theocracy has come to mean a Government by ordained priests, who wield authority as being specially appointed by those who claim to derive their rights from their sacerdotal position. I cannot over-emphasise the fact that such an idea is absolutely foreign to Islam. Islam does not recognise either priesthood or any sacerdotal authority; and, therefore, the question of a theocracy simply does not arise in Islam. If there are any who still use the word theocracy in the same breath as the polity of Pakistan, they are either labouring under a grave misapprehension, or indulging in mischievous propaganda.[59]

A politico-terminological transference is evident, for the principle that power (political sovereignty) is vested in the people is of Western origin. Islam maintains that it solely can be held by God, Who has granted limited rights, expressed in "the Divine Code, conveyed through the Prophet, as the Law above all Laws and Regulations."[60] Again, Liāquat 'Alī Khān's concept of theocracy seems to have a European flavour; even though it is true that priesthood is rejected by Islam, it has acknowledged the need for divines to analyse, interpret and adjust the *Sharī'ah's* principles. It has not rejected, therefore, the growth of a class which, by the nature of the Muslim body politic as a religious entity, had to be versed in Sacred Law. Liberalists and conservatives were (and are) agreed that power rests with God; the important distinction was and still is that the former used "the Government of God" in a universalist, and the latter employed it in a particularistic, sense. Universalism permits the acceptance of the European concept of citizenship; particularism cannot but reject it, as it is not satisfied with the phrase "Government of God," but adds thereto the phrase: whose principles

are finalised in the "Divine Code". Liāquat's denunciation of "sacerdotal authority" not only affirms that the power held by Churchmen in the West is contrary to Islam's teachings; it is also a sarcastic comment on the *'ulamā's* conception of themselves as its and Pakistan's guardians. He feared that the idea of Pakistan as an Islamic State might be interpreted as a theocracy, watched over vigilantly by the theologians. who would have become, in effect, its supreme leaders. His and his colleagues' dream of erecting a modern Muslim polity would have been shattered. His anxiety had been shared by his friend, Jinnāḥ, who, a year before the introduction of the Objectives Resolution, had said: " 'Pakistan is not a theocracy or anything like it. Islam demands from us the tolerance of other creeds and we welcome in closest association with us all those who, of whatever creed, are themselves willing and ready to play their part as true and loyal citizens of Pakistan.' "[61]

Both men conceived of a Muslim State in modern terms, that is, a democratic organism in which representational government and citizenship pass beyond the limits of religious into what might be termed civil law. Their attitude is reflected in the Objectives Resolution which, on the one hand, deviates from Islamic politico-juridical theory and experience and, on the other, attempts to retain certain basic Muslim principles. However, if sovereignty lies with God (as its Preamble declares), is it not a contradiction to stress the people's representational rights? A positive answer would qualify when studying this question from a Western viewpoint, if the word "sovereignty" did not have the modifying phrase "over the entire universe". It shows, indeed, the modernists' wish to graft European political principles upon an Islamic foundation to which they have given a universalist interpretation. In the subsequent debates, Mr Bhupendra Kumar Datta, an East Bengali Hindu, being in the opposition, moved; " 'That the paragraph beginning with the words "Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe" and ending with the words "is a sacred trust" be omitted.' "[62] He argued that "politics and religion belong to two different regions of the mind,"[63] the former "to the domain of reason," the latter to "the other sphere of faith". Both being intermingled in the Preamble to the Objectives Resolution, he stated:

> Thereby, on the one hand, you run the risk of subjecting religion to criticism, which will rightly be resented as sacreligious; on the other hand, so far as the State and State policies are concerned, you cripple reason, curb criticism. Political institutions—particularly modern democratic institutions—as we all know, Sir, grow and progress by criticism from broader to still broader basis. As long as you remain strictly within the region of politics, criticism may be free and frank, even severe and bitter. . . .[64]

It would (according to Mr B. K. Datta) counter any tendency towards the establishment of absolutist rule, of "deification of the State that the

Preamble implies" and assure "the non-Muslim minorities".[65] His suggested amendment was not adopted.[66] Neither were two others, moved by Professor Raj Kumar Chakraverty of East Bengal. He suggested, first, that the Preamble's phrase: " 'the authority which He has delegated to State of Pakistan through its people' " be modified so as to read: " 'delegated to the people of Pakistan.' "[67] Second, he proposed that the word "democratic" be included in the Resolution's first paragraph, which would then have read as follows: " 'This Constituent Assembly representing the people of Pakistan resolves to frame a constitution for the sovereign, independent, democratic State of Pakistan.' "[68] Being also a member of the Hindu minority, he thus hoped to assure that the power would be vested in the people on the equality principle rather than in the State which, if it were asserted to be Muslim, would and should, from a fundamentalist viewpoint, negate certain political rights to other faith communities. "If the word 'democracy' is put here," Professor Chakraverty added, "we are going to have a rule by the people, a Government of the people, for the people, and by the people."[69] It would have meant an adaptation of French and American constitutional ideals and, again, have put the minorities at rest. Neither of his amendments were adopted. The reason for the Assembly's rejection of the three mentioned and many other proposed modifications can be surmised from the statement made by the Punjabi Aḥmadīyyah, Chaudhri Sir Muḥammad Ẓafrullah Khān:

> To the opening statement in the Preamble that sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to God Almighty alone, I do not conceive that any person believing in God could take exception. The rest of the Preamble, though based on the assumption that all authority, political or otherwise, which man has been invested with, has been delegated by the Supreme Ruler and must be exercised within the limits set by Him, is designed to emphasise that political authority vested in a people and by them entrusted to the State is a sacred trust and must be exercised and administered in that spirit. Some controversy has been raised as to whether that authority rests primarily in the people or in the State. From the Islamic point of view there can be no doubt that such authority or sovereignty as Islam concedes to mankind, vests in the people and in the Quran it is the people who are commanded to entrust that authority into the hands of those who are in every respect fit to exercise it. The State is the servant of the people and is like any other instrument in any other sphere brought into being for the purpose of serving the people. There need, therefore, be no apprehension that in some subtle manner this portion of the Preamble enshrines the Fascist or Nazi conception of a State. The Preamble is a solemn confession and declaration that God Almighty is the Supreme Ruler of the Universe, and that such authority as man is permitted to exercise is delegated authority and must be exercised in the solemn spirit of discharging a sacred trust. It is a constant reminder both to the people and to those who are appointed or elected to representative or official positions that they have

all to account to God for the manner in which they discharge their respective trusts. . . . [70]

He therefore considered the Preamble to be not only in accordance with Islamic principles, but also with the Western democratic spirit. Indeed, he asserted furthermore:

A democratic system of Government cannot be expected to yield . . . any beneficence till the nature and significance of the right of franchise is fully grasped and the franchise is exercised in every instance as if man was rendering an account in the Divine presence of something precious that has been entrusted to his custody. This is a doctrine that Islam inculcated almost fourteen centuries ago, and which is sought to be expressed in the words of the Preamble. Till this doctrine is fully grasped and becomes a permanent feature of the mental equipment of every voter, democracy will never have a fair chance. . . .[71]

His conception of "democracy," however, is dissimilar from that held by the West, for the earlier expressed reason that the principle of representation in Islamic theory has a different connotation. Nevertheless, it permitted him and others to assert that the Preamble was consistent with Article 19 of the United Nations Charter: " 'Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. . . . The will of the people shall be the basis of authority of government.' "[72]

The principal underlying thesis was expressed by Dr Ishtiāq Ḥusayn Qureshi, a Muslim from Uttar Pradesh, India (formerly the United Provinces):

Sir, it has been said that politics and religion should be completely divorced from each other, that politics and religion belong to different aspects of human activity and, indeed, it has been said that one being founded on reason and the other on faith, they should be related to different compartments of the human mind. I would submit most humbly that this is impossible. They cannot be divorced from each other for the simple reason that our reason is fashioned by our faith and our faith is fashioned by our reason. . . . Therefore, I would say that it is absolutely impossible to accept the theory of a split personality. . . . What does the Resolution say? The Resolution says that our polity should be based upon God-consciousness. . . . Are we really to divorce politics completely from ethical and spiritual principles? . . .[73]

He continued by asserting that the Resolution provides for legal and political safeguards. "But the real political safeguard for any minority," he added, "is to win the affection and respect of the majority. . . All that the Resolution tries to get at is to . . . remind the majority that . . . they must not forget the limits that have been prescribed by God. . . ."[74] Absolutism, therefore, is impossible, unless the people, themselves, support it; "the

guarantee against absolute authority lies only in emphasizing moral principles which work against absolutism, and in the recognition of the fact that authority has been delegated to the State through the people and not directly to the State. I fail to see how this militates against the idea of democracy. . . ."[75] He considered the type of government prescribed by the Resolution of a "secular" democratic nature inasmuch as it militated against priesthood rule. "Of course, if the word 'secular' means that the ideals of Islam, that the fundamental principles of religion, that the ethical outlook which religion inculcates in our people should not be observed, then I am afraid, Sir, that kind of secular democracy can never be acceptable to us in Pakistan."[76] He, furthermore, argued that despite the new State's Islamic nature, the minorities are not "debarred from holding or from participating in the political life of the country."[77] The Resolution lays down the principles of tolerance, equal opportunity and status (along with freedom of belief, worship, association, etc.), which, he felt, should assuage any suspicion and fear held by the minorities.

The type of reasoning in the Resolution's defence by such men as Sir Ẓafrullah Khān and Dr I. H. Qureshī was supported by most members of orthodoxy. In effect, Maulānā Shabbīr Aḥmad 'Uthmānī, following directly upon Dr Qureshī, assured the Assembly that: "I wholeheartedly support the noble, sober and discreet Objectives Resolution moved in the House by the Honourable Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan."[78] He based his decision upon its assertions that God is the Sovereign of the universe, religion and politics are intertwined in Islam, and His delegation of authority, to be exercised " 'within the limits prescribed by Him,' " which he considered "the fundamental difference between an Islamic State and a secular, materialistic State."[79] He indicated, however, more clearly than any of the liberalists, the essential distinction between a Muslim and a "secular" polity:

> The Islamic State means a state which is run on the exalted and excellent principles of Islam. It is evident that a State which is founded on some principles, be it theocratic or secular (like the U.S.S.R.), can be run only by those who believe in those principles. People who do not subscribe to those ideas may have a place in the administrative machinery of the State but they cannot be entrusted with the responsibility of framing the general policy of the State or dealing with matters vital to its safety and integrity. . . .[80]

This view, viz. "that an Islamic state would deny power at the highest level to non-Muslims, is supported by all serious students of Islam. . . . It must not be concluded that the teachings of Islam serve merely to deprive non-Muslims of certain democratic rights and privileges."[81] The liberalists, of course, agreed to the second part of this statement. Liāquat 'Alī Khān, acting as their spokesman, denied its first part, for he said: "This is

absolutely wrong. A non-Muslim can be the head of administration under a constitutional government with limited authority that is given under the constitution to a person or an institution in that particular state."[82] This idea rested on his thesis that neither social justice nor democracy can be had by denying a member of any religious group such a high-level post, for this would mean discrimination. "When we say social justice we mean social justice. And when we say democracy. . . we mean democracy in the real sense and nothing else."[83] He combined Islamic past experience, when even slaves became sulṭāns, with Western political theory. He thus could formulate the concept of the citizen as follows: "everyone of us is a national of Pakistan. I do not see any contradiction in this statement. You can be a national of a State, with equal rights, equal privileges and equal responsibilities and yet remain Muslims and Hindus."[84] He did not conceive of nationality in a communal sense, that is, membership in a particular faith group. Rather, he ignored religious affiliation for political purposes and stressed birth or naturalisation as the one legal prerequisite for incorporation in the State. His principle that ' the head of administration," if he meant thereby Pakistan's presidency, could be a non-Muslim, lost out for obvious reasons.

The theologians, at first opposed to Pakistan, because it excluded the majority of Muslims, comprising many remaining in India, reconciled themselves to it after its creation in so far as it would reflect "the outward form of the sovereignty of God. They wish to establish loyalty to the one true God through the State of Pakistan, and this would leave no place for those who are willing to admit only the lesser loyalty which ends with the state and the nation."[85] They regarded the latter type secular by nature, not only because it might be devoid of moral principles (as asserted by Dr Qureshī), but far more, because the Supreme loyalty is due to Divine laws laid down in the *Sharī'ah* which non-Muslims cannot uphold. Apart from the stipulation that its head must be a Muslim resident of Pakistan, which Sayyid Maudūdī considers to be one of "the basic qualifications for Citizenship as prescribed by the Qur'ān,"[86] its "national minorities" cannot be elected to key-posts, because they disbelieve in Islamic ideology. So, here again, a distinction in emphasis is noticeable between the liberalists' thesis that religion—in this context, Islam—inculcates moral principles and the conservatives' view that loyalty in an Islamic State must be pledged to the *Sharī'ah*, which breathes the "real" Muslim spirit. From the latter's viewpoint, the phrase "Islamic religion" could be said to be insufficient unless it is used with the implicit understanding that its Code is included in it. But the Objectives Resolution does not mention the *Sharī'ah*, and the principle of exclusion cannot be applied for the reason that it did not clearly

state this to be the case. Moreover, it did not enunciate the interpretation to be lent to such phrases as "equality of status" and "political justice". They could be taken, therefore, either in the meaning given them by Islam, i.e. equitable rights to live in a Muslim polity without State restraint, to humanitarian treatment and punishment for violations according to legal principles, or that attributed to them by the West, namely, representational rights by electoral vote and also the opportunity to serve in the highest positions of the land, which could and did serve as a nexus with Islamic theories. The former view bestows upon the minorities, as Mr Callard has observed, the "status . . . of privileged resident aliens rather than that of equal citizens."[87] The latter does not make any such distinctions on the basis of faith. Undoubtedly, Liāquat 'Alī Khān was sharply aware of, and took into account, the conservatives' position by framing the Objectives Resolution in such a way that it would appeal to them as well as to the liberalists. He also knew from direct acquaintance and discussions with the latter group that they would interpret certain of its phrases and terms differently from the fundamentalists. To allow for elasticity permitting a liberalist direction for the future Constitution and, yet, assure its approval by the theologians and the minorities, he left it somewhat ambiguous. His choice was a wise one, for the Objectives Resolution, in the same form as he had moved it (that is, without any of the proposed amendments) was adopted by the Constituent Assembly on 12 March 1949.[88] It paved the way for the drafting of a Charter, for which purpose a twenty-four-member Basic Principles Committee[89] was appointed on the same day after adopting the motion to this effect also introduced by Liāquat 'Alī Khān.

It marked a victory for the liberalists, but not for long. The work now proceeded in earnest, although progress was exceedingly slow. The chief stumbling block was the theologians' constant opposition to any formulation which they felt pointed to a non-Islamic direction.

After the creation of Pakistan the country was faced with the problem of preparing a constitution. The reactionaries and the sponsors of pseudo (*'ajami*) Islam demanded that there should be a provision in the constitution that in law-making the legislature shall have superimposed on it an *Ulama* Board whose word on all matters shall be deemed to be final. The demand amounted to assigning sovereignty to "*religious priests*" and to giving Pakistan a theocratic system of government, the system which Islam came to finish. The matter was still passing through its final stages when the then Governor-General ordered the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the constitution it drafted went by the board.[90]

Indeed, it would have led to an absolutist government, which the liberalists disavowed and the minorities feared. The outstanding spokesman for the *'ulamā'* arising at the time was Sayyid Abul A'lā Maudūdī. Born at

Aurangabad (Hyderabad, Deccan) in 1903, he concentrated on Islamic studies and then entered journalism in 1920. He moved to Delhi, where he became editor of its then influential newspaper, *al-Jamī'at* ; a few years later, he returned home and launched in 1932 a monthly journal on Qur'ānic exegesis, which gained a wide reading circle among his countrymen's elite. Invited by Dr Muḥammad Iqbāl in 1937 to co-operate on the codification of Muslim jurisprudence, he became in 1938 the head of an Islamic research institute (*Dār-ul-Islām*) centred at Lahore (Punjab). This work did not prevent him from acting for about two years as Dean of the Theology Faculty of Lahore's Islamia College. He founded (in 1941) the *Jamā'at-i-Islāmī*, a movement dedicated to Islamic Renaissance. He remained aloof from the Muslim League, whose members he considered unable to create an Islamic State, and did not associate himself with the Pakistan Movement when it was launched.[91] He thereby lost his popularity and moved his headquarters from Lahore to Pathankot, also located in the Punjab. Disturbances there forced him to flee to the new nation once it had been established. Henceforth, he supported it firmly, because he saw in it the possibility of Islam's rebirth. He began propaganda for an Islamic Constitution and way of life and found himself in opposition to Pakistan's liberalist authorities. They arrested him in October 1948 and did not release him until twenty months later in May 1950. He submitted constitutional proposals to the Basic Principles Committee's Report which was published in December 1952. Sentenced to death (commuted to a fourteen-year imprisonment) the next year,[92] he was freed again in spring 1955, when all decrees were voided with the first Constituent Assembly's dissolution. He then submitted his Comments on the 1956 Draft Constitution. His organisation (the Renaissance Movement) occasionally won seats in the provincial legislatures. Its importance lay, however, in its formation of cells in Government offices, colleges, schools, factories and villages, thus propagating its ideology among all levels of the population. It furthermore concentrated on medical and relief work among the poor. It was disbanded (as were all parties) by decree of the military regime instituted by Major General Iskandar Mirza.

Sayyid Maudūdī has written profusely ; among his pre-Partition works may be cited "Holy War in Islam" (*al Jihād fi'l-Islām*, 1929) and a monthly, "Exegesis of the Qur'ān" (*Tarjumān al-Qur'ān*, begun in 1932). A series of post-Partition speeches and articles, devoted to an inquiry into the nature of Islamic law, political and constitutional theory, were collected into one volume and published under the title of *The Islamic Law and Constitution*.[93]

His basic observations on the nature of the Muslim State have been given ; summarised, they are : God is its Sovereign, the *Sharī'ah* its Law, a sane, adult Muslim male citizen its head,[94] Muslim inhabitants are its

legal citizens, its minorities (*dhimmīs*) equal in all respects except regarding the rights to occupy key-posts in government and serve in the military, as "the Defence of the State . . . devolves exclusively and entirely on the Muslim citizens."[95] His following observations concerning the organisation of the Islamic State[96] may be added. It has a Legislature, "known as the 'Body which resolves and prescribes' (*Ahl-ul-Ḥall-i-wal-'Aqd*)," an Executive (*Ulul-Amr* or *Umarā'*, terms used respectively in the Qur'ān and *Ḥadīth* to denote this office) and a Judiciary (*Qaḍā'*), which are related to each other by the Chief of State's headship of each, but they function independently.[97] Their main concern, however, is "to enforce the Directives of God conveyed through the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* and adopt these directives for practical application in life."[98] The Judiciary may restrict the power had by the Legislature if the latter were to trespass Islamic principles. While this view is not based on precedent in Muslim history, because those in charge were thoroughly acquainted with the rules and decrees stipulated by the Qur'ān and Muḥammad, it is derived from contemporary conditions. The Legislature is solely a consultative body, over which the Head of State can cast his veto.

But this, when expressed in that precise form, can cause extensive misunderstanding; because in modern society, people try to interpret these things with reference to present-day environments, ignoring entirely the background attending the establishment of these conventions. In the period of the Righteous Caliphs, persons who were acting as advisers were not the leaders or members of separate organized parties, *nor were they hemmed in by parliamentary procedures* which is a feature of the modern parliamentary life. They did not come forearmed with policies and programmes drawn up in advance at party meetings. . . . They came with unbiased hearts and open minds and in their individual capacity. . . . In the end, the Caliph weighed all the arguments and exercised his own judgment, after which he gave his final verdict . . . which was generally such that the entire assembly accepted . . .[99] (italics ours).

It must be noted here that the "assembly" was not an elected body similar to present-day parliaments and that the "veto," if the Caliph "exercised" it (to use modern political terminology) was accepted either as the result of genuine deliberations among him and his "cabinet" members or by reason of the latter's fear if they opposed their ruler's will. Furthermore, in the case of weaklings, the *wazīr* having a position similar to that of a Prime Minister today, formulated State policy with or without the advice of consultants. In other words, precedent exists for a modern Muslim polity's organisation and the power it gives to its head. His supreme task remains, nevertheless, to assure that its affairs (political, judridical, social) are executed fully in accordance with the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* of the Prophet, but also of the Community, whose early leaders adhered to his principles.[100] No precedent exists, however, for the Judiciary's restriction of

the Legislature's powers, because this right was exercised by the caliph as the head of both bodies. Maudūdī's argument in favour of such a legal principle is grounded in his thesis that the Legislature's members might deviate from Islamic teachings, while the Judiciary, particularly if it is composed of or controlled by the theologians, could and should impose restraints upon it and, thereby also, upon the State's President. There would be no possibility of the Chief's supporting any rules or procedures contrary to Islamic Law as he, himself, would be indirectly under their control. They would act, in effect, as the guarantors that Pakistan is a "truly" Muslim polity.

Concerning the aspect of representational power, it must be stressed once more that the attitude towards its nature depends entirely upon historical experience and interpretation. From an Islamic viewpoint, the State is the people's servant in so far as it protects and guides them ; it is in charge of their welfare under Allah's benign rule. It is quite different from the Western thesis that the people themselves, regardless of creed, hold power in and over the State, whose policies they determine by vote. Islam grants such power only to God as the polity's Creator, and derivatively to its Muslim citizens, who must carry "the main burden of running it in accordance with Islam's best traditions, as they alone are supposed to believe in it implicitly. On them alone it enforces its laws as a whole and enjoins them to carry out all its religious, moral, cultural and political directives. It invests them with all its obligations and demands from them every sacrifice for the defence of its realm."[101] Such responsibilities do not devolve upon the minorities residing in an Islamic State. If they were given to the *dhimmīs* it would establish (according to Maudūdī) a precedent, un-Isamic in nature, for it would mean the possibility of undermining the polity's Muslim foundations. Such an attitude is entirely absent from a modern European democracy, which, unlike Islam, neither prescribes "a line of demarcation between" the adherents of a majority faith and religious minorities, nor absolves the last-mentioned "from the liabilities of running or defending the State."[102] It does not exclude them from the duty of obedience to the polity, which is the danger in one characterised as being fundamentally Islamic, because in the former a particular religion is not constitutionally confirmed as its Rule of Law, so that all faith groups can, if they wish, pledge loyalty to it. In this respect, also, it differs thoroughly from a Muslim State, in which obedience and allegiance to a specific faith (according to the theologians) must be decreed in its Charter, resulting in the inability of non-Muslims to submit to it.[103] Hence, the reason why they cannot be considered citizens by Muslim fundamentalists.

Related thereto is, of course, the electoral issue. Separate electorates had been asked by and granted to Muslims while they were, themselves, a

minority in a united India. Once Pakistan was founded, the problem was transferred to its own minority groups (Hindus, Christians, *et al.*). Generally, the whole question of whether the electoral principle was permitted by Islam needed scrutiny. Sayyid Maudūdī studied it and concluded that general elections are not contrary to Islamic experience.

From a superficial study of the problem it has been erroneously concluded that because during the period of the Caliphs the members of the Consultative Assembly were not chosen through organized general elections, there is no place for elections in Islam and it has been left solely to the discretion of the Caliphs as to whom they should consult. This error is due to the fact that the precedents of those times are applied to modern practices without reference to the then prevailing conditions. . . .[104]

The earliest principle applied was that of the Prophet's appointing the first Muslims as his trusted advisers. With the body politic's expansion, the process became one based on tests of great services to it rather than on votes. "There was, therefore, no need to take a vote for them and even if a vote was taken, there was nobody else in that society who would have been preferred by the voters. And those constitutional conventions under which fresh nominees continued to be incorporated in the Consultative Assembly by virtue of their services, experience and outstanding intellectual attributes, automatically received universal approval."[105] They were known as the "*Ahl-al-Ḥall-i-wal-'Aqd* . . . without whose advice no decision was ever taken in any important matter."[106] Maudūdī reached thereby the conclusion that "the *Amīr's* Consultative Assembly is not to consist of his hand-picked men but only of those persons who enjoy the confidence of the masses."[107] He answered the question : How are such men to be chosen in a modern Muslim *res publica* ? by postulating the modern elective procedure. "Modern elections form one of these permissible methods, provided they are not tarred with those corrupt practices which render modern democracy a sheer farce."[108] Although he concedes electoral rights to the minorities, he totally rejects the principle of joint *versus* that of separate electorates. His argument is[109] that Pakistan's liberalist Muslims, themselves, acted contrary to their previous pattern by advocating the former system, which they regarded "expedient" while living in Hindu India. Maudūdī denounces their view "that the system of joint electorate is feasible" in Pakistan, because it would mean a negation of the fundamental importance of, and assign secondary significance to, "religious creed, moral values, concept of life and patterns of culture and civilization."[110] He regards it as an imprudent device, because it is founded on the unwarranted assumption that the "divergent elements" can be welded "into one organic whole."[111] All communities will continue to vote for their own respective members and if anyone is weak "in every constituency, it will be deprived of representation altogether."[112] This would lead to dis-

content and unrest, to intrigues, bringing " morally depraved people " to the fore, resulting in the destruction of " the very basis of democracy."[113] Another argument for his opposition to joint electorates was "that we are not desirous of eliminating the distinctive features of the different communities of Pakistan. We are not at all keen to destroy their separate entity and coerce them to submerge their cultural individuality."[114] It is an interesting statement because it combines the liberalist with the fundamentalist thesis. The first, again, was expressed by Liāquat 'Alī Khān : " Here," in Pakistan, he said, " we are guaranteeing you your religious freedom, advancement of your culture, sanctity of your personal laws and equal opportunities, equality in the eye of law. . . . I want a State where every community will be free to live its own life and not be forced to act as the majority wants it to act."[115] The fundamentalists presented the same idea, but gave it a different interpretation by saying that joint electorates mean " enforced " support of the *Sharī'ah* by those who cannot do so, as they belong to other faith communities. The most important reason, however, was that "to unify and integrate these diverse communities is to relegate religion and faith into the lumber-room of insignificance, to destroy religion as the main factor shaping culture and civilization and foster *a common secular* culture as the basis of Pakistani Nationalism. *If this be the end, joint electorate is definitely a step forward in this direction.*"[116] He hoped that " this may be the view of a few secularists. As for the millons of Muslims of Pakistan, they have nothing but contempt for it. Because, if this was what the Muslims wanted, what was the harm in a United India . . . ? What was the need of offering a heavy price of life and property for the establishment of a separate state ? "[117]

Sayyid Maudūdī's argumentation clearly shows his conception of the Pakistan nation to be quite different from that held by the liberalists. Unlike the latter, he rejected the process of a political fusion of all its faith groups, which, he held, led to secularisation, for it implied that religion and politics are two separate realms. [118] " The only unifying factor is the religion of the majority which initially led to the establishment of this state and which alone can work as a unifying factor."[119] Any procedure not taking this factor into account leads, according to him, to its disintegration as a Muslim polity.[120]

The substance of the debates between the theologians and the liberalists reveals the profound differences concerning their theses on the nature of the Islamic State (Pakistan) and its Constitution, which had to define it. They were so far apart that progress on the drafting of a Charter was stifled. It remains now to present some of the proposals submitted by Maudūdī concerning the final Bills or Reports presented by the Basic Principles Committee to the Constituent Assembly respectively in 1953 and 1956.

The first paragraph of Sayyid Maudūdī's "Constitutional Proposals,"[121] sent to the Constituent Assembly in 1952, states that neither "the mere insertion of the Objectives Resolution in the Preamble of the Constitution, nor the inclusion of an article in the Directive Principles to the effect that no legislation will be made against the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah,* nor even the formation of a Committee of 'Ulamā' for consultative purposes" without final voice as to whether or not a certain law is in contravention of Scripture, serves the purpose of making "Pakistan a truly Islamic State."[122] He insisted on the inclusion of two provisions, viz. (1) "that no legislature, Central or Provincial, shall have the power to enact any law which conflicts with the teachings of the Qur'an and the *Sunnah*" ; (2) "that every citizen will have the right to challenge in the Supreme Court any law passed by a legislature on the ground of its being repugnant to the teachings of" these sources "and therefore *ultra vires* of the Constitution.[123] Concerning the first measure, the *Basic Principles Committee Report* stipulates in article 3 that: "No Legislature should enact any law which is repugnant to the Holy Quran and the Sunnah."[124] Sayyid Maudūdī criticised its "negative manner," because it could be accepted as a general directive to assure legislation in accordance with Islamic principles, recognising that these need further clarification. He demanded that they should be asserted positively to be the chife sources of legislation in Pakistan. Regarding his second proposal, the *Report* indicates that such action can originate solely in the "Legislature concerned" and laid down (in article 5) the procedure to be followed, namely, the President's appointment of a Board, whose members (to the maximum of five) shall be "well versed in Islamic laws"; if any objection to a certain Bill is made by a Muslim member of either House of the Federal Legislature, it must be recorded by its Chairman, forwarded with the Bill to the President, who, prior to giving his assent, "should consult the Board" as to whether or not it violates wholly or partly the provisions in the third article. Should disagreement arise among the Board's members, the President has the right to give or withhold his assent from the Bill in question. Were objection to it in part or in its entirety to arise, it shall not be deemed passed "unless it is passed by the majority of the members present and voting which should include the majority of the Muslim members present and voting."[125] Not only did the problem arise that the Board itself would become vested with the authority of interpretation as to what was Islamic or not, which Sayyid Maudūdī rejected because it did not necessarily include any theologians, as its members were appointed by the President himself, but furthermore, any Bill presented had to have a *Muslim*-majority vote to be considered legally passed. On the one hand, this principle was not invalid in its application to a Muslim-majority State ; on the other, it—and

the Board's right to declare a measure (introduced by a Hindu, for instance) as contrary to Islamic principles—did not please the minorities. As long as the President held the ultimate "veto" power and was a liberalist, the danger of authoritarian theocratic rule remained curbed. If an *amīr*, proving to be weak or oriented towards or being a member of orthodoxy (reflecting the country's turn of mind by vote) were elected, a serious problem would arise.[126] The Hindus were sharply aware of it and during the debates on the proposed Constitution expressed their discontent with certain formulations, including the assertion that Pakistan should be an Islamic State. They felt that such a declaration forever would produce uncertainty for them and other minorities and was contrary to the "secular" democracies found in the West, where religion remained separate from politics in so far as it was not specifically identified with a State faith. Sayyid Maudūdī, representing orthodoxy, and the liberalist segment disagreed with them by pointing to the clauses providing rights of professing another creed, attending separate religious and educational institutions, voting, representation, making a livelihood, State protection and assistance in case of need, and, generally, "equal" opportunities. The former demanded, however, also that: "Moral training in accordance with the Islamic principles and standards of conduct shall be made compulsory for all services: Central, Provincial, Military and Civil, and all that is not in tune with the Islamic teachings and the tenets of Islamic ethics shall be strictly excluded from that tranining."[127] Such a provision (from a fundamentalist viewpoint) would imply that non-Muslims could not serve in any branch of the administration, for they would be unwilling to submit to this kind of training, which inculcated an ideology different from their own. Furthermore, State compulsion in matters of religious belief and economic discrimination on that basis and the impossibility of a joint educational system shared by Muslims and non-Muslims, also would arise—and be un-Islamic and, hence, unconstitutional. If, on the contrary, Muslim ethics were held to agree with those taught by other faiths (which is generally the liberalists' contention), such problems would not develop. The real nature of the contention between the liberalists and the fundamentalists was that the latter wished to retain the older political conception concerning the minorities' role and rights in an Islamic State, while the former wished to modify it along Western democratic lines. This large issue, too, was raised by the minorities during the debates, but again (as shall be noted)[128] their fears were assuaged. Maudūdī's demand that Muslim Government personnel will receive "every facility necessary for the observance of the obligations prescribed by Islam"[129] seems reflected in articles 2(*a*) and 3 of the *Report*, providing respectively for facilities allowing them to understand what life in accordance with the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* means, decreeing

the instruction in their Scripture to be compulsory for them, and the creation of an organisation "for making the teachings of Islam known to the people". He insisted on freedom of life, property, association,[130] which he held were not included in the Fundamental Rights Report adopted by the Constituent Assembly in 1950[131] in "flagrant violation of Islamic tenets."[132] He rejected thereby the two modifying clauses added to most of that Bill's articles, viz. "except in accordance with law" or "subject to public order and morality."[133] His chief reason was his desire to curb the power of the Head of the State, whose "high-handedness" in the absence of the suggested safeguards would "breed discontent and even hatred against the Government itself."[134] He advocated the right of the citizens (including the *dhimmīs* to sue any State official, including their supreme Chief, negating the opinion that this would create confusion and make government nearly impossible, and hoping thereby to enforce orthodoxy's view on the rule of law in the Islamic polity, called Pakistan. It also implied the possible rejection by a segment among the population, or its majority, of one or more government officials, including the President, as unrepresentative (particularly because he appointed the Election Committee)[135] on the ground that either an election was rigged by him or that he and others were chosen despite the wish of a certain group, be they Muslims or minorities. The theologians, themselves, could thus protest against any appointment or the results of any election, if they felt that certain individuals—whom they considered too liberal—were chosen and make the functions of the administration difficult, if not impossibe, unless persons of their own choice were brought in as replacements. The Basic Principles Committee did not provide for such a measure ; it stated in article 14 (2) that : "The election of the Head of the State should not be called in question in any court of law." On the one hand, it tried to assure due process of law by not granting the right of contesting an election's results ; on the other, it contained the inherent danger that, if an orthodox-minded man were elected (mirroring the Muslim majority's will), it would undermine the minorities' political rights, sense of security, its loyalty to the Chief and his appointees and the State's internal peace. A number of Hindus, in effect, dissented when this article was voted upon and passed.[136] On this particular issue, then, the minorities agreed with the theologians, although the latter, professedly for the former's as well as the Muslims' interest, had in mind the possibility of thus controlling the governmental process.

Another restrictive principle which Sayyid Maudūdī presented was the negation of the President's right to abolish the entire Constitution.[137] As an obvious reason, he gave that it would mean despotic rule and imply that man is above the Law, which is un-Islamic. The true thesis underlying it

was, however, that once a Charter had been passed (with the implicit understanding of the theologians' support), it incorporated Islamic principles; if it were terminated, two conclusions could be reached, namely, the tenets of the faith were called in question by the Government (representing the people) or the authorities, themselves, could be regarded as irreligious, because they violated against the people's will the Constitution incorporating God's Law. In either case, such action would be undemocratic and constitute violation of the Charter.

Furthermore, he felt that voting rights "given to women should be qualified, at least for the present, by a certain standard of education";[138] inasmuch as relatively few women have enjoyed a good training, they would only harm their country's welfare by exercising this privilege. He rejected their election to the legislative assemblies, because "it is absolutely against the spirit and precepts of Islam, . . . nothing more than a blind imitation of the West" and, according to the faith, "active politics and administration are not the field of activity of the womenfolk."[139] Nevertheless, he suggested as a "proper" solution to this problem the establishment of:

> a separate Assembly whose membership should be confined to women only —all of them elected by female voters. This Assembly's main function should be to look after the women's special affairs, such as female education, female hospitals, etc. Of course, it should have the full right to criticise matters relating to the general welfare of the country. Moreover, this Assembly must be consulted by the legislature on all matters that concern the welfare of the women.[140]

He thus carried the joint electoral principle beyond the category of faith into that of sex. Again, the Basic Principles Committee did not incorporate his suggestion into its *Report*, whose term "citizen," moreover, did not carry any explicitly stated stipulation concerning either sex or religion.[141] A further significant point is the absence of the word "*Sharī'ah*" from it. Maudūdī demanded the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution that "all the existing laws of the land shall be brought in conformity with the Islamic *Sharī'ah* within a prescribed period which shall not exceed ten years in any case."[142] The *Report's* Directive Principles (article 4) read, in contrast: "Suitable steps should be taken for bringing the existing laws into conformity with the Islamic principles, and for the codification of such injunctions of the Holy Quran and the Sunnah as can be given legislative effect."[143] These two sources, then, are its sole acknowledged foundations (which he, himself, had asserted also[144]); in effect, it implies the Government's desire to study afresh the entire structure of the *Sharī'ah* and ensure the incorporation only of such older legal provisions which permitted the building and further development of a modern Islamic State. Liberals and

fundamentalists as noted disagreed violently on this issue.

Another interesting article (250) reads : "Wherever under the Constitution oath is required to be taken, the Muslims should take it in the name of God and the non-Muslims should take it either in the name of God or should make an affirmation." It reveals the right granted to all minority members to fill government posts. It affirms the Minorities Report's article 7 : "Every duly qualified citizen shall be eligible to appointment in the service of the State irrespective of religion, race, caste, sex, descent or place of birth."[145] No disagreement ultimately[146] existed between the liberals and the orthodox on the issue that Pakistan's head should be a Muslim,[147]but they differed on the above-cited article 7. The principle of tolerance which it confirms is accepted by both groups as also the thesis that the *amīr* is Islam's guardian and, therefore, must assure the execution of its laws, including those providing for minority protection, in his realm. The idea of equality—except for sex—implying that non-Muslims also could fill high posts in an Islamic land is part of their and caliphal history. As the article's substance harmonises with past experience, it should have had orthodoxy's approval. The reason why it did not was that the liberals finalised its contents in modern political terms of citizenship rights, thereby rejecting the idea that Pakistan, being an Islamic State, "is essentially an ideological state, and is thus radically different from a national state."[148] Its nature is such that it must solve the problem arising out of the presence of non-Muslims within it by guaranteeing "them certain specifically stated rights. Beyond these rights it does not permit them to meddle with the affairs of the State which is based on an ideology to which they honestly do not subscribe."[149] Here lies the fundamental problem of what constitutes an Islamic State.

The phrase "appointment in the service of the State" needs further scrutiny. It does not specifically prescribe what posts should or should not be filled by non-Muslims. The eligibility to all offices except that of the Presidency seems clear, for instance, from the *Basic Principles Committee's Report* (article 31), decreeing that all Ministers must take an oath of office, "provided that *in the case of a Muslim Minister* [italics ours] the oath of office should include an affirmation to the effect that both in his personal and public life he will endeavour to fulfil the obligations enjoined by the Holy Quran and the Sunnah." Consequently, a minority member may assume ministerial office by appointment.[150] No exceptions are made even for designations as Supreme Court Justices,[151] the only stipulation being Pakistan citizenship.[152] It means, in effect, no discrimination on the basis of religion,[153] and it is supported by the provision also that "the judicial conduct of the Judges of the Supreme Court should not be called in question in any of the

Legislatures." Its implications have been noted.[154] Emphasis must be laid on the consequence of such principles, permitting non-Muslims to take part in the judicial processes of law-making and interpretation, which is contrary, however, to the *Report's* third cited article, as its stipulation might not be executed fully under such circumstances. However, it is a fact that Muslims in the provincial and Central Legislatures constitute the majority, so that no such inherent danger would exist in the application of the aforementioned articles. The general tone of the *Report's* third paragraph (criticised by Sayyid Maudūdī) again was intended to counter any *fundamentalist* approach in State affairs, although it permitted of a stricter Islamic interpretation. Therefore, the Constituent Assembly did not feel that it would debilitate the State's Islamic foundations, particularly as the third article in its *Report* was considered a sufficient safeguard. This sentiment found clear expression during the debates on the "Procedure for Preventing Legislation Repugnant to the Quran and the Sunnah."[155] Professor Raj Kumar Chakraverty moved " 'that Chapter III of Part 1 (paragraphs 3 to 8) be omitted.' "[156] They referred to the implementation of Islamic legislation and the appointment of a Board for that purpose. The Assembly's deliberations centred in this respect on the issue of the support to be given to "an organisation (which) should be set up for making the teachings of Islam known to the people" [article 2 (3)]. Another Hindu, Shri Dhirendra Nath Datta, felt that this article took away all the "fundamental rights . . . granted to us" and moved an amendment replacing the word "people," which could be interpreted in the enlarged sense comprising Hindus and others as well, by the term "Muslims."[157] It was not adopted.[158] An amendment moved by Shri Kamini Kumar Datta provided for the inclusion of a new sub-paragraph in the above-mentioned article to the effect that " 'the proceeds of a special tax be specifically appropriated in payment of expenses for this organisation and its propagation and maintenance.' "[159] The dissenters argued that the Government should not sponsor the creation of such an organisation ; to do so could result in forcible indoctrination of minorities in the villages, towns, and even the schools. The Muslims held that this is contrary to the Qur'ān's teaching : "Let there be no compulsion in Religion."[160] The minorities, therefore, would have nothing to fear, particularly also, because they, as non-Muslims, are protected by the Fundamental Rights Clauses,[161] which do not obligate them to contribute to an Islamic organisation, but, for the same reason, grant to Muslims the right to propagate their own faith. The latter won out as the motion to include the cited sub-paragraph was approved.[162]

The chief problem, in effect, reflected also in the debates, was the proclamation of Pakistan as an Islamic Republic, which B.K. Datta

characterised as "the intolerant State of Religious Totalitarianism."[163] Mr A.K. Brohi (a Sindi Muslim) replied thereto by asking the question: " 'What is in a name?' Does it really matter if the name is to be an Islamic Republic of Pakistan? The name ought not offend, and after all when all is said and done, the substance of the Constitution will not have to be controlled by the name that will be given; it will be controlled by the actual provisions contained therein."[164] The minorities did not agree with him, because many of the proposed Constitution's clauses related to Islam's establishment as Pakistan's official religion. It did not mean the setting up of a democratic polity as envisaged originally by the *Quā'id-i-A'ẓam*, [165] in which no religion received State sanction as that land's supreme Faith and Law. Rather, they felt it to be a retrogression to medieval times,[166] Mr Fazlul Raḥmān (East Bengali Muslim) pointed out, in turn, that since Islam was acknowledged as Pakistan's religion, it had created an ideological State, within which its religious principles must be made known to all its inhabitants irrespective of faith and tolerance.[167] He and other Muslims were unable to convince the Hindus, who protested against the drafted Constitution as being undemocratic,[168] and left the Assembly only to return on the day when a final debate on the whole *Report* took place. They cast their eleven votes against it, but with a majority of twenty-nine Muslims balloting in favour, it was passed.[169]

When it was abolished as a result of the Constituent Assembly's dissolution, fresh deliberations on the basis of those previously presented had to be begun. Sayyid Maudūdī again submitted his "Comments" on the Constitution drafted in 1956.[170] They were generally in accordance with those he had presented in 1952. He noted with dissatisfaction that, despite his previous objections, supreme powers had been given to Pakisian's Executive and Chief of State, no provision was made in the new Charter for a three-year limit within which to separate the Judiciary from the Executive, and that the five-year period granted to the Board (to be appointed by Pakistan's President within twelve months after his election) for the compilation of laws in accordance with the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* afforded too long a time during which decrees contrary thereto could be enacted. He also challenged the authority vested in this Board, which "will presumably serve as the sole source of Islamic Law" and whose report must "be laid before the National Assembly, but it will still depend on the sweet will of that Assembly as to what extent it should take congnizance of that report in enacting law, and how long it should take in bringing the existing laws into conformity with the said Injunctions."[171] Nevertheless, the Constitution, incorporating many of the recommendations included in the 1952 Charter, found final acceptance from all Muslim quarters (despite certain reservations as noted) and was passed.

The reason was that it contained a sufficient number of Islamic provisions, which satisfied the orthodox group. It granted "fundamental rights" to the minorities,[172] who, nevertheless, did not feel happy about it. Their discontent was based on its acceptance of the minority principle, i.e. of distinction on a religious basis between those professing faiths other than that advocated by the State. It implied ultimately (they feared) their dependence upon a President's, Governmental and local authorities' good-will.[173] While they have not exercised too great a political influence since the 1956 Constitution went into effect, no serious discrimination (if any at all) appears to have been suffered by them.[174]

Primarily, they comprised non-Muslims (i.e. Hindus, Parsis, Christians, *et al.*). However, the Qādiyānīs also were considered as falling within that category. Muḥammad Iqbāl had stated that " their non-participation in the congregational prayers of Islam, their social boycott of Muslim in the matter of matrimony, etc., and, above all, their declaration that the entire world of Islam is *Kafir*—all these things constitue an unmistakable declaration of separation by the Qadiyanis themselves."[175] The Aḥrār Party, a Muslim organisation, to which a number of theologians, mainly in the Punjab, belonged,[176] expressed their fierce dislike of that group by declaring a "direct action" day against them, resulting in bloodshed and the proclamation of martial law in Lahore on 6 March 1953. It led to a formal Government investigation under Mr Muḥammad Munīr, then Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court,[177] whose Report accused Sayyid Maudūdī's organisation, the *Jamā'at-i-Islāmī*, of having been an accomplice in the disturbances, and of having demanded "' that the Mirzais should be declared a separate minority community and Sir Zafrullah Khan should be removed from his office."[178] The *Jamā'at* contested both charges by pointing to section 10 of its own constitution, advocating " democratic and constitutional methods only . . . with the help of propaganda and persuasion " in order to impose its envisaged reforms and formally publicising the fact " that we had no connection whatsoever with the direct action."[179] It then stated also that "we endorsed the real demand of the public about the Qadianis and that we would adopt effective measures in accordance with our own principles to achieve it."[180] It challenged the Government's right to declare martial law, which it regarded as an undemocratic procedure and the Report's implied contention

> that it should not be the duty of the state to declare a man to be a Muslim or non-Muslim, and, therefore, the demand to declare the Qadianis as non-Muslims must be rejected. But, let us pause and think. When Muslims argue that the Qadianis are not Muslims and should, therefore, be separated from them and the State rejects that demand, will it not mean that the State has thus declared the Qadianis to be Muslims? . . .[181]

The *Jamā'at's* opinion clearly was that the Aḥmadīyyals are non-Muslims,

thereby agreeing with Muḥammad Iqbāl and differing with the authorities. The basic ground for its view was that the Mirzā'īs do not aqknowledge the finality of Muḥammad's prophethood and thus disobey the Qur'ān's injunction.[182]

Again, the Deobandīs declared the Shī'ites to be non-Muslims, because they dishonour Muḥammad's Companion and father-in-law, Abū Bakr[183]; and the Chishtīs felt likewise about this sect, for the reason that its adherents raised his son-in-law and cousin 'Alī to the rank of prophethood.[184] " As regards the Ahl-i-Qur'an, they are Kafirs on unanimous verdict."[185] The *Munir R·port* stated: " 'The result of all this is that neither Shias nor Sunnis nor Deobandis nor Ahl-i-Hadith nor Barelvis are Muslims and any change from one view to the other must be accompanied in an Islamis State with the penalty of death if the Government of the State is in the hands of the party which considers the other party to be Kafirs. . . .' "[186] It would stamp " 'Islam as a religion of fanatics, which punishes all independent thinking. The Qur'ān again and again lays emphasis on reason and thought, advises toleration and preaches against compulsion in religious matters. . . . But our doctors would never dissociate chauvinism from Islam.' "[187] The *Jamā'at* disagreed with both theses. It argued that apostasy (referring here specifically to Aḥmadīyyahs, *et al.*, rather than to Muslims having embraced another religion, although they, of course, are included) is a serious crime deserving the death pentalty,[188] for it implies the breaking of the pledge to God and fellow-man[189] to remain pure in the faith[190] (Islam, considered the crystallisation of, and supreme to all other creeds). Nevertheless, they are permitted to the fold by friendly coercion or stricter measures.[191] However, the apostates unlike adherents to other faiths, who do not fall in that category,[192] are not permitted to propagate their religious views.

As regards the drawbacks which, in the opinion of learned authors of the Report, are inherent in this law of Islam, we wish to point out briefly that apostasy is not punished when Islam is in the position of a mere religion, but only when it assumes the form of a state. Quite naturally, the demands of a state are different from those of a mere religion . . . A man may . . . join another . . . religion. But is such a freedom permissible in the case of an individual's relation *vis-a-vis* the state anywhere in the world ? . . . Is it permissible for a citizen of the United States to declare that he does not believe in the Constitution of that country and that, on the contrary, his loyalty is for Soviet Russia ? Looking at your own state of Pakistan: Is high treason not a crime here ? . . . When you yourself argue in this fashion in the case of a state why are you troubled with the nightmare of religious fanaticism and intellectual paralysis when Islam, not as a mere religion but only when it becomes a state, enforces the law of punishing the apostates in order to prevent its constituents from falling a prey to disruption, disloyalty and assimilation in the systems opposed to its ? [193]

The Government's apprehension that, if a theologian were to become

Pakistan's President, he would have all but the members of his own group killed seems assuaged by the reply that no punishment would take place unless based not "upon the verdicts (*fatwas*) of the *muftis* (legal advisers) but on the decision given by the *Qazis* (judges of the Court)."[194] The *Jamā'at* thus did not negate the Government's contention, which thereby received added strength and significance.

Maudūdī's organisation reflected his and, generally, orthodoxy's views which, summarised, are: Islam brought Pakistan into being; it is its formal religion; therefore, Pakistan is an ideological State In such a polity, religion moulds every aspect of life and has as purpose to steel people to a well-disciplined moral life. Its minorities must pledge loyalty to the State, which gives them "equal" opportunities and protection under the Law, but they cannot be allowed joint electorates nor important government posts for the reason that, if such rights were granted, they would undermine the State's religio-social structure. The apostates' status is guided by the criminal law statutes. The inference is that they are worse off than the minorities, as they unlike the latter do not enjoy official protection.[195]

The Government, by ordering an inquiry into the Aḥmadīyyah disturbances and imprisoning those it considered guilty of "sedition," tried to act according to the "secular" principle that belief is a private affair even in an Islamic State. It thus conformed to the Qur'ānic stipulation of tolerance which it had incorporated in the "Directive Principles of State Policy," viz.:

> The State should endeavour to discourage amongst the Muslims of Pakistan parochial, tribal, racial and other similar un-Islamic feelings and inculcate in them the spirit to keep foremost in their minds the fundamental unity and solidarity of the Millat and the requirements of the ideology and the mission for the implementation of which Pakistan came into being.[196]

The same principle had been supported by Sayyid Mandūdī,[197] but as the *Munir Report* tersely noted (contrary to the *Jamā'at's* contentions), no agreement exists on the meaning of the word "Muslim" and " 'we cannot refrain from saying here that it was a matter of infinite regret to us that the Ulama whose first duty should be to have settled views on this subject, were hopelessly disagreed amongst themselves.' "[198]

The tension between State and society was felt acutely in Pakistan, as its leaders tried to harmonise Islamic with Western political concepts. Its thinkers had found themselves originally in opposition to orthodoxy on the issue of Islam's fundamental nature; its legislators had to make compromises, which gave their polity an increasingly religious mould. It raised the serious question of the minorities' loyalty to their State. The proclamation that Pakistan was to be an Islamic Republic, making that religion its principal foundation, rendered it difficult for non-Muslims to profess their allegiance

to it. Maudūdī's contention to the contrary, the allegiance expected from Americans to their Constitution does not have the same character, because it expressly forbids the State from proclaiming any faith as its preferred and official creed. The Constituent Assemblies' attempt to find a liberal formula was smothered (as the Hindus pointed out) by their allowing the State to sanction a particular religion whose supremacy to all others thereby was formally decreed.

The problem was not solved with the abolition of the 1956 Constitution, voiding all of its articles, including those stipulating Pakistan's "non-secular" nature and the Muslims' and others' rights, because Islam was not disavowed as its official faith. The minority question thus has remained an important one, not because of having been a part of its organic life (which is the case also in other polities), but of having continued to be linked with religion and State, rendering non-Muslim identification with Pakistan extremely difficult.

Chapter IX

CONCLUSION: THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN PAKISTAN TODAY

The imposition of martial law by President Ayūb Khān in October 1958 terminated Constitutional rule. He was intent, however, on maintaining Pakistan's character as an Islamic polity. Ayūb Khān was born at Abbotabad, near Rawalpindi[1] on 14 May 1907. He later attended Aligarh University and received his military training at the Royal Military College in Sandhurst, England. Having obtained his first commission in 1928, he rose in the military until he was named the Pakistan Army's first Commander-in-Chief (in 1951). He became a General (in 1952) and then Minister of Defence (1954-6), from which post he resigned. Appointed as Supreme Commander of Pakistan's Armed Forces and as the country's Chief Martial Law Administrator by Major-General Iskandar Mirza (on 7 October 1958), Ayūb Khān took over the Presidency from his superior in a bloodless coup (on 27 October of that year).[2] At that time he promised to lift martial law as soon as conditions permitted. He did not consider it punitive in nature, but " 'really reformatory law to rehabilitate the country on sound lines.' "[3] Nearly a week earlier (on 21 October), he had made this same statement during an address delivered before an assembly of senior civil officials at Dacca. He suggested, furthermore, that Pakistan should " 'adopt a wider outlook in the ideological and cultural fields.' "[4] It did not mean (according to Maudūdī's interpretation) the abandonment of religious and socio-cultural diversity, for President Ayūb indicated at the same time that " 'every effort must be made to develop regional cultures' " and ' "to accommodate the viewpoint of various social groups in the country.' "[5] He felt, therefore, rather the need for a meeting of minds and a unification of efforts so that *national (or State) would precede sectional interests in importance.* Ayūb hoped that "martial law administration" would harness all energies towards the development of his country. He was convinced that the concentration of power in one man's hands rather than recourse to representative government, symbolised by an elected assembly, would hasten the desired aim. He was right in so far as dictatorialism contains an element of compulsion, permitting no one to intervene, not even as a critic.

He nevertheless kept his promise to abolish martial law by taking various steps, the first being the introduction of his "Basic Democracies" scheme (in 1959), applying the procedure of universal elections; second, by appoint-

ing (on 17 February 1960) a Constitution Commission ; third, by promulgating a new Constitution (on 1 March 1962) ; and fourth, by having elections held for the National and the two Provincial Assemblies (respectively on 28 April and 6 May 1962). He announced to Pakistan's new Parliament (on 8 June 1962) that constitutional government formally was reinstated, thus ending forty-four months of martial law. The old cabinet serving under matrial law resigned the evening of 7 June ; a new one was appointed by Ayūb Khān on 8 June.

The discussion again shall focus on the religious, legal and political aspects found in the Constitution issued under Ayūb.

Religious Aspects. The first comment is the absence of the word "Islam" from the formal nomenclature given to Pakistan in the opening Article of the 1962 Constitution, which is : "The Republic of Pakistan" [Art. 1 (1)]. It negates the proposal adopted on 27 October 1953.[6] That the negation did not mean Islam's repudiation as Pakistan's politico-legal and socio-cultural foundation, is clear from the 1962 Preamble's second paragraph, which stresses that Pakistan must follow "Islamic principles of social justice". Despite the exclusion of the world "Islamic" from Pakistan's official nomenclature, it is implied. The reason for its omission may have been the desire to counteract any thought that Islamic Pakistan is a religious tyranny in which non-Muslims suffer from want of equal rights.[7] The references to "Islamic principles,"[8] to "Islamic Institutions" (Part X), to the Holy Qur'ān,[9] to Allah's "sovereignty over the entire Universe",[10] incurred the minorities' accusation that Pakistan's orientation was particularistic. This was the issue hotly contested by the Hindus during the debates in the 1950's. From the Muslim viewpoint, their accusation was baseless. It not only maintains that Allah is the name of the one and only Creator God, but that Islamic principles of social justice have universal value. This viewpoint is mirrored in the 1962, as it is in the 1956, Constitution. The difficulty was : to assure Pakistan's fundamentalists and modernists that their government would adhere to Qur'ānic teachings ; to convince its non-Muslim minorities that they would not be discriminated against.[11] This attempt lay behind the religious terminology found in the Preamble's cited paragraphs and other articles. The various groups remained unconvinced : the fundamentalists objecting to Pakistan's secularisation ; many, if not all, modernists disappointed with its still "too reactionary" form ; the minorities clamouring that it was too particularistic. Which among these three groups was right ? That the Constitution tried to quiet all critical voices is clear from another section of the 1962 Preamble [para. 4 (c)], which reads : "the Muslims of Pakistan should be enabled . . . to order their lives in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam." It omits the immediately following clause found in

the 1956 Charter's corresponding article: " as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah". The 1962 Constitution's Article 1 (2) asserts, however: "The teaching of the Holy Quran and Islamiat to the Muslims of Pakistan should be compulsory." Two comments are: the blatant omission of any reference to the Sunnah in this Article and, in fact, in the entire 1962 Constitution; and the use of the term "Islamiat" to denote generally the Islamic way of life.

Legal Aspects. In this respect, Article (1) under the 1962 Charter's "Principles of Law-Making" must be cited: "No law should be repugnant to Islam." Compare therewith Article (3) of the 1956 Constitution: "No Legislature should enact any law which is repugnant to the Holy Quran and the Sunnah." In comparing these two articles, the following points are noteworthy:

(1) The very general formulation of the 1962 Art. (1), "Principles of Law-Making";

(2) The use of the word "Law-Making" in that Article;

(3) The silence about the sources;

(4) The lack of reference to the Legislature in the cited Article.

"Principles of Law-Making"—1962 Constitution—Article (1):
"No law should be repugnant to Islam"

(1) *Its General Formulation.* The word "Islam" covers a wide spectrum, as it includes many diverse currents: Neo-Mu'tazilism, Wahhābism, Aḥmadism, for example, born and developed within its bosom. Among the fundamentalists, the Wahhābīs and the Aḥmadīyyahs disagree on the interpretation to be given to certain Qur'ānic portions. They, as do the modernists, the Shī'ites and other Muslim groups, have their own commentaries. The use of the word "Islam" allowed for a flexible interpretation, but it also raised the questions: which reading would be given primacy? What criteria of comparison were to be used to make final judgment as to whether any law formulated was or was not Islamic in character? Furthermore, it opened "the door of interpretation" (*ijtihād*), violating the principle of consensus (*ijmā'*). These facts prompted Pakistan's theologians, one of whose vigorous spokesmen remains Maulvī Maudūdī, criticise the article's formation as inadequate. They felt that its wording gave no guarantee that all laws issued during Ayūb Khān's presidency would be in accordance with Islam.

(2) *The Use of the Word "Law-Making".* It is wholly contrary to Islam's traditional legal approach which insists that all laws issued after the Qur'ān's revelation are derivatory. Law-Making is reserved to Allah; even Muḥammad the Prophet transmitted Holy Law. New decrees issued by humans must be patterned after those found in the Qur'ān. They may result from analogy, from precedent, from custom. The legal process is one of adaptation rather

than innovation. The word "Law-Making" reflects modern Western influence as well as Muslim modernism.

(3) *The Silence about the Sources.* It, too, indicates a modernist influence. Reference to the Qur'ān in Art. 1 (2)[12] and other articles shows that Ayūb had no intention to ignore it as the foundation of the Republic of Pakistan. However, there is a difference between using the Qur'ān as a religious and as a legal charter. On this issue the modernist splits with the fundamentalist, for the second group rejects such a distinction. From their viewpoint, the Qur'ān should be an Islamic land's constitution, although Maudūdī accepts this Western legal document to spell out more precisely the relationship between the various organs in a modern Muslim State. He and most of the theologians feel, nevertheless, that any modern charter must conform closely to the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*. The *Sunnah*'s relevance for modern Islam had been challenged by nineteenth-century modernists. Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, following S. Khudā Bakhsh, rejected as revealed many Qur'ānic stipulations covering the socio-economic[13] and legal domains. According to them and other Muslim modernists, Islam's teachings consist of such primary articles of belief as God's existence, Oneness, etc., and of those acts as prayer, pilgrimage, *zakāt*, etc., laid down in the Holy Writ. By denying the theological validity of a substantial part of the *Sharī ah*, they rejected partly at least its relevance for the new era. The argument which they opened has not subsided. The reformers continue to insist on a reinterpretation of older rules, on casting out many no longer fitting into twentieth-century life (viz. *purdah*), on further modernisation. The fundamentalists fearing corrosion of the faith and of Islamic principles insist on a purification programme somewhat along Wahhābī lines. To quiet them, undoubtedly, the Ayūb Adminstration set up an Islamic Research Institute (Article 207) and an Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology (199-206).[14] The Institue's members (its numbers not defined by the 1962 Constitution) and those sitting in the Council were to be presidentially appointed. The purposes of the Institute were historical research and pedagogy "for the purpose of assisting in the reconstruction of Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis" [Art. 207 (2)]. One of the Council's aims was to determine whether or not a proposed law "violates, or is otherwise not in accordance with, the Principles of Law-Making" [204 (1) (b)]. Another was to recommend ways to the Provincial Governments so as to encourage Pakistan's Muslims "to order their lives in accordance with the principles and concepts of Islam" [204 (1) (*a*)]. To be qualified, the Council's members had to have an "understanding and appreciation of Islam and of the economic, political, legal and administrative problems of Pakistan" [201 (2)]. This last article in particular reveals the Ayūb Administration's modernist orientation. It juxtaposes Islam and

Pakistan and insists on the Council members' grasp of other than religious principles. Thirdly, it refers, as does Article 204 [1 (a)], to Islam in general, not to its sources in particular. Article 204 [1 (*b*)] is instructive in this respect, because it does *not* state that any new decree should harmonise with the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah.* From a fundamentalist viewpoint, its reference to "Principles of Law-Making" becomes nearly meaningless, because it provides no specific guarantee that the Administration led by the then President Ayūb would adhere to all older sources. And despite the agreement among all Muslims on the essence of Islam as stated in the Qur'ān, the many commentaries differ in their interpretation. The Research Institute and the Council of Islamic Ideology were conceived, therefore, as instruments to find a *modus vivendi* between Islamic tradition and modernism. The Ayūb regime's refusal to heed Maudūdī's demand : include the sources as a specific guarantee that all laws accord with them, infuriated him. He and like-minded Pakistanis consider the sources' inclusion an assurance against their country's secularisation.

(4) *Absence of Any Reference to the Legislature* It did not mean the rejection of the need for such an institution which is indicated in "Part VI—Relations Between the Centre and the Provinces." Many clauses in this section, e g. 131(1) (2), 133(1) stress that "the Central Legislature shall have exclusive power to make laws . . . for the whole or any part of Pakistan with respect to any matter enumerated in the Third Schedule" [131 (1)].[15] Provincial legislatures could formulate laws for their respective provinces on matters not covered by the "Third Schedule" (132). The following law stated : "The responsibility of deciding whether a legislature has power under this Consitution to make a law is that of the legislature itself" [133 (1)]. No law's validity could be questioned "on the ground that the legislature by which it was made had no power to make the law" [133 (2)]. Laws passed by the Central Legislature needed the President's signature (135) ;[16] those approved by the provincial legislatures required the respective Governors' signature.[17] These articles prove the Ayūb Administration's acceptance of the institution known as a legislature, of its division into a central and provincial branches, and of their law-making function. One law irking many decrees : "When a Provincial Law is inconsistent with a Central Law, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid" (134). The control of the Central Administration over the legal domain in the provinces thereby was established in the Constitution. Another stipulates that for reasons of national interest and security [131 (2)] the Republic's authority extends to all provinces of Pakistan (135). The possibility of violating provincial autonomy is implied in these clauses. The intended control of the Legislatures by Ayūb shows throughout his Constitution. Was this aim

the only reason for omitting any reference to such a body from its "Principles of Law-Making" (Art. 1) ? Or was there another, namely, his desire to prevent the fundamentalists' influence on the legislative processes ? As a modernist, he did not favour it. A third reason may have been his reading of Islamic history: the ruler (caliph) held supreme power in the State, that is, over all, including the legislative, institutions. The fundamentalists sharply disagree with such an interpretation, insisting that the Legislature always was independent of the Executive in a Muslim State. They are right in so far as the formulation and the interpretation of laws was the function of the judges, who, however, were appointed by, a d thus stood under the authority of, the caliphs. This was Ayūb's contention. It served him to safeguard that Pakistan would not slide back into a conservative pattern without ignoring its Islamic foundations.[18] The modernists scorned the Executive control of the Legislatures for lack of a truer democratic spirit along Western lines. The minorities stood with the modernists, but they rejected all references to Islam in the Constitution as too particularistic.

Political Aspects. The 1962 Charter shows resemblance to its 1956 predecessor as follows It declares Pakistan to be a Republic [Article 1 (1)] consisting of two provinces : East Pakistan and West Pakistan [2 (a)], Dacca to remain East Bengal's capital [211 (3)]. It deviated from the 1956 Charter by designating a new capital, Islamabad, for West Pakistan [211 (1)] instead of Karachi, and transferring the government to Rawalpindi [211 (7)] while Islamabad was being built. The two Charters again agree that all power is to be vested in a President (1962 : Art. 9), who must be a male Muslim (10), chosen for a five-year term [12 (2a)].[19] This explains the eight-year term [166 (1)] covering the additional period between 1959 and 1962, and the Constitution's limiting Ayūb's second presidential term to "three years and sixty days" after it would take effect [226 (1) (2)]. He could be re-elected [166 (1)], resign [12 (3)][20] or be removed from office [13 (1)].[21] Representative government [Preamble, para. 4 (*a*)], symbolised by elected parliamentary bodies, also was the 1962 Constitution's pledge. It regarded the unicameral 156-member National Assembly—chosen on a parity basis from West and East Pakistan [19 and 20 (1)][22]—as the country's central organ. The National Assembly's membership was assigned a five-year term [21 (1)], although the first group elected to that body would serve "for a term of three years from the day on which the first meeting of that Assembly is held" [230 (1)]. Similar decrees governed the provincial assemblies [72 (1), 230 (2)]. Dacca was designated as the National Assembly's "principal seat" [211 (5)].[23]

Each province was to have a Governor, to "be appointed by the President" [66 (1)]. He has executive power in his own realm (80), subject to the

Chief's control [66 (2)] and a 155-member Assembly [71 (1)][24] sitting for a five-year term [72 (1)] However, the duration of the first Provincial Assemblies, as also of the Central Legislature, was limited to three years (230). A few seats—six in the latter (on a parity basis) and five in each of the former —were reserved to women [20 (2) and 71 (2)].

The President had the right to dissolve the National Assembly "at any time" [23 (1)], provided that its "unexpired portion" exceeds 120 days [23 (2)]. Each of the two governors similarly could abolish the Legislature in his Province if a conflict, arising between himself and that body, were decided by the National Assembly to which it had been submitted for a final decision in his favour, provided he had the President's approval (74).[25]

Elections must be—and were—held on the basis of adult suffrage [155, 156. 229 (2)] and by secret ballot (172). An Election Commissioner, appointed by the President [147 (1)] for a three-year term [150 (1)], supervised them and acted as chairman of a three-man Commission—consisting of himself and one Judge each of Pakistan's two High Courts—set up at the time elections were to be held for the President, an Assembly or for the holding of a referendum (153). The validity of a Presidential election [171 (2)], the Election Commissioner's condu t [181 (3) and 229 (10)] and of "general elections" were not to be contested except where, in the latter case, disputes arose (concerning vote counting, for instance) for the solution provisions are made by law (171). This principle, too, had been taken from of which the 1956 Charter ; its implications have been indicated.[26]

The State's legal machinery was the same under the 1962 as under the older Constitution. It must have a Supreme Court [49 (1)] with its permanent seat at Islamabad, but holding bi annual sessions at Dacca [56 (1)], and one High Court for each of the two Provinces. West Pakistan's shall have and had its principal centre at Lahore, but "permanent seats" also "at Karachi and Peshawar" [97 (a)] ; East Pakistan's at Dacca [97 (1)].[27] Both might sit in other places as determined by their respective Chief Justices with the Governor's approval. The Chief Justices and the Judges of the Supreme and High Courts were Presidential appointees. Lastly, the Judiciary's independence was guaranteed (Preamble, paragraph 4f).

The 1962 Constitution deviates from its predecessor on three significant and relevant issues : (1) the concept of representative government ; (2) the electoral procedure ; and (3) the lack of full powers granted to the Judiciary.

(1) *The Concept of Representative Government.* The 1962 Preamble's first paragraph asserts that "sovereignty . . . belongs to Almighty Allah alone and the authority exercisable by the people is a sacred trust." It excludes the 1956 Preamble's sentence: "which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed

by Him." What does this omission mean? That the principles of delegation, limitation and even transfer of power were weakened.

(*a*) *Delegation of power* in a modern democracy means that the people corporately forming the State give to their elected representatives headed by a President the right to govern them. Delegated power prevents arbitrary exercise by those elected to office. The people use their voting rights to prevent a dictatorial Government. The Islamic tradition of consultation often is cited as an equal guarantee against absolutism. Delegation of power also is an old Islamic principle, for top officials appointed by the rulers carried out their respectively designated functions. They, in turn, selected others to carry out their superiors' orders. It is not the same principle as that of delegation of power by popular will as expressed through a regularly held electoral vote. The cited paragraph seems to stress rather the older Islamic than the modern Western idea.

(*b*) *Limitation of power* is an important principle in Islamic as it is in Western political theory, but it is differently conceived. In Islam, the stress is primarily on man's limitation of power by His Creator. All, including the rulers, must acknowledge Allah as their Sovereign. This theory guarantees against despotism and is effected in an Islamic State, as said, by the consultation principle. The election device, first applied in ancient Greece, and revived in relatively recent times in the West, was not used in the Islamic world until its introduction through Western channels. The idea behind the election is that sovereign powers are vested in the people who by their vote limit the power of all whom they chose for office. It includes the President, to whom they grant "executive power". The Western political procedure equally is a guarantee against despotism. The procedure itself differs fundamentally from that followed—consultation, and, earlier, selection as well—since early times in the Islamic world. The older Islamic rather than the Western idea seems ingrained in the 1962 Preamble's paragraph (1) as another facet shows. Para (1) uses the phrase "exercisable by the people" rather than "exercised by the people". The distinction it makes between an actual fact ("exercised") and the capability of the exercise of power ("exercisable") is inescapable.

(*c*) *Transfer of power* by electoral procedures is considered part of the true democratic process. It acknowledges a people's full political sovereignty. The Islamic political doctrine granting limited sovereignty—limited because it is given by Allah—to His appointed vicegerents (caliphs) provides for a transfer of power only if a ruler disobeys Allah's "constitution" (the Qur'ān). Disobedience marks him who refuses to act as Islam's defender, who is unconcerned with his people's welfare. In such cases, he may be removed by the people themselves (revolution) or by those acting upon their

behalf (coup). The technique applied differs from the democratic procedure favouring elections at constitutionally decreed intervals. It explains the spirit behind the 1962 and 1956 Preambles and shows that the Preamble of 1962 (para 1) attempted less than its precedent to fit the Western mode into an Islamic political form Paragraph 2 of that Preamble further proves this. It cites Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ's declaration as follows: "... the founder of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah expressing the will of the people, declared that Pakistan should be a democratic State based on Islamic principles of social justice." This paragraph reflects the older doctrine of a Muslim polity wherein the people have indirect rather than direct governmental powers. That Jinnāḥ was understood to favour a parliamentary form based on adult suffrage exercised by Pakistan's Muslim and non-Muslim citizenry[28] is indicated, nevertheless, in the 1962 Preamble. It [in para. 4 (a)] asserts—as did its predecessor[29]—that "the State should exercise its powers and authority through representatives chosen by the people." This paragraph points to the acceptance of an electoral vote and, hence, of Western political idea and form. Although the idea differed from its Islamic counterpart, links are cited by Muslims with reference to the derivation, consultation and other Islamic principles. A new electoral procedure had to be introduced, although the Pakistanis had become familiar with it when they had to decide in favour of or against partition. How was it determined by the 1962 Charter?

(2) *The Electoral Procedure.* The reinterpretation and reconstitution of representative government is summed up by the system called "Basic Democracies," introduced a few years ago (in 1959) and decreed in the 1962 Constitution [229 (11)]. Its four-tiered structure was as follows: on the lowest level, each Province had a fifteen-member Council (*Union Panchayat*)—ten of whom were elected and five nominated—containing one representative for every 1000 to 1500 persons. Their duties were mainly judicial, administrative or related to development and police work. The next level covered the sub-divisional District Councils[30] to which the chairman of the *Union Panchayat* automatically belonged. They were concerned mainly with development work and officials engaged in this field of activity were members of these Councils. To the third tier belonged the District Councils, chaired by the Deputy Commissioner, and formed by a fifty-fifty percentage of Government personnel and others, including *Union Panchayat* members. On the fourth (and last) plateau stood the Divisional Council, presided over by the Commissioner and having the same proportion of Government and non-official membership as the District Councils. Elections on the basis of adult franchise to the *Union Panchayats*, "which constitute the foundation of this concept"[31] (that is, of Basic Democracies) were held in December 1959 and

January 1960, "by polling local political units of about 1000 persons each."[32] They chose 80,000 "Basic Democrats," i.e. those who had inscribed themselves on the electoral rolls covering 40,000 territorial units in each Province so that one elector (as a "Basic Democrat" also was called) represented one territorial unit covering approximately 1000 persons. This small group, forming about 10% of the country's total population, made up the Electoral College [158 (1) and (2)], whose individual members' term of office was not prescribed [158 (3)]. They were the candidates for the Presidency and the Assemblies.[33] For the purpose of filling the seats in these bodies, the electoral units were regrouped (during elections) into Provincial Constituencies, 150 in West and East Pakistan respectively, corresponding to the 40,000 territorial (or electoral) units in each Province.

When the first elections under the new Constitution were held (on 28 April 1962), the 80,000 "Basic Democrats" chose by ballot from amongst themselves 150 (of *circa* 600 candidates) as National Assembly members and (on 6 May) 150 (of approximately 1000) to either Provincial Assembly (or a total of 300 men to these two local organs). It meant that the Central Legislature's number (150) was equal to that found in each of the two Provincial organs, but that a two-to-one proportion exists between the two latter bodies in relation to the former. Again, the 150-member National Assembly represented 150 Provincial Constituencies in East and West Pakistan respectively, each of which was divided, as was noted, into 40,000 electoral units and presided over by a 150-man Provincial Assembly. In other words, the representation in the central organ (*versus* altogether 80,000 units) averaged 500 and in the Provincial bodies (against a total of 300 for the two combined) 200 electors in the 1962 race.

In explaining the Basic Democracies system during a public address given at Lyallpur (on 12 October 1959) Ayūb Khān had said that it conforms " 'to the requirements of our own nation and the genius of our own people.' " He mentioned three reasons why it was better than the Western type of democracies : first, it " 'will not be foisted upon the people from above,' " but " 'will work from below gradually going to the top' " ; second, it would permit particularly the illiterate lectorate in rural areas to stay near home and know the representatives for whom it votes, which would have been impossible if it had balloted for its candidate " 'from among forty to one hundred thousand persons in a constituency. In fact, in such a large number, an average voter does not even know what type of person he is casting his vote for. . . . But in Basic Democracies such a state of affairs will not be possible at all.' " Lastly, " 'the Council which will be formed will be free from the curse of party intrigue, political pressures and tub-thumping politicians.' "[34] It was hoped that the people in all parts of the country thus would

become acquainted with Government plans and activities and, even more significantly, "that this measure will bring about general political awakening and sense of responsibility in the broad mass of the people, which is the basic requirement for the success of democracy."[35]

The idea behind the system was alluded to by Ayūb Khān in the mentioned Lyallpur speech, when he asserted : " 'This country was brought into being by you This country is yours. And it is you who must step forward to mould its destiny and its future.' "[36] His speech acknowledged the Pakistanis' contribution in creating and developing Pakistan. It also enshrined Muḥammad Iqbāl's doctrine of activism, affirming the modernist principle that man is the agent of transformation. The deeply felt desire for vitality and progress also was manifest in the Lyallpur speech, which failed, however, to accept a true democratic policical form. This is shown further by the following :

(3) *The Judiciary's Lack of Full Powers.* The 1962 and 1956 Preambles insisted on the Judiciary's independence, but both Charters stipulated that the Supreme Court Justices and High Court Judges were to be presidentially appointed [50 (1) and 92 (1)].[37] They thus gave the Chief of State the opportunity to nominate highly qualified men, but also those known to be favourably disposed towards him. The 1962 Charter furthermore contained a stipulation demanding the creation of a Supreme Judicial Council [128(1)], which had the right to inquire "into the capacity or conduct of a Judge who is a member of the Council," i.e. the Supreme Court's Chief Justice, the two Justices following him in rank and the two Chief Justices of the High Courts (128). The Council's presidential appointees belonging to the Judiciary's top echelon were under each other's and the Administration's scrutiny. They could be removed [128 (6)] on grounds of mental or physical incapacity or gross misconduct, according to the President's opinion based "on information received from the Council or from any other source" [128 (5)]. It meant that the President could remove a Council member if the latter disagreed with any of his policies in spite of Article 3 (1) under "Principles of Law-Making" which, under the heading of *Freedom of Expression*, stated : "No law should impose any restriction on the freedom of a citizen to give expression to his thoughts." Again, the courts were barred from passing judgment on questions involving basic human rights.[38] It supports the thesis that the 1962 Constitution did not grant the Judiciary full powers.

That (1) the nature of representative government, (2) the electoral procedure and (3) the Judiciary's lack of full power pointed to the 1962 Charter's legalisation of authoritarianism was felt and criticised by the Pakistanis. Their dissent prior to the 1962 elections concerned the Charter's new electoral system and the banning of political parties.

Critique of the New Electoral System. Although the elections to the *Union Panchayats* were to be, and were, held in accordance with the Western principle of universal adult suffrage, the rolls containing the names of the "electors" were controlled. The reason was that these "electors" were known to and approved or rejected by the Chief Executive. Moreover, these "electors" were chosen from among and by the "Basic Democrats" [Articles 158(1), 160(2), 161(2)]. Consequently, no one disliked by the Administration would sit in the Legislatures and their membership could be counted upon to support every decree that the Administration wished to enact.

Political commentators have asserted that the new electoral system invites corrupt practices. It has been pointed out that candidates who already have a substantial following among electors in their constituencies might be tempted to try to buy the few additional votes needed to insure elections.

. . . Many names that were familiar in Pakistani political affairs before the military take-over are absent from the ballot. These individuals, including numerous former high officials, have been barred from political activity for alleged corruption under previous regimes.

Political commentators assert that the purged politicians are still as active supporters of favourite candidates. A great deal of voting tomorrow is expected to be based on personal considerations such as family or clan affiliations, business connections and the like. . . .[39]

This news item, presenting political opinion in Pakistan on the day before the elections to the National Assembly[40] were held, shows how deep the resentment was. It also unmasks the reasons for the resentment : the fear for corruption and the silencing of the opposition. The Constitution's clauses guaranteeing "freedom of expression" (3rd Principle of Law-Making) was broken by the Administration in barring former well-known politicians from political life and in forbiding opposition parties. "Political parties have been banished by order of the military regime," although some "are said to be functioning clandestinely under cover of newly formed cultural or religious organizations".[41] The ban on political parties violated not only the guarantee on free speech, but also that pertaining to freedom of association (4th Principle).

Of the successful candidates for the National Assembly, 44 per cent had been members of former political parties, which are now banned. Many of these politicians have been critical of the new Constitution and have called for a return to full suffrage and other features of standard democracy.

President Ayub indicated today that he would fight any return to the past in Pakistani politics.

"Politicians harp on a restoration of the old forms either because they cannot think for themselves or they believe they can profit by chaos," he declared.

The party machinery was in the hands of opportunists by and large.[42]

Ayūb's reported refusal to "return to the past in Pakistani politics" harmonised with his repeated statement that he did not wish "to imitate blindly the type of democracies to be found in other countries."[43] He insisted on an adaptation of Western to Islamic political modes. This adaptation was rejected by Pakistan's theologians as incorrect, for he violated what they consider to be a fundamental principle of democracy in Islam, viz. consultation (as stated) which includes open debate, criticism and compromise. Another reason for their opposition was the Constitution's idea of citizenship with specific reference to the minorities.

The Minorities' Status. In a democratic polity, all citizens—particularly the males—enjoy the same privileges and share equal responsibilities. In a Muslim State, the minorities are to be treated, as they were in former times, with dignity. This principle was asserted by Ayūb in his Lyallpur speech. "We can never become good people," he said, "until we develop in us fear of God and love of humanity. In fact, unless we do this we cannot claim to be good Muslims, nor good Pakistanis."[44] His Charter rejected discrimination, asserting freedom of religion [Art. 7 ; cf. Preamble, paras. 4 (d) (e), *et al.*] and equality before the law (2, 12, 14, *et al.*). The guarantee that Pakistan's non-Muslim inhabitants were equal in all respects with its Muslim citizens was strengthened by clauses allowing them to serve in the military and the legislatures. "No citizen should be denied entry in the service of Pakistan on the grounds of race, religion, caste, sex or place of residence or birth" [14 (1)]. It is only when "he has ceased to be a citizen or has affirmed allegiance to a foreign state" [103 (2) (d)][45] that he becomes disqualified. A law relating to military service reads : "Persons from all parts of Pakistan should be enabled to serve in the Defence Services of Pakistan" (17). It and other similar laws show a new orientation, for non-Muslims formerly were excluded from the military for fear that they could not be entrusted with a Muslim country's and people's defence. They had to pay a poll-tax (*jizyah*) instead—causing Westerners' critique that the minorities were unequal in a Muslim State—to cover the expense of their protection. Those abjuring modernism cannot accept the opening of Pakistan's defence forces to non-Muslims which they regard as a violation of the *Sharī'ah*. The opening up of the assemblies or legislatures to non-Muslims is an equally distasteful measure for many. Those asserting that Pakistan must remain fundamentally Islamic wonder how this is possible if non-Muslims participate in its policy-making. For the conservatives any political or other measure must be based on the Qur'ān, the *Sunnah* of the Prophet, the *Sunnah* of the Muslim community, etc. It must have, furthermore, the theologians' consensus (*ijmā'*), which guarantees not only their approval, but that any new legislation conforms to the sources. Those rejecting the older form are

responsible for Pakistan's de-islamisation, so argues the opposition. Their idea of citizenship conforms to the older Islamic principles by which minorities were treated humanely, could adhere to their respective faiths and customs, could carve a good life for themselves within the Islamic body politic. They disfavour the modern idea according to which birth, not religion, is the index of citizenship. If birth and continued residence are stressed, then anyone, irrespective of his religious and/or ethnic origins, can serve in any capacity, depending upon his abilities, his character, etc. This is the thesis found in the 1962 Charter, which follows therein the spirit of the Napoleonic and later Western Constitutions. Hence, the minorities can sit in the legislatures, as well as serve in the armies, for they have equal responsibilities in seeing that every law promotes the welfare of all and all are treated equally under the law. Their security depends upon it as much as that of the Muslim majority. If Islam is interpreted as containing "the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice" [Preamble, 4 (b)], it can be said that it permits the creation of a modern democracy. While the oppositon does not reject the validity of these principles, they interpret the form of democracy differently and insist that secularisation and, hence, degeneration result from a modernistic orientation. The debate also covered and continues to cover the role of Islamic womanhood. By granting all citizen rights, as spelled out, women cannot be excluded from any office. They thus gained rights to enter the army and the assemblies. One article reads : "Just and humane conditions of work should be provided and children and women should not be employed in vocations unsuited to their age and sex and maternity benefits should be provided for women in employment" (Art. 8). The term "employment" is not restrictive. Neither does this article stress the principle of separation (*purdah*). It, therefore, can be said to deviate from the Qur'ān (xxxiii. 53). To assure women's participation in political life, six seats—three of each Province—were reserved for them in the National Assembly [20 (2)]. "Five of the seats of members of the Assembly of each Province shall be reserved exclusively for women, but this clause shall not be construed as making a woman ineligible for election to any other seat in the Assembly." Formerly, the woman's place was at home, although instances have been recorded of women attending educational institutions jointly with males. Muḥammad's first wife Khadījah was a business woman and many women at the time were economically independent. Why not grant it to Pakistani womanhood in the twentieth century ? The opposition maintains that Muslim women can participate in political life: they should have their own organisations. They should observe *purdah* no matter what they do.[46] Their sitting in the Assemblies is contrary to the *Sharī'ah*; the formulation of decrees is a man's, not a woman's, job. The 1962 Constitution again deflects from the opposition's viewpoint. It

reflects the position of Modernist Pakistanis, the minorities and a segment among literate womanhood who maintain that Pakistan never can become a full democracy if it continues to follow older forms. They insist on Islam's progressive nature. They, therefore, disagreed also with Ayūb's refusal "to imitate blindly" Western democracies. They read it as an attempt to prevent free elections and thus as an autocratic measure. The result was increasing discontent against Ayūb's scheme of limited self-rule, which he called "Basic Democracies," among the intelligentsia, particularly of East Pakistan, "where the literacy rate is about double the national figure of 15 per cent."[47]

Other clauses fomenting the discontent, because they confirmed Ayūb's autocracy, related to his self-perpetuation and his veto. Not only did he interpret his usurpation of the presidency as a "Mandate given to me on the Fourteenth day of February, 1960, by the people of Pakistan. . ." (Preamble's last paragraph). In spite of the stipulated term that his government should remain in office : "three years and sixty days after that day," viz. after "the commencing day" [(226 (2)], he continued as Pakistan's President for nearly a decade. The Article 13 (1) granting to the National Assembly the right to present a resolution for his removal lost its effectiveness through others (26, 27) bestowing upon him as president the right to veto any of its acts. He could call for a referendum "amongst the members of the Electoral College," if his veto were overridden by the Assembly's two-third majority (24).[48] He could, if he wished, dissolve the Central Legislature [23 (1)]. The Constitution promulgated by Ayūb, therefore, had a semblance of parliamentary government.[49]

In retrospect, the smaller number of candidates under the Basic Democracies was asserted by Ayūb to permit the voters to know better the candidates whom they were to elect. It recalls Maudūdī's statement that men esteemed for their qualifications were taken into the government in older Islamic times. This precedent allowed him to accept the election system as devised under the 1962 Charter, which seems to mirror the earliest and yet small Muslim community's experiences as well as the caliphal doctrine. The Chief Executive is postulated therein as Islam's defender, head of government and people's protector. His role as protector included military defence and internal order. This notion is expressed in the phrase "in the interest of the security of Pakistan". Flexibility in its interpretation makes it legal to abolish parliament, to abrogate the Constitution.

Some final comments reiterating previous statements are :

(1) the 1962 Charter clearly was an attempt to adapt, as Ayūb himself had said, Western to Islamic ways ;

(2) in the adaptation, a one-man rule rather than a parliamentary form of government emerged ;

(3) another consequence is a confusing picture as Ayūb's Constitution reflects at once an older Islamic and a modernist orientation ;

(4) the result furthermore was dissatisfaction with it among (*i*) the modernists who regarded it insufficiently democratic ; (*ii*) the fundamentalists who thought it too modernist ; (*iii*) the minorities who considered it to be too Islamic ;

(5) the dissatisfaction resulted, too, from the East Pakistanis, charge that they were not given full equality ;

(6) the discontent derived not only from political, but also from economic, conditions—East Pakistan charging that it received far fewer funds than West Pakistan for its development; the minorities, that Muslims were given economic preference.

They indicate that Ayūb as President of Pakistan failed in uniting all groups. Was his administration a total disaster ? No, it was not. Under his presidency, the Five-Year Plans were a great success, impossible if there had not been internal stability. The generation that grew up and matured during it learned their political lessons well. They as members of the growing middle class, having received a better education through more schools and technical institutions, have learned to act as the critics. The minorities also have increased their awareness of their rights as citizens of Pakistan. Must these positives not be weighed against the negatives ?

The drama which began with the Great War of 1857 ended with the creation of Pakistan in 1947. The crucial question: What kind of polity must Pakistan be ? has received diverse answers and continues to be debated. Muḥammad Iqbāl gave Pakistan its political ideology : it must remain loyal to its own tradition and culture in order that it may not lose its soul ; this does not mean a return to past forms. For him one "foundation of the Quranic teaching" was "a keen sense of the . . . concept of life as a continuous movement in time."[50] The word "movement" implies creativity, change. Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ founded Pakistan as a political entity ; he favoured democratic parliamentary processes. This philosophico-political trend of thought, rooted partly in nineteenth-century modernism, was continued by Jinnāḥ's successors. In practice, however, the internal political experiment has negated the parliamentary form through successive coups and interims of non-constitutional government.

Muḥammad Ayūb Khān has been replaced by Āghā Muḥammad Yaḥyā Khān (on 25 March 1969). Both were self-appointed, declared martial law, and abolished a previous charter without popular consultation. Ayūb Khān promulgated, his successor has promised, a new Constitution, under which elections are to be held in 1970. Meanwhile, Pakistan again lies under a military regime. How is this repetitive cycle to be broken ? "Arise and lay the foundations of a new world," where there is freedom, and where

"Man's status is higher than the Heavens ;
Real culture is respect for Man."[51]

REFERENCES

Chapter I: Introduction, pp. 1-36

Page 1

1. Sepoy, an Anglo-Indian word, is derived from the Urdu-Persian term *sipāhī*, meaning soldier (*sipah* or "army"). It referred specifically to Indian soldiers trained and employed by the British.

2. Haraprasad Chattopadhyaya, *The Sepoy Mutiny, 1857. A Social Study and Analysis* (Calcutta: Bookland Private Limited, 1957), p. 1. *Vide* also Mahdi Husain, *Bahadur Shah II and the War of 1857 in Delhi with Its Unforgettable Scenes* (Delhi: Atma Ram & Sons, 1958), p 78. Telinga and Purbia sepoys rose on that day against the British at Meerut.

3. Colonel Finnis.

4. W H. Fitchett, *The Tale of the Great Mutiny* (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1913), pp. 1-2. Mungul Pande severely wounded, but did not kill, Lieutenant Baugh and Sergeant Major Hewson of the 34th Native Infantry. (*Vide* Chattopadhyaya, op. cit., p. 5, n. 18) According to Fitchett (p 1), General Hearsay, the Brigadier in charge, arrived in haste on the scene, and taking firm command, subdued Pande, who committed suicide, but Chattopadhyaya (p. 1) states that Pande was hanged "on April 8, 1857".

5. Mahdi Husain, op. cit., p. 6. The 1806 event is known as the Vellore mutiny. Source quoted: "Bengal Hurkaru, June 1, 3, 23, 1857" (N. 2, p. 6).

6. Ibid, p. 19. Source quoted: *La Revolte au Bengale en 1857 et 1858*, pp. 128-33. Mangin was an Irish soldier in East India Company service during 1857.

7. The East India Company was originally a trading concern founded by charter granted by Queen Elizabeth in 1600. Its troops served at first to protect its trading interests.

8. Led by Colonel Clive, they defeated the army of Nawāb Sirāj-ud-Dawlah of Bengal.

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9. W.W. Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans* (Calcutta: The Comrade Publishers, 1945), reprint of the last (1876) edition, p. 153. (First edition appeared in 1871.)

10. Chattopadhyaya, op. cit., n. 24, pp. 57-8. Source quoted: Sir Thomas Munro's Minute of April 12, 1822 "on the liberty of the Press," para. 11. For this Minute, "vide Parl. Papers (House of Commons), Vol. No. 29 of 1857". (Footnote comment on p. 59.)

11. The date of Delhi's fall to the British. The Mutiny spread from Barrackpur to Lucknow (main city of Oudh, now part of the United Provinces) on 4 May and to Meerut on 10 May 1857. It took a year of hard fighting to suppress the revolt. Innumerable works have been written on its military developments, among them Fitchett, Husain, and Chattopadhyaya, op. cit. These works are based on primary sources, among them Official Records found in the National Archives, New Delhi, Parliamentary Papers of the House of Commons, Narratives, etc.

12. He wrote a classical treatise on the subject, entitled *Asbāb-i-Baghāwat-i-Hind* (1858), translated into English as "Causes of the Indian Revolt" by Sir Auckland Colvin and Lt. Col. G.F.I. Graham (1873). The latter, in his *Life and Work of Syed*

Ahmad Khan (London : Wm. Blackwood & Sons, 1885), repeats the substance of Sir Sayyid's treatise (chap. IV).

13 Graham, op cit, p. 37.

14. In 1817 the Marathas attacked and lost out to East India Company forces; their chiefs sued for peace in 1816, when their territories in West Central India (except for Baroda, Gwalior and Indore) were annexed by the British.

15. On 13 March 1849 As a result, all Sikh territories also came under direct Company rule. Sind, the last independent Sikh-governed State, was incorporated on 30 March 1849. The Sikhs fought on the British side in 1857, however.

16 *Vide* Appendix D for list of Governor-Generals of India.

17. Chattopadhyaya, op. cit., pp. 41-2.

18 Geo. Bruce Malleson, *The Mutiny of the Bengal Army. An Historical Narrative* (London : Bosworth & Harrison, 1857), p 11. He served under Sir Charles James Napier, the General who conquered Sind (1841-3) for the British.

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19. Ibid, p. 17.

20 Malleson (op. cit., pp. 13 6) portrays the "Characters of the Members of the Government of India on Lord Canning's arrival".

21. Sir John Lawrence, "Minute of the proceedings relating to the trial of ex-king of Delhi—dd. 19th April 1858". It is published in his *Mutiny Records* (Punjab Government Press, 1911), Part II, pp. 381-8. Quotation taken from p. 382.

22 Fitchett, op. cit., p. 14, quoting from W.E.H. Lecky, unnamed source.

23. *Vide infra*, pp. 8, 17.

24. *Vide infra*, p. 9.

25 A new rifle, known as the Enfield Rifle, contained, unlike its obsolete predecessor called "Brown Bess," a grooved barrel requiring a lubricated cartridge.

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26 Chattopadhyaya, op. cit, p. 62, text and n. 34 : "Parl. Papers, Vol. 30 of 1857, Paper No. 259, p. 3 "

27 Fitchett, op. cit., p. 15.

28 Malleson, op. cit., p. 18.

29 Cf. "Extract Proceedings of a special meeting of the Committee of the Mahomedan Association, held on the 27th May, 1857 . . . " in J.K. Majumdar (Ed.), *Indian Speeches and Documents on British Rule, 1821-1918* (Calcutta : Longmans Green & Co., Ltd, 1937), pp. 67-9 This document refers to 16 May 1857 as the date on which the British Government published its disavowal in India's newspapers.

30. Malleson, op. cit., p. 17.

31. R. C. Majumdar, *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, 3 Vols. (Calcutta : Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1962), Vol. I, p. 108.

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32. Sir Sayyid's *Causes*, as quoted by Bashir Ahmad Dar, *Religious Thought of Sayyid Ahmad Khan* (Lahore : Institute of Islamic Culture, 1957), p. 284.

33 Chattopadhyaya, op. cit., p. 31, text and nn. 3 and 4, citing the following original documents : "(3) Parl. Papers, Vol. No. 43 of 1857 58 : Paper No. 75, p. 19. The Act referred to was Act No. 21 of 1850 entitled 'An Act for extending the principle of Section 19, Regulation 7 of 1832 of the Bengal Code through the provinces of E. I. Company'. Parl. Papers, Vol. 29 for 1857, No. 225, p 1." Footnote "(4) Parl. Papers (House of Commons), Vol. No. 43 of 1857-58, Paper No. 75, p. 19." Regulation XVII of 1829,

declaring the Hindu custom of Satī illegal, and the "Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act" of 1856 were extremely unpopular. The 1856 Act in particular shocked the religious sentiments of the orthodox Hindus "beyond measure" (Chattopadhyaya, op. cit , p. 31). This Act (like the annexation of Oudh) was put through *one* year prior to the Mutiny.

34. Since the first decades of the nineteenth century, missions had been "set up in various parts of the Bengal Presidency, including Bihar and Orissa, in many a district in the then North-Western Provinces, in certain parts of Central India and of the Punjab, in Oudh and in the Presidencies of Bombay and Madras." (Chattopadhyaya, op cit., p. ?6)

35. Ibid., p. 36. (The statistics were compiled by the Rev. Joseph Mullens in his *Thoughts on Missions to India* [Serampur Mission Press, 1825])

36. Ibid., p. 37.

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37. B A. Dar, op. cit., p. 286.

38. Ibid., p. 285.

39. Partial quotation of a letter addressed by Colonel Wheeler on 15 April 1857 to the then Assistant Adjutant General of the Presidency Division. Cited by Chattopadhyaya, op cit., p. 40, text and n. 29 : "Parl. Papers, Vol. 30 of 1857, Paper No. 263, pp. 167-68." In a previous letter, written on 4 April 1857 to the then officiating Brigade Major at Barrackpur, Col. Wheeler also admitted having preached Christianity to the sepoys (*vide* ibid. p. 40, text and n. 28 : "Parl. Papers, Vol. 30 of 1857, Paper No. 263, p 164").

40. There were innumerable secondary causes. Among them were those of a military nature, such as the presence of insufficient English troops—which Fitchett (op. cit , p. 18) regards as another primary military cause ; the lack of an army career for capable Indian officers. Additional *social* causes were the maltreatment of Indians by their European employers (*vide* Sir W. Napier, *Life and Opinions of Sir Charles Napier*, Vol. III, p 260 ; also Captain A. Hervy, *Ten Years in India*, 3 vols. (London : 1850), Vol. II, pp. 35-7 and 310) and the absence of the Bengal Army's sepoys' families many of whom accompanied the Indian soldiery in the other armies. Such *economic* causes as lower remuneration for sepoys and frequent non-payment of Indian employees (for the latter fact, *vide* sources listed here) are also mentioned. A *socio-religious* cause said to have contributed to the ill-feeling among the sepoys was their liability for overseas service (General Enlistment Order of 1856), which was resisted for fear of loss of caste.

41. The "Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act" and the General Enlistment Order (*vide supra*, respectively, p. 5, n. 33, and p. 6, n. 40).

42. Dealt out toward the end of 1856.

43. Fitchett, op. cit., p. 15.

44. *Vide infra*, Appendices A, B and C. Dozens were issued at that time.

45. J. K. Majumdar, op. cit., pp. 67-9.

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46. In this dispute, Sir Sayyid and W. Hunter were among the protagonists, defending their respective countrymen's viewpoint, *vide* section 2 of this chapter for a detailed discussion.

47. Husain, op. cit., p. 21. Source quoted : L. Martin, *La Puissance Militaire des Anglais dans l'inde et l'insurrection des cipayes* (1859), p. 226.

48. "Minute" of 19 April 1858, op. cit., p. 384 (*vide supra* p. 3).

49. Malleson, op. cit., p. 19.

50. R.C. Majumdar, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 242, quoting from *The Mutinies, the*

Government and the People, formerly regarded as anonymous, now believed to be Kishori Chand Mitra's work (cf. his note 99, p. 524, in op. cit., Vol. I).

51 Fitchett, op. cit., p. 10. According to the official statistics compiled and issued by Philip Nelville, Secretary of the Military Department, listed in "Parl. Papers, Vol. XLII of 1857-58 Paper No. 201. p. 5" (Chattopadhyaya, op. cit., p. 65, n. 8), the total composition of the Bengal, Madras and Bombay Armies as of 1857 was 45,522 Britishers and 232,224 Indians But Major General Bancock, attached to the Bengal Army, stated that prior to the Mutiny, 231,374 Indians and 38,745 Britishers served together in the Indian Army. (For these figures and the yearly military statistics, *vide* Chattopadhyaya, op cit, pp. 65-7.)

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52. Malleson, op. cit., Part II, p. 101. Part II is dated : "India, 10th Dec. 1857".

53. R C Majumdar, op cit., Vol. I, p 112.

54. Malleson, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

55. Ibid., p. 11.

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56. Chattopadhyaya (op. cit., p. 68) gives the percentages of Europeans to Indians serving in these three Armies ; *vide* ibid., pp. 71 ff., 77 ff., and 81 ff, for detailed statistics on the composition of respectively the Bengal, Madras and Bombay Armies.

57. Ibid., pp. 88-9.

58. *Vide infra*, pp. 14 ff.

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59. Malleson, op. cit., p. 19, giving a detailed account of the events on pp. 19 ff.

60. Ibid., p. 19.

61. Ibid., p. 20.

62 Although India was still under East India Company rule, the British Government had reserved for itself the sovereign dominion over the Company's plantations, forts and "palaces" since 1683.

63. *Vide supra*, p. 1.

64. Malleson, op. cit., p. 37.

65. Ibid., p. 73. This and the following quotations from Malleson, Part II, dated : "India : 10th Dec. 1857".

66. Ibid., p. 86.

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67. Ibid., pp. 89-90. Lt. Col. Neill had taken the command after Brigadier Ponsonby apparently was felled by a sunstroke.

68. Malleson, op. cit., p. 92.

69. Ibid., p. 153. The battle of 16 November 1857, occurring after Delhi's recapture (*vide infra*, p. 19).

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70. This region comprised the "Banaras, Allahabad, Agra, Rohilkhand, Meerut and Delhi divisions. The Banaras division was composed of Banaras, Mirzapur, Jaunpur, Gorakhpur, Ghazipur and Azamgarh districts. The Allahabad division comprised the districts of Allahabad, Fatehpur, Kanpur, Bandar and Hamirpur. The districts of Agra, Mathura, Mainpuri and Etawah constituted the Agra division. The Rohilkhand division was composed of Bareilly, Shahjahanpur, Moradabad, Bijnor and Budaun districts. The Meerut division" contained "such districts as Meerut, Muzaffarnagar, Saharanpur,

Bulandshahr, Dehra Dun and Aligarh. Lastly, the Delhi division was formed of Delhi, Gurgaon, Hissar, Panipat, and Rohtak" (Chattopadhyaya, op. cit., p. 6, n. 6).

71. Bundelkhand was a State in Central India.

72. The previously autonomous State of Oudh, now part of the United Provinces, contained Allahabad and Lucknow.

73. These two territories were situated across the Jumna River.

74. Bihar was at that time formed by the Patna, Bhagalpur and the Chotanagpur divisions as well as some tributary "Mahals" (Chattopadhyaya, op. cit., p. 113). It formed part of the Bengal Presidency.

75. Chattopadhyaya, op. cit., p 159, text and n. 14: "Out of upwards of 33 millions of population of the then North-Western provinces the Hindus numbered 28 millions in round numbers and the Muslims only 5 millions (*vide* Kaye, op. cit., III, p. 194, footnote)."

76 Ibid., p. 113, but *vide* p. 199, where it is stated that in East Bihar "the civil population remained, on the whole, quiet"; and p. 18: "East Bihar was also in the throes of a great agitation".

77. Malleson, op. cit., p. 177; p. 173 for the statistics.

78. Ibid., p. 113.

79. This vast region is called after its rulers (Rajputs, origin unknown), who arrived in the seventh and remained in control until the nineteenth century. At that time, it was bounded in the north-west by the Thar desert, in the north by the Punjab, in the south-east by Sind. The British set up Ajmer-Merwara (Ajmer today), but guaranteed the independence of nearly all the States, among them Jaipur, Jodhpur and Bikaner (all of which, including Ajmer, now form part of Rajasthan).

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80. Chattopadhyaya, op. cit., p. 198, text and n. 148: "*vide* his *Mutinies in Rajpootana*. P. 147".

81. Ibid., pp. 8, 142-3, 145 and 183 respectively for Ghazipur, Shahabad, Patna and Oudh. *Vide* also *infra*, pp. 16 ff.

82. Ibid., p. 198. The 6th Bengal Irregular Cavalry tried unsuccessfully, it seems, to win some Baluchis to their side. The Sepoy Army stationed in Sind contained approximately 5000 Indian and 1200 British soldiers.

83. Ibid., p. 199.

84. Ibid. pp. 198-9. Since 1756 Sind had been under the supervision of the Kabul Khāns.

85. The "13th, 14th, 16th and 21st Bombay Native Infantry Regiments, the 2nd European Infantry, 1st Bombay Fusiliers, 3rd troop horse artillery, two companies of the 4th battalion of artillery, 2nd Sind Irregular horse and of the 6th Bengal Irregular Cavalry" formed the Sepoy Army stationed in Sind. The 6th Bengal Irregular Cavalry apparently tried to win over some Baluchis to join the mutineers. Chattopadhyaya, op. cit., p. 198.

86. Ibid., p. 196, text and n. 142: "J.C. Browne—*The Punjab and Delhi in 1857*, Vol. I, p. 217." Mr Browne recorded Sir John Lawrence's statement that the Punjab's people and Chiefs kept calm. The Punjab was annexed in 1849, at the end of the second Anglo-Sikh war. (Since 1947, this province has been divided into East and West Punjab belonging respectively to India and Pakistan. The West Punjab was renamed Punjab in 1950.)

87. Ibid., pp. 196-7.

88. Ibid., p. 196.

89. *Vide supra*, p. 2.

90. While the Sikhs were the defeated group, some of their Chiefs (those of Patiala and Jind) apparently assisted the British. Patiala's ruler guarded the trunk road between Delhi and the Punjab with 5000 troops and Jind's threw his forces on the foreigners' side during the assault on Delhi (Fitchett, op. cit., p. 9). Husain (op cit., p. 195) cites as the source for it an entry made by Munshi Jiwan Lal in his diary which, along with that of Mu īnu'ddīn Ḥasan Khān, was edited and translated into English by C.T. Matcalfe and published (by A. Constable, Westminster, 1898) under the title of *Two Narratives of the Mutiny in Delhi*. The entry (in ibid., p. 114) notes that it was reported by a carter. According to Metcalfe, Jiwan Lal was a member of the Delhi Court years before and also during the Mutiny and acted as an intermediary between the British and the Mughals. Later, he was made (by the Governors) honorary Municipal Commissioner and Magistrate (*vide* Husain, op. cit , pp. 313-4).

91. Chattopadhyaya, op. cit., p. 185.

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92 Ibid., pp. 185, 186-7, and 187-8 respectively for the two districts and the Rajshahi division.

93 Ibid., p. 189.

94. Ibid., p. 191 ; *vide* also p. 190; and *infra*, pp. 17 ff., and Appendix E.

95. Chattopadhyaya (op. cit., p. 192, text and n. 130) cites the following source for the statement concerning Bengal's revenue deficit : "Parl. Papers. Vol. 4 of 1859. Minutes of evidence, P. 122." Among the Bengali pioneers at that time were the great Rammohun Roy and Devendranath Tagore, both progressive and pro-Western in their outlook.

96. Ibid., p. 193, text and n. 1. The accusation was made by John Bruce Norton in his book : *Topics for Indian Statesmen* (ed. G.R. Norton), London, 1858, p. 53.

97. Chattopadhyaya, op. cit., p. 193. Source quoted (in text) : "The Indian Field, dated February 12, 1859".

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98. Ibid , p. 189, text and n. 120 : "Parl. Papers, Vol. 44, Part I for 1857-58. Paper No. 364. Pp. 168-169." (Jessore lies in East Bengal.)

99. Ibid , p. 194, text and n. 135 : "Parl. Papers. Vol. 44, Part I for 1857-58. Paper No. 364. P. 244." The quotation is taken from a letter written by the Magistrate of Goalpara, on Assam's Brahmaputra River, to the Secretary of the Government of Bengal on 27 June 1857 A similar statement concerning the mood in Orissa is made by "Kaye and Malleson, op. cit., VI. P. 32" (ibid., p. 194, n. 133). Assam was made a separate province in 1874; its southernmost section was incorporated into East Bengal in 1947. Orissa's coastal section (made part of Orissa and Bihar in 1912) became a separate province in 1936. The population of this province was tripled in 1948 and 1949 by the addition of 24 former princely States and the enlarged province was made a State in 1950. (*Vide infra*, p. 140.)

100. For the composition of the Bombay Army, *vide supra*, p. 9.

101. The Parsees sent a loyalty pledge, "signed by about 400" Indians of various creeds and castes, to Lord Elphinstone, then Bombay's Governor. Chattopadhyaya, op. cit., pp. 195-6, n. 141, for the text of their pledge.

102. Ibid., p. 195.

103. Ibid., p. 19.

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104. Ibid., pp. 95-6. Nagpur, Indore and Gwalior (all three merged with Madhya

Pradesh) were Maratha States in Central India. Hyderabad, situated almost wholly in the Deccan plateau, is predominantly Hindu Formerly the Golconda Kingdom, whose capital (Hyderabad) was founded in 1589, had an ancient Hindu culture, whose famous remnants are the Ajanta and Ellora Caves This kingdom was conquered by Aurangzeb in 1687. Hyderabad's present dynasty was founded by a Mughal viceroy, Āṣaf Jāh, in 1724. Its northernmost section, Berar, was joined in 1903 to Central Provinces (and the entire area is now known as Madhya Pradesh). Upon partition, the Niẓām preferred independence or affiliation with Pakistan, but after occupation by Indian troops (in 1948), he agreed to a plebiscite and renunciation of most of his vast estate.

105. Ibid., p. 96.

106 Ibid., p. 195 (*vide supra*, pp. 8-9 for the composition of the Madras Army).

107. Ibid., p. 19.

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108. Husain, op cit., p 34. Source quoted : Metcalfe (ed. and tr), *Two Narratives*, p. 9.

109 Chattopadhyaya, op cit., p 100, text and n. 1 : "Parl. Papers, Vol. 44, Part III for 1857-58 P. 101." For obvious reasons, *vide supra*, p 15.

110 Ibid., p. 100, text and n. 2 : "Dr. Smith—*Oxford History of India*. P. 723."

111. Malleson, op. cit , p. 6. The B.N I. 19th Regiment. . . consisted by the time of the Mutiny of Sikhs (Chattopadhyaya, op. cit., p 4, footnote 13, citing as source : "Parl. Papers [House of Commons], Vol. 30 of 1857, Paper No. 270, p. 151.")

112. Chattopadhyaya, op. cit., p. 76.

113. *Vide supra*, p. 9.

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114. "These Brahmins and Rajputs of Oudh furnished the bulk of the Bengal Native Infantry before the Mutiny" (Chattopadhyaya, op. cit., p. 71). *Vide supra*, p. 8.

115 *Vide infra*, Appendix E.

116 Husain, op. cit., p. 15 text and n. 3 : J. "Holloway—*Essays on Indian Mutiny*, pp 18-19." The book was published in 1864.

117. S.M. Ikram, *Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan, 1858-1951* (Lahore : Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1965 [2nd edn.]), p. 25.

118. *Vide supra*, pp. 4 and 7 quoting respectively Dr Fitchett's and Mr Martin's views.

119. E. Thompson and G.F. Garratt, *Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India*, 2nd edition (Allahabad : Central Book Depot, 1958), p. 390, n. 2 (first edition, London : Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1934).

120. Ibid., p. 390, n. 2.

121. Chattopadhyaya, op. cit., p. 106.

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122. R.C. Majumdar, op. cit., p. 244.

123. Thompson and Garratt, op. cit., p. 414.

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124. The East India Company's Directors met for the last time in September 1858. However, it "survived as a corporation until 1874, as the Charter Act of 1833 had guaranteed an annuity to the stockholders for forty years." (T. Walter Wallbank, *India in the New Era* [New York : Scott, Foresman & Company, 1951], p. 60)

125. Queen Victoria's Proclamation, published by Lord Canning, India's Governor-General, on 1 November 1858 at Allahabad.

126. Thompson and Garratt, op. cit., p. 414.

127. Queen Victoria's Proclamation, 1858. By the 1876 Act, she assumed the title "Empress of India," which became effective on 1 January 1877. It "made the British legally the Paramount Power in India." (R.C. Majumdar, op. cit., p. 29.)

128. India's Governor-General, 1841-4.

129. Husain, op. cit., p. 14, text and n. 3 : 'Caveeshar, S. S.—*India's Fight for Freedom*, p. 427."

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130. As early as 1021 C.E., an Afghan dynasty, the Ghaznavids, had set up a principality at Lahore. They were followed subsequently by the Ghorids (1175-1206), the Slave Kings (1206-90), the Khiljīs (1290-1320), the Tughluqs (1320-1413), the Sayyids (1414-51) and the Lodīs (1451-1526). These dynasties are known aggregately as the Delhi Sulṭanate. It ended in 1526 with Bābur's ascendancy, and his foundation of the Mughal Empire, which lasted formally until January 1858, when the Emperor Bahādur Shāh II was tried, found guilty and exiled by the British to Rangoon (where he died in 1862, aged eighty-seven). The Sultanate mainly ruled North-Western India.

131. Founded by Muḥammad ibn 'Abd-ul-Wahhāb (1703-87) of the Hejaz, it was an Islamic reform movement. Its main ideas were : rejection of the saint cult, festivals, divine attributes to Muḥammad, prayer in his name, architectural adornments (e.g. mosque minarets, Ka'bah's silken curtains, etc.) of sacred buildings, of luxury in general (such as smoking), repudiation of Islam's four "legal" schools (Ḥanīfism, Shāfi'ism, Ḥanbalism, Mālikism) of *Ijmā'* ("consensus" among the theologians) and insistence on *Ijtihād* ("individual judgment") instead.

132. Sayyid Aḥmad went to Delhi (*c.* 1816) to study Islamic Law. There he met and for two years was trained by Shāh 'Abd al-Qādir and regarded himself as the disciple of his teacher and the latter's brother, Shāh 'Abd al-'Azīz, both sons of the Indian reformer Shāh Walī Allāh. Upon his return to India, he launched a vigorous preaching campaign, founded the *Ṭarīqah-i-Muḥammadiyyah* sect ('The Way of Muḥammad') and a propaganda organisation at Patna (1818). Then he joined bandit forces led by Amīr Khān Pindārī in Rajasthan. During 1822-3, he journeyed to Mecca where he came in contact with Wahhābī ideas. In 1824 he appeared at Peshawar, inciting the tribes to a *jihād* against the Sikhs (which began in 1826 and ended with Peshawar's fall to the Wahhābīs in 1830). From 1830 on, his power began to wane (the Sikhs regained Peshawar, and the hill tribes rose against him for his attempts at reforming their marriage customs). He was killed in a battle against the Sikhs (led by Prince Sher Singh). For particulars, *vide* Hunter, op. cit., pp. 4-10.

133. Dr Ikram (op. cit., p. 103) suggests that Bengal's Wahhābīs were originally "the offshoot of the reform movement started by Shah Wali Allah".

134. Hunter, op cit. p. 15.

135. They were fought in 1858, 1863 and 1868. The State trials were begun in 1864 and followed upon each war. After the first conflict, the Wahhābīs were dislodged from Sittana and settled at Malka. (Ibid., pp. 75 ff)

136. Henceforth called Sir Sayyid or Sir Aḥmad to distinguish him from Sayyid Aḥmad of Rai Bareli. (*Vide infra*, chapter II, for Sir Sayyid's life and work.)

137 Sayyid Ahmad Khan, *Review on Dr. Hunter's Indian Musalmans* (Lahore : Premier Book House, n.d., reprinted from the original 1873 edition), p. 12—henceforth cited as *Review*.

138. Ibid., pp. 14-5.

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139. Ibid., p. 25.

140. Freeland Abbot, "The Jihād of Sayyid Aḥmad Shahīd, "*The Muslim World*, Vol. LXX, No. 3, July 1962, pp. 216-22; *vide* p. 220.

141. Hunter, op. cit., p. 13. The reference pertains to the Wahhābīs.

142. Sir Sayyid, *Review*, p. 15.

143. Ibid., p. 25.

144. Chattopadhyaya, op. cit., p 104, n. 8, containing the quotation and its source: C. Forjett, *Our Real Danger in India* (London: 1877), "p. 131". Mr Forjett was at that time Bombay' s Police Commissioner.

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145. Ibid., p. 117.

146. Hunter, op. cit., pp. 12, 14-5, where he relates that, on 19 August 1852, Patna's Magistrate recorded that the Wahhābī sect was growing "in that city".

147. Ibid., pp. 36-7, and n. 1, p. 316: "*Alias* Nisar Ali, a native of Chandpur village, and resident in Baraset. . . . "

148. Ram Gopal, *Indian Muslims, A Political History, 1858 1947* (London: Asia Publisbing House, 1959), p. 9 (quoted by S.M. Ikram, op. cit., p. 104).

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149. Hunter, op cit., p. 67.

150. *Vide infra*, Appendix C.

151. The Wahhābī wars, trials and propaganda, i.e. the negative aspects. They did not take into account the expressed desire on the part of a number of Muslim groups to co-operate with Government during the Mutiny.

152. For a detailed discussion, *vide infra*, pp. 26 ff.

153. Murray T. Titus, *Indian Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 179 He rather than Tītū Miyān is claimed by the Farā'idī sect in East Bengal to be their founder. (Hunter, op. cit, p. 91, n. 2.)

154 Qur'ān, translated by the Rev. J.M. Rodwell, Everyman' s Library No. 380, E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1909 edn., 1948 reprint. Surah II, verses 186-187.

155. *Vide supra*, p. 5.

156. *Vide supra*, p. 5, and *infra* Appendix B. Not all Muslims agreed. (*Vide infra*, pp. 26 ff.: also Appendix E.)

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157. Hunter, op. cit., p. 62, text and n 1: "Jama Tafaser, printed at Delhi, 1867. *Calcutta Review*, vol cii, p. 391. . . . " A similar tract is quoted by Hunter, pp. 68-70, which he "abbreviated from *Calcutta Review*, cii, pp 388-390." (P. 70, n. 1.)

158 Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), Chap. XI, "Types of Jihād," pp 74-82. *Vide* p. 80 for passage summarised.

159. No valid reason for a *jihād* would have existed.

160. His proper name was al-Nu'mān ibn Thābit (d. 767 C.E.), leader of the Iraq "school" of law. His disciples Imām Yūsuf, who preserved in his *Kitāb al-Kharāj* ("Book of the Land Tax," published in Cairo, 1927) Abū Ḥanīfah's principal views, and Imām Muḥammad held one of these three conditions sufficient for a country to lapse into *dār-ul-ḥarb*. (Hunter, op. cit., p.119.)

161. This statement, made by Hunter, op. cit., p. 119, rests on some proof, because the Indians generally regarded the sea with suspicion.

162. "Aurangzeb' s Decrees," a collection of *fatwās* (legal injunctions) issued during this Emperor's reign.

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163. Disagreement existed about the proper translation of the term *amān-i-awwal.* Dr Hunter insisted it meant "religious security," while Calcutta's theologians felt that it denoted "religious liberty". Dr Hunter argued that the Muslims' religious security was impaired as it could be had only under their own sovereigns. However, "religious liberty" is endangered also, because it is granted finally by the rulers' graciousness. Without it, there can be no security and *vice versa.* (*Vide infra,* p. 27.)

164. Answer given by Jamāl ibn 'Abdullah Shaykh 'Umar al-Ḥanafī, at that time Muftī of Mecca. The answers given respectively by Aḥmad ibn Zainī Dahlān (the Shāfi'ite Muftī) and Ḥusain ibn Ibrāhīm (the Mālikite Muftī), reflect the same viewpoint. (*Vide* Hunter, op. cit., pp. 207-8, Appendix I.

165. Ibid , p. 209, Appendix II.

166. Ibid.

167. Ibid , p. 210, Appendix III, "Decision of the Calcutta Muhammadan Society". It was embodied in a pamphlet "entitled, 'Abstract of Proceedings of the Muhammadan Literary Society of Calcutta, on Wednesday, 23rd November 1870. Being a lecture by Maulavi Karamat Ali of Jaunpur on a question of Muhammadan Law, involving the Duty of Muhammadans in British India towards the Ruling Power'. Calcutta, 1871." (P. 114, n. 1.) The Maulavī presented his lecture to the Society originally on 23 November 1870. (P 108, n. 2.) Among others subscribing to the view that British India remained *dār-ul-Islām* were Maulavī 'Abdul Ḥaqq, Maulavī 'Abdul Ḥakīm, Maulavī 'Abdul Laṭif Khān Bahādur.

168. Dr Hunter's dedication is dated 23 June 1871.

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169. Hunter, op. cit , p. 117.

170. Ibid., pp. 120-4 where he declares his "extreme suspicion" of the decision reached by Mecca's theologians.

171. Ibid., p. 120. (*Vide supra.* n. 163.)

172. Ibid., p. 123.

173. Particularly the abolition of the qāḍīs. (*Vide infra*, pp. 33 ff.)

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174. Graham, op. cit , p. 235.

175. Ibid., p. 237.

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176. Hunter, op. cit , pp. 167-8. Source quoted : Petition addressed by the Orissa Muslims to the Commissioner, E.W. Molony, C.S. (who sent a copy thereof to Dr Hunter). It probably dated from 1869 or 1870, judging from Dr Hunter's phrase : "a petition lately presented" ; in other words, shortly before he wrote his book, which was published first in 1871.

177. Ibid , p. 158.

178. Ibid.

179. *Vide supra*, p. 22.

180. *Vide supra*, n. 130.

181. *Vide infra*, pp. 232-3, 236.

182. Kumaraswami Kamaraj, responsible for finding a successor to India's deceased Prime Minister Nehru and his successor Shastri, does not speak any language other than his mother tongue, which is Tamil.

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183. India's Governor-General between 1786 and 1794. The first Governor-General under the India Act sponsored in 1784 by Prime Minister William Pitt, under which a Control Board—consisting of a Secretary of State (a British Cabinet Member), the Exchequer's Chancellor, and four privy councillors—was set up for the supervision of all military, civil and revenue affairs. Henceforth, the British Government appointed the Governor-General who was responsible to it rather than to the East India Company. The latter kept its trading activities and patronage. (Wallbank, op. cit, p. 55.) Lord Cornwallis was reappointed as Governor-General in 1805. He died at Ghazipur, *en route* to suppress anti-British elements.

184. Hunter, op. cit., p. 158.

185. Ibid., pp. 152-4.

186. Resumption Laws : Regulation VI of 1819. As long as a revenue farmer paid his land tax, he could give rent free lands to religious institutions for endowment. The Resumption proceedings began in 1828 (during Lord William Bentinck's Governor-Generalship, 1828-35) and ended in 1846 (when Lord Hardinge was the Governor-General, 1844-8).

187. Hunter, op. cit., p. 177. (*Vide supra*, p. 30.)

188. Ibid, p. 151. Only one Muslim, Hidāyat 'Alī, received the honorary rank of Captain ; he was singled out by Colonel Rattray during the Mutiny.

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189. Ibid., p. 159.

190. Ibid., pp. 163-4.

191. Ibid, pp. 183-4. The relevant regulations found in the "Indian Statute Books" are incorporated in the Bengal Code and pertain to the years 1793-1845.

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192. Ibid., p. 184, n. 1 : "By Act XI of 1864, subsequently repealed by the schedule attached to Act VIII of 1868 which, however, did not revive the old Regulations under which the appointments had formerly been made."

193. Ibid., p. 185.

194. Ibid,, p. 187.

195. Ibid, p. 162. The description relates to the conditions of the Bengali Muslims, but fits also those then living in other areas of India. Among the gazetted appointments were civil service posts given under contract by the Crown to Englishmen (against 260 Europeans, no Hindus or Muslims occupied such posts in April 1871), judicial officers in Non-Regulation Districts, appointed by the local Government (47 Europeans against neither Muslims nor Hindus), "Extra Assistant Commissioners" (26 Europeans, 7 Hindus and no Muslims), Deputy Magistrates and Deputy Collectors (113 Hindus, 53 Europeans, and only 6 Muslims). Among the Gazetted Police Department officers, there were 106 Europeans, 3 Hindus and no Muslims. In the three listed Establishments (Engineering, Subordinate and Accounts) of the Public Works Department, only 4 Muslims (Subordinate Establishment) served against a total of 248 Europeans (154, 72 and 22 respectively) and 198 Hindus (19, 125 and 54 respectively). (*Vide* ibid, p. 161 : "Distribution of State Patronage in Bengal, April 1871".)

196. Hunter (op. cit., p. 167) refers to a notice of vacancies in the office of the Sundarbans Commissioner, placed in the Government Gazette. It stated that solely Hindus could fill these vacancies. Dr Hunter asserts that he could not verify the advertisement, but accepted its validity as it apparently was not contradicted.

197. *Vide infra*, chapter III.

198. Hunter, op. cit., p. 165.

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199. Ibid., p. 166.

200. Ibid, pp. 120 and 191-2: various attempts to reform the *Madrasahs* have failed; "and in 1869 the Bengal Government had to issue a commission, still sitting, to inquire in the causes of its inefficiency".

201. A specific case cited was the trust left by a rich Muslim who died in the Hugli District in 1806. In his will, he asked that proceeds be used for pious purposes, usually defined as the erection of a *Madrasah* for poor Muslim scholars. Instead, the funds were used by the authorities to build an English College. To soften the Muslims' anger, a small Muslim school was attached to it, but only about 15% of the total proceeds (£350 out of £5260 were diverted for its maintenance. (Hunter, op. cit., pp. 178-81; p. 180 for figures cited.)

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202. Ibid., p. 168.

203. Ibid., p. 169 In 1817, about three decades before Macaulay's Education Minute was passed (in 1835), a Hindu College for training in the English language was founded at Calcutta through the joint efforts of an English resident watchmaker, David Hare, and the Hindu ' anglicist," Rammohan Roy (1772-1833). The Hindus were fortunate in having at this early time leaders urging them to learn this foreign language.

204. Ibid., p. 175.

205. Ibid.

206. Ibid., pp. 168-9.

207. For the obvious reason that an Islamic education in Muslim schools und- British auspices would have been unacceptable.

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208. Hunter, op. cit., p. 140.

209. Ibid., p. 144.

210. Ibid., p. 170.

211. Ibid., p. 143.

212. Ibid., p. 205.

213. Ibid., p. 202.

214. Ibid., p. 203.

Chapter II. The Growth of Modernism in Indo-Islamic Thought, pp. 37-114

Page 37

1. Baljon, *Reforms and Religious Ideas of Sayyid Ahmad Khan*, p. 2: "On the father's side he was descended from Mohammed, the Prophet, in the 36th degree. Under Umayyad tyranny, his ancestors 'fled to Damghan (Persia)' and ultimately settled in Herat (Afghanistan) whence they came to India (probably during Shāh Jahān's reign, 1628-66) and received posts in the Mughal Government."

2. Since Wellesley took Delhi from the Maratthas in 1803, the city had been in

British hands, but the Mughal Emperor (Shāh 'Ālam at that time, 1759-1806) was permitted to retain his sovereignty within the large area of his palace, the Red Fort.

3. He was apparently friendly with Emperor Akbar II (r. 1806-37), who succeeded to Shāh 'Ālam. (Baljon, op. cit., p. 2.)

4. *Vide infra*, n. 36.

5 Baljon, op. cit., p. 2, text and n. 5.

6. Aziz Ahmad, "Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muslim India," in *Studia Islamica*, Larose, Paris, Vol. XIII, March 1961, p. 57. The best study for Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's life is the biography: *Ḥayāt-i-Jāwid* ('The Life of Excellence") by the renowned Indo-Muslim poet Alṭāf Ḥusayn (Hālī) (1837-1914), which has not been translated into English so far. A good (all-comprising) English biography so far has not appeared.

7. The need to re-read scientific books by the age of thirty, when his interest in science had grown) reflects the insufficient instruction he had received in this field at the *maktab* (Baljon, op. cit., p. 3).

8. Aziz Ahmad, op. cit., p. 57.

9. Throughout this chapter, the name Sayyid Aḥmad or Aḥmad refers to Sayyid Aḥmad Khān. He is often called "Sir Sayyid" (he was knighted in 1888) to distinguish him from Sayyid Aḥmad of Rai Bareli, the Indian Wahhābī.

10. A dispute with a Palace official (Raj Sohan Lal) resulted in a decrease of Mīr Muttaqī's remunerations during his lifetime. (Baljon, op. cit., p. 4.)

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11. In the early years of the nineteenth century, Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's maternal grandfather, Farīd al-Dīn, had been an ambassador (*wakil*) in English service.

12. An assessment official. The word *amin* means "honest" and the term *ṣadr-amin* actually implied "the keeper of a trust". It was a function originally assigned to the *mushrif* or "inspector".

13. *Vide infra*, "Sir Sayyid the Theologian," pp. 42 ff., for a brief discussion on his religious tractates dating from this period. Other works dating from this period were a biography of Farīd al-Dīn, a brief sketch of Mughal royal personages (*Jām-i-Jam*, 1840), and a translation of two Persian scientific treatises, respectively, "Introduction to Mechanics" (1844) and "Advice for the Use of Compasses" (1846). (*Vide* Baljon, op. cit., "Bibliography," pp. 99-101.)

14. It was written by Abu'l-Faḍl, a friend of this Mughal Emperor (r. 1556-1605).

15. A famous Urdu poet. (*Vide infra*, pp 101 ff., for a discussion of his views.)

16 Ḥālī, op. cit., "2.39". (Reference given by Baljon, op. cit., p. 5.)

17. He suffered some personal losses during the Mutiny. His home was plundered, a cousin and an uncle were murdered (by Sikhs) and, shortly afterwards, his aged mother died from stress. Having lost his brother a decade earlier, which had saddened him deeply, no immediate family relations were left. He had meanwhile married, however.

18. Part of a speech made before an Educational Conference (28 December 1889). His wish to leave India may have been influenced by Wahhābī propaganda, although such evidence is lacking. (*Vide supra*, pp. 24-5.)

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19. *Vide infra*, pp. 43 ff., for a more detailed discussion of this work.

20. Sir Sayyid's first letter (dd. 1892), to Muḥsin-ul-Mulk, prefaced to his *Taḥrīr fī Uṣūl al-Tafsīr* (1892), translated into English by Muḥammad Daud Rahbar, and publish-

ed in *The Muslim World*, The Hartford Seminary Foundation, Hartford, Vol. XLVI, 1956, pp. 104-12 and 324-35, respectively. *Vide*, ibid., p. 332, for the statement given in the text.

21. *Vide infra*, "Sir Sayyid the Educator" (pp. 75 ff).

22 Prior to 1867, his educational policy was non-communal. (*Vide* Baljon, op. cit., p. 35, n. 33 ; *infra*, pp. 76 ff.)

23 The pertinent treatises were : "Causes of the Indian Revolt" (1860, 1861), and *Loyal Muhammadans* (1862), quoted in Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans Vide supra*, chapter I:2.

24. The administration of drugs which, if given to a healthy person, would cause in him symptoms similar to those manifested by the person suffering from a particular disease. The theory underlying this type of treatment is that like produces like.

25. His son, Sayyid Maḥmūd, was the first student from N.W. India to receive a Government fellowship.

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26 Excerpt from a letter (quoted by Hunter, op. cit., p. 187) Sir Sayyid wrote from London (on 15 October 1869) to the Secretary of the Scientific Society at Aligarh. It was published subsequently in the Society's *Gazette*.

27. Hindustan literally means "land of the Indus," i e. North-West India, which was the centre of Islamic power.

28 He discussed this book (published in 1870) with Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881), as also the latter's works. An enlarged Urdu edition of Sir Sayyid's *Essays*, entitled *Khuṭubāt al-Aḥmadiyyah*, appeared shortly afterwards. *Vide infra*, pp. 45 ff.

29 Possibly after the examples of (the daily) *The Spectator* (1711-2) and its (thrice-weekly) predecessor, *The Tatler* (1701-11). Addison satirised extremes of social behaviour, while Steele examined the profounder issues of ethics. Sir Sayyid may have become acquainted with these journals while doing library research for his *Essays*.

30 Baljon, op. cit., p. 25. Its publication was halted in 1876, because its founder had become preoccupied with plans for Aligarh College, but it was resumed twice during the 1890's.

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31. Ibid., p. 27, text and n. 10, citing as source : Ḥālī, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 169-70.

32. His *Tafsir* appeared in six parts, respectively, in 1880, 1882, 1885, 1888, 1892 and 1895. The *Taḥrir* was published in 1892. (Baljon, op. cit., p. 99 ; *vide infra*, pp. 46 ff.)

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33. *Vide infra*, pp. 76 ff.

34. His literary career began with a short historical work *Jām-i-Jam* (1840) describing the Mughal royal families. (*Vide* Baljon, op. cit., p. 100.)

35. Commemorative writings in celebration of Muḥammad's birthday (*Maulūd*). Baljon (op. cit , pp. 45-8) gives a brief summary of all tracts written by Sir Sayyid at this early stage in his career.

36. Islamic mysticism. Baljon, op cit , p. 47, n. 1 : "*Taṣawwur* ('imagining') is an essential part of the training of Naqshbandī novices. The pupil is directed to think of the Pīr's form, to retain his breath, and to suppose his heart to express the word 'Allah' (R.F. Burton, *Sindh* [1851]. p. 215)." This treatise described the spiritual mode of the Naqshbandī sect.

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37. It does not imply that Wahhābī influences were absent.

38 B.A. Dar, *Religious Thought of Sayyid Ahmad Khan* (Lahore : Institute of Islamic Culture, 1957), p. 47.

39. Baljon, op. cit , pp. 16-7.

40. It had been used as a contemptible expression for Jesus in Jewish parlance of earlier days.

41. The proper origin of the word *Naṣārā* has not been determined so far.

42. *Vide* also v. 111.

43. Mīr Muttaqī's liberalism may have influenced his son. (Baljon, op. cit., p. 77, n. 2, citing as source : Ḥālī, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 18.)

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44. In three volumes, dealing respectively with the nature of the Muslim attitude towards Holy Writ, his commentary on *Genesis* i-11, and his observation on the *Gospel of St Matthew*, chapters 1-5.

45. Baljon, op. cit., p. 78

46. Muḥammad replied to the Jews criticising him for his defective knowledge of their Scripture that the People of the Book themselves "had twisted (*ḥarafa*) the sacred books. In establishing the *taḥrīf* doctrine, however, the Muslim scholars disagreed. Some of them (Bīrūnī, Ibn Ḥazm, *et al.*) understood by it a real alteration of the text by the Jews and Christians, but other Muslim divines (Ṭabarī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Razī, Ibn Khaldūn, *et al.*) confined it to erroneous interpretations of the texts." (Baljon, op. cit., p. 78, n. 4.)

47. So he does concerning the doctrine of Christ, which he presents also in his "Commentary of the Qur'ān".

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48. *Vide supra*, chapter I, pp. 25 ff.

49. Baljon, op. cit., p. 79, text and n. 11 : "A curious argument which he produces for it is in a *ḥadith* quoted from Bukhārī (I, 3) where it is stated that 'Waraqa b. Naufal, who became a Christian before Mohammed announced his message, and who knew how to write Hebrew, copied from the gospel what God wanted that he should copy'."

50. He attacked paticularly F.C. Baur (1792-1860), who had stated that St Matthew did not write the Gospel bearing his name, and J.W. Colenso (1814-83).

51. In the sense of revelation, which is different from the Christian meaning assigned to this term. (*Vide infra*, pp 57 ff.)

52. It means that certain passages are superseded by others but again have validity when in circumstances similar to those to which they apply re-occur. (*Vide* ii. 100 for verse quoted in support of this theory, and *infra*, p. 56.)

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53. Sir William Muir, *Life of Mahomet* (London : Smith, Elder & Co., 1858 [First edn.]). He, as also his countryman Edward Gibbon (1737-94) and the Frenchman, Alphonse Lamartina (1790-1869), held that Islam was an intolerant faith His book apparently impressed the English-educated Muslims, because he founded his arguments on historical evidence. (*Vide* Baljon, op. cit , p 88, text and n 2 ; Graham, *Life and Work of Syed Ahmad Khan*, p. 49.)

54. He may have been correct, because of Islam's indirect influence (possibly) upon the Christian Reform through the Carmatian movement, which, in turn, was a sub-sect of the Shī'ite Ismā'īlites (or "Seveners"), another Muslim branch.

55. Aziz Ahmad, op. cit., p. 59, text and n. 1 (respectively, pp. 58, 59), quoting as

source: "Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's Letters" (*Khuṭūt-i-Sir Sayyid*) to Muḥsin-ul-Mulk, p. 55. (Sir Ross Mas'ūd, compiler, 2nd edn., Badaun, 1931.) The first edition of this exchange, entitled *Makātabat al-Khullān* ("Correspondence of Friends") was published by Muḥammad 'Uthmān Maqbūl in 1915. The opening letters are prefixed to Sir Sayyid's work on Qur'ānic exegesis.

56. Baljon, op cit., p. 87. Speech delivered at Lahore on 1 February 1884. Source quoted (n. 11.: *Lectures ka Majmū'ah* (1890), Part I, compiled by Muḥammad Sirāj al-Dīn, p. 210. The second volume, entitled *Majmū'ah Lectures* (1892) and the third, called *Mukammal Majmū'ah Lectures wa Speeches* (1900) were compiled respectively by Sirāj al-Dīn and Muḥammad Imām al-Dīn.

57. *Vide supra*, p. 41, n. 32, for the dates when its various parts were published. Sir Sayyid's *Tafsir* is not a word-for-word "Commentary," but a series of essays on selected verses relating to important issues of his day. A major portion of this work discusses those sections which involved (according to its author) supernatural phenomena. It was written to avert, in fact, a decisive attitude by Aligarh's graduates towards the miraculous and the supernatural in the Qur'ān. (Muhammad Daud Rahbar, "Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan's Principles of Exegesis Translated from His *Taḥrir fi Uṣūl al-Tafsir*" in two parts, published respectively in *The Muslim World*, The Hartford Seminary Foundation, Hartford, Vol. XLVI, 1956, pp. 104-12 and 324-35. *Vide* pp. 49 and 50.)

58. Sir Sayyid's first letter (1892) to Muḥsin-ul-Mulk in the series prefixed to his *Taḥrir*. (*Vide* Rahbar, op. cit , p. 332.)

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59. *Vide infra*, pp. 48 ff.

60. *Taḥrir*, Principle 6 (quoted by Rahbar in *The Muslim World*, Vol. XLVI, No. 2, April 1956, p. 107).

61. Ibid., Principle 7 (*idem*).

62. *Vide infra*, p. 60, n. 132.

63. Born at Murcia, Spain, he died at Damascus, where his tomb is still standing. He is renowned for his *Futūḥāt al-Makkiyyah* ("Meccan Revelations") and the *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam* ("Bezels of Wisdom").

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64. *Tafsir a'-Qur'ān* (henceforth abbreviated as T.Q.) "2, 91-92". Sir Sayyid said that the word *selem* should be rendered in its "original" meaning of "shadow". (Baljon, op cit., p. 80, text and n. 13.)

65. It is a recurrent theme throughout the Qur'ān and a forceful denial of Arabian polytheism on the one hand and the Christian doctrine of Jesus as God's Son on the other.

66. Involved is the thesis that essence implies existence, advanced by the Western Catholic theologian St Anselm (1033-1109 C.E.), and accepted later by the French philosopher Rene Descartes (1596-1650). The latter may have influenced Sir Sayyid's theological concepts. (*Vide infra*, p. 76, for foreign influences on him). Within the Islamic theological tradition, the Mu'tazilite theory that attributes formed part of the Divine substance was countered by the criticism that they would become indistinct from God and hence cease to be recognisable.

67. It also refers to the problem of Allah's creation of unbelief and His damnation of the faithless.

68. Baljon, op. cit., p. 51. Source listed (n. 1): "*Tahzib al-Akhlāq*, 5th July, 1894".

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69. Ibid., pp. 50-1, citing the same source.

70. Ibid., p. 52. Source quoted (n. 26) : "T.A. of 5th July, 1894". *Vide* the theory of "contingency," developed by Baron Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716) who stated that it is logically possible for the entire universe and every particular thing in it not to exist; the sufficient reason for its existence is God.

71. In the sense that, despite God's remoteness, He initiates everything.

72. The Qur'ānic and Jewish doctrines of creation agree with each other in so far as *creatio ex nihilo*, the six days, and the completion of creation are concerned. The Old Testament, unlike the Qur'ān, says that God rested on the seventh day (*Genesis* 2 : 2, 3).

73. It springs from the movement for the incorporation of Jews in the cultural and political life of the countries where they resided. It was initiated in Germany by Moses Mendelssohn (1729-86).

74. *The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia* (New York City : 1941), Vol. III, p. 398.

75. Baljon, op. cit., p. 52. Source quoted (p. 53, n. 27) : "T.A. of 5th June, 1894".

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76. *Taḥrir*, Principle 7 (Rahbar in op. cit., April 1956, pp. 107-8).

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77. *Vide*, for instance, xx. 47 ff., presenting a direct discourse between Allah and Moses (who receives the command to proceed to Pharaoh's court) ; cf. also vii, 139-141 (Moses's request that God manifest Himself).

78. *Taḥrir*, Principles 1 and 5.

79. Ibid., Principle 6.

80. Ibid., Principle 7.

81. Ibid., Principle 14.

82 Ibid., Principle 9.

83. He agreed with Shāh Walī Allāh that miracles occur in conformance with "natural law," but the latter still held that they are supernatural, which is rejected by Sir Sayyid.

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84. Exegesis of S. xxvi. 63. *Tafsir*, Vol. I, pp. 84-8, quotation from p. 84. The Mu'tazilite Hishām b. 'Amr al-Futwāṭī also expressed disbelief in supernatural events. (Baljon, op. cit., pp. 55-6 and 92 citing al-Maqrīzī [1364-1442 C.E.], author of *al-Mawā'iẓ wa'l-I'tibār fī Dhikr al-Khiṭaṭ wa'l-Āthār* ("Sermons and Learning by Example on account of the new settlements and remains"), ed. Bulaq, 2 vols., 1853, Part 2, p. 347.

85. *Taḥrir*, Principle 15 (Rahbar, op. cit., p. 329).

86. *Essays* posthumely collected (*Ākhirī Maḍāmīn*), written between 1897 and 1898, pp. 41-2. (Baljon, op. cit., pp. 54-5, n. 36 for source.)

87. Baljon, op. cit., p. 55.

88. This view was held also by Abū Mūsā 'Isā b. Ṣabīḥ, *alias* al-Muzdar ; *vide* al-Maqrīzī, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 346, (Baljon, op. cit., p. 92.)

89. *Taḥrir*, Principle 8. (Rahbar's translation, op. cit., p. 108.)

90. Ibid., Principle 8 which forms the substance of this entire section's discussion.

91 The more orthodox Ash'ariyyah denied the existence of natural law.

92. *Vide*, f.i, xxxiii. 62.

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93. *Taḥrir*, Principle 8.

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94. Ibid., Principle 5.

95. Ibid., Principle 15.

96. F. i. : "Heaven's gates," the camel passing through a needle's eye (vii. 37), quoted by Sir Sayyid as examples. (*Taḥrir*, Principle 15.)

97. Ibid., Principle 15.

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98. Ibid., Principle 15.

99. *Tafsir al-Jinn wa'l-Jann 'alā mā fi'l-Qur'ān* ("Commentary on the Jinn and Jann of the Qur'ān"), 1892.

100. vi. 100 ; lxxii. 5 ; xxxvii. 158 ; xxxiv. 40 ; vi. 41 ; and xxix. 37. This view was held by the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā' (Brethren of Purity). (Baljon, op. cit., respectively, pp. 57-8 and 92)

101. He quoted the lexicon, entitled *al-Siḥāḥ* (Bulaq, 2 vols. 1292 H) by the Arab philologist Jawharī (died *c.* 1008 C.E.), who defined the word *ins* (or *ans*) as settled tribes inhabiting villages and towns ; hence, they were regarded as civilised (Baljon, op. cit., p. 58.)

102. *Taḥrir*, Principle 15. This view is given under the same Principle as his theory on *tā'wil* for obvious reasons.

103. "Essay on Mohammedan Traditions," found in his *Essays on the Life of Mohammed.*

104. Baljon, op. cit., p. 62, text and n. 58, citing as source : "A.M. 96".

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105. Ibid., n. 59, citing as source : "T.A. 185".

106. Ibid., p. 63, text and n. 62, citing as source : "A.M. 97". This reference covers both questions in the above-mentioned paragraph.

107. Ibid., p. 62, text and n. 60, citing as source : "Eassays on Mohammedan Traditions, p. 14".

108. Ibid., p. 62, text and n. 61, citing as source : "A.M. 132".

109. Rahbar, op. cit., p. 331.

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110. Maulavī 'Alī Bakhsh Khān made a pilgrimage to Mecca to obtain a *fatwā* from the *muftis* of each of the four "schools" denouncing Sir Sayyid for his rejection of miracles, angels, the devil, his view that Muḥammad's heavenly journey (*mi'rāj*) was a vision rather than an actual event and that slavery continued from pre-Islamic into Islamic times, i.e. while Islam forbade slavery, those held in bondage were not immediately released, although rules for their treatment were decreed. (Few Muslim modernists have taken this stand) (*Vide* Sir Sayyid's *Ibṭāl-i-Ghulāmī* or "Abolition of Slavery," 1893.) 'Alī Bakhsh also wanted to have their opinion on whether Muslims were permitted to support Aligarh College, an institution founded by a man said to claim that Muslims were uneducated unless they were taught European ideas. (*Vide infra*, "Sir Sayyid, the Educator".) Source : Baljon, op. cit., p. 28.

111. *Tafsīr*, Vol. I, 162. (Baljon, op. cit., p. 53.)

112. *Vide* x. 16, 38.

113. *Taḥrīr*, Principle 8.

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114. *Tafsir*, Vol. I, 26-9. (Baljon, op. cit., pp. 58-9.)

115. *Taḥrīr*, Principle 4.

116. Shāh Walī Allāh, *al-Tafhīmāt-i-Ilāhiyyah* ("Allah's Speech"), quoted by Rahbar, op. cit , p 106.

117. Doctrine of *Tadalliyyāt*. *Vide* ii. 91 : ". . . Gabriel . . . it is who by God's leave hath caused the Koran to descend on thy heart. . . ." It could furnish evidence for the infusion process

118. *Vide*, for instance, xvi. 104.

119. Mu'tazilism may have been influenced by Christianity. J.B. Moss, *Man's Religions* (New York : The Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 745.

120. "The word *spirit* is probably to be understood of the Angel Gabriel." (Qur'ān, op. cit., p. 171, n. 5 by the Rev. J. M. Rodwell ; *vide* also ibid., n. 3, p. 346.)

121 Cf. xliii. 2 and xviii. 110.

122. *Taḥrīr*, Principle 4.

123. T.Q . Vol. I, 29. (Baljon, *Modern Muslim Koran Interpretation* [Leiden : E J. Brill, 1961], p. 65, n. 3.)

124. *Vide supra*, p. 41, n. 32, giving 1880 as publication date for the first volume of T.Q.

125 In particular, the views given by George Berkeley (1685-1753), namely, without a percipient mind, revelation (a fact) cannot occur (*A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* [La Salle : The Open Court Publishing Company, 1950], Part I. Principles 2 and 3, pp. 30-1.). The Urdu word for heart (*dil*) conveys a sense similar to the Western concept of the "soul" or "mind".

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126. *Vide supra*, pp. 47, 48, 50,

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127. *Tahdhib al-Akhlāq*, Part 2 (in Faḍl al-Dīn's edn.), pp. 124 ff. (Baljon, *Reforms*. . . . pp. 60-1, n. 55.)

128. *Vide supra*, p. 58.

129. *Vide supra*, p. 44.

130 To prevent his divinisation, as he fully rejected the Christian doctrine of Jesus (xviii. 10)

131. Sir Sayyid interpreted Muḥammad's attack on a small Qurayshite caravan (Battle of Badr, 2 H) as an attack decreed by God against unbelievers (i.e non-Muslims). He rationalised the Prophet's marriage to Zainab (xxxiii. 37) by saying that (as a cousin) he knew her since childhood, married her (against her will) to his adopted son (ex-slave) Zaid, and feeling responsible after her divorce, wed her himself. (Baljon, *Reforms*, pp. 59-60 ; sources quoted respectively for Badr event, "*Tafsīr*, 4, 3-4," and for the Zainab affair, "A.M., 162-5".)

132. Particularly, in his old age, Sir Sayyid visited the tomb (at Sirhind) of Shaikh Aḥmad (1564-1624 C.E.), an Indian reformer (reacting against extreme Ṣūfism). Baljon (*Reforms*, p. 86,) regarded it as an "indication that Aḥmad Khān cannot have been a rationalist with all his heart".

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133. Gnosticism crept into Islamic mysticism.

134. *Vide* xxxiii. 38 : "No blame attacheth to the Prophet where God hath given him a permission."

135. By "His," of course, is meant Allah's.

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136. Qur'ān, op cit., pp. 346 and 207, nn. 3 and 2, respectively.

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137. Ibid., p. 406, n. 1.

138. The Holy Qur'ān, translated by Maulvī Muḥammad 'Alī (Lahore, Aḥmadīyyah Anjuman-i-Ishā'at-i-Islām, 1935), p. 156, n. 427. The verse number in this translation is 46 contrary to Rodwell's 42.

139. Beidh is the commentator mentioned by the Rev. Rodwell (Qur'ān, op. cit., p. 390, n 4).

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140. Walter, *The Ahmadiya Movement*, p. 36, n. 1.

141. Qur'ān, op. cit., p. 391, n. 2.

142. Baljon, *Reforms*, p. 81, text and n. 16 : "T.K., 3, 84".

143 T.Q., Vol. III, 80. In its 2nd volume (p. 29), Sir Sayyid explains the designation "Son of God" as a Greek epithet for revered persons (e.g. Romulus, Plato), which Christians used for Jesus when expressing their doctrine in Greek idiom. (Baljon, *Reforms*. pp 80-4, n. 15, p. 81.)

144. Joseph, according to *Matthew*, 1 : 18, 24 ; *Luke*, 1 : 27 ; *et al.*

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145. T.Q., Vol. II, pp 43 ff. (Baljon, *Reforms*, p. 83, containing quotation and citing [in n. 22] its source.) Cf. *Mark*, 16 : 4-6 ; *Matthew*, 28 : 5-6 : *Luke*, 24 : 2.

146. *Vide* Baljon *Modern Muslim Koran Interpretation*, p. 70, n. 2 and p. 71, n. 1.

147. *Vide* also iii. 73 ; xix. 36 ; iv. 169 ; *et al.*

148 *Vide supra*, p. 61.

149 Disagreement exists on the doctrine of the Virgin Birth and resurrection between Islamic orthodoxy and the modernists on the one, and among the latter, on the other hand (*vide* Baljon, *Modern Muslim Koran Interpretation*, p. 70, n 2 and p. 71, n. 1).

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150. "T.K. 1, 14-5". (Baljon, *Reforms*, p. 61, text and n. 56.)

151. *Tahdhib*, Part 2 (in Faḍl al-Dīn's edn.), p. 532. (Baljon, *Reforms*, p. 61, text and n. 55.)

152. *Vide*, further, *infra*, pp. 67 ff.

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153. *Taḥrir*, Principle 9.

154. *Tahdhib al-Akhlāq*, 2 September 1894. (Baljon, *Reforms*, p. 67, text and n. 77.)

155. T.A., issue dated 22 August 1895. *Vide* also Sir Sayyid's *Tafsir al-Qur'ān*, Vol. I, pp. 16-7. (Baljon, *Reforms*, pp. 63-4, text and nn. 66, 67, on p. 64.)

156. Tradition cited by 'Abdallah b. 'Umar, who heard it from his father 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭâb, one of the Prophet's Companions and the Second Caliph. (*Vide* Sir Sayyid's T.Q., Vol. VI, p. 167, cited by Baljon, *Reforms*, p. 65, text and n. 70 and p 64, n 69 : "This tradition can . . . be found in al-Mu'tazilah (ed. by T.W. Arnold [1902], p 8-9". It is noted in al-Murtaḍā's *Kitāb al-Milal wa'l-Niḥal*.)

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157. Among the earliest philosophical sects in Islam were the Qadarīyah favouring free will (from them developed the Mutakallimūn) and the Jabarīyah, who were deter-

minists. Orthodox Ash'arites—like the Jabarīyah—were predestinarians. The Mu'tazilites (who sprang from the Mutakallimūn) stressed free will.

158. Sir Sayyid's treatises on prayer were: "The Ode of the Ritual" (*Ṭariqat al-Ṣalāt*, 1887), covering daily prayer according to the Ḥanafī rite; "Mysteries of Prayer" (*Asrār al-Ṣalāt*, 1888); "Personal Prayer and Fulfilment of Duties" (*al-Du'ā' wa'l-Istijābat*, 1892).

159. It implies such rules (*aṣlī*) as: ablution, prostration, the folding of arms, concentration on God, presentation of humility and needs, direction of prayer (*qiblah*).

160. Muḥsin-ul-Mulk's fourth and seventh letters to Sir Sayyid, both written in August 1895. (Baljon, *Reforms*, pp. 74-5.)

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161. Doctrine of *Karma*. He did not accept, of course, the Hindu theories of rebirth and transmigration.

162. *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān*, Vol. III, p. 55. (Baljon, *Reforms*, p. 57, text and n. 45)

163. Said to be ten altogether: the sun's rise from the west, the coming respectively of a big beast, Gog and Magog ("barbarian hosts"), ad-Dajjāl (the False Messiah), Jesus, a dense smoke, and three eclipses—or earthquakes—in the west, the east and the Arabian Peninsula. (Abū Dāwūd's *Sunan*, Tazi edn., Cairo, 1929, Part II, p. 212. *Vide* A. Jeffery, [ed.], *Muhammad and His Religion* [New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1958], p. 144.) Orthodox Muslims believe in two trumpet blasts, separated from each other by forty years.

164. Some interesting analogies can be drawn between Sir Sayyid and al-Ghazālī: both lived at a time of upheaval, were teachers (although the former in a less academic way than the latter), spent time away from their abode (the latter in solitude, the former abroad) and laboured on a theological analysis, which had a rationalist base.

165. Again, a similarity exists between Sir Sayyid's and al-Ghazālī's career, for the latter also sought the service of foreigners (the Saljūqs), who (unlike the British), however, were from the East and Islamised.

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166. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Modern Islam in India* (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1946), p. 22.

167. In a sense similar to that given it by Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-78).

168. Baljon, *Reforms*, pp. 86 ff.

169. Sir Sayyid's reproach of Muḥsin-ul-Mulk's view, expressed in the former's letter dated 8 October 1892 to his friend. (Last in the series prefixed to his *Taḥrīr*, *vide* Rahbar, op. cit., pp. 334-5.)

170. Muḥsin-ul-Mulk's reply to Sir Sayyid's first letter, both dated August 1892. (*Vide* Rahbar, op. cit., pp. 332-3.)

171. The Egyptian modernists, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1838-97) and (his disciple and collaborator) Muḥammad 'Abduh wrote fierce articles against Sir Sayyid both for his theological and political (pro-British) stand in their periodical "The Indisssoluble Bond" (*al-'Urwat al-Wuthqā*) and in separate articles. *Vide*, for instance, al-Afghānī's "Refutation of Materialism" (original Persian title: *Radd Neitcheriyye*, first published in Bombay, 1881, translated into Arabic by Muḥammad 'Abduh, and its 1902 edition into French by M.A. Goichon, Paris, 1942).

172. Muḥsin-ul-Mulk's first letter to Sir Sayyid, dated 9 August 1892. (Baljon *Reforms*, p. 74, n. 24.)

173. *Vide infra*, pp. 94 ff.

174. Baljon, *Reforms*, p. 74, n. 24. (Rahbar, op. cit., p. 333.)

175. Muhsin-ul-Mulk's second letter to Sir Sayyid, dated 18 September 1892. (Baljon, *Reforms*, p 74, n. 24.)

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176. Rahbar, op. cit., p. 333.

177. Goichon, op. cit., p. 62. *Neicheriyye* is the Persian word for "natural religion," formed from an anglo-arabicised word "natur" to which the genetive ī was added, and which was transcribed according to English pronunciation.

178. "Sayings" attributed to Muḥammad.

179. "Customs" of the Prophet and the Muslim community.

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180. Women's seclusion behind a curtain. *Vide* xxxiii. 53, called "Verse of the Curtain," which may date from 5 H /627 C E.

181. Quoted by Baljon, *Reforms*, p. 31, from "A.M. p. 1". Some of Sir Sayyid's contemporary "followers," among them S. Khudā Bakhsh (*vide infra*, p. 92).

182. *Vide supra*, p. 66.

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183. Their role could be compared with that of the papacy in so far as they had similar authority. However, they act concertly as a group, while the popes have supreme power. It is a fact, nevertheless, that the Muslim theologians' consensus has the same force as the papal decrees.

184. *Vide infra*, chapter III.

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185. He did not accuse them of having brought about their decay, which he attributed rather to political and economic factors. (*Vide supra*, chapter 1 : 2.)

186. The danger is present, however.

187. *Vide* Muhsin-ul-Mulk s first letter to Sir Sayyid, in which he wrote that many "naturalists" had given up religion altogether.

188. "T.A. 196." (Baljon, *Reforms*, pp. 66-7, n. 76)

189. By the end of the tenth century C.E., when the four schools of law had been developed, Muslims gave up their independent judgment in religious matters by following one or another of these "rites".

190. "*Majmū'ah*, I, 221." (Baljon, *Reforms*, p. 66, n. 76.)

191. That is, what will be the sources and the nature of such a new Code ? Will it essentially be Islamic ?

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192. This problem is encountered mainly in the Sunnite world ; the Shī'ites have their *mujtahidin*.

193. Baljon, *Reforms*, p. 34, n. 30 : "The exact date is not mentioned by Ḥālī, as he states only : 'in those days'." The context indicates (according to Baljon) *c.* 1859. Ḥālī's *Biography* (first volume) is the chief source for Sir Sayyid's educational activities and policies.

194. He did not emphasise translation as much in later years. (*Vide infra*, p. 76.)

195. *Vide* his Report to the Commission on Education (1882), advocating British English "primary and middle schools" only for youths who will continue in higher education.

196. A Hindu, Raja Hardev Narayan Singh, was the school's first patron. (Baljon,

Reforms, p. 35, n. 33.)

197. *Vide infra*, pp. 76 ff.

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198. That is to say, it did not concern itself solely with the training of Muslims. (*Vile nfra*, chapter VII, for a detailed discussion of communalism and nationalism in Islamic India.)

199. Elphinstone's *History of India*, Senior's and Mill's works on Political Economy, Burn's book on Agriculture, Harris's treatise on Electricity, and a number of elementary books on Algebra and Arithmetic were among those works which the Society translated. (Baljon, *Reforms*, p. 35, n. 34.)

200. Nearly two decades later he confessed to the failure of the Society's aim : " 'I perceived that it is impossible to instruct my people by means of translated works of modern sciences' " (statement made in a lecture presented at Jalandhar on 4 February 1884 : "See *Majmū'a*, I, 231. " Baljon, *Reforms*, p. 36, n. 35.

201. Ibid., pp. 35-6, n. 33.

202. Baljon (Ibid., p. 36) made this statement ; the evidence points to its correctness. It implies that Sir Sayyid was not a communalist, at least not at that time. (*Vide infra*, pp. 81 ff.)

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203. Graham, op. cit., pp. 242 ff. (*Vide* also Baljon, *Reforms*, p. 37.)

204. Graham, op. cit., p. 319.

205. Ibid., p. 320.

206. Ibid.

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207. Baljon, *Reforms*, p. 38.

208. Ibid., p. 38. Baljon adds (in n. 39) that Sir Sayyid preferred not to visit his birthplace, "lest all the sad memories of those days would be awakened in him. (Cf. H.J. 2, 491.)

209. Some obstacles had to be met, namely, the collector in Aligarh did not wish to see the plot designated for the college to become rent-free property. Stratchey's intervention was necessary. Baljon, *Reforms*, p. 7, n. 24.

210. Ibid., p. 41. Sir Sayyid's own theological views were not taught. (Footnote 44, citing as source : "Iftikhār 'Ālam, *History of the Mohammadan College*, p. 130".) Those students absent from prayers were fined (Baljon, n. 45).

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211. Compare the following figures : 3.4% against the Government census of 45.9% in Bengal ; 0.9% *versus* 6.8% in Madras. (Baljon, *Reforms*, p. 42.)

212. *Vide infra*, chapter III.

213. Speech given before the meeting of the Muhammadan Educational Conference in December 1887. (Baljon, *Reforms*, p. 43.)

214. The English had done so (*vide supra*, p. 33, n. 201).

215. Another relevant resolution was to request the Government that it include religious instruction for Muslims in the schools. It reflects an attitude similar to that held in Catholicism, which considers religion as moulding the human personality and, hence, as an integral part of education.

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216. Baljon, *Reforms*, p. 44, n. 52, citing as source : "*Majmū'a*, I, 266-9". The state-

ment was made before the Muhammadan Educational Conference (3rd session, 1888).

217. Graham, op. cit., p. 323.

218. Ibid., pp. 324-5.

219. View expressed before the Commission on Education. (Baljon, *Reforms*, p. 44, n. 52, citing as source : "H.J. I. 252-3".)

220. Statement made on the occasion of Sir William Muir's visit to Aligarh (12 November 1875). (Graham, op. cit., p. 257.) Undoubtedly, he wished to assuage the English-man's view that European culture (providing education for women) is superior. (*Vide supra*, p. 46.)

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221. "*Majmū'a*, 3, 501." (Source cited by Baljon, *Reforms*, p. 37, n. 36.)

222. "H.J. I : 252." Statement made before the Commission on Education. (Source cited by Baljon, *Reforms*, p. 37, n. 36, referring furthermore to a similar criticism expressed by Sir Sayyid and found in "A.M. 63".)

223. In the sense of obtaining government posts.

224. Graham, op. cit., p. 257, reporting also Sir Sayyid's motto : "The true student is a student all his life."

225. *Vide* footnote 228 *infra*.

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226. *Vide* Ikram, op. cit., p. 33.

227. Represented by such men as the Hon. Messrs Surendranath Banerjea (1848-1926) and Gopal Krishna Gokhale (1866-1915), both of whom pleaded for Indian, i.e. Hindu-Muslim, unity.

228. The foremost among them were the writer Bankim Chandra Chatterjee (1838-94) whose poem *Bande Matram* ("Hail to the Mother"), at once an invocation to Bengal and the Hindu goddess Kali swept the religious and nationalist emotions—and the political figure Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856-1920), born in the Mahratta Deccan (stronghold of Hindu orthodox reaction), who revived the cult of Shivaji, the first Mahratta chief to rebel against Muslim domination, and incited India to boycott British imports (Swadeshi movement).

229. Founded by Dayanada Saraswati (in 1875 at Bombay), it was the most militant Hindu organisation. To what extent extremist Hinduism may have been influenced by Wahhābī and Mahratta discontent is as yet an open question. In any case, it reflected a severe reaction against Christian and Muslim influences.

230. *Vide infra*, chapter VII.

231. *Vide infra*, p. 7.

232. Wallbank, op. cit., p. 66, *vide infra*, p. 97.

233. Ikram, op. cit., p. 43.

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234. *Vide supra*, pp. 30 ff.

235. Ikram, op. cit., pp. 36-7.

236. W.C. Smith, op. cit., p. 25. Statement made in 1884.

237. Speech, entitled "The Present State of Indian Politics," quoted by Richard Symonds, *The Making of Pakistan* (London : Faber and Faber, 1949), p. 31.

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238. *Vide infra*, chapter VII : 3.

239. Ikram, op. cit., pp. 51-2, n. 1, p. 52: cited from : *Eminent Mussalmans* (Nateson), pp. 30-1.

240. *Vide infra*, chapter V : 4.

241. Graham, op. cit., p. 316.

242. Prior and subsequent to 1857. (*Vide supra*, pp. 39-40.)

243. Delhi became India's capital in 1911.

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244. *Vide supra*, pp. 29-30.

245. Aziz Ahmad, op. cit., p. 65, text and n. 4 ; Ḥālī, op. cit., II, 340.

246. Founded by Amīr 'Alī and other young Muslims at Calcutta in 1877, ten years after the Benares episode. (*Vide supra*, p. 76, and *infra*, p. 111.)

247. Aziz Ahmad, op. cit., p. 65.

248. Daniel and Alice Thorner, "India and Pakistan," article in *Most of the World* (ed. Ralph Linton), New York : Columbia University Press, 1949, p. 603.

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249. Aziz Ahmad, op. cit., p. 69, text and n. 2. It is one of the fifty-two innovations listed by "Ḥālī, op. cit., II, 256." Sir Sayyid had supported the *tanzimāt* and later reforms in Turkey and had sent a copy of his *Essays on the Life of Mohammed* to Sulṭān 'Abd al-'Azīz with a note (dd. 18 July 1870) enpressing the hope that the Sulṭān would remain the defender of " 'the throne of the Caliph'." (Aziz Ahmad, op. cit., p. 68, text and n. 1 : "Graham, op. cit., 114-5." *Vide infra*, chapter V : 4.)

250. Aziz Ahmad, op. cit., p. 72, text and n. 1: "Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, *Ākhiri Mazāmin*, 32-3."

251. Ibid., p. 72, text and n. 2 : "Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, *Khilāfat and Khalifa*, article in *Ākhiri Mazāmin*, p. 39. Also his *Truth about Khilāfat*, Lahore, 1916 " (*Vide* also *supra*, chapter I.)

252. Ibid , pp. 66-7. Al-Afghānī denounced Sir Sayyid for his pro-Britishness. Source quoted (p. 66, n. 3) : "al-Afghānī, *Sharḥ-i-Ḥal-i-Aghurian*. 1879."

253. F.K. Khan Durrani, *The Meaning of Pakistan* (Lahore : Shaikh Muhammad Asharf, 1944), pp. 63-4.

254. Ikram, op. cit., p. 57.

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255. *Vide infra*, chapter VII.

256 Baljon, *Reforms*, p. 63, text and n. 63 : "Cf. T.A. 15-20."

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257. *Vide* ibid., chapter V : "Opposition to Aḥmad Khān."

258 His journey to London, his disregard for Muslim food regulations (he ate strangled hens on board ship—*vide* ibid., p. 69, n. 8, citing as source Sir Sayyid's *Musāfirān-i-London* or "Travellers to London"), and the lottery he organised to collect money for Aligarh's support (although gambling is forbidden by the Qur'ān, ii. 216 for instance—*vide* ibid , p. 96) incensed Indo-Muslim orthodoxy.

259. Baljon (*Reforms*, p. 86) suggests the term "rational supernaturalism for Sir Sayyid's religious doctrine, because it is a compromise between belief in God and His intervention in human history on the one hand and on the other hand the need for a re-examination of the content of revelation.

260. *Vide* ibid., p. 93, where this opinion is also expressed.

261. W.C. Smith (op. cit , Part I, chapters I, II and III, respectively) divides Indo-Muslim modernism into three parts : The Aligarh Group, taking European civilisation as their ideal for comparison : a circle of men using the Islamic past for their criterion of

measurement; and, lastly, that movement (initiated by and centred on Muḥammad Iqbāl) demanding the creation of a progressive Indo-Muslim culture, oriented towards the future.

262. Rahman (op. cit., p 84) limits the designation "Aligarh School" to those immediately connected with this institution. Contrary to W.C. Smith, he excludes Professor Khudā Bakhsh from it despite the latter's presentation of views which are similar to Sir Sayyid's.

263. His position differs from Sir Sayyid's, but he felt also the need for reform. (*Vide infra*, pp. 95 ff.)

264. Died 15 June 1895.

265. Chirāgh 'Alī, op. cit., "Introduction," p. xxxiv (cited by W. C. Smith, op. cit., p. 29 text and p. 315, n. 32).

266. xxx. 38, for instance, reads in part: "Whatever ye put out at usury to increase it with the substance of others shall have no increase from God. . . ."

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267. iv. 38 reads in part: "Men are superior to women on account of the qualities with which God hath gifted the one above the other. . . ."

268 xxxiii. 53 b: "And when ye would ask any gift of his wives, ask it from behind a wall. . . ." Called the "Verse of the Curtain," it may date from 5 H, 627 C.E. The custom probably was practised by the neighbouring Persians and Byzantines. Muḥammad introduced it among the Arabs.

269. Compare the demand made by the Egyptian modernist, Muḥammad 'Abduh (1849-1905), not only for the improvement of the educational system (stressed by Sir Sayyid) but also for the equal treatment of each wife, as advocated in iv. 3, which, he felt, points to monogamy. The Egyptian and Turkish modernists took a far stronger critical stand on the status of Islamic womanhood than did the Indo-Muslim group.

270. This doctrine was advanced by the early Abbasids for propaganda purposes in the eighth century C.E.

271. He may have been influenced in his view by Muḥammad 'Abduh. One of the three editors of "The Egyptian Events" (*al-Waqā'i' al-Miṣriyyah*), the official Egyptian Government organ at the time, 'Abduh advocated a representative government elected by the people. The *Sharī'ah* does not define such a political institution.

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272. Died 15 October 1947.

273. After 1857, Sir Sayyid became a forward-looking man. None of his later works deal with India's Islamic past.

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274. Khuda Bakhsh, *Essays: Indian and Islamic* (London: Probsthain & Co., 1912), pp. 23-4.

275. Ibid., p. 284. *Vide* also pp. 13 ff., where the five daily prayers, payment of the poor-tax (*zakāt*), fast (during Ramaḍān) and pilgrimage are included. These are duties performed by most Muslims.

276. He may have been influenced in his views also directly by another Egyptian modernist, Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā' (1865-1935)—'Abduh's disciple—who advocated the drawing up of a new system of laws.

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277. Gibb, *Whither Islam?*, p. 202 (no source cited).

278. *Vide infra*, chapters VIII and IX.

279. Khuda Bakhsh, op. cit., pp. 255 ff.

280. Ibid., p. 256.

281. Ibid , p. 258.

282. Ibid , p. 259.

283. The Ottoman Empire was tottering (and by 1916 lay prostrate). *Vide infra*, chapter V.

284 Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, while in Paris, founded (in 1884) a journal by this name (its Arabic equivalent : *al-'Urwat al-Wuthqā*), which served as the organ of a secret anti-colonialist organisation similarly called. (The journal's last edition appeared in October 1895.)

285. Khudā Bakhsh on this issue also may have been influenced by Rashīd Riḍā' or Muḥammad 'Abduh who, himself, had broken with al-Afghānī, because he preferred education to revolution as the means to achieve eventual self-government.

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286. Was the idea of the League of Nations influenced in part, perhaps, by the Muslim concept of brotherhood ?

287. *Vide*, for instance, iii. 79 : "Whoso desireth any other religion than Islam . . . in the next world he shall be among the lost."

288. Khuda Bakhsh, op. cit., p. 216.

289. Ibid , pp. 224-5.

290. Ibid , p. 225.

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291. Ibid., p. 24.

292. The modernist attitude is given.

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293. Khuda Bakhsh, op. cit., p. 215.

294. Ibid., pp. 214-5.

295. Ibid., pp. 219-20.

296. W.C. Smith, op. cit , p. 32.

297. *Vide* Ikram, op. cit , pp. 82-95, for a more detailed description of his activities.

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298. *Vide supra*, pp- 70-1.

299. Ikram, op. cit., p. 83.

300. Ibid., p. 84.

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301. Ibid., p. 85.

302. Ibid., p. 89.

303. W.C. Smith, op. cit., p. 30.

304. *Vide supra*, chapter I : 2.

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305. *Vide infra*, chapter VII : 2.

306. Ikram, op cit , p. 116.

307 *Vide supra*, chapter VII.

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308 Ikram, op. cit , p. 117, text and n. "1. Quoted in *Tazkirah-i-Viqar*, pp. 169-170.

309. Ibid , p. 118, text and n. "1. Quoted in *Tazkirah-i-Viqar*, pp. 340-341."

310. Ibid , p. 119.

311. Ibid.
312. Ibid., p. 121.
313. Ibid.
314. Ibid., p. 122.

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315. Sir Sayyid's contemporary, Karl Marx (1818 83) held that man is the master of his own destiny. Was the Indo-Muslim modernist influenced by the Russian's view ? (It is a preponderant theme in the entire modernist movement.)

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316. *Musaddas* ("Ebb and Flow of Islam"), published in 1879. The opening quatrain is quoted, using the translation by F. Rahman, op. cit., p. 85.

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317. *Vide infra*, chapter V : 1.
318. *Vide infra*, chapter VII.
319. Vide Ikram, op. cit., p. 78, quoted from Ḥālī's poem "Patriotism".
320. Ibid., p. 79.

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321. Prior to the First World War, a distinction was made between the Near, Middle and Far East. The Near East comprised Greece, Bulgaria, Egypt, Syria, Turkey as well as Syria and Lebanon (the Levant States). The Middle East included Iraq, Arabia, Iran, the Gulf Shaykhdoms, the Aden Protectorate and Colony and Afghanistan. The Far East embraced, amongst others, India, inclusive of its predominantly Muslim-settled territories.
322. *Vide infra*, chapter V.
323. *Vide infra*, chapter III : 1.
324. *Vide infra*, chapter III : 2 and 3.
325. Ikram, op. cit., pp. 135-6; *vide infra*, chapter VII.
326. Ikram, op. cit., p. 135.

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327. This colleague had written an article on *Jihād* (Ikram, op. cit., p. 138). *Vide infra*, p. 106, for Shiblī's political views.
328. This seems to be Professor Ikram's thesis (op. cit., p. 138).
329. *Al-Kalām*, Lahore : 1952, p. 10. (Translation by Rahman, op. cit., p. 85.) This book was published first in 1904. Among Shiblī's many outstanding works are : "Life of the Prophet" (*Sīrat al-Nabī*, completed by his pupil Sulaymān Nadwī), "Life of 'Umar the Great, the second Caliph of Islam" (first English-translated volume of *al-Fārūq*, 1899), "Life of the Imām Abū Ḥanīfah" (*Sīrat al-Nu'mān*, 1893). Apart from these and other writings he authored "A History of Persian Poetry" (*Shi'r al-'Ajam*, 5 vols., 1908 ff.). (*Vide* W. C. Smith, op. cit., p. 316, for further bibliographical references.)
330. Aziz Ahmad, op. cit., p. 73.

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331. Ibid., p. 72, text and n. 5 : "Shiblī, article on *Khilāfat* in *Maqālāt*, I, 182-7." (The *Maqālāt* was published at Azamgarh, 1930-4) This doctrine is held by Shāfi'ites.

332. Nādir Qulī (1688-1747), born near Mohamedabad (modern Kala Kuhna) in Khurasan, succeeded the Ṣafavid monarch Shāh Ṭahmāsp (in 1736) to Persia's throne and invaded India (then ruled by the Mughal Emperor Muḥammad Shāh) in 1738. Delhi

had to surrender and give up its treasures including the Peacock Throne.

333. An independent dynasty.

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334. He had married an English woman, née Isabelle Ida Kostam.

335. *Vide infra,* p. 248.

336. He sent a letter jointly with the late Aga Khān to the then Ottoman Prime Minister, 'Iṣmat Pāshā. It appeared in the Istanbul Press before its receipt by the Ankara Government (*Vide* Appendix K).

337. Apart from those mentioned, he wrote a number of legal tractates, among them a two-volume work on *Mahomedan Law, A Student's Handbook of Mahomedan Law,* and *A Commentary on the Bengal Tenancy Act.*

338. *The Life and Teachings of Mohammed* (Williams and Norgate, 1873). (Subsequent references to this book, whose content in many cases is the same as that of *The Spirit of Islam,* will be given simply as *Mohammed*)

339. First published in 1891. Amīr 'Alī revised it several times, lastly in 1922. It was reprinted in 1953.

340. London, 1899 ; 10th (revised) reprint, 1951.

341. Constable & Co.. Ltd., 1906. The book was reprinted in 1909 and 1914. The last reprint has been consulted.

342. Due to the many different aspects found in his thinking, a division similar to that applied to Sir Sayyid's system has been made.

343. *Mohammed,* pp. 150-1.

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344. Ibid., p. 160 *Vide* also *Islam,* pp. 4 ff.

345. *Mohammed,* p. 159.

346. *Islam,* pp. 3-4.

347. Ibid., p. 16.

348. Ibid., p. 15.

349. Ibid., 16-7.

350. Ibid., pp. 13-5.

351. *Mohammed,* p. 227.

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352. *The Spirit of Islam* (London : Christophers, 1935 reprint), (First edition published in 1891) P. 139.

353. *Mohammed,* p. 15.

354 *Spirit of Islam,* 1935, pp. 142-3.

355. *Vide supra,* p. 65.

356 *Mohammed,* p. 223.

357. Ibid., p 225.

358. *The Legal Position of Women in Islam* (University of London Press, Ltd , 1912), p. 8.

359. Ibid , pp. 9 ff.

360 Old English law did not bestow this right, but the rule was changed about 1833. American law also permits an ascendant to inherit from a descendant.

361. *The Legal Position of Women in Islam,* p. 21, where he states that "Abū Ḥanīfa . . . has declared that a woman is entitled to hold the office of Judge or Kāzī equally with a man." He asks whether Europe "has risen to the same conception of woman's rights

and privileges in the twentieth century ?"

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362. Ibid , p. 31.
363. Ibid , p. 25.
364 *Mohammed*, p 254.
365 Ibid., pp. 254-5.
366. *The Legal Position of Women in Islam*, pp. 36, 37.
367. *Mohammed*, pp. 206-7. (*Vide* ii. 257.)
368. Ibid , p. 207.
369. Ibid., p. 205.

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370. Ibid., p., 216.
371. For instance, the Zoroastrians of Persia, the Copts of Egypt, the Assyrians and the Jews were persecuted since Islam's earliest times. It is true, however, that at certain periods, Christians and Jews were able to pursue their activities unhindered and participate in the life around them.
372. *Spirit of Islam*, p. 176.
373 *Mohammed*, p 189.
374. Ibid., p. 341, n. Source cited : "The Kitāb-ul-Mustatrif, chap. ii ; also given in the *Mishkāt*, Bk. xxii, chap. 18, pt. 3 (from Abū Hurairah)."
375 Ibid , pp. 290-1.
376. Ibid., p. 160.

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377. Particularly the theory postulated by Henri Bergson (1859-1941) on the intellect (reason) and instinct (intuition).
378 *Islam*, p 48, text and n. 3 : "An interesting pamphlet called *The Agreement between Science and Religion*, by Orlando J. Smith (New York : Farrell)."
379. It may have stimulated the Hindus to found their Indian National Congress in 1885.
380 *The Encyclopaedia of Islam* (Leiden : E.J. Brill, 1960), Vol. I, No. 443. Source quoted : Amīr 'Ali's "*Memoirs*, 1932, No. 10."
381 Ibid., I, p 443.

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382 *Eminent Mussalmans* (1st edn.), G.A. Natesan, Madras (n.d.), p. 157. No source cited.
383. He was among those who persuaded Lord Morley to grant separate electorates to India's Muslims (a policy favoured by Sir Sayyid). *Vide infra*, chapter VII.
384. *Eminent Mussalmans*, p. 158.
385. Ibid.
386 *Vide infra*, chapter V : 4 for a discussion of *Khilāfatism*.

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387. *Mohammed*, p 206.
388 *Spirit of Islam*.

Chapter III : The Orthodox Reaction, pp. 115-135

ge 115

1. According to the Muslim philosophers, the world's plurality and variety are not derived directly from God, but from a series of incorporeal mediators (a single, self-subsistent principle, the first created ; abstract intellect" or "angel" ; and so on). This Aristotelian-Neoplatonic doctrine was rejected by al-Ghazālī, who postulated the theory of mediation. (Averroes's *Tahāfut at-Tahāfut* or "The Incoherence of the Incoherence," tr. by Simon van den Bergh [Oxford University Press, 1954]. *Vide* p. 104 for al-Ghazālī's argument.)

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2. The "Canon of Medicine" (*al-Qānūn fī al-Ṭibb*) by Avicenna, 980-1037 C.E., remained a standard medical text in European universities unt l the seventeenth century. The *Opticae Thesaurus* (*Kitāb al-Manāẓir*) by Ibn al-Ḥaytham of Basra (965-*c*. 1039), alias Alhazen, influenced, amongst others, Leonardo da Vinci and Johann Kepler.

3. Averroes (Ibn Rushd), op. cit., p. 316.

4. Ibid., "About the Natural Sciences," p. 330.

5. Ibid., pp. 311 ff. Al-Ghazālī held that religion does not object to their pursuit except on four points : (1) logical relation between cause and effect ; (2) soul's spirituality; (3) its substantiality ; (4) its immortality. Despite his refutation, he nevertheless accepted the soul's spirituality.

6. Sulṭān Maḥmūd raided the Punjab seventeen times between 999 and 1026 C.E. and founded the Ghaznavid principality—the first Muslim political centre in the Punjab —at Lohore. One of his greatest contemporaries, al-Bīrūnī (973-1048) of Khiva (located today in the Uzbek S.S.R.) followed the Sulṭān to the Punjab, mastered Sanskrit and wrote his famous work : *Inquiry into India*.

7. *Rulings on Temporary Government* (*Fatāwā yi-Jahāndārī*) by Ḍiyā'-ud-Dīn Barnī (*c*. 1285-*c*. 1357 C.E.), the greatest Indo-Muslim historian of the Sultanate period. *Vide* folio 10b of op. cit., quoted in *Sources of Indian Tradition*, p. 481.

8. "Between the end of the twelfth century and the end of the fifteenth, three great Ṣūfī orders had migrated from Iraq and Persia into northern India, the Chishtī, the Suhrawardī, and the Firdausī. The first was the largest and most popular ' and had its centre in present Uttar Pradesh. The other two orders established themselves respectively in Sind and Bihar (*Sources*, p. 147).

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9. He belonged to the Firdausī order and wrote a Collection of Letters (*Maktūbat-i-Sa'dī*.

10. *Maktūbāt-i-Sa'dī*, p. 49 ; quoted in *Sources*, p. 421.

11. *Maktūbāt-i-Sa'dī*, p. 51 ; *Sources*, p. 421.

12. The aim of the Ṣūfīs, unlike that of the theologians, was to attain union (gnosis) with God.

13. *Sources*, p. 461, adapting the *Visva-Bharati Annals* ; quotation from Vol. IV, pp. 35-6.

14. Gibb, Ed., *Whither Islam*, p. 212.

15. Of the Ḥanafite rite. The Shāfi'ites, Ḥanbalites and Mālikites had no *madrasahs* of their own in India. The Twelve Shī'ah have their Madrasat al-Wā'iẓīn at Lucknow.

16. The curricular development of India's *madrasahs* can be divided historically into five stages, respectively : thirteenth-sixteenth, sixteenth-seventeenth, seventeenth-eighteenth, eighteenth-nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. Asaf A.A. Fyzee, "Islamic

Law and Theology in India—Proposals for a Fresh Approach," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 8, No. 2, Spring 1954, p. 168.

17. Since the fifteenth century, and even prior thereto, Ḥanafite schools of Law were found in India. Fyzee, op. cit., p. 167.

18. Its foundation was ordered by the Emperor Aurangzeb in 1684. Ibid., p. 169. *Vide* also *infra*, pp. 127-8.

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19. It is still given today in the *madrasahs*, which, according to the rough 1950 Government of India census, numbered 88. Fyzee, op. cit., p. 167.

20. Ibid., p. 168.

21. Islamic, unlike medieval Western, philosophy remained closely connected with theology. The latter, in ancient times, included the physical but in the modern era inclines towards the natural sciences. The former's development, therefore, has been quite different.

22. *Fatḥ al-Raḥmān*. Arabic studies in India strengthened the local languages (Urdu, Hindi) and supported Persian, the State language until the advent of the English. Fyzee, op. cit., respectively, pp. 171 and 168.

23. It must not be compared essentially with the Protestant development in Germany. Luther's translation of the Bible from Latin into German (in 1523)—which was preceded by Wycliff's English rendering (fourteenth century)—represented a fierce reaction against papal authority, made possible by the Humanist Tradition. It furthermore enabled the population at large to (learn to) read the Scripture. Islam did not experience Humanism as such an orientation—inherent in Mu'tazilism—was squashed by traditionalism (perhaps because it did not inherit the tradition of the *Prophets*). Even today, many Muslim theologians oppose the translation of the Qur'ān into vernacular tongues precisely because this would open the way to individual interpretation(s).

24. *Ḥujjat Allāh al-Bālighah*, published by Munīrīyyah Press, Cairo, 1352 H. (Also in a Karenki edn., n.d.). Fyzee, op. cit., p. 171.

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25. *Vide supra*, chapter I : 2.

26. *Vide supra*, chapter I : 2. Hunter (in his *The Indian Musulmans*) makes suggestions to this end. The British did not heed them and it was left to Sir Sayyid to carry them out.

27. *Vide* pp. 133 ff. for the meaning and aim of education.

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28. This last point reveals the power of political influences which remained dominant throughout the first half of the twentieth century.

29. After partition, Aligarh was taken over by India's Government. Fyzee, op. cit., p. 172. Its religious character no longer seems predominant.

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30. J. N. Farquhar, *Modern Religious Movements in India* (London : Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1929), pp. 347-9.

31. Ibid., p. 348. Farquhar's statement that the Anjuman set up a Ḥamīdīyah School is erroneous.

32. Ibid., pp. 348-9.

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33. Ibid., p. 349.

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34 *Vide infra*, pp. 125-6.

35 That is, during the Non-Co-operation and Khilāfat Movements. *Vide infra*, chapter V : 4.

36 W.C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, p. 128.

37 The Khilāfat leader, Muḥammad 'Alī, was its first head. He represented the modernist viewpoint.

38 W. C. Smith, op. cit., p. 130.

39 Ibid.

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40 The term "nationalist" here refers to the nation-wide (Indian) rather than the communal (Muslim or Hindu) sphere.

41. S. M. Ikram, *Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan*, p. 125.

42. Ibid., p. 124, citing as source (in n. 1) : "K.M. Pannikar, *A Survey of Indian History* (5th edn.), p. 283".

43 Farquhar, op. cit., p. 351.

44 Ikram, op. cit., p. 126, also for the statistics.

45. Farquhar, op. cit., p. 351.

46. Smith, op. cit., p. 295; *vide* Ikram, op. cit., pp. 129-30.

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47 Smith, op. cit., p. 295.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Polygamy existed in pre-Islamic Arabia. Apart from following custom, Muḥammad contracted multiple marriages (after Khadījah's decease) for two chief reasons: the bereavement of many women whose breadwinnders died in battle and his desire to link himself with some of the noble families and thus reduce jealousies. *Vide* Qur'ān, xxxiii 49, in which Muḥammad is given the unique privilege of marrying "any believing woman" if he so desires. (Compare verse 51.) *Vide* also iv. 128 : "And ye will not have it at all in your power to treat your wives alike, even though you fain would do so. . . ."

52 xxxiii. 53, known as "Verse of the Curtain". The custom may have originated with Muḥammad's marriage to Zainab (Zaid's divorced wife, *vide* verse 37) in 5 H. (627 C.E.).

53. iv. 38.

54 As examples may be cited the Farangī Maḥall (*vide supra*, pp. 117-8), and al-Azhar (built in 972 C.E).

55. Ikram, op. cit., p. 127.

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56. *Vide supra*, pp. 96 ff.

57 *Vide supra*, p. 97, and *infra*, pp. 247-8.

58 Aziz Ahmad, "Les Musulmans et le Nationalism Indien" (The Muslims and Indian Nationalism), extract from the journal *Orient*, No. 20, Societe d'Etudes et de Publications, Paris, p. 3.

59. Ikram, op. cit.

60 Farquhar, op. cit., p. 350.

61. Branches sprung up subsequently at Madras and Shahjahanpur.

62 Farquhar, op. cit, p. 350.
63 Ibid.

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64 W. C. Smith, op. cit., p. 296.
65 Ibid.
66 *Vide infra*, chapter III : 3.
67 *Vide supra*, p. 117.

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68 Smith, op. cit, p. 296.
69. Farquhar, op. cit., p. 351.

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70 *Vide infra*, pp. 205 6.
71 Smith, op. cit., p. 297.
72 *Vide infra*, chapter VII : 1, 2.
73 *Vide infra*, chapter VII : 3.
74 Smith, op. cit., pp. 297, 270 and 331, n. 8.
75. *Vide infra*, pp. 309-10.

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76. Such as those written by Muḥammad 'Abduh.

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77 Smith, op. cit., pp. 270, 297-8.
78 *Vide supra*, pp. 102 ff.
79 Smith, op. cit, p. 42.
80. Muḥammad Shiblī, *Khuṭabāt*, in which he scores the *Dars-i-Niẓāmi*.
81. Ibid, p. 16, translated by Fyzee, op. cit., pp. 169-70.

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82. Smith, op. cit, p. 40.

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83 The Qur'ānic view that the Muslim is Allah's vicegerent can be interpreted as applying to each individual, but the political development in the Islamic world was oligarchic in nature.

84. Smith, op. cit., p. 296.

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85. Such an education as offered by most institutions in the West is rejected, because it does not attempt to inculcate spiritual values. The phrase "moral values" not necessarily implies a religious content ; it is derived from the influence of Humanism, resulting from the Renaissance and originating from Athenian liberalism. Also, *vide supra*, p 118, n. 23.

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86. Gibb, op. cit., p. 212.

87. Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, *The Second Five-Year Plan (1960-1965)*, p. 350.

Chapter IV : The Aḥmadīyyah Movement, pp. 136-182.

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1. A designation often worn by members of Mughal descent in the subcontinent.

2. According to Mr Walter, *The Aḥmadiya Movement*, p. 13, Islampur was the capital of the small state in which Ghulām Aḥmad's ancestors settled and its name was changed later to Qadiyan His information differs from the account given by an outstanding Aḥmadīyyah (Sir Muḥammad Ẓafarullah Khān, in a bulletin entitled *The Head of the Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam*, The Moslem Sunrise Press, Chicago, p. 1), which has been presented in the text.

3. Ghulām Aḥmad's birthdate seems uncertain. Walter (op. cit, p. 1) gives 1839, but mentions in a footnote (number 2) that 1836 or 1837 is often stated. Sir Muḥammad Ẓafarullah Khān lists 1835 as Ghulām Aḥmad's year of birth.

4. For this portion of Ghulām Aḥmad's biography, I am indebted to Mr Walter, op. cit., p 14.

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5. The accounts given by Mr Walter and Sir Ẓafarullah Khān (op. cit.) on Ghulām Aḥmad's rejection of and disinterest in his father's efforts fully coincide.

6. Walter, op. cit, pp. 15-6.

7. *Vide infra*, pp. 143 ff.

8. These works have not been translated into English.

9. *The Review of Religions*, Vol. VI (1907), p. 271. The authorship—neither indicated for this nor many other articles—must undoubtedly be ascribed to Mirza Ghulām Aḥmad. A collection of these *fatwās* exists in Urdu.

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10 The first issue of this *Review* came out at Qadiyan in 1892 ; it ended with volume XLVII in 1947

11. *Vide infra*, pp. 140 and 166 ff.

12 Walter, op. cit., pp. 111-2.

13. Ibid., pp. 43-4.

14. Ibid., p. 45, qouted from *The Review of Religions*, V (1906), p. 459 ; cf. also V, p. 461.

15. He did not accept Ghulām Aḥmad's challenge to enter into a prayer-duel with him. Dowie also called himself, among others, "The Promised Messiah" and set up "Zion City"—a religious community of sorts—on Lake Michigan's shores in 1901. He was ultimately suspended from the church. Cf. *The Review of Religions*, VI : "Divine Judgment in Dowie's Death," pp. 117-29 ; and "American Press on the Dowie Prediction," pp. 300-5 —quotations cited from "The War of the Prophets" in the New York *Truth Seeker* (15 June 1907), from "A Messiah in India," in the *Dunnville Gazette* (7 June 1907), and from the Boston *Herald* (25 June 1907).

16 See *The Review of Religions*, V : "The Will of the Promised Messiah," pp. 24-37.

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17. The general belief is that Ghulām Aḥmad died of cholera.

18. On his role after Ghulām Aḥmad's death, *vide infra*, pp. 156 ff.

19. *The Review of Religions*, VII, pp. 241-7 ; quotation cited from p. 242.

20. This informatian was taken by Mr Walter (op. cit., p. 15) from one of Ghulām Aḥmad's biographers, Mi'rāj-ud-Dīn, who wrote in 1908.

21. Walter, op. cit., p. 23.

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22. *The Review of Religions*, V, p. 150. (Quoted by Walter, op. cit., pp. 19-20.)

23. Dr Griswold is the author of a biography entitled *Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the Mehdi Messiah of Qadiyan*, Ludhiana, Punjab, 1902. The quotation is taken from Walter, op. cit., p. 21.

24. Walter, op. cit., p. 23.

25. *Vide supra*, p. 137.

26. Walter, op. cit., p. 43.

27. In 1905 a new province, of Eastern Bengal and Assam, was in part created out of a section of old Bengal, and there was a general realignment of boundaries in that part of India. The move was believed by the Hindu populace to be an attempt to weaken national, political and religious feeling, and proved so unpopular that in December 1911 . . . announcement was made of a forthcoming rearrangement of the boundaries, whereby Eastern Bengal was to be reunited to Bengal proper in the present Bengal Presidency." Walter, op. cit., p 47, n 2

28. *The Review of Religions*, V, p. 82 (Walter, op. cit., p. 47).

29. Ibid., p. 363, and Walter, op. cit., p 48. An article in *The Review of Religions*, XV, for May 1916 (p. 168) entitled "Ahmad's Prophecy about Bengal," states that his prediction has been fulfilled because of the rearrangement announced on 12 December 1911.

30. *The Review of Religions*, III, p. 350 (quoted by Walter, op. cit., p. 44).

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31. The mystics in Islam.

32. Cf. an article entitled "Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, a False Messiah of India," *The Missionary Review of the World*, New Series, XX. (Reference taken from Walter, op. cit., p. 47, n. 1)

33. *Vide supra* p. 138.

34. *Vide infra*, Appendix G.

35. Walter, p. 19.

36. Ibid., p. 21, taken from Dr Griswold, op. cit. (*vide supra*, p. 140, n. 23).

37. *Vide* "The Divine Origin of the Holy Quran," *The Review of Religions*, VIII and IX.

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38. *The Review of Religions*, VI, p. 49 ; cf. also p. 53.

39. Qur'an, v. 52 ; cf. also chapter III : 2.

40. *Vide infra*, pp. 142, 159-60, and Appendix I.

41. "Islam" by Muḥammad 'Alī, reprinted in *The Review of Religions*, X, pp. 1-21, on p. 3 : A Speech Presented at the Allahabad Conference of Religion in January 1911.

42. Mirza Bashir-ud-Din Mahmud Ahmad, *Ahmadiyyat* or *The True Islam*, 3rd edn. (Washington, D. C.: McGregor & Werner, Inc., 1951), p 17.

43 Walter, op. cit., p 55, and n. 1 ; *idem.* : the saints have *ilhām*, that is, "direct illumination" in contradistinction to 'that which comes through study and deduction".

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44. Quoted by Walter (op. cit., pp. 25-6) from "My Claim to Promised Messiahship," a paper made public in 1904. *The Review Religions*, III, p. 331.

45. An eclipse will be one of the signs of the last days and is said to be foretold in

a *hadith*, "included in the *Maṣābiḥ as sunna* of Al Baghawi, Cairo, Vol. II, p. 147. It is not in the Qur'an" (Walter, op. cit., p. 30, n. 1).

46. Walter, op. cit. p. 35, quoted from *The Review of Religions*, I, p. 318.

47 Ibid., p. 31, quoted from *The Review of Religions*, II, p. 369 "Sale (*Preliminary Discourse*, Sect. IV, pp. 56 ff) gives many of the signs found in the various traditions, together with their source" (Walter, op cit., p. 30, n. 2).

48 Mirza Bashir-ud-Din Mahmud, op. cit., p. 28.

49 Jesus addressing Israel to convince them of Muḥammad's valid demands that they accept Islam. Ghulām Aḥmad interpreted this verse as referring not to Muḥammad, but to himself, as bearer of the name Aḥmad (*Review of Religions*, I, p. 266).

50. *The Review of Religions*, I, p. 266. Another basic question involves the figure of the Paraclete. *Vide infra*, pp. 167-8 for the discussion on this subject.

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51. Ibid., I, p. 251 (quoted by Walter, op. cit., p. 37; cf. also p. 36).

52. Walter, op. cit., p. 39.

53 *The Review of Religions*, VI, p. 284.

54. Ghulam Ahmad, *The Philosophy of the Teachings of Islam*, The Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam (Washington D.C.: 1953), p. 13.

55 Ibid. "The Muhammadans, the Mahdi and the Ahmadiyya Movement," pp. 271-90, quoted from p. 279, and taken from a work entitled the *Iqtirāh-us-Sā'at*, whose author apparently was Ṣiddīq Ḥasan Khān, at one time the leader of a puritanical Wahhābite group, called the Ahl-i-Ḥadīth ("People of Tradition"), who were about 40,000 strong in the Panjab in the 1910's and to whom the name refers in particular. (The figure is given by Walter, op. cit., p. 17. n. 3.)

56. *The Review of Religions*, VI, p. 290.

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57. This verse is numbered 190 in some other editions of the Qur'ān. *Vide supra*, chapter I : 2.

58. *The Review of Religions*, p. 283.

59. This is the first of the three main tenets of the Qadiyan Aḥmadīyyahs. (*Vide* Walter, op. cit., pp. 121-2)

60. *The Review of Religions*, VI, contains a series of articles entitled "The Purity of the Text of the Holy Quran."

61. Muḥammad's Companions (who knew what the Prophet said and did in all kinds of situations) passed this knowledge on to the Followers No tradition beyond Muḥammad's second generation was accepted as genuine. The six books of *Hadiths* were probably accepted by general contemporary consent as canonical. The Aḥmadīyyahs do not accept all of the traditions contained therein. The Ahl-i-Qur'ān ("People of the Qur'ān"), another Muslim sect, reject the *Hadiths* altogether.

62. No Muslim accepts Mr Rodwell's statement that 225 verses are abrogated, (*Qur'an*, p. 349, n. 1).

63. *The Review of Religions*, VI, p. 294. Although, according to the Aḥmadīyyahs, a few traditions concerning abrogated verses are recorded by Bukhārī, none of these derive from Muḥammad.

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64. Ibid., p. 299.

65. Ibid., p. 295.

66. *Vide supra*, chapter II : 1.

67. *The Review of Religions*, VI, p. 364.

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68. Ibid., p. 365.

69. Ibid., p. 366.

70. Islam does not accept the Christian doctrine of Sin ; it appears to be closer to the Judaic (Prophetic) concept of backsliding.

71. Arthur Jeffery, Ed., *Islam, Muhammad and His Religion*, The Library of Religion, No. Six (New York : The Liberal Arts Press, 1958), "Predestination," pp. 147-8.

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72 Sir Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, *My Faith*, The Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam, Washington, D.C p. 14 (no publication date given).

73 Jeffery, op. cit., "On Predestination and the Decree," pp. 149-50. Accepting this tradition's authenticity, Muḥammad's view was that Allah had created the devil to test man's faith. The Aḥmadīyyah position could be defined on the basis of this tradition.

74. *Vide supra*, pp. 67 ff.

75 E g., the Mu'tazilites, who, contrary to the Jabrites, advanced the doctrine of free will. Muḥammad Iqbāl later stressed the dynamism implied in that doctrine. *Vide infra*, pp 219 ff.

76. Walter, op. cit., p. 57, quoted from *The Review of Religions*, XIV (1915), p. 449.

77. This legal impost amounts to one-fortieth of a person's annual income and is levied for the purpose of assisting needy Muslims.

78. The very young, the very old and the sick are exempted from this duty.

79. Walter, op. cit., p. 69, quoted from *The Review of Religions*, X, p. 62.

80. Ibid., p. 68, quoted from *The Review of Religions*, I, p. 322.

81. Cf., for instance, Qur'ān, iii. 129, 130. The greatest sin, *shirk* or human association with God, will not be forgiven.

82. Ghulam Ahmad, *The Philosophy of the Teachings of Islam*: "Question One : The Physical, Moral and Spiritual States of Man," cf. pp. 19-23 for quotations given.

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83. Ibid., pp 20-1.

84. Ibid., p. 22.

85 Ibid., "Question Two : The State of Man in the After-Life," pp. 125-43.

86 Ibid., p. 132 Qur'ān xxiii. 102, "in which this word appears is the source of the Muslim conception of an intermediate state" (Walter, op. cit., p. 62, n. 1).

87 Ghulam Ahmad, *The Teachings of Islam*, p. 134.

88 Ibid., pp. 135-6.

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89. Ibid., p. 26.

90 Ibid., p. 25.

91. Ghulām Aḥmad translated the Arabic word *nafsun* as "soul" (its more prevalent English equivalent) or as "spirit" ; for instance, *nafs-i-ammārah* as "uncontrollable spirit," *nafs-i-muṭma'innah* as "soul at rest".

92. Qur'ān, op. cit., lvi. 12-37, lii. 20, *et al.* for the descriptions of Paradise ; lvi.

40-56, 93-94, lxix 30-31 for those depicting Hell.

93. *Vide supra*, p. 67,

94. Ghulam Ahmad, *The Teachings of Islam*. p. 162.

95. "This new body is not a body of clay. . . ." *Vide supra*, p 149.

96. Ghulam Ahmad, *The Teachings of Islam*, p. 143 ; cf. also ibid., pp. 126-7, and Sir Sayyid's view, *vide supra*, pp. 68 ff.

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97. Walter, op. cit , p. 123.

98. Christians and Jews were called by Muhammad the "People of the Book," but latter he accused them of apostasy, because they refused to embrace Islam, i.e. the ultimate true religion.

99. Quoted by Walter (op. cit., p. 74, n. 1) from a Turkish textbook on canon law, called "Meeting of the Seas" (*Multak ı-ul-Abḥār*) by Ibrāhīm of Aleppo, 1873, pp. 396-7. This reference and its translation were provided from Mr Walter by the late Professor M H. Ananikian of Hartford, U.S.A.

100. *The Review of Religions*, VII : "Effect of Apostasy from Islamism in British India," pp 145-73, quoted from p. 149.

101 One of Ghulām Aḥmad's followers in Afghanistan, Maulvī 'Abdul Laṭīf, was slain on Amīr 'Abdur Raḥmān's orders, because he was regarded as a *murtadd*. See *The Review of Religions*, XI (1912) : "Persecution of the Ahmadis," (pp. 448-57) for the details of this happening.

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102. Ghulam Ahmad, *The Teachings of Islam*, pp. 99 and 32 respectively.

103. Ibid., p. 100.

104 This word means "evidence" or, in religious terminology, "evidence of the faith". In fact, it is the name given to the Muslim credal formula : "There is no God but God and Muhammad is His Apostle" ; by repeating it (aloud or to oneself), one bears witness to the Faith.

105. *The Review of Religions*, VI : "Fundamental Doctrines of the Muslim Faith," pp 24-35, quoted from p. 27.

106. Neither food nor liquids may be taken from sunrise to sunset.

107. Nor required of the very old, young or sick.

108. Ghulam Ahmad, *The Teachings of Islam*, p. 118.

109. Ibid.

110. Ibid., p 82.

111. The monist Ṣūfīs were in the majority ; the smaller group consisted of those maintaining that God and creation are not the same, as creation is not part of God's essence, concluding that monism is invalid.

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112. *Vide supra*, pp. 151-2, for his interpretation of Paradise.

113. This doctrine, which is pertinent to the theory of the Caliphate (*vide infra*, chapter V : 4 [*a*]), has two aspects : one stressing its theological formulation and the other its linguistic-political development. The former is discussed in this section.

114. Muḥammad, who remarried upon Khadījah's death, held Abū Bakr's daughter 'Ā'yeshah to be his favourite wife.

115. Abū Bakr and 'Alī were not chosen especially because of their relationship to Muḥammad, but as staunch defenders of Islam and able administrators.

116. During the Umayyad (661-749 C.E.) and the Abbasid (750-1258 C.E.) Caliphates, as during the Ottoman Empire (1300-1922), succession was determined (once the forebear of each of these dynasties had established himself by conquest as ruler) by royal lineage.

117. This is the wider meaning of *sunnah*, namely, the custom of the Muslim world, which collectively are denoted today by the term "shi'ār" (*vide infra*, p. 162, n. 156).

118. "The term *khalīfah* occurs only twice in the Koran (2 : 28, 38 : 25) ; in neither case does it seem to have any technical signifiance or to carry any indication that it was intended to be applied to the successor of Muḥammad" (Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, p. 178 ; *vide infra*, chapter V : 4 [*a*].)

119. This word refers to the Islamic world as a whole prior to the break-up of the Ottoman Empire. Since then, the term "communities," referring to large political entities in which the Empire was divided, can be appropriately used. Prior to it, "communities" refer, in the context of Muslim history, specifically to Islamic settlements.

120. The word *Shī'ah* means a "party". The Shī'ites form 'Alī's party.

121. 'Alī (murdered), his elder son al-Ḥasan (probably poisoned) and his younger son al-Ḥusayn (slain at the battle of Karbala, fought between 'Alīd and Umayyad forces, on 10 October 680—10 Muḥarram 61—which date marks the beginning of the development of *imāmate* doctrine). By their death, they bore witness to their faith.

122. "Imām" comes "from an Arabic stem meaning to precede, to lead," in the services, which function was originally preserved for Muḥammad ; it then devolved upon the caliphs (Hitti, op. cit., p. 248, n. 1). In theory, any Muslim can lead an Islamic congregation in prayer.

123. The next three *imāms* of the sect known as the Twelvers were no blood-relations to Ḥusayn. (*Vide* next note.)

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124. Hitti, op. cit., p. 248, and n. 4 : "Immunity from error and sin is ascribed in varying degrees by Sunnites to the prophets only, especially to Muḥammad."

125. According to Islamic political theory, *mulk* or "kingship" refers to absolute illimited authority in contradistinction to the concept of vicegerency, which implies rule derived from Allah and hence is limited.

126. Hitti, op. cit., p. 185.

127. Mirza Bashir-ud-Din Mahmud, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

128. Ibid., p. 177.

129. Ibn Khaldūn, Ya'qūbī, Ṭabarī, for instance. (Cf. Hitti, op. cit., pp. 197-8.)

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130. Bashir-ud-Din Mahmud, op. cit., p. 175.

131. Ibid., p. 177. By "the Islamic constitution" is meant the Qur'ān.

132. This happened when the first Aḥmadīyyah *khalīfah* fell sick and asked Bashīr-ud-Dīn Maḥmūd to take over.

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133. *Vide infra*, p. 157.

134. Sir Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

135. Walter, op. cit., p. 113.

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136. It occurred during the viceroyalty of Lord Hardinge, an attempt on whose life had been made in 1912, a year after Queen Mother Mary and the late King George V of

England had been crowned formally at Delhi, a ceremony held for the purpose of strengthening the ties between India and the Crown. India was then already in the throes of political turbulence. Cf. Wallbank, *India in the New Era*, pp. 92 and 97.

137. Walter, op. cit., pp. 113, 114, and 67.

138. It was at that time a bi-weekly vernacular, but later became an important daily publication.

139. Walter, op. cit., p. 114. According to Sir Ẓafarullah Khān, who is, himself, an Aḥmadīyyah, Bashīr-ud-Dīn Maḥmūd did not take part in the controversy; see, op. cit., p. 8.

140. He was the leader of the anti-Aḥmadīyyah forces in Indian Islam (*vide supra*, p. 137). Prior thereto, he was one of Ghulām Aḥmad's followers and editor of *The Review of Religions*, in which he was assisted for some time by Khwājah Kamāl-ud-Dīn. (Walter, op. cit., p. 17.)

141. Sir Zafarullah Khan, op. cit., p. 9. *Khalifa-tul-Masiḥ I* means the "first successor to the Messiah".

142. According to Mr A.Q. Zaighun, the orthodox Aḥmadīyyah representative whom I interviewed in New York (*vide* Preface), Maulavī Muḥammad 'Alī wished to be chosen as the Aḥmadīyyah leader. This is neither mentioned by Mr Walter nor by Sir Ẓafarullah Khān.

143. He was in England where he had gone as an Aḥmadīyyah missionary in 1912, opened a mission (*vide infra*, part 4), and had started, in 1913, a magazine called first *Muslim India and the Islamic Review* and known later as *The Islamic Review and Muslim India* (*Vide infra*, pp. 165-6.)

144. Walter, op. cit., pp. 114, 126.

145. *Vide infra* pp. 158-9.

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146. Sir Zafarullah Khan, op. cit., p. 7.

147. Ibid.

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148. Walter, op. cit., p. 116.

149. *Vide infra*, Appendix I.

150. Volume I, S. 1-9; Volume II, part 1, S. 10-18; Lahore, 1947 and 1949, respectively.

151. Sir Zafarullah Khan, op. cit., p. 22.

152. Walter, op. cit., p. 118.

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153. Bashir-ud-Din Mahmud, op. cit., p. 175.

154. This latest figure was given by Mr Zaighun.

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155. Sir Zafarullah Khan, op. cit., p. 13.

156. This custom, it is believed, was taken over by Islam upon contact with Sassanid Iran. *Pardah* (literally "behind the curtain") is not enjoined in the Qur'ān, but it is part of the *shi'ār* of the Muslim world. (*Vide supra*, chapter II : 2).

157. Sir Zafarullah Khan, op. cit., p. 14.

158. *The Review of Religions*, XXXVIII, "Lajnato Amaillah"—"Association of the Maid-servants of God," p. 239.

159. Ibid.

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160. *Vide infra,* Appendix F.

161. *Vide infra,* Appendix G.

162. Walter, op. cit., p. 118.

163. Ibid. Monghyr is a town situated in a district of the same name in West Bengal.

164. Ibid., p. 119. Mr Walter did not divulge the source containing this quotation.

165. He started later his own sect, carrying with him the approximately 300 adherents whom he had converted earlier to Aḥmadīyyat. He proclaimed : "'I am the man from God : You must all follow me. I am the real Khalifa of Qadian.'" (Walter, op. cit., pp. 46 and 119.)

166. Ibid., p. 118

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167. Ibid., p. 119. The majority of the Malabar Muslims are Moplahs (or Mapillas). They "are descendants of Arab immigrants of the eighth and ninth centuries, with a considerable admixture of Hindu blood.' (*Idem.*, n. 2.)

168. Ibid., p. 120. This report was published in *The Review of Religions*, IV (June 1916), p. 224.

169. Mirza Mubarak Ahmad, *Our Foreign Missions* (Lahore : Lion Press, end of 1958), p. 22; also *vide infra,* Appendix F.

170. *Vide infra,* Appendix I; cf. Appendix H.

171. *Vide infra,* Appendix J.

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172. This is clear from their Declaration Form ; *vide infra,* Appendix K.

173. Khwājah Kamāl-ud-Dīn graduated from Forman Christian College, received a B.A. in 1893, then became a pleader in Peshawar and later in Lahore. As mentioned, he seceded from the Qadiyan party. He had gone to England early in 1912. *Vide supra,* p. 147, n. 143.

174. Lord Headley's conversion created a sensation in England. The *New York Times* of 21 December 1913 carried this news and a description of a meeting held at the London mission during the first days of December 1913. Walter, op. cit., "Appendix V".

175. Ibid., p. 126.

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176 *Vide supra,* part 3, "Sesession".

177 *Vide supra,* pp. 157-8.

178 *Vide infra,* Appendix K.

179. *Vide infra,* pp. 176 ff.

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180. Muslims generally maintain that this prophecy refers to Muḥammad. "Other Scriptural passages which Muslims apply to Muḥammad are : Deuteronomy, 33 : 2 ; Isaiah, 21 : 6" *et al.* (Walter, op cit., p. 27, n. 1).

181. Hazrat Mirza Bashir-ud-Din Mahmud Ahmad, *The Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam,* a paper delivered by him at the Conference of Living Religions of the British Empire at London in September 1924, revised translation into English by Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, The Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam, Inc., Chicago, p. 13.

182. The Muslims believe that at the day of judgment all the Jews will appear with the right hand tied to the neck." (*Qur'ān,* op. cit., p. 493, n. 2 to v. 69, which states that

the hands of the Jews "shall be *chained* up".)

183. *Vide supra*, pp. 63.

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184. *Vide supra*, pp. 60-1.

185. *The Review of Religions*, VI : "Christ in the Quran, "pp. 404-19, 442-66, Heading ". . . The Word of God," p. 408.

186. *Vide infra*, pp. 169 ff.

187 *The Review of Religions*, VI, Heading 1, as cited, p. 441.

188 Ibid. : "5 Conception by the Holy Ghost," p. 415.

189. iv. 169 ; cf. also xix. 17.

190. *The Review of Religions*, VI : Heading "2.—The Spirit of God," p. 412.

191. Ibid., "Miracles of Healing in Christianity," pp. 177-84.

192. Other prophecies, made by Jesus, which Ghulām Aḥmad declared did not materialise, are found in John, 14 : 12 ; Luke, 23 : 43 ; *et al.* (Cf. Walter, op. cit., p. 87.)

193. Article by Ghulām Aḥmad, printed in *The Review of Religions*, I, p. 348 (quoted by Walter, op. cit., p. 84 ; and p. 86 for other quotations from Ghulām Aḥmad's writings on the same subject).

194. *The Review of Religions*, VII : "The Mahdi, II, 5. Second Advent of Jesus," p. 199.

195. Ibid , VI : "Christ in the Quran. 8. The Death and Resurrection of Jesus," pp. 418-9 Cf. furthermore the following literature distributed by the Ahmadiyya Center in New York City : "The Bible Says : Jesus Did Not Die on the Cross," a printed leaflet ; *How Jesus Survived Crucification*, a pamphlet.

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196. *Vide supra*, pp. 59 ff

197. *Jesus in Kashmir*, published by the Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam, New York, N.Y. Yūs Āsaf is the name borne by the protagonist in *Barlaam and Josaphat*—where he is also called Yūs (Joseph) Āfāt (i.e. Josaphat)—and in a very old Persian story (by Muḥammad ibn Bahawaih), translated into Urdu as *Ikmal-ud-Din* ("The Perfection of Faith"), which tells of the life of Yūs Āsaf, an Indian prince and saint, whose wanderings brought him to Kashmir where he died. Ghulām Aḥmad said that Yūs was a corrupted form of Yasū' (Jesus's original name, which is Yasū' in Urdu) and that Āsaf was the Hebrew verb *asaf* ("to gather"), referring to Jesus's mission to gather Israel's lost tribes. The thesis that Jesus had gone to India—presented by Nicolas Notovich in *Unknown Life of Christ* and based on an old manuscript which he claimed he had seen in Tibet and contained a description of Jesus's journey to India—was exploded by Professor J.A. Douglas in 1895. Walter (op. cit., pp 92-3) undertook a journey and saw this tomb which resembled "hundreds of other tombs of Muhammadan saints".

198. Ghulam Ahmad, *The Teachings of Islam*, p. 192. Cf. also Muhammad Sadiq, *The Christian Doctrine of Atonement*, The Oriental and Religious Publishing Corporation, Ltd., Rabwah, W. Pakistan, 1957, which elaborates the reasons for rejecting the atonement doctrine.

199. *The Review of Religions*, VI : "Christ in the Quran. 3. Mediator," p. 413.

200. Ibid. : "10 & 11. Saviour and Final Judge of Mankind," p. 459.

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201. *Vide supra*, p. 65.

202. Bashir-ud-Din Mahmud Ahmad, *The Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam*, a paper read at the Conference of Living Religions of the British Empire, op. cit. Quotation from

p. 14. Bashir-ud-Dīn Maḥmūd presents his father's view so that his account may be used as an illustration.

203 Ibid., p. 15.

204 *Vide supra*, pp. 143 and 168.

205. Walter, op cit., p. 32.

206. Ibid., p. 34, n. 1.

207. Ibid., p. 33.

208. Bashir-ud-Din Mahmud Ahmad, *The Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam*, p. 14.

209. Walter, op cit., p. 36. (Quoted from *The Review of Religions*, II, p. 67.)

210. Bashir-ud-Din Mahmud Ahmad, *The Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam*, p. 14.

211. Walter, op cit., p. 33. (Quoted from *The Review of Religions*, I, 1902, p. 206 ; cf. also ibid., p. 340).

212. Ibid., p. 33.

213. Ibid., p. 137. Muslim theologians also defended Islam against Christian claims, but their arguments differed from those advanced by Ghulām Aḥmad.

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214. *The Review of Religions*, XV, p. 9. (Quoted by Walter, op. cit., p. 137.)

215. *Vide infra*, pp. 175-6.

216. Walter, op. cit., p. 139.

217. Ibid., pp. 50-1. (Quoted from *The Review of Religions*, III, p. 411.)

218. Ibid., p. 102.

219. Called "the Father of Modern India," because of his reinterpretation of Hinduism, forestalling large-scale conversion of Hindus to Christianity and revitalising the old faith. (*Sources in Indian Tradition*, pp. 573 ff.)

220. It was founded by Swami Dayananda Saraswati in 1875 at Bombay and played its part in the rise of Hindu nationalism. (*Sources of Indian Tradition*, pp. 628 ff.)

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221. Walter, op. cit., p. 103. (Quoted from *The Review of Religious*, II, pp. 139-40.)

222. This practice, involving the contracting of a relationship successively with eleven women by a man or with eleven men by a woman, has for the most part been abandoned by the Arya Samaj members.

223. Walter, op. cit., p. 51. (Quoted from *The Review of Religions*, III, p. 411.)

224. Ibid., p. 51. (Sialkot address.)

225. *The Review of Religions*, VII : "The Arya Samaj At The Religious Conference at Lahore," quoted from pp. 46 and 47.

226. Ibid., VII : "Relation of Sikhism to Islam," pp. 425-42.

227. *Sources of Indian Tradition*, chapter XX, p. 536.

228. Ibid., p. 534, for both quotations.

229. Ibid., p. 536.

230. Ibid., p. 534.

231. Ibid., p. 533.

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232. *The Review of Religions*, VII : "Relation of Sikhism to Islam," p. 427.

233. Walter, op. cit., p. 107 (quoted from *The Review of Religions*, II, p. 32). According to information received by Walter from a Sikh friend of his, a cloak worn by Nanak supposedly existed (at Dera Baba Nanak in the Punjab) and it had Arabic characters written upon it which until 1918 had not been deciphered (Walter, op. cit., p. 108, n. 3, and pp. 106-7). Ghulām Aḥmad said that he had made a journey to this place on 30

September 1895 and that the cloak's coverings, placed over it by successive Sikh generations, had been removed so that he could examine it. Walter questioned "several well-informed Sikhs about this incident, but found them unable to verify it" (p. 107, n. 3).

234. The movement derived its name Bābism from *Bāb* or "Gate," a title assumed by its founder. It is also called Bahā'ism after the name of the founder's successor, Bahā'ullāh, author of the *Kitāb-ul-Aqdas* ("Holiest Book").

235. *Vide supra*, pp. 153-4.

236. *The Review of Religions*, VI : "The Babi or the Bahai Religion. I," pp. 171-7, quotation from pp 173-4. This volume contains a series of five articles devoted to Bahā'ism.

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237. Ibid., pp. 283-404, quoted from p. 389.

238. Ibid, p. 391.

239. Ibid., p. 393.

240. Walter, op. cit, p. 109.

241. The Hinayana claims to be closer than the Mahayana School to the Buddha's teachings, because it does not divinise him. Nevertheless, it also reveres his relics and fashions images of him. (*Vide* J. Noss, *Man's Religions*, pp. 167, 177-8, 181 ff.)

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242. Walter, op. cit., p. 109. Many Buddhists lived in East India, mostly in that region called today East Pakistan (i.e. East Bengal).

243. Another word for Zoroastrianism derived from its deity's name, Ahura Mazda, the "Wise Lord," of which Ormazd is a contraction.

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244. *Vide supra*, p. 171.

245. *The Review of Religions*, IX (1910), p. 520.

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246. It no longer is mentioned in the Ṣadr Initiation Form (*vide supra*, p. 166, and *supra* Appendix I).

247. Ruling of the Patna High Court, 21 December 1916. (Walter, op. cit., Appendix VI.)

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248 Ibid., pp. 157-9.

249. *Vide The Review of Religions*, VII, p. 411.

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250. According to Mr Zaighun, Aḥmadīyyah girls are permitted to marry men among the "People of the Book".

251. Ghulam Ahmad, *The Teachings of Islam*, pp. 49-54.

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252. *Vide*, for instance, xvii. 37 : "And give full measure when you measure, and weigh with just balance. . . ."

253 *Ahmadiyyat*, p. 171.

254. He was chosen as its president during its 1962 session.

255. *Ahmadiyyat*, section on "International Relations," pp. 194-201, *vide* p. 200 He expressed this view, however, in the first edition, according to Sir Ẓafrullah Khān (op. cit., p. 20).

256 The Ṣadr's repudiation of its founder's claim to prophethood may lead to a less severe judgment by non-Aḥmadīyyah Muslims.

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257. Bashir-ud-Din Mahmud, *Ahmadiyyat*, p. 21.

Chapter V: The Growth of Pan-Islamic Feeling, pp. 183-212

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1. For a fine analysis and wealth of documentation, *vide* Dwight E. Lee, "The Origins of Pan-Islamism," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. XLVII, No. 2 (January 1942), pp. 278-87.

2. The word "pan-Islamism" appears to be "of European coinage and was probably adopted in imitation of pan-Slavism, which had become current in the 1870's" (ibid., p. 280).

3. Sulṭān 'Abdul 'Azīz and his successor, Sulṭān 'Abdul Ḥamīd II, championed Islamic cause. In the 1870 s, the Turkish Press preached crusades against the Muslims' enemies. (Ibid., pp. 282 and 281.)

4. Constitutional Ottoman Empire, implying the transformation of autocratic rule into a parliamentary organisation representing all countries that formed part of the Ottoman domain.

5. The unification of the Middle East under Arab leadership. It reflects the rivalry between Turks and Arabs for domination of the Muslim world.

6. This was the assessment of pan-Islamism by the Turkish nationalist, Yusuf Akcura (1876-1933) who was inspired by Huseyinzade 'Alī, a doctor from the Caucasus. He proposed the idea known as pan-Turanianism, i.e. unification on the basis of a common ethnic and historical background (in which it resembles pan-Arabism) rather than on that of a joint religion (the essential principle of pan-Islamism).

7. Al-Afghānī is regarded as having been "perhaps the earliest and greatest intellectual founder and leader of Pan-Islamism" (Lee, op. cit., p. 283).

8. Ibid., p. 283.

9. Arminius Vambery's letter "dated December 31, 1877, and published in the *Daily Telegraph* (London), January 12, 1878," p. 3, under the title of "England, Turkey, and Asia" (ibid., p. 280, text and n 7).

10. Tilak's extremist policies found ready response among the ultra-nationalist Hindu Bengali elements.

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11. *Vide supra*, chapter I : 2.

12 Lord Curzon (India's Viceroy 1899-1905) decreed the partition in June 1905. The reunification was effected under his successor, Lord Minto (Viceroy 1905 10).

13 Gopal Krishna Gokhale, the Hindu nationalist leader, led his "community's" protest against the partition, which the Muslims apparently did not oppose. The latter, unlike their Hindu compatriots, reacted fiercely against the merger, for it meant the reincorporation of a Muslim-minority into a Hindu-majority State.

14. From a fundamentalist Muslim viewpoint.

15. Lee, op. cit., p. 281, n. 9, citing as source : Sayyid Amīr 'Alī's views on pan-Islamism in *Proc. Central Asia Soc.*, 12 January 1912, pp. 19-20

16. The two Balkan Wars (1912-3) deprived the Ottoman Empire of its European possessions.

17. *Vide supra*, p. 97.

18. Rahman, op. cit., p. 88.

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19. His book, *India Wins Freedom, An Autobiographical Narrative* (henceforward *Autobiography*), [New York : Longmans, Green and Co., 1960), furnishes most of the details for this section. Consulted also was Mahadev Desai's *Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, The President of the Indian National Congress, A Biographical Memoir* (London : George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1941).

20. Ikram, *Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan*, p. 141.

21. He published "The Voice of Truth" (*Lisān-us-Ṣidq*), which was preceded, however, by a journal entitled *Nayrang-i-'Ālam*, publishing the works by young Urdu poets (Desai, op. cit., pp. 29 and 31). He also wrote articles for the then outstanding literary journal : *Makhzan* (Ikram, op. cit., p. 143).

22. Azad *Autobiography*, p. 3.

23. Ibid., p. 4.

24. Ikram, op. cit., p. 143; also p. 144 for Abul-Kalām's meeting with Shiblī.

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25. Azad *Autobiography*, p. 7, where he contests Desai's statement (made in the latter's op. cit., p. 27) that he attended al-Azhar.

26. Hindu protest against Lord Curzon's partition plan led to the formation of secret societies.

27. Louis Massignon, "My Meetings with Maulana Azad," in H. Kabir, Ed., *Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Memorial Volume* (henceforward *Memorial Volume*), (New York and Bombay : Asia Publishing House, 1959), pp. 27-9, *vide* p. 27 for quotation in text.

28. "People of the Ḥadīth," one of the many Indo-Muslim reform groups inspired by Sayyid Aḥmad of Rae Bareli. Their main aim was to purify Islam of Hindu practices and superstitions.

29. A generic term for the Muslim Reform Movement. More specifically, it implies the Modernist Party founded by al-Afghānī and 'Abduh at Paris (in 1883). (Henri Laoust, *Le Califat dans la Doctrine de Rasid Rida*, Memoires de l'Institut francais de Damas, Beirut, 19 8, pp. 245-5, n. 23.)

30. Azad, *Autobiography*, p. 8.

31. A year and a half after the first issue of Muḥammad 'Alī's journal, *The Comrade*, appeared. (*Vide infra*, p. 191.)

32. *Vide* Ikram, op. cit., p. 144, and *supra*, p. 97.

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33. Azad, *Autobiography*, p. 9, where he also states that *al-Hilāl* became so popular that it reached a sale of 26 000 copies weekly within two years of its publication.

34. Ikram, op. cit., p. 147, citing "Al-Hilal, 8-9-12, etc."

35. His attempt in 1927 to republish *al-Hilāl* failed : "within six months" it was withdrawn from circulation (Ikram, op. cit., p. 151).

36. By Royal Proclamation, decreeing amnesty for political prisoners.

37. *Vide infra*, pp. 200 ff.

38. Motivated by the Rowlatt Bills (published in February 1919, after the Defence

of India Act had expired) permitting trial of political prisoners without juries in certain specified areas and giving internment powers to the provincial governments. It was passed during the annual Congress session at Nagpur on 20 December 1920.

39. *Memorial Volume*. Sayyid Maḥmūd's article, "A Resplendent Personality" (pp. 37-52). quoted from pp. 43-4. Desai (op. cit., p. 75) calls it "'A Declaration of Faith'."

40. Desai, op. cit., pp. 12-3

41. Ibid., p. 13. (Also stated in his Ramgarh address.)

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42. With Sir Stafford Cripps in 1942 and Lord Wavell (Simla Conference) in 1945.

43. Congress passed the Independence Resolution in 1929. The Government of India Act, 1935, superseding the expired Defence of India Regulations, provided for a central government and provincial autonomy.

44. First edition, Delhi, 1946.

45. Published in two (undated) volumes. The "Preface" to the first volume is dated 12 September 1931. The second one was published in Bijnor, probably between 1940 and 1943 (Fyzee, "Islamic Law and Theology in India—Proposals for a Fresh Approach," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 8. No. 2, p. 177). *Vide* Desai, op. cit., pp. 97-111, Chapt. X, entitled "Views on Religion" and Moh. Habib, "The Revolutionary Maulana" in *Memorial Volume* pp. 79-100.

46. *Memorial Volume*, p. 39. No date of the journal's issue, from which the quotation has been taken, is indicated.

47. Desai, op. cit., p. 81.

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48. Ibid., p. 110.

49. *Memoral Volume*, p. 86.

50. Ibid., pp. 86-7.

51. Ibid., p. 98, citing as source : "*Tarjuman al-Qur'an*, II, p. 179".

52. Desai, op. cit., p. 101 ; it also is taken from Azād's 'Commentary".

53. Ibid., p. 117. "I will not hazard the guess," the Maulana said, "that it is the same as *dharma*, though *dharma* also has the same connotation".

54. Ibid., pp. 107-8.

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55. Azad, *Autobiography*, p. 4.

56. *Memorial Volume*, p. 84, text and n. 3, citing as source : "*Address to the Bengal Khilafat Conference*, 1920".

57. Ibid., pp. 82-3.

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58. Desai, op. cit., p. 79, quoting Āzād's "Declaration" at his 1921 trials.

59. Ibid., p. 77—1921 trial.

60. Ibid., p. 83—1921 trial. He acknowledged his confidence in Gandhi's Non-Co-operation programme.

61. This is also Ibn Khaldūn's view regarding Muslim-non-Muslim relationships, expressed in his *al-Muqaddima*, ed. Quatremere, Paris : 1815, Vol II, pp. 65-79. (Reference cited by Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*, p. 71.)

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62. *Vide supra*, pp. 4-5.

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63. xlviii. 28 states: "It is He Who hath sent His Apostle with the 'Guidance,' and the religion of truth, that He may exalt it above every religion. And enough *for thee* is this testimony on the part of God."

64. *Memoial Volume*, p. 81.

65. Ibid., p. 85.

66. Ibid. p. 82.

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67. J.B. Kripalani, "The Voice of Reason," in ibid., p. 34.

68. *Vide supra*, p. 5.

69. Khadduri, op cit., p. 80.

70. Ibid , p. 45.

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71. *Vide infra*, chapter VII.

72. *Muhammad Ali, His Life, Services and Trial*, Enlarged (2nd) Edn., Ganesh & Co., Madras, n d. This book provides a detailed biography.

73 *Sources of Indian Tradition*, p. 769.

74. *Vide supra*, p. 102.

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75. Reprinted from the *Times of India* and the *Indian Spectator*, Bombay Gazette Steam Press, 1907.

76. Written in 1904 and presented first before a session held by the Bombay Presidency Muhammadan Educational Conference at Ahmedabad and, later, before the annual session of the All-India Muhammadan Educational Conference at Lucknow.

77. The *Times of India*, Lahore's *Observer*, *Daily Mail*, *Indian Spectator*.

78 *Muhammad Ali, His Life*, p. 15.

79. Ibid. states as date: 14 January 1911; Ikram (op. cit., p. 160) mentions 1 January of that year.

80. *Vide supra*, p. 84, n. 243.

81. It reached a circulation of 9000 copies. (*Muhammad Ali, His Life*, p. 29.)

82 Ibid , p 29.

83 Ikram, op. cit., p. 162.

84 In "The Choice of the Turks" (*Comrade*, 26 September 1914), replying to an article of the same title published in the *London Times*.

85. *Vide infra*, pp. 203 ff.

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86. Lord Chelmsford's successor as Viceroy in April 1921.

87. *Muhammad Ali, His Life*, p. 174.

88 Under Sections 107 and 108 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

89 *Vide supra*, Appendix L.

90 *Muhammad Ali His Life*, p 186.

91 W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, p. 206.

92 Ibid., p. 207, and also pp. 172-3. The Muslims were requested to give up their separate electorates. (*Vide infra*, pp. 274 ff.)

93. The Sarda Act, originally called a "Bill To Regulate Marriage of Children amongst the Hindus," introduced by Rai Sahib M. Harbilas Sarda on 1 February 1927, and passed by the Government of India on 1 October 1929. It came into effect on 1 April

1930 The Act prohibits the marriage of boys under eighteen and of girls under fourteen years of age. (Vide, Katherine Mayo, *Volume II* [London : Jonathan Cape, 1931]. Also E. F. Rathbone, *Child Marriage : The Indian Minotaur* [London : George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1934].)

94 *Vide infra*, p. 214, n. 6.

95. Ed. Afzal Iqbal, n.d. *Vide* also *Select Writings and Speeches of Maulana Mohamed Ali* (compiled and ed. by Afzal Iqbal), (Lahore : Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1944).

96. *Vide infra* respectively, this chapter, section 4, and chapter VII.

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97. *Muhammad Ali, His Life*, pp. 59-61.

98 *Select Writings*, p. 55. Article dated Februry 1912, in reply to a lecture given by Professor Margoliouth at London.

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99. *Muhammad Ali, His Life*, p. 231. (*Vide infra* Appendix K.)

100. Ibid., p. 61.

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101. *Vide infra*, Appendfx K ? ; also pp. 207 and 208.

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102. *Vide infra*, p. 208.

103. *Vide infra*, chapter VII.

104. *Vide* his article, published in *The Comrade* (1912), entitled : "The Communal Patriot," reproduced in de Bary, Ed., *Sources of Indian Tradition*, pp. 772-8.

105. *Vide infra*, Appendix K.

106. *Vide infra*, pp. 214-5.

107. The interpretation is that given by the Sunnite theologians. The Shī'ah agree in so far as Muḥammad's role is concerned, but reject the rulership of his successors except that of his cousin and son-in-law, 'Alī. They claim that he alone, due to his blood-relationship with the Prophet, had immediate right to the *imāmate*.

108 D S Margoliouth, "The Sense of the Title Khalifah" in T.W. Arnold, Ed., *A Volume of Oriental Studies* (Cambridge University Press, 1922), p. 322.

109. The Semitic view is that all men are God's sons.

110 Margoliouth, "The Sense," op. cit., p. 323.

111. In 622 C.E., reckoned in the Muslim calendar as 1 H.

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112 Nawāb Ṣadr Yār Jung Bahādur and M. Muḥ. Ḥabībur Raḥmān Khān Sherwānī, *Ḥadrat Abū Bakr, the First Caliph of Islam* (Lahore : Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1947 [2nd reprint], 1963), p. 125.

113. Margoliouth, "The Sense," op. cit., p. 323.

114. Ibid., p. 327, stating that the term "Caliphs of Allah," used by the Umayyad Yazīd ibn al-Walīd (d. 744 C.E.) and found also in the Abbasid (750-1258) accession oaths, undoubtedly was used to legitimise these Dynasties' claims to headship in the Islamic world.

115. The Shāfi'ite jurist al-Māwardī (d. 1058 C.E.) held this view stating (*vide Kitāb al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyah* or "A Treatise on Muhammadan Law," Cairo : 1909, "General Introduction," I, pp. 1-61) that the mode of its application may vary. (*Vide* also H.A.R. Gibb, "Some Considerations on the Sunni Theory of the Caliphate," in *Archives d'Histoire du droit oriental*, Vol. III, Paris : Librarie Orientaliste, 1948, pp. 408, 409.)

116. Sa'd al-Dīn al-Taftazānī (1322-90 C.E.) wrote (in his *Maqāṣid al-Ṭālibīn* or "Commentary," Constantinople: 1860) that *ijmā'* occurred prior to Muḥammad's burial. He also said (in op. cit., chapter 6), that the "authority inherited from the Prophet comprises at once the spiritual and the temporal." (*Vide* Laoust, op. cit., p 14.)

117. Ann K.S Lambton, "Ghazali's Concept of Kingship," in *The Islamic Quarterly* (published by The Islamic Cultural Centre, London, England), April 1954, p 53, quoting from his work, *al-Iqtiṣād fi'l-I'tiqād*, "The Road Leading to a Knowledge of the Proper Faith," Cairo, 2nd edn., 1909.

118. Gibb, "Sunni Theory," op. cit., p. 403, citing as source "*Iḥyā'*, II, 124 (Cairo, 1352)," i.e. "The Revivification of the Sciences," 1933 edn.

119. Ibn Jamā'ah (1241-1333 C.E.) *Taḥrīr al-Aḥkām fi Tadbir Ahl al-Islām* ("Handbook of Islamic State and Administrative Law," *Islamica*, VI, 4, 355-9, ed. H. Kofler). Reference cited by H. Gibb in "Sunni Theory," op. cit., p. 403.

120 Gibb, op. cit., p. 404.

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121. Ibid., p. 405, where he also states that this doctrine was influenced by the "Platonic idea of the philosopher-king to the Islamic Imam," a Shī'ite theory, at first rejected by the Sunnī theologians, who accepted it after it had been stripped of its theosophical aspects and adapted to orthodox views.

122 Ibid., p. 405, saying further that contrary "to the later developments of the Ash'arite theory, the Hilafa remains explicitly linked with the supremacy of the Sarī'a."

123. The alleged transfer of the title "Caliph" by the pseudo-caliph al-Mutawakkil at Cairo to the Ottoman Sulṭān Selim I (r 1512-20) in 1516 is regarded by such scholars as P.K. Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, p. 489, and H A.R Gibb. "Sunni Theory," op cit., p. 406, as a legendary account, probably to validate the Ottoman claim to the politico-religious headship in the Islamic world. Egypt's Muslim modernist, Rashīd Riḍā', also rejected it, stating: "The Turkish caliphate of the Ottoman dynasty rests on force." (Laoust, op. cit., p. 94.)

124 Gibb, "Sunni Theory," op. cit., p. 406 He lists three exceptions: two inscriptions respectively by Sulṭāns Sulaymān I in Jerusalem's citadel, Bāyazīd II in Madīnah's Masjid al-jumu'ah, and a decree by Muḥammad II Fātiḥ issued in a protocol of a "waqf-nāmah" (published Istanbul, 1935). According to him, they emphasise not the religious, but the military aspect; nl., the epithet "Lord of the Ghāzīs and Warriors for the Faith," found in the last-named decree.

125. Such as the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb. (*Vide infra*, p 207.)

126. Persia since the sixteenth century was ruled by the Ṣafavids (and later by the Qājārs). Afghanistan partly by the Mughals and from the eighteenth century by the Durrānī dynasty, while India from the seventeenth century on lay under the British.

127. Laoust, op. cit., p. 232. Evidently the juridical evolution as pointed out above was fully accepted among the Sunnite majority.

128. Obviously, the Ottomans were not of Quraysh lineage which was one of the prescribed conditions.

129. Muhammad Barakatullah, *The Khilafet* (London: Luzac & Co., 1924), p. 1.

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130. *Vide infra*, pp. 210 ff. where it is discussed.

131. *Vide infra*, chapter VII: for a discussion of the Non-Co-operation Movement.

132. Gibb, *Whither Islam?*, p. 220.

133. *Muhammad Ali, His Life*, p. 118

134. Ibid., pp. 122, 123. The "petition" was signed by the 'Alī Brothers, Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāḥ, Gandhi, Pandit Motilal Nehru, and other Muslim and Hindu notables. The Treaty of Sevres, which Sulṭān Muḥammad VI (r. 1912-22) was forced to sign (10 June 1920), cut up the Ottoman Empire into various parts. Arabia retained its independence (it had revolted against Turkish oppression and aided the British in their military exploits).

135. Ibid., p. 118.

136. Ibid., p. 135.

137. Ibid., p. 129. Statement made in a cable he sent to Mr Chotan, President of the Central Khilafat Committee, on 7 March 1920.

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138. Muhammad Ali, *Thoughts on the Present Situation*, pp. 169-70. Part of a speech entitled: "A People's Right to Live," delivered by him on 23 March 1920 at Essex Hall, London.

139. Ibid., pp. 171-2.

140. Ibid., p. 183. Speech delivered on 22 April 1920 at Kingsway Hall, London.

141. Ibid., p. 135. Allied cable, dated San Remo, 20 April 1920, and deputation's reply dated 24 April 1920.

142. Ibid., p. 149. It was published in India's press on 23 August 1920.

143. Among them, in particular, Ẓafar 'Alī Khān, founder of Lahore's *Zamīndār* and Āghā Muhammad Khān, Sr., Amīr 'Alī then residing in England, also (as stated) supported it.

144. Not all Muslim (or Hindu) representatives gave it their support. The majority did, however; the Muslims, to save the Caliphate, welcomed the Hindu alliance.

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145. W. C. Smith, (op. cit., p. 204) says also: "it is estimated that during December-January 1921-22 thirty thousand persons were imprisoned for their politics."

146. Ibid., p. 204.

147. 'Abd al-Majīd, replacing Muḥammad VI.

148. W.C. Smith, op. cit., p. 205.

149. Letter, dated 24 November 1923 and published in *The Times*, 14 December 1923. *Vide infra*, Appendix M, for its full text.

150. Gibb, *Whither Islam ?*, p. 224. It turned down an invitation to attend a *Khilafat* conference at Cairo (1926).

151. W.C. Smith, op. cit., p. 207.

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152. *Vide* 'Abd al-Qādir Badā'ūnī, *Muntakhab-ut-Tawārīkh* ("Selections from Histories"), II, 271-2, translated by G.S.A. Ranking and W.H. Lowe, 3 vols., Calcutta: The Asiatic Society, 1895-1925. Reference cited by *Sources of Indian Tradition*, pp. 507-8, 937. The Arabic translation of the title is Amir al-Mū'minīn. (*Vide supra*, pp. 202 ff.)

153. Aurangzeb was called thus by Shaykh Muḥammad al-Murādī (d. 1791), chief Hanafī *mufti* at Damascus, in his work, *Silk-ud-Durar* ("Biographical Dictionary"), IV, 113-4. (Source cited by Gibb, "Sunni Theory," op. cit., p. 409.)

154. *Vide supra*, p. 203, n. 124.

155. Akbar was called variously "*Padshāh Ghāzī*" ("Emperor and Conqueror for the Faith") and "Sulṭān of Islam" who "is most just, most wise king and one most informed of God". It clearly shows the distinction made between rulership in disregard of

the *Sharī'ah* and that based on it. (*Vide supra,* pp. 202-3; for Akbar's titles, Badā'ūnī in *Sources*, p 508.)

156. Aziz Ahmad, "Sayyid Ahmad Khan," *Studia Islamica*, XIII, p 75.

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157 *Vide supra*, p. 201.

158. *Vide supra*, p 201.

159. Aziz Ahmad, "Sayyid Ahmad Khan" op. cit., p. 72 citing as source (n. 2): "Khilafat and Khalifa, article in *Akhiri Mazamin*, p. 39; also his *Truth* about *Khilafat*, Lahore 1916."

160 Aziz Ahmad, "Sayyid Ahmad Khan," op cit, p. 72, states that Sir Sayyid induced Muḥammad Shiblī, before the latter came under al-Afghānī's influence, to express this thesis in an article, entitled *Khilafat* in *Maqālat*, I, 182-7."

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161. *Vide supra*, p. 200.

162 This view is expressed, amongst others, by the Egyptain 'Alī 'Abd ar-Rāziq (1888-1950) in his work, "Islam and the Basis of Government" (*al-Islām wa Uṣūl al-Ḥukm*), Cairo: al-Azhar, 1925.

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163 Gibb. *Whither Islam?*, p. 225.

164. Al-Māwardī, op cit., Vol. I. p. 95 and p. 159 for clarification of the term "replacing" by adding the phrase "God's messenger," that is Muḥammad, thus implying succession.

165. Al-Ghazālī maintained that the caliph should be kept in order to maintain law and a semblance of order in a chaotic society. Al-Māwardī (op. cit, Vol. I, pp. 170 ff.) approved of deposition if the caliph became unjust or physically incapacitated. Rashīd Riḍā' (H. Laoust, op cit, p 114) criticised India's Muslims for supporting a tyrannical caliph ('Abd al-Ḥamīd), who "regarded himself above human and divine law," and for rejecting the thesis of a spiritual caliphate.

166. He held that in such a case it was "obligatory" in contrast to the view expressed by the Khārijite theologian Abū Bakr al-A'ẓam, who said it is "permissible". Al-Māwardī, op. cit, Vol. I, p. 95.

167. Ibid., pp. 172-3.

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168. Barakatullah, op. cit., p. 84.

169. Ibid., p. 56.

170. Count Ostorog's n. (2) in al-Māwardī, op cit, pp. 192-3.

171. 'Abd ar-Rāziq among the Egyptians; Sir Sayyid, Shaykh Khudā Bakhsh, *et al.* among India's Muslims.

172. D.S. Margoliouth, *Mohammedanism* (London: Willams and Norgate, 1911), p. 75.

173. Barakatullah, op cit., p. 84.

174. Ibid., pp 59 ff. (Cf. Rashīd Riḍā'—Laoust tr.—pp 132 ff)

175. Rashīd Riḍā' (op. cit., p. 122) advocates "a religious apostolate," despite being a modernist.

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176. Ibid., pp. 123-7, stating (p. 126) that the Muslim world for the most part

"detests the actual Government of the Hijaz". It means rejection of a Saudi Arab as "caliph". *Vide* also, ibid, p. 130, and Barakatullah, op. cit., pp. 55-8, rejecting, among others Sherif Husayn of Mecca, whose name was read already from the pulpits during Friday (congregational) prayers. It meant originally public announcement of a new caliph's enthronement.

Chapter VI, Muḥammad Iqbāl, pp. 213-231

Page 213

1. W.C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, p. 102.

2. Founded in 1906 as a counterpart to the Indian National Congress with the purpose of representing in a forceful manner the political aspirations of the Muslim community in India. *Vide infra*, chapter VII : 3.

3. Each year the Muslim League met in a different city.

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4. Richard Symonds, *The Making of Pakistan* (London : Faber and Faber, 2nd edn., 1950). Whether this idea was first advanced by Raḥmat 'Alī or Iqbāl is of much less importance than the fact that it was conceived and given expression and eventually gained popularity. *Vide infra*, pp. 278 ff.

5. League policy remained vague until 1938, when reorganisation was undertaken. With the adoption of the Pakistan Resolution in 1940, the Muslim League began a vigorous campaign for the creation of a separate Muslim State to be carved out of the Indian subcontinent and to consist of Muslim majority areas. *Vide infra*, chapter VII : 3.

6. The first conference was begun on 12 November 1930, the second on 7 September 1931, the third and final one lasted from 17 November to 24 December 1932. *Vide infra*, pp 275 ff.

7. Symonds, op. cit., pp. 52 ff.; T.W. Wallbank, *India in the New Era*, "Index".

8. In 1922.

9. The charge is often made that the Indian Muslims were more interested in happenings in other Muslim lands than in India. This appears to be, however, the spirit of Islam, which teaches that all its Believers constitute one brotherhood.

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10. Delivered by Iqbāl in English in 1928-9 under the title of *Six Lectures on the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. They were edited a second time in 1944 under the title of *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*.

11. Ibid., chapter IV : "The Conception of God and the Meaning of Prayer," pp. 82 ff.

12. Ibid., p 85.

13. Ibid., p 86.

14. Ibid., p 119.

15. Ibid., p. 140.

16. Ibid., p. 141.

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17. *Vide infra*, particularly pp. 218 ff., for his concept of time and creativity in time.

18. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 196.

91. *Vide supra*, p. 215.

20. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 149.

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21 Ibid., p 156.

22. *Vide infra*, pp. 225 ff.

23 The "Word" is not to be taken in the Christian sense of the Logos.

24. Christian eschatology is another unique explanation for the mystic longing of final consummation in God.

25. "The Earth-Soul Welcomes Adam", written in Urdu. Iqbāl wrote much of his work in Persian.

26. For a definition of activity, *vide supra*, p. 216.

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27 *Vide supra*, pp. 215 ff.

28 Development or arrest of physical growth has a tremendous importance for mental and behavioural progress or statism and is, therefore, included in the science called Psychology.

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29. *Vide infra*, pp. 220 ff.

30 Though Iqbāl rejected Ṣūfism, he was greatly influenced by the Persian mystic, Jalāl-ud-Dīn al-Rūmī. However, the path elaborated by the Ṣūfīs is not in life, it is not a part of life, while the path advocated by Iqbāl is in life; he does not reject spirituality, as has been shown, but it must be a spirituality which is in constant touch with life.

31. A number of Iqbāl's writings contain the word "Khūdī." *Asrār-i-Khūdī* ("The Secrets of the Self," translated into English by R.A Nicholson—rev. edn., 1944 (Lahore) —made Iqbāl famous in the English-speaking world; *Rumūz-i-Bekhudī* ("The Mysteries of Selflessness"), translated into English by A J. Arberry, was published by J. Murray, London, 1953.

32. Iqbāl, *Lectures*, p. 100.

33. Ibid.

34 Ibid., p. 106.

35. Ibid., p. 105.

36. Ibid., p. 102.

37. Another thrust at fatalism.

38. One is reminded of the Hindu Karma Doctrine, but caution must be exercised in tracing any influence, even though Iqbāl lived in India. For the same concept of consequences of action is found also in the Old Testament, Book of *Deuteronomy*.

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39. Also *vide supra*, pp. 217-8.

40. If evil had ontological status, there would be the duality found in Manichaeism. (Cf., for example, in contrast, the view propounded by one of the foremost Western thinkers and writers, Goethe, in *Faust* where Satan gets the better of man.)

41. Iqbal, *Lectures*, p. 51.

42. Ibid.

43. Time for Iqbāl means, as stated, chronological time: i.e. duration, process, a series of moments; and historical time which unfolds events at each successive moment. It bears no relation to the concept of Eternal Time found, for instance, in Hinduism. (Duration is used in the sense of Bergson's philosophy where it is meant as a series of

points, in time, each point standing for a moment; at each point, thers is a rest or duration.)

44. Iqbal, *Lectures*, p. 118.

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45 Ibid., 119.

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46. K. G. Saiyidain, *Education for International Understanding* (Bombay: Hind Kitabs. Ltd., 1948), p. 155.

47. Ibid, p. 67.

48. Ibid., p. 68.

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49 Iqbal, *Lectures*, p 155.

50. Ibid.

51. Saiyidain, op. cit., p 69.

52. Ibid, p. 69.

53. This poem is quoted by Saiyidain (ibid.), p. 70.

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54. That is to say, man's.

55. Saiyidain, op cit., p. 70.

56. *Idem, Iqbal's Educational Philosophy* (Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf, 1945), pp. 125-6.

57. Ibid., pp. 131-2. See also his *Education for International Understanding*, p. 71.

58. Saiyidain, *Education for International Understanding*, p. 70.

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59. The strength to conquer, of course, does not mean that the conquest is necessarily successful. It is true, however, that Islam's conquest of an immense part of the world—due to the Muslims' zeal and fearless courage—was an absolute success.

60. The implication is that religion advocates tolerance. Iqbāl is right, of course. The tragic fact is that tolerance was rarely preached from the pulpit.

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61. *Vide supra*, p. 219, n. 31.

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62. *Vide supra*, p. 214, n. 9. Inasmuch as Iqbāl was of opinion that a devout Christian was a better Muslim than the irreligious Muslim, he also conceived of an ideal Community in which all communities (Islamic, Christian, etc.) were immersed. Such an ideal Community would, however, efface all distinctions between the various communities. This is the approach of Idealism.

63. Iqbal, *Lectures*, p. 159.

64. Ibid., p. 154.

65. Ibid., p. 155. Also, *vide* above, and n. 62. "Theocracy" means not a Church-dominated State, but a State which acknowledges as its sovereign not man, but God (Islamic interpretation). Islam has no organised priesthood and no Church in the Western sense of the word It is a congregation of men who assemble on Friday in the mosque for prayer, led by an *imām*, but they can pray anywhere they wish and need no intermediary. The *imām* has no status comparable to that of the priest in Catholicism or Protest-

antism. He is a member of the community without any preferential status.

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66 Iqbāl accepted, however, the Muslim view concerning the role of womanhood in society.

67. By community, of course, is meant (where not stated) the Islamic community, although Islam could give guidance to other communities as well.

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68. *Vide supra*, pp. 226 ff.

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69. Iqbāl, *Payām-i-Mashriq* ("Message from the East"), Lahore: 1924, pp. 146-8; quoted in Saiyidain, *Iqbal's Educational Philosophy*, p. 58.

Chapter VII : Indian Muslim Nationalism, Its Philosophy and Ideals, pp. 232-306

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1. 1818 according to *The Oxford Universal Dictionary*, 3rd (rev.) edn., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1955, p 1311.

2. Margoliouth, *Mohammedanism*, p. 75. The Qur'ānic verse he quoted is iii. 100.

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3. A number among them belong to the Indo-Aryan race, a subdivision of the large Indo-European group.

4. The Christian Arabs of Syria and Lebanon, for instance. It raises the immense issue of whether they were originally Arabs, converted to Christianity (the assertion implied in the text) or, perhaps, segments of ancient Western peoples who, in the course of time, assumed Arabic ethnic, social and cultural characteristics.

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5. Speech by V D. Savarkar (1883-1918), for seven years President of the Mahasabha, a Hindu nationalist organisation, founded in 1919, at its December 1939 Calcutta session. Quoted by F K Khan Durrani, *Meaning of Pakistan*, pp. 102-5; *vide* pp. 104-5. Savarkar was influenced by the then current nationalist ideas and Hindu extremism. He demanded (in 1923) the militarisation of all Hindus as well as the reconversion of India's Muslims, most of whom, he argued, originally belonged to the Hindu race. (*Vide* ibid., pp. 112 ff., and *Sources*, pp. 878-88.)

6. *Vide supra*, pp. 238 ff.

7. The Greeks, Romans, Franks, Belgae, Saxons, *et al.*, were of the same ethnic stock as the Hindus.

8. F.K. Khan Durrani, op. cit., p. 95, presents this viewpoint.

9. Ibid., pp. 56-61. Durrani gives a full description of Bankim Chandra Chatterjee's novel *Ananda Math*, in which this song appears.

10. Ibid., pp. 91-2.

11. *Vide infra*, pp. 304 ff.

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12. *Vide infra*, pp. 242 ff.

13. Durrani, op. cit., p. 92.

14. Ibid., p. 95.

15. Ibid., p. 97.

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16 As examples may be cited Egypt's Copts and Persia's Zoroastrians. The former, who may constitute ancient ethnic elements which became christianised, remained in their country; the latter's descendants, called Parsis, emigrated in modern times to India, particularly settling in Bombay.

17. *Vide supra.* chapter III.

18. *Muhammad 'Ali, His Life*, pp. 50-1.

19. *Vide supra*, pp. 34 and 75.

20 This problem did not exist in the Christian missionary schools, exposing Muslims and Hindus to a religion neither group called its own.

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21. Muhammad 'Alī, *Writings and Speeches* ("Introduction" by Afzal Iqbal, Ed), p. xii.

22. "There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is His Apostle." It is the Muslim credo, testifying allegiance to Islam.

23. This is the view presented by a contemporary Hindu mystic, Shri Aurobindo Ghose (1872-1950)—who, unlike Tilak, was not commmunalist-minded—in a speech entitled "Nationalism is the Work of God" (*Sources of Indian Tradition*, pp. 728-9).

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24. Muhammad 'Alī, "The Communal Patriot," article published in *The Comrade* (1912). (Quoted, amongst others, in *Sources of Indian Tradition*. pp. 772-8)

25 Muhammad 'Alī, *The Comrade* (14 January 1911). (Cited in *His Life*, p. 25.)

26. *The Comrade* cited in ibid., p. 17, without indicating the issue's date.

27. Āzād showed preference "in a survey of the history of religions for W. Schmidt's theory of a universal 'Urmonotheismus,' " (Baljon, "A Modern Urdu Tafsir," *The World of Islam* [Leiden : E.J. Brill], 1953, Vol. II, p. 98, and n. 1.)

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28. *Vide supra*, pp. 76 and 84 ff.

29 *Vide supra*, pp. 233 ff.

30. *Vide supra*, pp 83 ff.

31. *Vide supra*, p. 233.

32 Durrani, op. cit., p. 129.

33. This occurred not only throughout the Middle Ages and Renaissance period, but again under Hitler in 1934-5.

34. Shamloo, *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal* (Lahore : Al-Manar Academy, 2nd edn., 1948), p. 7. Source : "Presidential address delivered at the annual session of the All-India Muslim League at Allahabad on the 29th December, 1930" (pp. 3-36 in Shamloo's edition).

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35. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

36. Ibid., p. 9. The (uncited) source is E. Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation ?* ("What constitutes a nation ?"), (Paris : C. Levy, 1882), p. 29. *Vide* also Aziz Ahmad, "Iqbal et la

theorie du Pakistan" ("Iqbal and the Theory of Pakistan"), in *Revue Orient*, No. 17, Paris, 1961, p. 87 and n. 41.

37. Renan, op. cit., pp. 26-7. (Source cited by A. Ahmad, *Iqbal*, p. 87, and nn. 39, 40)

38. It does not mean that Muslims do not wish to work together with other peoples, but in this context their brotherhood is stressed.

39. Renan, op. cit., p. 26 (quoted by A. Ahmad, *Iqbal*, p. 87).

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40. Ibid., pp. 22-5 (quoted by A. Ahmad, ibid., p. 87).

41. Statement made by A. Ahmad, *Iqbal*, p. 87.

42. The passage quoted from Renan seems to echo Rousseau's view of man's innate goodness.

43. Shamloo, op. cit., pp. 10-11. Allahabad address (1930).

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44. Ibid., pp. 11-2 (1930 address continued).

45. Choudhry Raḥmat 'Alī, *Pakistan, The Fatherland of the Pak Nation* (Cambridge: The Pakistan National Liberation Movement [3rd edn.] 1947). *Vide* pp. 213-4, stating that he presented the plan for a Muslim State in India in 1915.

46. S. M. Ikram, *Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan*, p. 174.

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47. Ibid., pp. 175-6.

48. Founder of the Khāksār Movement (1931), and author of *al-Tadhkirah* (1924). His real name is Muḥammad 'Ināyat Allah Khān (b. 1888). *Vide* Baljon, "A Modern Muslim Decalogue," *The World Of Islam*, Vol. III (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1954), pp. 187-200; also W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, Part II, chapter 4.

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49. This is not altogether true throughout the Muslim world, particularly in tribal areas where the older forms of allegiance to the tribe still precedes in importance loyalty to the Central Government.

50. The Indian Patriotic Association, which he founded shortly after Congress, was open to Hindus opposing the latter political body.

51. A resolution moved at the Bombay 1938 meeting of Congress to forbid its members from joining the Mahasabha and *vice versa* was defeated.

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52. Durrani, op. cit., p. 118 footnote, quoting Ambedkar, *Thoughts on Pakistan*, p. 41.

53. Ibid., p. 101. No source given.

54. Aziz Ahmad, "The Muslims and Indian Nationalism," extract from the journal *Orient*, No. 20, p. 3, p. 17 (translation from French by author).

55. Durrani, op. cit., pp. 98-9, quoting from Lala Hardyal, *Mere Vichar*, as given by Indra Prakash in *Where We Differ*.

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56. V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p 2. (The quotation's source is not cited.)

57. J. Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (New York: The John Day Company, 1946), p. 358.

58. *Vide supra*, pp. 97-8.

59. *Vide* Ikram, op. cit., chapter 12.

60. His paper on "The Education of Mussulmans in the Punjab," read before the 1893 Muslim Educational Conference so impressed Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān that the twenty-six-year old was chosen as president of the subsequent conference (ibid., p. 208).

61. Called the Morley-Minto Reforms, which were incorporated into the 1909 Indian Council's Act.

62. The address it presented to Lord Minto was prepared by the scholar Sayyid Ḥusayn Bilgrāmī, who stated therein that the Muslims constituted a distinct community.

63. Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League, Its History, Activities and Achievements* (Agra : Agra Book House, 1954), p. 33.

64. Not until 1912 approximately—after *The Comrade* made its appearance—did India's Muslims turn anti-British.

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65. Due to Bengal's partition, effected in 1905. The decree was rescinded in 1911, but reapplied in 1947.

66. Menon, op. cit., p. 10.

67. It was applied for the first time during the elections held under the 1909 Act; and formally restated in the Communal Award announced by England's Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald on 16 April 1932, providing separate electorotes for minority groups, including the Muslims, Anglo-Indians and the Hindu Depressed Classes (Untouchables). (*Vide infra*, p. 275.)

68. Presided over by Nawâb Viqār-ul-Mulk. *Vide supra*, pp. 97-8.

69. Bahadur, op. cit., p. 41, text and n. 1, citing as source: "The Aligarh Institute Gazette dated January 2, 1907 : Pages 9 & 10."

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70. Its first annual session at which Bengal's Partition was formally approved. Yearly meetings were held respectively in different cities : Delhi, Calcutta, *et al*.

71. *Vide supra*, pp. 105-6.

72. *Vide supra*, p. 248.

73. Bahadur, op. cit., p. 73.

74. Ibid., p. 74.

75. *Vide infra*, pp. 282-3.

76. *Vide*, amongst others, W. C. Smith, op. cit., Part II, chapter V, and Bahadur, op. cit., for a detailed account on Muslim League activities.

77. In the 1910's, it was "feebly" anti-British ; Indo-Muslim hostility towards the authorities was channelled through such bodies as Congress and the All-India Khilafat Committees and Conferences. W.C. Smith, op. cit., p. 247 ; for the *Khilāfat* Movement, *vide supra*, V : 4.

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78. Aziz Ahmad, "The Mulisms and Indian Nationalism," op. cit., p. 14. His sharp statement on the Agha Khan is not entirely deserved. He presided over the All-Parties Muslim Conference at Delhi in 1929 and apparently he was Muslim India's spokesman during the London Round Table Conferences (1931-2). Ikram, op. cit., p. 199.

79. Ikram, op. cit., p. 203.

80. Ibid.

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81. Ibid., p. 208. The best detailed account in English of the "Emergence of the

Muslim Majority Provinces' ' is found in Ikram, chapter 13, which carries this heading.

82. Symonds, op. cit., p. 50.

83. Ibid., p. 51.

84. Ikram, op. cit., p. 211.

85. Ibid., p. 212, also giving the passage quoted in the above text.

86. Not to be confused with Islamia College at Peshawar.

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87. Ikram, op. cit., p. 213.

88. Ibid., p. 216.

89. Ibid., p. 215.

90. Ibid., pp. 216-7, citing (in n. 1, p. 217) : "Azim Hussain, *Fazl-i-Hussain, A Political Biography*, pp. 306".

91. Ibid., op. cit., 219.

92. Ibid., p. 217.

93. His father, Sardār Muḥammad Ḥayāt, was on the staff of General Nicholson, British commander during Delhi's reoccupation and aided Sir Sayyid (ibid, p. 218).

94. Ibid., p. 219.

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95. *Vide infra*, pp. 283 ff.

96. Menon, op. cit., pp. 156-7, 163. The Captain was the deceased Premier's son, taken into the cabinet by his father's successor and dismissed for a grave injustice.

97. The other five provinces were: the N.-W.F.P., Bengal, Assam, Baluchistan and Sind. *Vide* Menon, op. cit., pp. 164-6, paraphrasing the Jinnah-Gandhi conference and correspondence (9-27 September 1944), released on the last day (27th).

98. Menon, op. cit., pp. 211, 188.

99. Ibid., p 212. During the Simla Conference, convened by Lord Wavell on 25 June 1945. It was divided into five sessions, the last having taken place on 14 July.

100. Ibid., p. 226.

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101. Ibid., p. 230.

102. Ibid., p. 231.

103. Ibid.

104. Smith, op. cit., p. 273, for the quotations in this section.

105. Menon, op. cit., p. 345 ; cf. ibid., p. 54, stating that the governor had this right by proclamation when a provincial government no longer could function under the 1935 Act.

106. Symonds, op. cit., p. 81.

107. Ibid.

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108. Lord Wavell left India on 23 March 1947.

109. *Vide infra*, p. 255.

110. Menon, op. cit., p. 354. Expressed in a public speech, given on 20 April 1947.

111. Ibid., p. 355. Statement made before the Constituent Assembly on 28 April 1947.

112. Ibid., p. 439.

113. Ibid., p. 388.

114. It seems surprising, on the other hand, that the Punjabi Hindus voted for division, in view of their previous opposition to the whole Pakistan scheme. Their aversity to living in a Muslim-dominated area and acceptance of Congress policies account for it.

115. For the Radcliffe Award and dissatisfaction with it, in so far as it pertains to the Punjab's division, *vide* Menon, op. cit., p. 403.

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116 He had been born in the year that Amīr 'Alī founded the Central National Muhammadan Association and Sir Sayyid, having relinquished his judgeship a year earlier, had turned sixty.

117. Ikram, op. cit, p. 215.

118. Ibid., p. 222; according to him, no solid biography has been written.

119. Ibid, p. 223, and *infra*, p. 274.

120 Ikram, op. cit., p. 224.

121. Ibid, p. 223.

122. *Vide infra*, pp. 275 ff.

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123. Ikram, op cit., p 225.

124. Symonds, op. cit., p. 64.

125. Ikram, op cit., pp. 226-7. Lord Linlithgow then was Governor-General of India (1936-43). He succeeded Lord Willingdon (1931-5) and was replaced by Lord Wavell (1943-March 1947), who, in turn, was followed by Lord Mountbatten (March-August 1947), the last in a long series of India's Governor-Generals. (*Vide infra*, Appendix E.)

126 Ikram, op. cit., p. 224.

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127. *Vide supra*, p. 255.

128. Ikram, op. cit., p. 227.

129. Menon, op. cit., pp. 180-205.

130. *Vide supra*, p 253.

131 Menon, op. cit., pp. 231-2.

132. *Vide supra*, pp. 254-5.

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133. Menon, op. cit, p. 335.

134. Ibid., p. 387.

135. Ibid., pp. 387-8.

136. Ikram, op. cit., p. 129.

137. Ibid., p. 228, text and n. 1, citing Choudhury Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, p. 97.

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138. Symonds, op. cit., p. 144, text and n. 1: "Muslims were 33,000,000 out of the province's population of 60,000,000 in 1941."

139. *Vide* Ikram, op. cit., pp. 230-4.

140. It became Pakistan's capital—Dacca being East Pakistan's—but was replaced rather recently by Rawalpindi (Islamabad).

141. By 1941, Sind had a 71% Muslim majority out of approximately 4,500,000 inhabitants. The 23% rise in the Sindhi Muslim population resulted from the completion of the Lloyd Barrage at Sukkur (1930) increasing cotton production threefold, that of

wheat fivefold. Symonds, op. cit., p. 134 ; Menon, op. cit., p. 49.

142. Montagu, Secretary of State for India at the time.

143. Menon, op. cit., p. 49.

144. Ikram, op. cit., pp. 232-3.

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145. Ibid., p. 233.

146. Ibid., p. 234.

147. Ibid.

148 Symonds, op. cit., p. 135.

149. The Durand Line was drawn (1875-93) to avoid any common border between India and Russia. As a result, Pakistan shares a 600-mile border with Afghanistan, whose government continuously has repudiated the Agreement since 1947.

150. Cantwell Smith, op. cit., p. 223.

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151. Ibid., p. 221.

152. Menon (op. cit., pp. 36-7) lists Jinnāḥ's "Fourteen Points" ; also *vide infra*, pp. 273 ff.

153. Cantwell Smith, op. cit., p. 222.

154 Menon, op. cit, p. 48.

155. Ibid., p. 49, giving a table for the various provinces, lists the total N.-W.F.P. population as three million, which is the figure listed by Symonds (op. cit., p. 118) for 1941.

156. Ikram, op. cit., p. 235.

157. Cantwell Smith, op. cit., p. 231.

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158. Ikram, op. cit., p. 236.

159. Menon, op. cit., p. 221.

160. Ikram, op. cit., p. 236.

161. Menon, op. cit, chapter III : "War and the Deadlock" (pp. 58 ff.).

162. Ibid., p. 74.

163. Ibid., pp. 78-9.

164. The Marquess of Zetland was still the Secretary of State for India, succeeded by L.S. Amery (in May 1940) when Churchill followed Neville Chamberlain as England's Prime Minister.

165. Menon, op. cit., p. 151.

166. Ikram, op. cit., p. 236.

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167. Menon, op. cit., pp. 179-80 ; *vide* Cantwell Smith, op. cit., p. 278.

168. *Vide supra*, p. 54.

169. Ikram, op. cit., p. 236.

170. Menon (op. cit, p. 221) seems to imply that his decision was taken in late 1945 rather than in 1946.

171. Ibid., p. 230.

172. *Vide supra*, p. 55.

173. Menon, op. cit., respectively pp 293, 305 and 316. It was sworn in on 2 September 1946. A formal communique stating that the Muslim League had decided to join the Interim Government was published in the press on 15 October 1946 Jinnāḥ had sent a

list of five League nominees, including Liyāqat 'Alī Khān, the previous day.

174. Ikram, op. cit., p. 237.

175. Ibid.

176 Menon (op. cit, p. 346) seems to imply that it also occurred in late February 1947, but Dr Ikram is silent about it. Regarding the date, it is possible that the Pir gave his orders while detained by the authorities.

177 Ibid., p. 357.

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178. Ikram, op. cit., p. 237.

179 Menon, op. cit., p. 512.

180. Ibid, p. 389.

181. Ikram, op cit., p. 238, text and n. "1. Brecher, *Nehru : A Political Biography*, p 351."

182. Symonds, op. cit., p. 123.

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183 *Vide infra*, pp. 265-7.

184. The largest of Baluchistan's states, whose Khān was nominal suzerain over the others mentioned in the text.

185. Symonds, op. cit., p. 139.

186. Three Afghan wars were fought : 1838-42, 1878-80 and 1919.

187. Menon, op cit., p 37.

188. Ibid., p. 195.

189. Symonds, op. cit., p. 90.

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190. Cantwell Smith, op. cit, p 231.

191. Menon, op. cit., p. 99.

192. *Vide supra*, pp. 213-4.

193. Menon (op. cit., pp. 259-60) cites the text of this memorandum.

194. Ibid., p. 270.

195 So called because it was composed of a delegation of Cabinet ministers, which reached New Delhi on 24 March 1946 and left India on 29 June. *Vide* Menon, op. cit., chapter X : "The Cabinet Mission" ; also *infra*, pp. 284 ff.

196 Ibid, p. 271. The Shāhī Jirga is the tribal council.

197. *Vide infra*, p. 253.

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198. Menon, op. cit., p. 363.

199. Ibid., p. 512.

200. Ibid., p. 388.

201. Ikram, op. cit., p. 238.

202. Symonds, op. cit., p. 90. Written in 1949. Also *vide infra*, chapters VIII and IX.

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203. Symonds, op. cit., p. 63.

204. Apart from those mentioned in *supra*, chapter V, particularly Abul-Kalām zād and Muḥammad 'Alī.

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205. *Vide supra*, p. 97.

206 *Vide supra*, pp 83-4.

207. *Vide* Bahadur, op. cit., chapter 8 ; *Sources of Indian Tradition*, pp. 831 ff. ; Ikram, op. cit., chapter XIV.

208. *Sources*, p. 665, stating as the dates of Naoroji's election as Congress president: "1886, 1893 and 1906". While a student in England, Jinnāḥ had supported Naoroji for the Houes of Commons' membership.

209. Jinnāḥ's maiden speech in Congress was made on a Muslim subject : "Waqf al-Aulād" (Ikram, op. cit., p 240). It pointed to his immediate concern.

210 *Sources*, pp 694-704, quotes excerpts from Gokhale's *Speeches*.

211 During its first annual session at Karachi (1907).

212 In the Punjab and Bengal, for instance, where the Muslims formed the majority, they would have proportionately fewer seats in the legislatures than their numbers warranted.

213. Bahadur, op. cit., p. 83, text and n. 2, citing as source : "Sir Chimanlal H. Setalvad : Recollections and Reflections : Pages 282 & 283."

214. An All-India Conference, held at Allahabad (on 1 January 1911) drew about 40 Muslims and 60 Hindus. (Bahadur, op. cit., p. 85.) It shows their non-communalist attitude.

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215. Ikram, op. cit., p. 240.

216. Ibid.

217. Ibid., p. 242, text and n. "1. Remarks by Mrs. Naidu quoted in *Mohammad Ali Jinnah* (M. H. Syed), p. 92."

218. Ibid., p. 241.

219. *Vide infra*, pp. 273 and 305.

220. Menon, op. cit., pp. 11 ff. The Act also enlarged the Imperial Legislative Council to sixty members maximum and to an optimum of fifty the provincial councils, which now were permitted to discuss budget and state resolutions to be regarded as recommendations to the executive branch of Government.

221. Ikram, op. cit., p. 241.

222. Ibid.

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223 Symonds, op. cit., p. 45.

224. However, *vide infra*, p. 273.

225 Passed as a counterpart to Great Britain's Defence of the Realm Act.

226. Wallbank, op. cit., p 105.

227 Originally two Acts had been suggested by the Rowlatt Sedition Committee—so called after Sir Sidney Rowlatt, Judge of the King's Bench in England—appointed in December 1917, it submitted its report to the Government in April 1918, suggesting minor, but permanent, changes in the criminal law as well as trial for sedition without witnesses or juries. Only one Act was promulgated (February 1919).

228 He attacked the Act in his speech before the national Muslim League's Calcutta session (September 1920). Ikram, op. cit., p. 244.

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229. Symonds, op. cit., p. 45. (*Vide supra*, pp. 259-60.)

230. Symonds, op cit., p. 46. The reforms were incorporated in the 1919 Government of India Act. *Vide* Menon, op. cit., pp. 19-26.

231. *Vide supra*, chapter V : 4.

232. Participating actively in India's political life, she became its National Congress President (1917). Originally a member of the Fabian Society, i.e. a socialist, she later became a theosophist. She also wrote on birth control in *The Fruits of Philosophy* (published in 1877, England).

233. Menon, op. cit., p. 30.

234. Ikram, op. cit., p. 244.

235. Symonds, op. cit., p. 47.

236. *Sources*, p. 833.

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237. Ikram, op. cit., p. 246, text and n. "1. See *Mohammad Ali Jinnah* (Syed), p. 305."

238. Ibid., text and n. "2. Quoted in *Eminent Musalmans* (Natesan), p. 435."

239. *Vide supra*, p. 271.

240. Ikram, op. cit., pp. 247-8.

241. No Indians were invited to sit on it.

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242. It met during February-March at Delhi and during May at Bombay. *Vide* Menon, op. cit., pp. 34 ff.

243. President Jawaharlal's (late) lawyer-father, originally pro-British, joined Dr Annie Besant's (the Theosophist leader) Home Rule League founded in 1916 and joined the Congress Movement in 1919, after severe English repression following Gandhi's *Satyagraha* Day. (Frank Moraes, *Jawāharlal Nehru, A Biography* [New York : The Macmillan Co., 1956], p. 7.)

244. Menon, op. cit., p. 36-7.

245. During its All-Parties Conference at Lucknow, 20-31 August 1928.

246. Bahadur, op. cit., p. 198, text and n. 1, citing as source : "Muhammad Ali Jinnah (A Political Study) by Sayyid Matlub Hasan : Page 418."

247. *Vide supra*, chapter VI, p. 214. The League was still split, but an All-Muslim Parties Conference (at Delhi, winter 1929) tried to resolve the differences. The leaders of both wings attended the London meetings. The 'ulamā', during a session chaired by Muḥammad 'Alī at Cawnpore, 23 December 1929, supported the holding of these Conferences when they were announced.

248. Congress decided at its Lahore meeting, December 1929, not to participate in the Conference, but did (through Gandhi) after the Gandhi-Irwin Pact was signed (5 March 1931), by which it promised to suspend the Civil Disobedience campaign (begun in 1930 and ended in 1934), and attend the London meetings, while Government released the prisoners who had participated in the aforementioned campaign. The Indian States were well represented.

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249. Ikram, op. cit., p. 252.

250. Bahadur, op. cit., p. 208, text and n. 2 : "Indian Round Table Conference 12th November, 1930-19th January, 1931—Proceedings of Sub-Committees, Volume I : Page 695."

251. Menon, op. cit., p. 47.

252. Commonly called the "Untouchables". Also, *vide supra*, p. 247, n. 67.

253. They did not split the Hindu population, whose leaders concluded with Dr B.R. Ambedkar, representative of the Depressed Classes, the Poona Pact on 24 September 1932, thereby revising the Award by a joint electoral system on condition that reserved seats in the provincial legislatures be granted.

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254. Menon, op. cit., 44.

255. A liberal-minded Congress member who, with S. Banerjea and V.S. Srinavasa Sastri, had left this organisation because of its growing extremism and founded the National Liberal Federation in 1919 Ibid., pp. 27 ff.

256. Ibid., p. 33. This recommendation was not included in the Majority Report, prepared by the same Committee, which itself was the outcome of a Congress resolution presented in February 1924 to revise the 1919 Government of India Act. Both Reports were made public in March 1925.

257 Ibid., p. 31.

258. Ibid. Pandit Motilal Nehru's suggestion undoubtedly motivated the British to convene the Round Table Conferences.

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259. *Vide supra*, chapter VI, pp. 213-4.

260. Shamloo, op. cit., p. 31 (Allahabad speech, 1930).

261. Ibid., p. 30.

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262. Ibid., p. 17.

263. *Sources of Indian Tradition*, pp. 834 ff. *Vide infra*, pp. 283 ff.

264. C R. Ali, pp. 224 ff. Also *vide supra*, chapter VI, p. 214, n. 4. His pamphlet's title may have been taken from a statement found in Leo Pinsker's *Auto-Emancipation* (1882) : "Let 'Now or never' be our watchword . . . ."

265. Ibid., p. 255. " 'Pakistan' is both a Persian and an Urdu word. It is composed of letters taken from the names of all our homelands—'Indian' and 'Asian'. That is, Panjab, Afghania (North-West Frontier Province), Kashmir, Iran, Sindh (including Kachch and Kathiawar), Tukharistan, Afghanistan, and Balochistan. It means the land of the Paks—the spiritually pure and clean. It symbolizes the religious beliefs and the ethnical stocks of our people ; and it stands for all the territorial constituents of our original Fatherland."

266. Ibid., p 227.

267. Shamloo, op. cit., p. 38 ("Presidential address delivered at the annual session of the All-India Muslim Conference at Lahore on the 21st March 1932.")

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268. *Vide supra*, p. 240, and *infra*, p. 283.

269. C.R. Ali, op. cit., p. 227.

270 Ibid., p. 228

271. Ibid., pp. 228, 229. He stated five additional aims : "*milatally*," the independence of such provinces as Assam, Deccan, Bengal, Orissa, Bihar and their integration into the "Pak Millat" (i.e. consolidation) ; "*fraternally*," freedom of all Muslim lands and "the creation of a Pan-Islamic world-organization" ; "*continentally*," the granting of nationhood to all communities in India and this country's "conversion" to " 'the Continent of Dinia' . . . the land of all faiths and the fraternities" ; "*culturally*," the crea-

tion of "the Cultural Orbit of Pakasia"; and "*internationally*," world recognition of all nations' equality "which is an absolute prerequisite of the peace, progress, and prosperity of Mankind."

272. *Vide supra*, pp. 240 ff.

273. *Vide supra*, p. 241.

274. K.A Ahmad, *The Founder of Pakistan, Through Trial to Triumph* (Cambridge; W. Heffer & Sons, Ltd., 1942), p. 19.

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275. Aziz Ahmad, "The Muslims and Indian Nationalism," op. cit., p. 26; cf. Ikram, op. cit., p 253.

276. Ikram, op. cit, p. 252.

277. Menon, op cit, pp. 47 ff. Ramsay MacDonald still was Prime Minister; Lord Willingdon succeeded Lord Irwin as Vicerory; Sir Samuel Hoare (later Viscount Templewood) replaced Wedgwood Benn as Secretary of State.

278 Ikram, op. cit, p. 253.

279 Ibid., p 254.

280 Ibid.; *vide supra*, pp. 246, 249-68.

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281. Bahadur, op. cit., p. 179, text, citing letter "dated June 21, 1937: Lahore" and footnote 2, 'Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah: Published by Shaykh Muhammad Ashraf, Kashmiri Bazar, Lahore."

282. *Vide infra*, p. 283.

283 Menon, op. cit., pp 51 ff.

284. Bahadur, op. cit., p. 219, text and n. 1: "The Government of India Act 1935, Sixth Schedule, Part I Section 5; Page, 338."

285. Ibid., p. 219, text and n. 2: "The Government of India Act 1935, First Schedule: Table of seats for Council of States, Page 309, and for Federal Assembly, Page 311: Fifth Schedule: Table of seats for Provincial Legislative Assemblies, Page 336 and for Provincial Legislative Councils, Page 337."

286 The problem was made more complex, because the Governor-General retained overriding powers.

287. Menon, op cit, p. 54.

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288. The first to be held under the 1935 Act. "Out of a total of 485 Muslim seats, the Muslim League was able to capture only 108. The Congress contested 58 Muslim seats and won 26" (Menon, op. cit., p. 55). W.C. Smith observes (op. cit., p. 250) that League reorganisations are too late to capture more seats and (ibid., p. 174) only 11% of the entire provincial population had the franchise. *Vide supra*, pp. 249-68.

289. His presidential address before the All-India National Convention (19 March 1937). *Vide* Bahadur, op. cit., p. 245, text and n. 2: "The Indian Review dated April, 1937: Page, 233."

290. W.C. Smith (op. cit., p. 215) also makes this observation.

291. Ibid., p. 255.

292. Ibid., pp. 255-6 It was supported by the British as well as by liberal-minded Hindus.

293. Ibid., p. 257, also p. 256 stating that during its "anti-Congress 'Day of

Deliverance'. . . in December 1939 . . . Hindu and other communalists were invited to take part, and did so."

294. Bahadur, op. cit., p. 245. The direct source is : Jinnāḥ, "Presidential Address, All-India Muslim League, Lucknow Session, October 1937," p. 7 (*vide* W.C. Smith, op. cit., p. 3-6, nn. 6 and 9).

295. W.C. Smith, op. cit., p. 250, text and p. 326, n. 9, citing same address as source.

296. Bahadur, op. cit., p. 245, n. 3 : "Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah," op. cit. The quotation is taken from Iqbāl's letter to Jinnāḥ, dated Lahore, 20 March 1937, as a direct result of President J. Nehru's suggestion for a "Mass-Contact" Movement among India's Muslims.

297. *Vide supra*, p. 278.

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298. *Sources of Indian Tradition*, p. 834.

299. Ibid., p. 836, quoting from "Jinnah, *Some Recent Speeches and Writings*" ed. by Jamil-ud-din Ahmad. 2 vols. M. Ashraf, Lahore, 1946-7, Vol. I. *Vide supra*, p. 277.

300. *Sources*, p. 837, citing from same 1940 address.

301. Ibid., p. 838, citing from same address.

302. Bahadur, op. cit., pp. 267-8, citing (p. 268, n. 1) as a main source: "Pakistan A Nation by El Hamza : Appendix Pages, 146 & 147 : 1946 Edition Published by Islamic Literature Publishing House, Lahore". The unquoted portion of the Resolution dealt with the guarantee of sufficient safeguards for minorities to be embodied in the new Muslim State's Constitution.

303. *Vide supra*, respectively, pp. 83-4 and 116 ff.

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304. Bahadur, op. cit., p. 268, n. 1 also, citing as evidence for the date given : "The Islamic Culture, dated October, 1943 (Page 466)," and "the Indian Annual Register, January-June, 1940, Page 53."

305. Menon, op. cit., p. 83.

306. W.C. Smith, op. cit., p. 259, text and p. 327: "26. Rajindra Prashad's statement and Jinnah's reply are given in *The Sunday Statesman*, Delhi, 20-4-41."

307. *Vide infra*, pp. 83 4.

308. *Vide infra*, p. 273.

309. Menon (op. cit., p. 73), states that Desai, then Congress Party leader in the Central Legislative Assembly, accepted Dominion Status which he did not consider different from independence.

310. Ibid., p. 82.

311. Ibid., p. 71.

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312. Ibid., p. 73.

313. *Vide infra*, pp. 284 ff. ; p. 298.

314. *Vide supra*, p. 245.

315. Khan Durrani, op. cit., p. 102, but *vide infra*, p. 305.

316. *Vide supra*, p. 283.

317. Khan Durrani, op. cit., p. 104.

318. Ibid., p. 103.

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319. Menon, op. cit., pp. 122 ff. Sir Stafford reached Delhi on 22 March by Churchill's

order (statement to House of Commons, dated 11 March), broadcast his proposals on 30 March and 11 April, left for England on the 12th.

320. Ibid , p. 123.
321. Ibid., p. 124.
322. Ibid., p. 126.
323 Ibid., p. 133.

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324 Khan Durrani, op. cit., pp. 161-2.
325. Ibid., pp. 168, 169.

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326. Ibid., pp. 169-72 for this section.
327. Ibid., p. 172.
328. Ibid., p. 21, for both sections quoted from Ambedkar's work (pp. 329 ff.). His book went through many editions.
329. Ibid., p. 175.
330. Ibid., p. 177.

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331 Ibid , p. 165.
332. Ibid.
333. Ibid., p 164.
334. Ikram, op. cit , p. 262.
335. Menon, op. cit , p. 140.

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336. Cantwell Smith, op. cit., p. 281. Also *vide supra*, p. 268.
337 Ibid., p. 281.

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338. Ikram, op. cit., p. 264.
339. The Cabinet Mission consisted of Lord Pethick-Lawrence, India's Secretary of State, Sir Stafford Cripps, Board of Trade President, and Mr A V. Alexander, first Admiralty Lord. They reached Delhi on 24 March 1946, opened their conference at Simla on 5 May and left India on 29 June. *Vide* Menon, op. cit , chapters X and XI for full details.
340. Ibid., pp. 260 ff.
341 Ibid., p. 262.
342 Ibid., p 261.
343 Ibid., p. 281.
344 Bahadur, op. cit., p. 321.
345. Menon, op cit., p. 269 (Point 5).

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346. Ibid., p. 261 (Point 2).
347. Ibid., p. 276 ; pp. 274-6 for this section.
348. Ibid., p. 277.

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349. Ibid.
350. Ibid., p. 281. Press conference held on 10 July 1946.
351. Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, p. 182.

352. Menon, op. cit,, pp. 285-6.

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353. Ibid., pp. 288-9.
354. Azad. op. cit., p. 183.
355. Ibid., p. 184.

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356. Symonds, op. cit., p. 69, text and n. "3. Statistics given by Sir Stafford Cripps in the House of Commons, 12th December 1946". (Cf. Menon, op. cit., p. 294, stating the loss of "nearly 5,000 lives," injury done to "over 15,000 persons and about one hundred thousand were rendered homeless".

357. This assurance was given him during a private conference with Lord Wavell on 25 September 1946.

358. Menon, op. cit., p. 312.

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359. Ibid. pp. 312-3.
360. Ibid., p. 313.
361. Ibid., p. 314.
362. Ibid.

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363. Ibid , p. 315.
364. Ibid., p. 316.
365. Ibid , p. 317.
366. Ikram, op. cit , p. 267, text and n. "1. Brecher, *Nehru, A Political Biography*, p. 324."
367. As reported by Azad, op. cit., pp. 166-7.
368. Ibid., p. 167.

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369. Menon, op. cit., p. 320.

370. Ibid., p. 320. Nehru was the "Vice President of the Executive Council—External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations".

371. For the situation in the Punjab, *vide supra*, p. 249, and Ikram, op. cit., pp. 269-74.

372. Menon, op. cit., p. 321.
373. Ibid., p. 323.
374. Ibid., p. 322.

375. He was the Muslim League's secretary (1936-47) and became Pakistan's first Prime Minister (1947-51).

376. Leader of the Sikh community at the time.

377. Called the "December 6th Statement". *Vide* Menon, op. cit., pp. 329-30.

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378. *Vide* paragraph 19, sections v and viii of the "Statement of the Cabinet Mission Plan and the Viceroy, 16 May, 1946," reproduced in full by Menon, op. cit., Appendix IV. The sections that were disputed are found in ibid., p. 473.

379. Its first session was held on 9 December 1946 ; its second, on 20 January 1947.

380. Menon, op. cit., p. 333.
381. Ibid., p. 334.

382. Ibid., p. 334. (*Vide supra*, p. 293.)

383. Ibid., p. 337.

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384. By Prime Minister Attlee in Parliament.

385. Lord Wavell apparently supported Jinnāḥ's view that Congress rather than the Muslim League opposed the Cabinet Mission Plan.

386. Menon, op. cit., p. 354. Public speech given on 20 April 1947.

387. Ibid., p. 355. Statement made before the Constituent Assembly on 28 April 1947.

388. *Vide supra*, p. 254.

389. "Statement made by His Majesty's Government, 3 June, 1947". Menon, op. cit., Appendix X, p. 514, for the quoted paragraph.

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390. Ibid., p. 378.

391. Possibly influenced by the view, which Sir Francis Mudie, Sind's Governor at the time, expressed to Lord Mountbatten on 18 May 1947—en route to London—viz. power should be transferred without delay. Ibid., p. 367.

392. Ibid. p. 382.

393. Ibid., Appendix XI.

394. Ibid., p. 393.

395. Ibid., p. 366.

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396. Ikram, op. cit., p 279.

397. Alan Campbell-Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten* (New York : E P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1953), p. 70.

398. Ibid., p. 17.

399. Ikram, op. cit., p 279.

400. Campbell-Johnson, op. cit., p. 23.

401. Ibid., p. 98, his own quotation from a private letter addressed to his mother.

402. Ibid., p. 59.

403. Ibid., p. 127.

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404. *Vide infra*, chapter VIII.

405. Azad, *Autobiography*, p. 109.

406. *Vide supra*, pp. 278 ff.

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407. *Vide supra*, pp. 271, 273, 277, 289-90.

408. Symonds, op. cit., pp. 57-8 text and p. 58 n. "1. Saiyid, *Jinnah*, p. 876."

409. Leon B. Pullada, *The Islamic State in Pakistan*, "a paper submitted to the University of Pennsylvania and to the Foreign Service Institute, Department of State, in conjunction with a detail for South Asia Regional Studies, 1951-1952," June 1952, p. 29, text and n. 1 : "Dawn (Karachi), December 29, 1946."

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410. Particularly, *vide supra*, pp. 275-6.

411. It is a sad comment that, generally, the West is far less interested in Islamic than in the Indian and Asian worlds.

Chapter VIII: The Force of the Conservative Current, pp. 307-339

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1. *Speeches by Quaid e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah*, June 1947-August 1948. Pak Publicity, Karachi (n.d.), p 28. The excerpt is taken from ' Quaid-e-Azam's Address to Civil, Naval, Military and Air Force Officers of the Pakistan Government at Khaliqdina Hall, Karachi, on October 11, 1947".

2. *Vide infra*, pp. 312 ff.

3. It provided that Pakistan would be ruled under the modified and adapted 1935 Government of India Act.

4. He was sworn in as Pakistan's first Governor-General on 15 August 1947. It formally bestowed upon him the title of *Quā'id-i-A'ẓam* in accordance with a resoultion moved Mr Liyāqat 'Alī Khān.

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5. He took office as Pakistan's Cabinet Chief on 15 August 1947 and succeeded Mr Jinnāḥ as Muslim League head upon the latter's death (in September 1948), holding both posts until his assassination in October 1951. *Vide infra*, pp. 311 ff.

6. Khwājah Nāẓimuddīn at first became Governor-General upon Jinnāḥ's death. In October 1951 he succeeded Liyāqat 'Alī Khān as Premier and was elected Muslim League president on 16 November 1951 Ghulām Muḥammad took over as Governor-General (October 1951-September 1955).

7. Sayyid Abul-A'lā Maudūdī, *The Islamic Law and Constitution* (tr. and ed. by Khurshīd Aḥmad), (Lahore : Islamic Publications, Ltd. [2nd edn.], 1960, chapter 10).

8. Ambassador to Washington, D.C. (1952-3), he replaced Mr Nāẓimuddīn as Premier (upon Ghulām Muḥammad's request) and League president. He resigned early in 1955, but was re-elected that summer. *Vide infra*, p. 309. n. 16.

9. *Report of the Court of Inquiry*, constituted under the Punjab Act II of 1954; it is called the "Munir Report" after the then Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court, Mr Justice Muḥammad Munīr. *Vide infra*, p. 336

10. A combination formed in late 1953 of the Awami League and the Krishak Sramik Party, an important post-Partition organisation, composed mainly of Mr Faḍlul Ḥaq's adherents. He had moved the 1940 Lahore Revolution, founded his own Krishak Proja Party, rejoined the Muslim League, from which he was expelled by Jinnāḥ in 1941. In August 1955, he became Governor of East Bengal. *Vide supra*, pp. 255 ff.

11. "The Rule of Law," article by an unnamed correspondent, in *Pakistan Affairs*, published by the Embassy of Pakistan, Washington, D.C., Vol. VIII, No. 15, 8 April 1955, pp. 2-3.

12. Keith Callard, *Pakistan, A Political Study* (London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd , 1957), pp. 145 and 146, where it is stated that the Court declared the Governor-General to be a part of the legislative function, which it differentiated, however, from "the right of dissolution".

13. Ibid., p. 141. A new Cabinet, consisting of four old and four new members (among the latter, General M. Ayūb Khān), was sworn in in the evening of 24 October.

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14. Ibid., pp. 142-3.

15. The Awami (People's) League, an all-Pakistan Muslim opposition party, originating in East Bengal, was headed by Mr H.S. Suhrawardy, the last Chief Minister of

undivided Bengal. It became important after the Muslim League declined with Liyāqat 'Alī Khān's death.

16 Among the five Central Cabinet members re-elected were: Prime Minister Muḥammad 'Alī (by the East Pakistan Provincial Legislature), Finance Minister, Chaudhrī Muḥammad 'Alī and Minister of the Interior, Major General Iskandar Mirza. The new Cabinet was sworn in on 11 August 1955, four days after the latter had been designated as Acting Governor-General, as Ghulām Muḥammad took two months' leave, because of health reasons.

17. Among them the Indian Independence (Amendment) Act, 1950, substituting the name "Punjab" for West Punjab," the Adult Franchise Act, 1951, the Governor-General's ordinance of 27 March 1955, unifying Pakistan into two units (East and West), each with its own single administration and a Federal Government for the whole country.

18. It reconvened, eighty-man strong, on 8 August 1953 at Karachi.

19. Maudūdī, op. cit., Appendix IV.

20. Acting Governor-General since 7 August, he had replaced Prime Minister Muḥammad 'Alī (again appointed as Ambassador to Washington, D.C., on 24 August 1955) by Chaudhrī Muḥammad 'Alī, who thus became also Muslim League president, but resigned from both posts in September 1956, when he was succeeded by H. S. Suhrawardy (who stayed in office until October 1957).

21. A new Charter was promulgated on 1 March 1962, restoring representative government, under the directive of General M. Ayūb Khān, who replaced Major General Iskandar Mirza in a bloodless coup on 27 October 1958.

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22. If dying is regarded as a Divine decree (rather than merely a part of the natural order), such a view is valid. Otherwise, the Aḥmadiyyah (and Reform Judaic) thesis that a prophet's death does not necessarily end revelation (and legislation) appears tenable.

23. The earliest among them were theologians who, possessing Qur'ānic scholarship, extracted, examined and classified its legal principles. Later on, generations of jurists arose. Nevertheless, they had to be well versed in the Qur'ān, which was the first and primary source of Islamic Law.

24. *Vide* xxvi, 53. Does the pyramid architecturally reflect a similar ancient (pre-Islamic) Middle Eastern theology, taken over partly by Islam? *Vide supra*, p. 202.

25. Bukhārī, Muslim, and others have shown that a large number of Traditions are unauthentic. Many were fabricated by rival "schools" to justify their claims *vis a vis* others. *Vide* also J. Schacht, *The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950). He rejects most of them as being spurious.

26. Some amalgamation of Roman law took place. Also, elements of pre-Islamic or "Arabian custory law" (*jus gentium* or *Arabian sunnah* not to be confused with Muḥammad's *sunnah*) are present in the Qur'ān and merged (in practice) with Roman and Muslim legal principles.

27. Formulated by Mālik ibn Anas (*c.* 715-95 C.E.), founder of the Mālikite "school" (or *madhhab*, "rite").

28. Both were contributed by Abū Ḥanīfah (699-767 C.E.), founder of the Ḥanafite "school".

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29. The Abbasid caliph, al-Mutawakkil (r. 847-61) denounced in 848 Mu'tazilism to be a heresy.

30 Ataturk's Turkey is regarded as a secular, Afghanistan as an Islamic, State.

31. Aziz Ahmad, "The Nature of Islamic Political Theory, in *Proceedings of the First All-Pakistan Political Science Conference, 1950* (Lahore: The Punjab University Press, 1950), p. 2.

32. W.C. Smith, *Pakistan as an Islamic State* (Preliminary Discourse), (Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf, 1951), p. 7.

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33. "Address of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on his election as President (11th August, 1947)" in *Speeches of Quaid-i-Azam in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (1947-1948)*, Manager, Governor-General's Press and Publications, Karachi, 1950, p. 1. Henceforth *Speeches*.

34. Ibid., p 3.

35. Some notable exceptions were the Umayyad 'Umar II (r. 717-20) and the Abbasid al-Mutawakkil (r. 847-61), both of whom issued stringent regulations, forbidding non-Muslims from erecting places of worship, holding public office, etc The last mentioned caliph was fiercely anti-Shī'ite, destroying 'Alī's tomb at al-Najaf and al-Ḥusayn's at Kerbela.

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36. Maudūdī, op. cit., p. 421. (Appendix V, entitled "White Paper on the Problem of Electorates," issued by the Jamā'at-i-Islāmī in January 1958.)

37. A political (contrary to "modernist" which is rather a theological) designation for those favourable to reforms leading to a Western democratic direction and, hence, opposed to conservatives restricted to traditionalism and thus prejudiced against new ideas. The latter are "reformist" in the sense of reconstructing a pure(r) Islamic—not a modern—*res publica*.

38. During the first Constituent Assembly's Fifth Session.

39. *Vide* ii. 229: "These are the bounds of God: therefore overstep them not; for whoever oversteppeth the bounds of God, they are evil-doers."

40. *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, Vol. V, No. 1, 7 March 1949, Manager of Publications, Government of Pakistan, Karachi, pp. 1-2 Henceforth *Debates*.

41. 'Umar appointed a board of six electors, who chose 'Uthmān over 'Alī. Its constitution was called "consultation" (*al-shūrā*).

42. Mu'āwīyah (r. 661-80) initiated hereditary rulership (perhaps imitating Byzantine practices) by nominating his son, Yazīd (r. 680-3), as his successor in 679 and taking the oath of allegiance from deputations whom he called from the provinces to the capital (Damascus) for this special purpose.

43. The position in this respect seems close to Catholic Church practice. The Electors decide (by ballot) on the future Pope, regarded as the spiritual head of his transworldly Congregation. (Many Popes battled with kings for temporal power) The individual Catholics do not participate in this "election," but accept it, nevertheless. Similarly, the Muslims did not choose their caliphs, but submitted to their leaders' choice.

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44. The repudiation of a State religion by the United States Constitution (First Amendment) is interpreted by Muslim orthodoxy as a transformance of sovereignty from God to the prople, who thereby repudiate any limitations set upon their power by a religious Code Liberalism, with its universalist thesis, and permitting "the free exercise" of worship, has no appeal to the traditionalist-minded.

45. The verse quoted undoubtedly reflects Muḥammad's insistence that he is not

divine. *Vide* xli. 13 : "Worship none but God," substantiating such an interpretation.

46. Maudūdī, *The Nature and Contents of Islamic Constitution* (ed. by Khurshīd Aḥmad), Jamā'at-i-Islāmī Publications, Karachi (n.d.), p. 18. It was a speech delivered by him before the Karachi Bar Association, winter 1952.

47. Special days were set aside for the purpose.

48. Athens is the classic example. Its famous leader, Pericles (*c.* 490-429 B.C.), enunciated this ideal in his *Funeral Oration*.

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49. The Greeks and Romans, too, were of Indo-European stock.

50. Originally, the Indo-European tribes had their councils. In Athens, a distinction was made between the Council of the Elders and the popular assembly. The former institution came to be called the Senate in Rome. The present-day U.S. form of Senate and House of Representatives keeps alive a very old practical idea.

51. This idea, expressed also in the U.S. Constitution, is closer to the Roman concept of *jus*, which partly conveys property rights, than to Greek principles.

52. Reforms instituted by Clisthenes (508 or 506-500 B.C ?), whose practice of granting citizenship to foreigners, particularly artists, was stopped by Pericles's law of 451 B.C. (Pericles lived from *c.* 495 to 429 B.C.)

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53. Cf. Lebanon, whose half Christian (Maronite) and half Muslim population are more or less represented equally in Parliament. Its Constitution states that the country's President must be a Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunnite, and the president of the Chamber, a Shī'ite.

54. *Vide infra*, pp. 325 ff.

55. *Vide supra*, chapter II.

56. *Vide infra*, pp. 321-2.

57. A military rather than a civil notion, because the meaning was that Muslim soldiers were willing to give their life for the security also of the Caliphate's non-Muslim inhabitants. Another element was the feeling that non-Muslims might be unreliable and endanger the State as they might gain control of the armed forces and use them against their host.

58. *Vide* v. 46: "But if thou judge, then judge between them with equity. God loveth those who deal equitably."

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59. *Debates*, Vol. V, No. 1, 7 March 1949, p. 3.

60. Maudūdī, *The Nature and Contents of Islamic Constitution*, p. 18.

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61. *Speeches*, From June 1947 to August 1948, pp. 82-3. The quotation is taken from the "Quaid-e-Azam's Broadcast talk to the people of Australia recorded on the 19th February 1948".

62. *Debates*, Vol. V, No 2, 8 March 1949, p. 13.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid., p. 14.

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65. Ibid., p. 15.

66. Ibid., Vol. V, No. 5, 12 March 1949, p. 100.

67. Ibid., Vol. V, No. 2, p. 17.

68. Ibid., p. 19.
69. Ibid.

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70 Ibid., Vol. V, No. 5, 12 March 1949, pp. 71-2.
71. Ibid., p. 72.
72. Ibid., Vol V, No 3, 9 March 1949, p. 37.
73. Ibid., p. 39.
74. Ibid., p. 40.

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75. Ibid., p. 41.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid., p. 42.
78. Ibid., p. 43.
79. Ibid., p 45.

80 Ibid. Interestingly, he did not cite the United States as an example of a "secular" State. Obviously, it is not a Muslim polity, but neither does it deny God's existence and sovereignty, and thus is not "secular" in the same sense as the U.S.S.R, which denies any form of supernaturalist belief.

81. K. Callard, op. cit., p. 234.

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82. Liyāqat 'Alī Khān's speech before the Constituent Assembly in conclusion of the debate on "The Motion on Aims and Objects," given on 12 March 1949. Published in *Pakistan's Fundamentals of Freedom*, Controller of Printing and Stationery, Government of Pakistan, p. 26.

83. Ibid., p. 27.
84. Ibid., p. 28.
85. K. Callard, op. cit., p. 235.
86. *The Nature and Contents of Islamic Constitution*, p. 47.

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87. K. Callard, op. cit , p. 235.
88 *Debates*, Vol. V, No. 5, 12 March 1949, pp. 98 101.
89. Ibid , pp. 101-2, giving the names of its members, among whom were: Sir Muḥammad Ẓafarullah Khān, Mr Ghulām Muḥammad, Dr I. H. Qureshi and "the mover": the Hon. Mr Liyāqat 'Alī Khān.
90. G. A. Parwez, *Is Islam A Failure ? No.* (Lahore: Idārah-i-Ṭulū'-i-Islām, n.d.), p. 44.

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91. *An Analysis of the Munir Report* (tr. and ed. by Khurshīd Aḥmad), Karachi: Jamā'at-i-Islāmī, December 1956), p. 80. Henceforth *Analysis*.

92. The main reason probably was the Jamā'at's participation in the anti-Aḥmadiyyah campaign in the Punjab (1953), which the organisation, however, has denied (*v. de ibid.*, p. 20). According to Mr Khurshīd Aḥmad, however, the condemnation resulted from "writing a pamphlet which itself was never proscribed!" (*Islamic Law and Constitution*, p. 432, citing biographical details—Appendix VI). He did not mention the article by name.

93. 2nd edn., 1960. *Vide Supra*, p. 308, n. 7.

94. He regards these as the legal requirements decreed by the Qur'ān, citing respectively iv. 62, 38 and viii. 73 as proofs. (*The Nature and Contents of Islamic Constitution*, pp. 44-5.)

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95. Ibid., p. 49.

96. Ibid., pp. 21 ff. for the subsequent textual quotations.

97. The insistence on the Judiciary's independence, found in Pakistan's Constitution, therefore, is not un-Islamic.

98. *The Nature and Contents of Islamic Constitution*, p. 23.

99. Ibid., p. 29.

100. Of course, the question concerning their interpretation again arises, because fierce opposition parties (e.g. Khārijites, 'Alīds, *et al.*) existed in early Islamic times. *Vide* J. Schacht, op cit., for the legal aspect of this problem.

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101. *The Nature and Contents of Islamic Constitution*, p. 48.

102. Ibid , p. 50.

103. *Vide infra*, pp 330 ff.

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104. *The Nature and Contents of Islamic Constitution*, p. 37.

105. Ibid., p 39.

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid., p. 40.

108. Ibid., p. 41. Among the "corrupt practices" was the party system, which Muslim fundamentalists reject on the basis of Qur'ān, vi. 160 : "As to those who split up their religion and become sects, have thou nothing to do with them ; their affair is with God only. . . ." Another, of course, was "law-making" as distinct from the derivative process. A third was undoubtedly the right of vote granted to women—an acknowledgment that they are neither intellectually inferior not to be ruled by men, which is contrary to iv. 38 : "Men are in charge of women" as Maudūdī has translated it (*versus* Rodwell's version : "Men are superior to women on account" of their respective qualities).

109. *Islamic Law and Constitution*, chapter 9, entitled: "The Problem of Electorate," pp. 325 ff.

110. Ibid., p. 328.

111. Ibid.

112. Ibid., p. 329.

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113. Ibid.

114. Ibid.

115. *Speeches*, Constituent Assembly Speech, 12 March 1949, p. 29.

116. *Islamic Law and Constitution*, p. 330.

117. Ibid., p. 331.

118. *Vide Analysis*, p. 135, where the Lahore High Court is accused of entertaining such a view. The Electorate Act, 1956, "provided in four short clauses that for national and provincial elections, East Pakistan should have a joint electorate and West Pakistan separate electorates. The Electorate (Amendment) Act, 1957, established joint electorates for both East and West Pakistan (*Dawn*, April 25, 1957). The key vote was

36 : 14." (K. Callard, op. cit., p. 252, n. 3.)

119. *Islamic Law and Constitution*, chapter 9, p. 331.

120. Ibid., p. 332

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121. Ibid., chapter 10 Also Appendix II, "Ulamā's Amendments to the Basic Principles Committee's Report," which substantially covers the same points as found in the Tenth Chapter.

122. Ibid , p. 337.

123. Ibid.

124 *Report of the Basic Principles Committee*, Manager, Government of Pakistan Press, Karachi, 1953 "Ch. III—Procedure for Preventing Legislation Repugnant to the Quran and the Sunnah". Quotations taken from pp. 4-5. It is henceforth called the *Report* or the *B P.C Report*.

125 Ibid.

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126. *Vide infra*, pp. 331 ff.

127. *Islamic Law and Constitution*, pp. 337-8.

128 *Vide infra*, pp. 334 ff.

129. *Islamic Law and Constitution*, p. 338.

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130. Ibid., pp. 338, 339.

131 *Interim Report*, Committee on Fundamental Rights of Citizens of Pakistan and on Matters Relating to Minorities, Manager, Governor-General's Press and Publications, Karachi, 1950. It was passed by the Constituent Assembly on 6 October 1950.

132. *Islamic Law and Constitution*, p. 338.

133 *Interim Report* ; its articles 8 and 16 have the former, its articles 9 (2), 10 and 11, the latter clause.

134. *Islamic Law and Constitution*, p. 339 ; *vide* also ibid., pp. 348 ff.

135. *Report*, article 23(2) rejected by Maudūdī in op. cit., p. 343, where he advocated that such right be vested in the "Supreme or a High Court". He also denounced the Executive's prerogative of "preventive detention" (in his op. cit., pp. 339 ff.), which is included, however, in the *B.P.C. Report* of 1950 and 1953 (*vide* latter's "Schedule I, List I [Federal]," paragraph 3, p. 69). It permitted Government to imprison "saboteurs," among them those trying to disrupt it (and including, therefore, not solely spies, but Muslim theologians as well).

136. *Report*, p. 7, note.

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137. Ibid., art. 20, and art. 25, permitting his removal by a two-thirds majority vote in each of the Federal Legislature's two Houses. *Vide* Maudūdī, *Islamic Law and Constitution*, p. 348, but he conceded the rights to suspsend the Charter "at the most in a province and for a specified period."

138. Maudūdī, *Islamic Law and Constitution*, p. 345.

139. Ibid., pp. 345-6.

140. Ibid., p 346.

141. Everywhere, it uses the term "he," not "she," but from an Islamic viewpoint,

it can be argued that the former includes the latter so that (from a modernist viewpoint) either a male or a female could be meant. Even in the articles relating to the election of a President of the State, no specific paragraph was included to read that this office should be filled only by a male, although the term "he" could and was interpreted as such. *Vide infra*, p. 333.

142. *Islamic Law and Constitution*, p. 337.

143. *Vide* also the *Report's* article 3.

144. *Vide supra*, pp. 329 ff.

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145. *Vide* also article 4 of the *Minorities Report*, forbidding discrimination on these grounds.

146. *Vide supra*, pp. 321-2 for Liyāqat 'Alī Khān's view.

147. *Vide B.P.C. Report*, article 13 (1).

148. Maudūdī, *Islamic Law and Constitution*, p. 295, and chapter 8 : "Rights of Non-Muslims in Islamic State."

149. Ibid., article (4), left column, pp. 296-7.

150. All Ministers must be appointed by the President upon the Premier's advice. *Report*, article 28 (1).

151. Ibid., "Part X. The Judiciary." The President also makes the appointment of the Justices after consultation with the Chief Justice (articles 162, 163).

152. Ibid., articles 164 and 163 (3), requiring "an oath or affirmation in the prescribed form."

153. Nothing is said about the exclusion of non-Muslims from the Armed Forces in the *Report*.

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154. *Vide supra*, pp. 331-2.

155. It is the title of the *B.P.C. Report's* chapter III, which opens with the aforementioned article 3. *Vide Debates*, Vol. XV, Nos. 17-21. The debates on the "Procedure" began on 29 October and ended on 3 November 1955. It was part of the series of paragraph-by-paragraph discussions of the entire *Report*.

156. *Debates*, Vol. XV, No. 17, 29 October 1953, p. 589.

157. Ibid., Vol. XV, No. 19, 31 October 1953, p. 634.

158. Ibid., p. 656.

159. Ibid., p. 634.

160. Ibid., pp. 647 ff. S. ii. 257 is quoted ; cf. iii. 79 ; ix. 29, *et al.*

161. *Vide* particularly the *B.P.C. Report's* article 15 and the *Minorities Report's* article 14. The former imposes upon the State the obligation of protecting the non-Muslims' "rights and interests," the latter prohibits the compulsory levying of "special taxes" whose proceeds would be used to defray the "expenses for the propagation or maintenance of any particular religion other than his own."

162. *Debates*, Vol. XV, No. 19, 31 October 1953, p. 656.

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163. Ibid., p. 639.

164. Ibid., Vol. XV, No. 20, 2 November 1953, p. 663.

165. Ibid., Vol. XV, No. 19, 21 October 1953, p. 633. View expressed by Shri Dhirendra Nath Datta, East Bengal, "General," meaning that he did not belong to East Bengal's Scheduled Castes, which were made into a separate electorate (rather than

granted reserved seats filled by those classified as "general" voters, i.e. Christians, Hindus, *et al*) by the electoral law of 1952. *Vide* K. Callard, op. cit., pp. 241 and 247. Thus they had a privilege which they shared with the Muslims, who also had separate electorates.

166. *Debates*, Vol. XV, No. 19, p. 643. Assertion made by Mr Seth Sukhdev, a Hindu from Sind.

167. Ibid., p. 637.

168. K. Callard, op. cit., p 255, citing as source in n. 2 : "Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, Vol. XVI, pp. 504, 505, September 21, 1954."

169. Ibid., p. 255, citing as source in n. 3 : "*Ibid.*, p. 571."

170. *Islamic Law and Constitution*, Appendix III.

171, Ibid., p. 399.

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172. *Vide*, for instance, articles 18 and 205 of the 1956 Constitution. Many of the pertinent clauses were included in the 1962 Charter.

173. An economic—local—problem is the possibility of pressure exerted on a firm's employing too few Muslims and too many Hindus, with the consequence that some of the latter would be fired and replaced by more of the former group. Another is that Hindus or other minority members might feel (rightly or wrongly) that they are being arrested not on the legal ground of "security," but for the illegal reason of not being Muslims and, therefore, more easily subject to police detention.

174. K. Callard, op. cit., pp. 258 ff.

175. Shamloo, *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, Part Two: "Islam and Qadianism," chapter III : "A Letter to the 'Statesman' on Qadianis and Orthodox Muslims," published on 10 June 1935.

176. It was founded in 1930 *Vide* W.C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, pp. 224-8 and 297.

177. He became Pakistan's Chief Justice after his *Report's* publication.

178. *Analysis*, p. 68, citing from the *Munir Report*, p. 140.

179. Ibid., p. 19, n. 17a

180. Ibid., p. 20, n. 17c, citing as the newspaper having published this statement (which formed part of the Jamā'at's "resolution" passed by its Working Committee on 5 March 1953) the Lahore daily, *Tasnim*, 5 March 1953. It is stated also (Ibid., p 21, n. 17e) that it expelled two of its members for having disobeyed its instructions by participating in the "direct action day".

181. Ibid., p. 121.

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182. Ibid., pp. 161 ff.

183. Ibid., p. 165. He was 'Ā'ishah's father.

184 Ibid. Verdict pronounced by Mr Ibrāhīm 'Alī Chishtī, a leader of one of the main Ṣūfī orders in India.

185. Ibid., p. 166.

186. Ibid. text and n. 97, citing as source the *Munir Report*, p. 219.

187. Ibid., pp. 167 and 170, quoting from the *Munir Report*, p. 220.

188. S. ii. 52 decrees "slay the guilty among you "

189. *Vide* S. ix. 29 : "Make war upon such of those to whom the Scriptures have been given as . . . profess not the profession of the truth." The Word "Scriptures" referring specifically to the Old and New Testaments, could designate the Qur'ān as well

(for later Muslim interpreters).

190. *Analysis*, p. 173.

191. War-making, for instance. *Vide* ix. 11 and 13, 14. Abū Bakr waged wars with the Arabs to punish their apostasy upon Muḥammad's death.

192. *Analysis*, p. 181.

193. Ibid., pp. 176-7.

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194. Ibid., p. 177.

195. Sayyid Maudūdī advocated, however, that they be treated as a minority, which would give them State protection, but exclude them from certain privileges restricted to the majority.

196. *B.P.C. Report*, 1953, article 10.

197. *Islamic Law and Constitution*, p. 366, requesting the inclusion of the words "geographical . . . and linguistic," to assure its transnational character.

198. *Analysis*, text and n. 87, citing as source the *Munir Report*, p. 205. For the Jamā'at's refutation, *vide* ibid., pp. 159 ff.

Chapter IX : Conclusion : The Role of Islam in Pakistan Today, pp. 340-355

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1. Islamabad, the new capital, is built near Rawalpindi. Dacca is considered the second capital and the National Assembly's centre. *Vide The Constitution of the Republic of Pakistan*, 1962 [*infra* Appendix N], respectively Arts. 211 (7), 211 (1) and 211 (3), (5); and *infra*, p. 345.

2. He visited the United States from 11 to 18 July 1961, addressing a joint session of Congress on 12 July.

3. *Pakistan Affairs*, Embassy of Pakistan, Washington, D.C., Vol. XI, No. 18, 1 November 1958, p. 2.

4. Ibid., p. 4. Article entitled "General Ayub Calls for Common Cultural Outlook."

5. Ibid.

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6. *Vide supra*, chapter VIII, p. 308.

7. *1962 Constitution*, "Preamble," para. 4 (d).

8. Ibid., "Principles of Policy," para. 204 (a), for example.

9. Ibid., Art. 1 (2). It is the only article in the 1962 Constitution which contains a reference to the Qur'ān.

10. Ibid., "Preamble," para. 1.

11. Ibid., "Principles of Policy;" paras. 2, 3 *et al.*

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12. *Vide supra*, p. 341.

13. The decree forbidding usury (xxx. 38, for example) is laid down in the 1962 as it is in the 1956 Constitution.

14. Its membership: a minimum of five and a maximum of twelve, to serve for a

three-year term.

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15. Cf. Law No 131 (4), stating that the Central Legislature has powers, if not exclusive, to frame laws for Islamabad Capital and Dacca Capital Territory regarding "any matter not enumerated in the Third Schedule".

16 Cf. Laws Nos. 27 (1) ff., 28, asserting the same principle concerning the National Assembly.

17. Cf. Laws Nos. 77(1) ff., 78, stressing likewise with regard to the provincial assemblies. *Vide infra*, n. 23.

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18. *Vide supra*, p. 341.

19. Cf. *B.C.P. Report*, Art. 16.

20. *Vide infra*, p. 355.

21. *B.C.P. Report*, Arts. 17 and 25(1).

22. Ibid., Arts. 38(i), (ii) and 43 (i). However, the 120-man House of Units and the 400-member House of the People, set up under this older document, had been discarded for a far smaller unicameral national organ as the above text indicates.

23. Cf. 1962 Constitution, Art. 22(4) where its meeting-place was not indicated. Also its Chapter 2, where the term "Central Legislature" is defined as the "National Assembly" (art. 19).

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24. Ibid., Art. 98(2) stipulates a maximum of 350 and a minimum of 75 members for each of the two Provincial Legislatures.

25. Ibid., Art 111 concedes this right to a "Head of the Unit," i.e. the Governor of a Province.

26. *Vide supra*, pp. 330 ff.

27. These provisions have been carried out.

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28. The idea that non-Muslims have voting rights in the Muslim State where they are born aud reside is novel. (*Vide infra*, pp. 352 ff.)

29. Cf. *B P.C Report*, Preamble, para. 3.

30. The sub-divisional District Council is called Tehsil in West and Thana in East Pakistan.

31. *Pakistan Affairs*, Vol. XII, No. 12, 1 July 1959, p. 1.

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32. *The New York Times*, news item from Karachi dated 27 April and published on 28 April 1962.

33. The Constitution does not seem clear on whether the President must be chosen from among the Electoral College or whether it may vote on someone from the outside. *Vide* Art. 165(1).

34. *Pakistan Affairs*, Vol. XII, No. 20, 27 October 1959, p. 1.

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35. Ibid., Vol. XII, No. 12, 1 July 1959, p. 1.

36. Ibid , Vol. XII, No. 20, 27 October 1959, p. 1.

37. *Vide* Art. 30 (4-6) as also *infra*, pp. 351.

38. *B.C P. Report*, Arts. 163(1)-(2) and 195(1).

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39. *The New York Times*, news item from Karachi, dated 27 April 1962, and published on 28 April 1962.

40. Pakistan's newly elected National Assembly met for the first time at Rawalpindi on 8 June 1962.

41. *The New York Times*, 27 April 1962, news item.

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42. *The New York Times* interview, dated 1 May 1962, at Rawalpindi; published on 2 May 1962. Cf. also *Pakistan Affairs*, Vol. XII, No 20, 27 October 1959, p. 1.

43. 1 May 1962, cited *New York Times* interview.

44. *Pakistan Affairs*, Vol. XII, No. 20, 27 October 1959, p. 1.

45. Cf other sections of Art 103 for additional reasons for disqualification.

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46. The notion of *purdah* apparently centres now more on the wearing of the veil than on separation, which is stressed nevertheless by Maudūdī as by the Aḥmadīyyah and like-minded Muslims as the classic social principle relating to Islamic womanhood.

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47 *The New York Times*, news item from Dacca, dated 4 May, and published on 13 May 1962.

48 Cf. Law No. 13(7) in the 1962 Charter.

49. *Vide* Maudūdī's critique, *supra*, pp. 325 ff.

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50. Muhammad Iqbal, *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, pp. 140 and 141.

51. *Idem*, *Jāvid Nāmah*, p 7. as translated by S. A. Vahid in *Studies in Iqbal* (Lahore : Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1967), p. 148.

*Appendix A**

THE SEPOY REPLY

Be it known to all the Hindoos and Mahomedans, the subjects and servants on the part of the officers of the English forces stationed at Dehli and Mirath that all the Europeans are united in this point, first to deprive the army of their religion and then by the force of strong measures to christianise all the subjects In fact it is the absolute order of the Governor-General to serve out cartridges made up with swine and beef fat; if there be then thousand who resist this, to blow them up; if fifty thousand to disband them.

For this reason we have merely for the sake of the faith concerted with all the subjects and have not left one infidel of this place alive and have constituted the Emperor of Dehli upon this engagement that whichever of the troops will slaughter all their European officers and people, and pledge allegiance to him, shall always receive double salary. Hundreds of cannon and immense treasure have come to hand; it is therefore requisite that all subjects will unite cordially with the army, take courage and not leave the seed of these devils in any place.

All the expenditure that may be incurred by the subjects in furnishing supplies to the army, they will take receipts for the same from the officers of the army and retain them by themselves; they will receive double price from the Emperor. Whoever will at this time give way to pusillanimity and allow himself to be overreached by these deceivers and depend upon their word, will experience the fruits of their submission like the inhabitants of Lakhnao. It is necessary that all Hindoos and Mahomedans should be of one mind in this struggle and make arrangements for their preservation with the advice of some creditable persons. Wherever the arrangements shall be good and with whomsoever the subjects shall be pleased those individuals shall be placed in high offices in those places.

And to circulate copies of this proclamation in every place as far as it may be possible, let it not be understood to be less than a stroke of the sword that this proclamation be stuck up at a conspicuous place in order that all Hindoos and Mahomedans may become appeased and be prepared. If the infidels now become mild, it is merely an expedient to save their lives.

*Mahdi Husain, *Bahadur Shah II and the War of 1857 in Dehli with Its Unforgettable Scenes*, pp. 8-9, and p. 9, n. 1 for source quoted: "*Bengal Hurkaru*, June 13, 1857." Also *vide supra*, p. 9.

Whoever will be deluded by these frauds, he will repent. Our reign continues. Thirty rupees to a mounted and ten rupees to a foot soldier will be the salary of the new servants of Dehli.

*Appendix B**

"FIRMAN OF THE EMPEROR OF DEHLI"

Let it be known to all the rajas and chiefs of India: Whereas you are noted for your all-round goodness, virtues and liberality and whereas the different creeds of India are sponsored by your good sense and right approach, you are hereby reminded that God has created you to maintain through your efforts His different religions. It is incumbent on you to know well, and adhere to, the tenets and teachings of your respective religions. It is by destroying the enemies who have tampered with your religion that you can be true to God and justify in His eyes the high positions He has given to you all. . . . It is written in your sacred books that death is better than apostasy; and such is verily the ordainment of God—a truth which everybody, high and low, clearly knows.

Now these Englishmen want to destroy all the religions; and in order to tamper with India's different creeds they have had books written, published and distributed by means of the clergymen who go about preaching their own tenets It is worth your while to notice what different tricks the English have been playing in order to destory our religions: first they have ordered that when a man dies his widow can remarry; secondly the ancient practice of performing *sati* the Englishmen have abolished; thirdly they have openly declared and brought home to the people that they would be recipients of Government honours and distinctions if they join their fold and embrace their religion. They have also advised the people to attend the churches and listen to the sermons. Over and above all this they ordered that only the true heirs of their body would be entitled to succeed to the rajas' *gaddi* and that no recognition would be accorded to the children of adoption although the Shastras permit ten different kinds of heirs. By this means the British Government aims at seizing your States and jagirs just as they have seized Lakhnao and Nagpur. Besides this, they have issued compulsory orders that prisoners in jail should eat the chapatis and have died of starvation, but many have been compelled to eat those chapatis whereby they have lost their caste. And when this trick of the English did not answer they got the powdered bones mixed in sugar so that the unsuspecting people, on eating the same, lose their caste and faith. Further the British Government arranged the sale of a mixture of small pieces of bone and meat in open market.

*Husain, op. cit., pp. 10-3. Published in 1859, this *Firman* is the first proclamation issued by Emperor Bahādur Shāh II. *Vide* also *supra*, p. 7.

In short, they have adopted and tried every means to impair our religions. Some Bengalis decided to watch and follow the lead of the army and to embrace the religion of the English should the army do so. Thereupon the English ordered the Brahmans and top-ranking men of society to cut the cartridges prepared out of the animal fat. On receiving this order the Musalman sepoys thinking that by so doing their Hindu colleagues would lose caste sympathised with them and refused to cut the cartridges. The Englishmen shot them down as well as all those who had similarly refused to cut the cartridges. Seeing this great tyranny the sepoys started killing Englishmen and they killed the Firangis wherever found. By the grace of God and divine aid the sepoys are still busy in the pursuit of similar plans so that a few Englishmen who might have still lingered in odd places may also be destroyed. It is our firm belief that, should Englishmen still remain in India and survive this killing, then surely they would in return kill all the inhabitants of this country and annihilate our religions. As for those of our fellow-countrymen—and they are not many—who are still supporting the English and are fighting their battle it can be easily said that there is no hope for their redemption—the English will surely destroy their faith and religion.

In these circumstances we ask you what measures have you adopted to protect your faith and lives. If you and we unite holding one and the same opinion, we can verily destory these Englishmen, and thereby we can save our country and faith since all of you desire the common weal of Hindus and Musalmans. Verily the English are the enemies of both. Therefore in the hope of supporting the cause of your religion and in order to repulse the common enemy it is hereby announced by means of this Printed Firman that the Hindus and Musalmans must unite and join hands—the Hindus solemnizing this union by taking an oath on the sacred Ganges, Tulsi and Salgram and the Musalmans by swearing on the Quran—to save their own lives and religions, considering it their duty to kill the English.

Inasmuch as the slaughter of cows is a curse and insult according to the Hindu religion, the leading Musalmans have decided and resolved that, should the Hindus zealously join hands with the Musalmans in killing the Englishmen, they would immediately and from that very day abandon the slaughter of cows and oxen. Afterwards, if a Musalman were found acting contrary to the said decision and resolve [that is indulging in cow-slaughter], he would be considered an outlaw beyond the pale of the Quran ; eating of beef on the part of such a Musalman would be tantamount to eating pork. As for the Hindus failing to make up their minds to kill the English their sin in the eyes of God would be as grave as cow-slaughter and beef-eating.

In order to grind their own axe the Englishmen also would make an equally solemn pledge and promise to abstain from tampering with the

Hindu religion, but no wise man can now be duped by them. Englishmen are noted for their false promises, craftiness and cunning. The moment their object is achieved they cast their promises and pledges to the winds.

Therefore, never rely on the word of Englishmen. And rest assured that never again will you be able to avail yourselves of such an opportunity which has now presented itself.

*Appendix C**

"AZAMGARH PROCLAMATION"

It being clear as the noonday sun that Hindoos and Musalmans have been ruined by the faithless Infidels, it becomes necessary for every ambitious and aspiring man and for those devoted to this cause (especially for Kings and Chiefs who have been created by God expressly for the purpose of taking care of the people and of their rights) to sacrifice their lives and fortunes for improving the condition of the people. Several of the Princes of Dehli have, with this view, travelled for the last several years in all quarters of Hindoostan, Persia and Afghanistan and one of them has succeeded in bringing the Persian and Afghanistan forces to this quarter of the globe.

It must be known that I, Aboo Moozuffer Sirajooddeen Buhadoor Shah Ghazee, Emperor of Hindoostan have determined to kill and extirpate the Christians and to preserve and protect the public and after travelling a good deal have arrived here and planted the standard of Mahomed, for rallying around it not only Musulmans but Hindoos who, from the time of my forefathers were faithful and obedient subjects and who have joined me in killing the Christians, and to raise alike their standard of Muhabeer. I am glad to proclaim that several Mahomedans and Hindoos have since joined us and assisted in exterminating the Christians, and that a force from the west is very shortly expected to join and reinforce our cause. I therefore publish the following articles for general information and guidance and make known that any one who has not the means of defraying the expenses, may receive succour from the Imperial Treasury on making his wants known.

It should be further remembered that the books of Hindoo and Mahomedan Religion prophesy that after this year the British reign will end in Hindoostan and in several other places; every man should therefore

*Husain, op. cit., pp. xlvi-li. 16 Muḥarram 1275 corresponds to 25 August 1858. The "'force from the west,'" whose expected arrival is indicated in the second paragraph of this Proclamation, refers to assistance from Iran and Arabia. It is to be noted that this Proclamation is dated long after the trial of Bahādur Shāh II, but he had not yet been exiled. It was issued during the period they were making plans for his exile in his name by Prince Firoz Shāh, one of the direct descendants of Bahādur Shāh I. His was a last attempt to rally all Indians in the Emperor's name, and this Proclamation "was in fact a replica of Emperor Bahadur Shah II's Proclamation of 25th August 1857." (Husain, op. cit., p. lii ; *vide supra*, Appendix B for the 1857 Proclamation.) Prince Firoz Shāh (d. 1294/1877) retired to Mecca.

remove from his mind the fear of its continuance, and should join our cause thus obtaining some benefit to himself, otherwise he will repent, and that in a short time. (*Couplet*: Do not waste time when you can make your fortune by immediately joining us, for the time is precious and once lost can never be restored.)

Keep in mind that the outrages committed by our forces are inseparable from Civil Warfare, and be assured that they will not continue long, though the well-wishers of the British may speak to the contrary about the continuance of such outrages for ever. Every man should present himself to us and state his grievances when immediate redress will be given and all his losses made good from the Imperial Treasury after the establishment of our reign.

1st. *Zamindars!* It is very well known that the British assess lands very highly and this has been the cause of your ruin. Besides, when sued by a mean labourer or a male or female servant, you are summoned without investigation to attend to their court and are thus dishonoured and degraded, and when you have to prosecute a case in their court you are put to the expense of doing so on stamp paper and have to pay court fees which are ruinous. Besides this you have to pace a percentage for roads and schools—all these grievances will be removed in our reign and the powers of all Zamindars thereby increased, and their complaints decided agreeably to the Shari'a and Shastra. It is therefore incumbent on you to make common cause with us; and those of you who will supply men and money to help us to kill these Christians and to meet the expenses of our Troops, will receive a perpetual remission of half the revenue of their Ilaqas, and those who supply only men or money will receive a remission of one quarter of the revenue for goods; such as have, during the British rule, lost their lands and will now join in this common cause will be replaced in possession of their lands and remission of a quarter of the Revenue will also be granted.

2nd. *Merchants!* You are also well aware that the faithless British have appropriated to themselves the monopoly of all lucrative trade such as indigo, opium, cloth . . . and left the less remunerative merchandise to you, and when you have to resort to their courts you have to pay large sums for stamp papers and court fees; moreover they realize money from the public in the shape of postage and school funds and you, like the Zamindars, are degraded by being summoned to their courts and imprisoned or fined on the assertion of men and low people. But during the King's Reign all these inconveniences wlll be put a stop to, and every description of trade, whether by sea or land, left to native merchants (Hindoos and Musalmans) and men will be posted at each stage on the road for your protection at the King's expense. Besides every assistance shall be given to the poorer members of your class. It is therefore necessary for you to assist us with men and money.

3rd. *Men of Service!* You likewise well know that in the Civil and Military Department, all the less lucrative and dignified situations are given to natives and the well paid and honourable ones to Europeans, for instance in the Military Line the highest post that a native attains is that of a Subadar on a salary of 60 or 70 Rupees a month and in Civil that of a Sadr Ameen on a salary of 500 Rupees—and jageers, rewards, maafees etc are not known to be in existence while during our reign, the offices of Colonels, Generals, etc. which are now given to the Europeans only, and the ranks of Pansadee, Shash Hazaree, Punj Hazaree, Haft Hazaree, Sepah Salar in the military and those of Collector, Magistrate, Judge, Sadr Dewanee, Secretary, Governor-General, etc. in the Civil Departments and the situations of Wizarat, Qazi, Sifarat, Sooba, Nizamat Dewanee and yielding lacs of rupees will be granted to the natives of this country. Besides Jageers, rewards, maafees, etc. will be bestowed on them; moreover it should be well understood that by remaining with the Christians you will be called Infidels in this world, and will forfeit your prospects in the next, and if any of you die while fighting against the British, you will gain a name in this world and obtain endless happiness in the next, therefore every one now in the service of the Firangees should leave them and join us and their salaries will at present be doubled or tripled and they will hereafter be promoted to higher grades. If any one cannot openly leave British employ they should secretly assist us as much as lies in their power. If any Telingas or Sowars, who have killed Christians and gone to their homes will come and join us, they will be paid, sepoys at 3 as. a day and Sowars at 8 and 12 as. besides the double *batha* and the monthly pay given by the Firangees. If any others will accept employment under us, they will get for the present as follows:

Matchlockmen	2 as. a day
Each man with sword and shield	$1\frac{1}{2}$ as. a day
Sowar with a full size horse	8 as. a day
Sowar with pony	6 as. a day

But after the settlement of our rule they will get as follows:

Each sepoy	8 and 10 Rs. per month
Each Sowar	25 and 30 Rs. per month

4th. *Artizans!* You are also well aware that the Europeans import every sort of article from Europe leaving but a small trade in your hands, while in our reign every article will be manufactured by you which will tend to your benefit and profit. Besides the Emperor and his Chiefs will require precious articles which you will supply and which will greatly enhance your profits. You should therefore leave the British and join us and secure the good will of both God and man.

5th. *Scholars of both creeds of Hindoos and Musalmans!* (*Maulvies and*

Pundits !) You are aware that the British are opposed to your religion and as the present is a Religious War you should join us and gain the good will of your Creator, otherwise you will be considered 'Sinners'. If you will join us you will receive maafees and lands from the Emperor.

It should be borne in mind that if any one of the above-mentioned classes of the people, after reading or hearing this Proclamation still adhere to the British, his property etc. will be confiscated and he and his family put to the sword.

Dated Urrutha [*sic*] Ilaqa Azamagarh (*Azimgurah*), the 16th Muharram 1275, corresponding with 3rd Bhadoon 1265 Fuslee.

True Translation.
Sd. J. D. Forsythe,
Secretary to the Chief Comm. Oude.

Appendix D

LIST OF INDIA'S GOVERNOR-GENERALS

Name	*Dates of Tenure*
Warren Hastings[1]	1774-1785
Sir John McPherson	1785-1786
Lord Cornwallis	1786-1793
Lord Teignmouth (Sir John Shore)	1793-1798
Lord Wellesley	1798-1805
Lord Cornwallis	1805 (died shortly afterwards)
Sir Geo. H. Barlow	1805-1807
Lord (G.E., 1st Earl of) Minto	1807-1813
Lord Moira (Marquess of Hastings)	1813-1823
Lord Amherst	1823-1828
Lord Bentinck	1828-1835
Sir (Baron) C.T. Metcalfe	1835-1836
Lord Auckland	1836-1842
Lord Ellenborough	1842-1844
Lord Hardinge	1844-1848
Lord Dalhousie	1848-1856
Lord Canning[2]	1856-1862
Lord (J.B., 8th Earl of) Elgin	1862-d. 1863
Lord (Sir John) Lawrence	1864-1869
Lord Mayo	1860-d. 1872
Lord Northbrook	1872-1876
Lord Lytton	1876-1880
Lord Ripon	1880-1884
Lord Dufferin	1884-1888
Lord Lansdowne	1888-1894
Lord (A.B., 9th Earl of) Elgin	1894-1899
Lord Curzon	1899-1905
Lord (G. J., 4th Earl of) Minto	1905-1910

1. Robert Clive's successor as Bengal's Governor (in 1771), he became the first Governor-General of British India—ruled by the East India Company—appointed by Parliament.

2. India's first Governor-General under the Crown (after the East India Company's power had been transferred in 1858).

Name	Dates of Tenure
Lord Hardinge	1910-1916
Lord Chelmsford[3]	1916-1921
Lord Reading	1921-1926
Lord Irwin	1926 1931
Lord Willingdon	1931-1936
Lord Linlithgow	1936-1943
Lord Wavell	1943-Mar. 1947
Lord Mountabatten[4]	Mar.-Aug. 1947

3. The Government of India Act (1919) was enacted into law under his administration.

4. Free India's Governor-General 1947-8.

Appendix E[1]

DOCUMENT NO. 23—"PROCEEDINGS OF A MEETING OF THE MAHOMEDANS AT CALCUTTA ON THE BREAKING OUT OF THE SEPOY MUTINY, HELD ON 27TH MAY, 1857"

Whereas the news of the state of mutiny and disaffection of a portion of the Native Army have caused great anxiety and grief on account of the injury to the Company and ruin of the people which may accrue therefrom, we have in this meeting passed the following resolutions:

1st. It is with feelings of deep regret that the members of this meeting hear that a portion of the Native Forces have recklessly thrown off their allegiance and become the destroyers of public safety, have murdered some of God's creatures and excited rebellion and disturbance, causing pillage and plunder in the Western districts of this Kingdom.

2nd. Although from the suddenness of the mutiny of the above-mentioned seditious troops, whose former fidelity rendered them free from all suspicion of such evil actions, the safety and peace of several places have accidentally been endangered, the members of this assembly feel the utmost confidence in the Government, as they know that its members are acting most wisely in exigence, and they feel certain that the fire of this rebellion will soon be extinguished.

3rd. We subjects are well aware that the members of the British Government from the commencement of their dominion in Hindoostan have repeatedly declared and made known their determination not to interfere with the religion or religious observance of any of their subjects, and we repose entire faith in this declaration and assert that up to the present time a space of nearly one hundred years our religion has never been interfered with.

4th. A number of us, having left home have found a dwelling and asylum under this Government where we live in peace and safety, protected by the equity and fostering care of the British Government and suffering no kind of injury or loss.

5th. As we have ever lived in safety and felicity under the British rule

1. J.K. Majumdar, Ed., *Indian Speeches and Documents on British Rule 1821-1918*, pp. 64-5. Cf. also Doc. No. 24, "Letter to the Governor-General of India . . . dated 28th May, 1857," in which the Muhammadan Association members state that they are "loyal subjects of the British Government" (p. 66).

and have never been molested or interfered with in religious matters, we therefore, with the utmost eagerness and sincerity, hereby determine that in case of necessity, we will serve the Government to the utmost of our abilities and means

7th. The members of this meeting determine that these proceedings be published for the information of all the people, and that the original duly signed with an English translation be forwarded for the perusal of the noble Governor General (may his prosperity increase).

Appendix F[1]

MISSIONS ESTABLISHED BY RABWAH AḤMADĪYYAHS

Continent (or Region) and Country (or Island)	*Centre of Activities*	*Date Mission Opened*	*No. of Mosques and Dates Opened*
East Africa			
Kenya	Nairobi	Not given	1 (1957)
	Mombasa	Not given	1 (1959)
Tanganyika	Tabora	1934	1
	Jinja[2]	—	1 (under construction)
Uganda	Kampala	—	1 (under construction)
	Morogtoro	—	
Mauritius		1915	1
West Africa[3]			
Nigeria	Lagos	Not given	19 in total
	Ibadan	Not given	
Liberia	Monrovia	1956	None
Sierra Leone	Magburka	Not given	26 in total
	Freetown	Not given	
Ghana[4]	Salt Pond	Not given	151
American Hemisphere			
South America			
Dutch Guiana		1956	None
West Indies	Trinidad	1950	None
	Granada	Not given	None
	Antigua Island	Not given	None

1. This Appendix solely indicates Rabwah Aḥmadīyyah centres. All information is given as of December 1958.

2. Situated at the Nile source.

3. Territories bordering the Sahara desert are traditionally Muslim areas. As of 1962, West Africa has approximately 25 million Muslims of whom a sizable number—if not the majority—may be Aḥmadīyyahs.

4. Largest Mission.

Continent (or Region) and Country (or Island)	*Centre of Activities*	*Date Mission Opened*	*No. of Mosques and Dates Opened*
North America			
U.S.A.[5]	Washington	1921	Aḥmadīyyahs
	Los Angeles		3 mosques
	Detroit	1957	
	Dayton		(1957)
Europe			
England	London[6]	1912 or 1913	1 (1926)
West Germany	Hamburg	1949	1 (1957)
Netherlands	The Hague	1947	1 (1955)
Spain	Madrid[7]	1946	
Sweden	Gotenberg	1956	
	Stockholm	1956	1 (in planning stage)
Switzerland (Austria under the Swiss mission)	Munich	1948 as of 1955[8]	
Middle East			
Syria[9]	Aleppo	Shortly after 1924	1
Lebanon	Beirut	Not given	None
Oman	Muscat	Not given	None
Israel	Haifa		1

5. Aḥmadīyyah communities varying in size are found in New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Chicago, St Louis and Los Angeles.

6. A London Conference, presided over by Mirza Bashīr-ud-Dīn Maḥmūd, took place on 22-24 July 1955. To co-ordinate missionary activities, the world's regions were divided as follows : North-Eastern Europe (Scandinavia, Finland, Holland and Germany, headquarters in Hamburg) ; North-Western Europe (Spain and Great Britain, headquarters in London) ; Southern and Central Europe (Switzerland, Austria and Italy, headquarters in Munich) ; the Two Americas (headquarters in Washington) ; West Africa (Sierra Leone, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and other regions, headquarters in Lagos). Missions started in Italy (1937), Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, had to be closed because of unfavourable situations.

7. Aḥmadīyyat is propagated among the students coming to Spain from Algeria, Morocco, Tunis, Cuba and those coming from other Spanish speaking countries (e.g. the Philippines and Latin American lands), thus scattering the seed over a large area.

8. Aḥmadīyyah Mission work undertaken by trips from Switzerland to various places in Austria.

9. The Syrian is in close work with the Oman Mission.

Appendix F

Continent (or Region) and Country (or Island)	*Centre of Activities*	*Date Mission Opened*	*No. of Mosques and Dates Opened*
South-East Asia[10]			
Ceylon	Colombo	1951	1
Burma[11]	Rangoon	1952	1
Indonesia	Djakarta (on Java)		34 in total
	Padang (on Sumatra)		
Borneo[12]	Jesselton		
	Labuan		3 in total
	Ranao[13]		
Federation of Malayan States	Singapore	1935	1 (1957) 2 in total

10. Prior to 1937, the Qadiyan Aḥmadīyyahs engaged in some missionary activities in Japan and China's eastern provinces. (Zafarullah Khan, *The Head of the Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam*, p. 15)

11. The population of 17,500,000 comprises 1,000,000 Muslims, 900,000 Christians, 150,000 Hindus, "a few hundred thousand hill tribes who are animists," and Hinayana Buddhists. (Mubarak Ahmad, *Our Foreign Missions*, p. 22.)

12. Separated from Indonesia, probably for reasons of concentrated propagation efforts.

13 Main centre of missionary activities in 1957 to challenge Christian attempts at converting the Dusan Tribe—pagan except for a few Muslims—which comprises about one half of the population.

Appendix G

Region	*Year*	*No.*
India		
Punjab	1896	313
	1901	3,450 total
United Provinces		931 total
Bombay Presidency[1]		11,087 total
Punjab	1911[2]	18,695
		18,116 males
		8,579 females
(Total strength : a/c Walter)	1918	*c.* 70,000
(Total strength : a/c Walter)	1959	*c.* 800,000
Pakistan		*c.* 500,000
Indonesia		*c.* 40,000
U.S.A.		*c.* 1,000
Africa, Europe, U.S S.R.		
Middle East (except Pakistan and Far East)		balance
Gold Coast	1931	8,110
Gold Coast	1948	22,572[3]

1. This number is "inaccurate" according to Mr Walter (*The Ahmadiyya Movement*, p. 112), because the majority of the Qadiyan Aḥmadīyyahs were in the Punjab.
2. Census of India Report. *Vide* Walter, op. cit., p. 112.
3. Mirza Mubarak Ahmad, op cit., p. 14.

Appendix H

CONDITION OF *BAI'AT* (INITIATION INTO THE AḤMADĪYYAH MOVEMENT)*

The man who accepts *Bai'at* should firmly make up his mind:

Firstly, that up to the day of his death he will abstain from *Shirk*, i.e. setting up equals to God.

Secondly, that he will keep away from falsehood, adultery, looking at women other than near relatives, cruelty, dishonesty, riot and rebellion, and, in short, every kind of evil : and will not allow himself to be carried away by his passions, however strong they may be.

Thirdly, that he will pray five times a day without fail, according to the commands of Allah and his Apostle, and to the best of his ability will try to offer his *Tahajjud* prayers (prayer of the latter part of the night), to invoke the blessings of God (*Durūd*) upon his prophet, to ask pardon for his sins and the help of God ; and that, remembering the blessings of God, he will always praise him.

Fourthly, that he will in no way harm God's creatures generally, and Moslems particularly, under the influence of his passions—neither with his hands, nor with his tongue, nor by any other means.

Fifthly, that in every state of sorrow or pleasure, prosperity or adversity, felicity or misfortune, he will prove himself faithful to God, and that in every condition he will accept the decree of God, and in this way he will be ready to bear every kind of insult and pain. At the time of any misfortune he will never turn away from him, but rather he will advance further.

Sixthly, that he will not follow vulgar customs and will abstain from evil inclination, and that he will completely submit to the authority of the Holy Qur'ān, and that he will make the sayings of God and his Apostle the guiding principle of his life.

Seventhly, that he will fully give up pride and haughtiness, and will pass his days with humility, lowliness, courtesy and meekness.

Eighthly, that he will consider religion, the dignity of religion and the well-being of Islām dearer than life, wealth and children, and, in short, dearer than everything else.

Ninthly, that he will be for God's sake showing sympathy with the crea-

*Walter, op. cit., "Appendix III," pp. 146-7. Obtainable in pamphlet form from any Aḥmadīyyah centre.

tures of Allah, and to the best of his power he will use his natural abilities for the welfare of God's creatures.

Tenthly, that he will establish a brotherhood with me (the promised Messiah) on condition of obeying me in everything good, and keep it up to the day of his death, and this relationship will be of such a high order that its example will not be found in any worldly relationship either of blood relations or of servant and master.

Appendix I

THE ARTICLES OF FAITH OF THE AḤMADĪYYAH COMMUNITY*

1. God is one, and nobody is or can be his co-sharer in his self, attributes, names or worship.

2. The angels exist.

3. God has been sending from time immemorial his apostles in every country and nation for the guidance of his creatures, and we believe in every one of them whose names have been mentioned in the Holy Qur'ān individually and in the rest collectively.

4. Our Book is the Holy Qur'ān and our prophet is Muhammad (peace be upon him), and he is the seal of prophets.

5. The door of inspiration has always been, and will always be, open, and no attribute of God ever becomes useless As he used to hold communion with his good servants, so he does even now, and will continue to do up to the end of the world.

6. This is our firm faith that divine decree (*taqdīr*) as enunciated by the Holy Qur'ān is correct, and that God listens to and accepts the prayers of his creatures, and great deeds are achieved by means of prayer.

7. We believe in the rising of the human beings after their death, and also we firmly believe that the heaven and the hell, as described by the Qur'ān and the Traditions, exist and that on the day of Resurrection our prophet Muhammad will be the intercessor.

8. We firmly believe that the man about whom prophecies have been made by the old prophets under different names and of whom the Holy Qur'ān speaks in the verse, "He it is who raised a prophet amongst the Meccans . . . and among others of them who have not overtaken them," as the second advent of our Lord Muhammad, and whom our Lord Muhammad calls Messiah the prophet and the Mahdi (the man), Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian, and besides him nobody is the promised Messiah.

9. It is our firm belief that the Holy Qur'ān is a perfect book and that no new law will be required till the day of Resurrection, and that our Lord Muhammad possesses collectively all the qualities of all the prophets, and that after him none can, far from gaining any spiritual eminence, ever become a true believer except by complete obedience to him. We, not for a

*Walter, op. cit., "Appendix III," pp. 147-8.

moment, believe that any old prophet will come to this place a second time because in that we will have to admit some defect in the spiritual powers of our Lord Muhammad--but we believe among his followers Reformers have appeared, and will continue to appear, with spiritual knowledge of a very high order. Not only this, but a man can even gain prophethood by the help of our Lord Muhammad's spiritual powers. But no prophet with a new book or having been appointed direct will ever come ; for in this case it would be an insult to the perfect prophethood of our Lord, and this is the meaning of the seal of prophets, and in this sense the Lord has on the one hand said, "There is no prophet (i.e. an independent prophet or a prophet with a new law) after me," and on the other hand has called the coming Messiah a prophet of God.

10. According to this we believe that a man, the Promised Messiah, has gained prophethood in spite of his being a follower of our Lord. We believe in the miracles of the prophets, which, in the words of the Qur'ān, are called signs of God, and this is our firm faith that God, for the manifestations of his glory and for proving the truth of his apostles, has been, through his servants, showing signs which are beyond the power of human beings.

Appendix J

DECLARATION FORM[1]

I——————————— ———son / daughter / wife of——————————————————

of (address)——————— ——————————————————— ——do hereby faithfully and solemnly declare of my own free will that I adopt Islam as my religion ; that I worship One and only Allah (God) alone ; that I believe Muhammad to be his messenger and servant ; that I respect equally all prophets—Abraham, Moses, Jesus, etc.—that I will live a Muslim life by the help of Allah.

La ilaha ill-Allah Muhammad al-rasul-Allah[2]

1. Issued by the Lahore Anjuman. Walter, op. cit., p. 128.

2. The formula's translation is "There is no God but Allah (and) Muhammad is His messenger" (or prophet).

Appendix K

KARACHI TRIAL—EXCERPTS*

"Proceedings of 27th October"

Gentlemen of the Jury, I was explaining to you that the proclamation of the Queen made in 1858, confirmed by the late King Edward, in the Proclamation, made on the fiftieth anniversay of the Queen's proclamation and also confirmed by letters addressed to the Princes and the people of India by King George after his accession to the throne gave the protection of the law to His Majesty's subjects in India with regard to their religious beliefs and religious practices, and I was telling you that that was the whole of our case. And that whatever may be an offence according to the Penal Code, or for that matter of any other code, if any person—be he Hindu or Mussalman or Christian—does a thing which his religion requires him to do, then even if that is an offence under the Penal Code or any other law that is enforced in British India, that law cannot stand in his way and he cannot be punished. The law gives him its protection, as stated in these three Proclamations . . . (p. 230). But, at the same time, I ask you to understand, Gentlemen of the Jury, that if you to-day deny a Hindu or a Mussalman or a Christian, his right to do his duty to God . . ., you yourselves will be a party to the destruction of the religious freedom enjoyed in this country and given by the Queen's Proclamation . . . (p. 231). The world is not divided into two parts—one God's and the other Caesar's. No? . . . God is the sole Ruler. . . . And if the king or any other human creature . . . demand from you anything which is against God, then that demand is not to be satisfied. It is God alone whose demand is to be satisfied. . . . I challenge the Government, I challenge the Public Prosecutor to produce any man in this trial to produce any man, to say any Mussalman who could say that, in spite of what God says, if the Government of the day says "you must not do this although his religion requires it," any Mussalman who could say, well, in that case, I must follow that Government. And a Mussalman who says that, I say openly, is not a Mussalman. And I believe that this is also true of the Hindus, Christians, Jews, true in the case of everyone who believes in God (p. 232).

A Mussalman's Faith—What It Is

. . . A Mussalman's faith does not consist merely in believing in a set

**Muhammad Ali, His Life, Services and Trial* (enlarged 2nd edition), Madras: Ganesh & Co. (n.d.), pp. 228-86.

of doctrines and living up to that belief himself, he must also exhort himself to the fullest extent of his power, of course without resort to any compulsion, to the end that others also conform to the prescribed beliefs and practices. . . . If, therefore, any Mussalman is being compelled to wage war against the Mujahid of Islam, he must not only be a conscientious objector himself, but must, if he values his own salvation, persuade his brothers also, at whatever risk to himself, to take similar objection. Then and not until then can he hope for salvation. This is our belief as well as the belief of every other Mussalman, and in our humble way we seek to live up to it and if we are denied freedom to inculcate this doctrine we must conclude that the land where this freedom does not exist is not safe for Islam.

Now, this was the first charge we had brought against the Government. During the war Mussalmans have been required *in defiance of their religious obligations* (mark the word gentlemen) to assist Government in waging war against the Khalifa and those engaged in jehad . . . (p. 239).

The Court : The law of the Quoran is not the law of the country. . . .

M. M. Ali : What I am concerned with is this, that my law is to be the first law binding on me and I say that these three Proclamations give me protection.

The Court : I rule that against you.

M. M. Ali : I am very glad that you rule that against me. Not only has the Judge ruled against the king, but recently in the Legislative Assembly a Moslem Member proposed a Resolution recommending to the Government that no servant of the Government and particularly no Mahomedan soldier should be asked to go against the law of his religion, and what did the Viceroy do ? He disallowed the Resolution (pp. 239-40).

Hostile Action against Angora Government

But there was a Resolution too, a solemn resolve and determination that if the British Government, directly or indirectly, secretly or openly, takes any hostile action against the Government of Angora, the Mussalmans of India would be obliged to take to Civil Disobedience in concert with the Congress and to make a declaration at the forthcoming Congress at Ahmedabad in December of Indian Independence and of the establishment of a Republic. Gentlemen, we had provided not only for open hostile action against Angora on the part of the British but also for secret action : not only for direct action through the Greeks. Yes, we know only too well the English diplomacy. . . (p. 245). In England they want to down every other Nation and particularly the Turks . . . (p. 248). I will still appeal to the Judge because he too has a soul to be saved like ours. . . .

Charge of Attempting to Seduce

Out of the 500 Ulemas who signed the Fatwa only two or these have

been brought here. Well, why have not the others been prosecuted? I thought that the Ulemas who had done this would have been here. . . . But in this case of attempt in pursuance of the conspiracy I thought the clear conspirators were the Jamiat-ul-Ulema. Whatever the conspiracy is, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema is a party to it and I said that at last the association of the Ulema was doing its religious duty. But I was immediately corrected by my friend, brother-in-law and legal adviser though not my legal representative in this case, Mr. Kuhzzam Ali. He said—no, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema too deny the distribution and printing of these leaflets . . . (pp. 256-7).

Breeze in Court

My bargain as a Muslim with an Islamic Government is different from my bargain as a Muslim with a non-Muslim Government. From non-Muslims I do not quire that they should do anything for me, except permit me to hold my own religious opinions. . . . There is an obligation upon me to tell God's own truth that it is religiously forbidden to join the British Army and to fight a Muslim without a just cause, and that it is unjust to kill a brother-Muslim at the bidding of the Government, which is next to infidelity . . . (pp. 265-6).

The Gourt: I cannot allow you to discuss religious law here.

M. M. Ali: There is no question of religious law. I am arguing about the law of the land as you call it. I have got to show to the Assessors that this declaration of statement contained in the Resolution is true because it is based on the Quoran and the Hadis.

The Court: There is no necessity of it.

M. M. Ali: . . . I have got to take my law from the Quoran and the king. The king gives me protection for following the Quoran's Law in those Proclamations. That is the King's Law. If you do not obey that, then why is the King's portrait over there (pointing to the portrait of King Edward, hung upon the wall). . . . I don't want to be obstinate and cheeky. But I cannot have my right brushed aside (pp. 271-2).

Section 117

Now comes section 117. Against me this is the only other section. (Reads.) "Whoever abets the commission of offence, by the public generally or by any number or class of persons exceeding ten, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both." . .(p. 286).

M. M. Ali: . . . But what is the offence? The offence is to ask the Muslim soldier to do his duty to God, to bring the law of Islam home to him. But that is no offence. Therefore, I have committed no offence. And there is no offence that I abet, the entire ground is taken away from under the

feet of the prosecution. . . .

I will not be a party to . . . killing . . . for personal malice, but for the sake of my God I will kill all. I will not spare any one, I will slaughter my own brothers, my dear aged mother, wife, children and all for the sake of God—so help me God !

THE SERVANT

Appendix L

Letter dated 24 November 1923 addressed to his Excellency Ghāzī 'Iṣmat Pāshā, Prime Minister of Turkey, at Angora, by his Highness the Āgha Khān and the Right Honourable Sayyid Amīr 'Alī in London*

Your Excellency,

1. As consistent friends of new Turkey and in full sympathy with her aspirations as an independent member of the comity of the free nations of the world, we desire, with your permission, to invite the attention of the Grand National Assembly to the very disturbing effects the present uncertain position of the Caliph-Imām is exercising among the vast populations who belong to the Sunnī communion. We have noticed with the greatest regret that Islam, as a great moral and cohesive force, is losing among large sections of the Sunnī population, owing to the diminution in the Caliph's dignity and prestige, its weight and influence. For obvious reasons we do not wish to particularize the facts, but its absolute accuracy cannot be gainsaid.

2. In the Sunnī communion, we need not point out, the *spiritual* headship forms the link which binds the followers of Islam as a vast congregation. When the Caliphate was in peril from outside attacks, Musulman feeling all over the world was violently agitated, and the Muslims of India gave their sympathy and support to the Turkish nation in the belief that in fighting for their independence they were fighting also for the preservation in tact of the institution which symbolized Muslim solidarity. Throughout those critical times we strenuously pleaded for the Turkish cause. And a British Muslim organization has, ever since the Turco-Italian War in Tripoli and Cyrenaica, devoted its energies in endeavouring to alleviate the untold suffering and distress among the Turkish people. Our observations and suggestions therefore, we trust, will receive a courteous hearing from your Excellency's Government regarding a question in which we, in common with all Muslims, take the deepest interest.

3. It must not be supposed for a moment from our remarks that we wish to suggest that the powers of the people's representatives should be in any degree curtailed. What we respectfully urge is that the religious headship of the Sunnī world should be maintained in tact in accordance with the Shariy-

*A.J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs*, 1925, Vol. I, "The Islamic World Since the Peace Settlement," Oxford University Press, 1927, Appendix I, pp. 571-2.

yet. In our opinion any diminution in the prestige of the Caliph or the elimination of the Caliphate as a religious factor from the Turkish body politic would mean the disintegration of Islam and its practical disappearance as a moral force in the world—a contingency which, we are sure, neither the Grand National Assembly nor His Excellency the President Ghāzī Mustafā Kemāl Pasha can view with equanimity.

4. In our opinion the Caliph-Imām symbolizes the unity of the Sunnī communion : and the fact that he is a member of the Turkish people and is a descendant of the founder of the Turkish nation gives to Turkey a position pre-eminent among Islamic nations.

5. For fourteen centuries it has been the cardinal principle of the *Ahl-i-Sunnat*, and on this, we believe, is the *Ijmāa-i-Ummat*, that the Caliph, the Vicegerent of the Prophet, is the Imām of the Sunnī congregations, and that between him and the general body of worshippers there is a nexus which knits together the *Ahl-i-Sunnat*. This mystical element cannot be eradicated from the Muslim mind without creating discord in the world of Islam.

6. We need not remind your Excellency that even when the Caliph-Imām lost his temporal power the great Kings and Chieftains sought and obtained from him investiture in order to validate their title to rule and to lead at prayers, the usual concomitant of secular authority. If Islam is to maintain its place in the world as a great moral force, the Caliph's position and dignity should not, in any event, be less than that of the Pontiff of the Church of Rome.

7. For these reasons, among others equally cogent, we, as the true friends of Turkey, respectfully urge upon the Grand National Assembly and its great and far-sighted leader the imminent necessity for maintaining the religious and moral solidarity of Islam by placing the Caliph-Imamate on a basis which would command the confidence and esteem of the Muslim nations, and thus impart to the Turkish State unique strength and dignity.

We are, Your Excellency, your obedient servants,

AGA KHAN
AMEER ALI

Appendix M

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN

The Constitution has not been reproduced here with a view not to increasing the volume of the book. Those interested in having a copy of the Constitution may write to the Publisher : Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Kashmiri Bazar, Lahore (Pakistan).

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[*Note.*—Where volume number is given, it means that only that particular volume was consulted.]

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